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ABSTRACf 
What are the determinants of the formation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC)? This is the question around which this dissertation evolves. Simple it might 
be as a question, preoccupation with it aims at disclosing the substance and nature of 
contemporary subregional cooperation which takes place at the borderlands of 
Europe. 
This dissertation is above all a case study based on empirical research. The 
object of analysis is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), a cooperative 
structure tha t emerged in Europe in the early 1990s. Here we do not claim to 
undertake an area research rather we aim at examining an international political 
economy phenomenon. 
The main conceptual element of this dissertation is that it brings forward the 
notion of subregionalism. To examine the formation of Black Sea subregionalism we 
embark on an eclectic theoretical approach and apply an analytical framework of five 
variables which come both from within the subregional level and outside of it: 
economic difficulties, transnational demands, leadership, security dilemma and the 
European Union. 
What this dissertation concludes is that BSEC is an intergovernmental mode of 
cooperation representing more a foreign policy tool and less an integration process. 
We show that the Black Sea has witnessed a structural or 'instrumental' 
subregionalism of intergovernmental nature which is shaped by the interplay of the 
abovementioned variables. The correlation between subregionalism (around the 
Black Sea) and regionalism (Europe-wide) is thus of great importance. Thus, BSEC is 
better understood not within the framework of the regionalization-globalization 
nexus but rather in the framework of the new European order. Furthermore we show 
how contemporary subregionalism, being a primarily political instrument, is of a 
flexible nature responding to different needs at different times. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is primarily an empirical study. The research object is the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) whose foundations lie in the Istanbul Declaration of 
25 June 1992 signed by the following eleven states: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
The purpose of this dissertation is twofold. First, to fill a gap in the empirical 
literature on contemporary regionalism by undertaking systematic research on a 
largely ignored subregional structure. Second, to contribute to the ongoing 
theoretical debate within the international relations discipline over the issue of 
regionalism by advancing the conceptualization of one type of regionalism: 
subregional cooperation. 
Above all this dissertation examines the story of Black Sea subregionalism and 
in doing so, reveals what is significant here. The basic concern of the research is to 
disclose how the formation of BSEC has evolved since its conceptualization and what 
has been driving and conditioning the BSEC process. 
1. The research agenda 
An introduction to BSEC 
According to its Charter BSEC is a 'regional economic organization' whose mission is 
"to promote a lasting and closer cooperation among the states of the BSEC region" 
(preamble, para. 6). Its members· share the common vision of their regional 
cooperation as "a part of the integration process in Europe, based on human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, prosperity through economic liberty, social justice, and 
equal security and stability, which is open for interaction· with other countries, 
regional initiatives and international organizations and financial institutions" 
(preamble, para. 9). Economic cooperation is seen as "a contribution to the 
achievement of a higher degree of integration of the Founding Members into the 
world economy" (preamble, para. 10). Although an economic organization, BSEC's 
aims go far beyond purely economic goals to "turning the BSEC Region into one of 
peace, stability and prosperity" (preamble, para. 11). Furthermore, it does not 
represent a design and implementation of a set of preferential policies within the 
group of countries it includes, although it aims at the encouragement of the exchange 
of goods between them. 
Hence, the philosophy upon which BSEC is built is based on the principle of 
'stability and peace through prosperity'. Regional economic cooperation was thus 
perceived by the founding members as a stimulus for regional security and political 
stability and it was based on three motivations: cooperation rather than conflict; 
regionalism as a step to global integration and avoiding new division in Europe 
(Adams et al., 2002). 
The principles and objectives to be promoted by the organization are specified 
as follows (BSEC, 1998a, article 3): 
a) to act in a spirit of friendship and good neighbourliness and enhance 
mutual respect and confidence, dialogue and cooperation among the Member 
States; 
b) to further develop and diversify bilateral and multilateral cooperation on 
the basis of the principles and rule of international law; 
c) to act for improving the business en~ironment and promoting individual 
and collective initiative of the enterprises and companies directly involved in 
the process of economic cooperation; 
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d) to develop economic collaboration in a manner not contravening the 
international obligations of the Member States including those deriving their 
membership to international organizations or institutions of an integrative or 
other nature and not preventing the promotion of their relations with third 
parties; 
e) to take into account the specific economic conditions and interests of the 
Member States involved; 
f) to further encourage the participation in the BSEC process of economic 
cooperation of other interested states, international economic and financial 
institutions as well as enterprises and companies. 
In line with the above principles and objectives, BSEC's focus of activities is on 
the following fields: trade and economic development; banking and finance; 
communications; energy; transport; agriculture and agro-industry; health care and 
pharmaceuticals; environmental protection; tourism; science and technology; 
exchange of statistical data and economic information; collaboration between 
customs and other border authorities; human contacts; combating organized crime; 
illicit trafficking of drugs, weapons and radioactive materials, all acts of terrorism 
and illegal migration (BSEC, 1998a, article 4). 
Conceived in 1990 as a flexible economic cooperation scheme originally among 
four Black Sea coastal states (Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria and the former Soviet 
Union), BSEC was soon transformed into an intergovernmental bureaucratic 
structure of eleven states stretching .beyond the Black Sea itself.! It covers an area of 
1 Iran, FYROM, Serbia and Montenegro and Uzbekistan have put forward their applications 
to join BSEC. Austria, Italy, Israel, Egypt, France, Germany, Slovakia, Tunisia and Poland 
participate as observers. 
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nearly 20 million sq. km expanding in two continents and has a market of 300 million 
people.2 Although it remains a primarily intergovernmental organization, it has 
established a web of institutions at the parliamentary, local government, business, 
academic and financial level. 
BSEC's regional identity has been contested. Starting with its membership it 
presents great asymmetry in terms of economic development, security concerns, 
political power, culture and religion, size and population and affiliation to 
international organizations. Historical developments have left each country at a 
different level of economic development. Geographical proximity, though contested, 
as in the case of Albania's membership, is a criterion for classing the countries as a 
group, but it is not a sufficient explanation for regional cooperation. Actual political 
and economic integration is difficult to trace throughout the BSEC-wide area. One 
might claim that there is a type of security community in terms of the interlink of 
security problems in the area but this is far from arguing that there is a common 
threat perception. Given the economic and political fragmentation of the BSEC space 
and the complex security problems among its members (almost all its members have 
bilateral security problems with some of them being technically in a state of war e.g. 
Armenia-Azerbaijan) as well as its cultural diversity, the existence of BSEC alone has 
been considered as a success. Notwithstanding the poor results of subregionalism in 
the area, it seems that all countries remain focused on subregional cooperation. The 
mode in which this cooperation has been evolving is a primarily intergovernmental 
one. 
2 The ten member states plus the three Russian oblasts which have Black Sea coastlines is 190 
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Tile driving question 
The main concern of this dissertation is to explore the factors that shape BSEC's 
formation and evolution. 
Conflict and cooperation are two dynamic~ that shape international relations 
around the Black Sea. It was disintegration (collapse of the Soviet Union, emergence 
of new state entities, economic and social fragmentation) rather than integration that 
in many aspects was dominant around the Black Sea area in the last decade. 
Institutionalized cooperative efforts to build a subregion have advanced in spite of 
the negative structural environment. In a decade of existence, BSEC's actual 
contribution to the economic integration or political coordination among its members 
may be regarded as poor, but BSEC has both enlarged and deepened particularly in 
the form of institutional development. From a historical perspective, at the time of its 
conceptualization, BSEC was devised as an informal economic process that would be 
business-led, requiring no extensive institutional structures. However, it developed 
exactly in the opposite direction, resulting in an intergovernmental structure, with a 
web of subregional bureaucratic institutions. 
The main concern of this dissertation is to account for the reconfiguration of 
BSEC. This question is addressed in three sequenced parts. First, we aim to introduce 
BSEC and to provide an overview of the subregional process around the Black Sea. 
Second, we seek to establish the nature of BSEC and explain its mode of governance. 
Third, we place BSEC within the European integration process, revealing the 
interaction between the EU and BSEC. The main purpose is to cast light on the 
million people. 
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factors influencing the reconfiguration of BSEC thus contributing to the 
conceptualization of the subregional phenomenon in Europe. 
With this research, we try to fill in a gap in the existing literature on BSEC that 
either has focused on the founding factors of the initiative or has been of a normative 
nature. What has been lacking is a detailed and analytical exploration of the 
character of BSEC subregionalism and the dynamics of its evolution. 
WlIat is new? 
This dissertation has two elements that may be considered as carrying a sense of 
originality. Firstly, a systematic investigation to conceptualize the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation process has not been previously carried out. We thus aim 
empirically to further the existing literature on regional cooperation with the insights 
derived from a structure not examined before. The existing literature deals with the 
issue of the origins of subregionalism but there is a gap in our understanding on the 
actual difference that subregional groups such as BSEC have brought about in 
international relations and in particular their interrelation with broader regional 
processes. Secondly, we embark upon an endeavour to test the analytical power of 
the term 'subregionalism' which has appeared relatively recently in the international 
relations literature. 
2. A historical perspective 
Depending on the power struggle ~ the area, the Black Sea has been both a frontier 
and a barrier, a land of peace and intensive· economic interaction or a field of 
competition and fragmentation. 
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Starting from its geographical characterization, the Black Sea is an almost 
closed sea, which communicates with the Mediterranean only through the narrow 
Bosphorus Straits. It has access to the Central Asian Steppes (through the Caucasus 
and the Caspian Sea) and to Central Europe (through the Danube and other major 
European rivers). To question the existence of the Black Sea as a unity would be not a 
very difficult task. Textbooks of geography never present this region as a geographic 
unity but as a series of territories. Its territorial variety and cultural diversity has 
been coupled throughout time with political and often economic fragmentation that 
has reinforced the image of a divided land. Most approaches have placed the Black 
Sea on the margins of historically important regions such as Europe or the 
Mediterranean. Braudel (1976, p. 110) thus, has treated the Black Sea as a 'backyard' 
or an extension of the Mediterranean world: 
The far off Black Sea, limit of Mediterranean shipping, was ringed round 
by wild lands, with a few exceptions, both uncivilized and de-civilized. Great 
mountains bordered it to the south and east, hostile mountains through which 
the roads made their difficult way from Persia, Armenia, Mesopotamia to the 
great center of Trebizond. To the north by contrast rolled the great Russian 
plains, a land of passage and nomadism, over which a jealous guard was still 
maintained by the Crimean Tatars in the sixteenth century. It was only in the 
following century that the Russian outlaws, the Cossacks, were to reach the 
shore of the sea and begin their piracy at the expense of the Turks. Already in 
the sixteenth century, the Muscovites were taking advantage of the winter to 
make' courreries' towards its shores. 
Historically, the ports of the Black Sea created a network of economic activities 
linking the people around and beyond the sea, i.e. they had their own economic life. 
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A blooming trade took place across the Black Sea during the ancient Greek and 
Roman times, connecting its south and north, east and west coasts. In antiquity, fish 
and grain from the Black Sea were traded with manufactured goods from Greek and 
Italian cities. This composition of trade made the role of the Black Sea economy a 
peripheral one (Ozveren, 2001, p.73). In the Roman period, Sinope in the south of the 
Black Sea, benefiting from its central positioning, thus acting as a collecting point for 
products bound for export to the south and interior of Asia Minor or the 
Mediterranean. From the 4th century B.c. onwards the sea trade expanded. This was 
due to corn imports from the Crimea and southern Russian Steppes to Athens and 
Greek cities to support the ever expanding Roman army. The Euxeinos Pontus3 
became soon a Roman lake with garrisons placed along the north and east coasts to 
protect the corn trade of the north coast and the eastern trade. 
Trade was not generated only around the coast of the Black Sea itself. Trade 
with Asia was central for the economy of the Black Sea cities. The northern trade 
route from the East to the Black Sea was a principal means of conveying the 
commodities of the East to Europe. Goods were brought from India to the Caspian 
Sea and from there to the Black Sea and via Sinope and the South Coast to Byzantium 
and Europe. In addition to the flourishing spice trade under the Roman Empire, the 
old silk-road from China ran along the north route and through to Tanais, the most 
north-eastern point of the Black Sea. Trade with the East was mainly in luxury items 
(silk, spices, perfumes, drugs, and ivory). 
During the Byzantine rule, Black Sea production was directed to the capital city 
(Constantinople). When the Byzantine authority started fading, the area became 
3 In ancient times, the Black Sea was called Ellxeinos Pontos which means the Hospitable Sea 
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politically fragmented and open to outside economic penetration (Bratianu, 1969, p. 
177). As Braudel argues (1976), in the sixteenth century the Black Sea was 
increasingly reduced to the status of an Ottoman lake, being turned into an economic 
unit cut off from the rest of the Mediterranean. The Black Sea as an economic unit 
was basically the result of the imposition of a certain division of labour by the 
Ottoman capital city. The regional market became subservient to the designed 
division of labour imposed from the centre with an eye to the 'provisioning 
principle' . 
The regional political economy changed with the introduction of the Russian 
factor from the north. Braudel (1976, p. 191) stated that during the sixteenth century, 
the Russian presence in the region was limited, since Russian interest was focused on 
the Baltic and Caspian Seas as well as the economic expansion of Russian land: 
The whole of southern Russian was a deserted land. Crossed only by the 
bands of Tartar nomads ... At the end of the eighteenth century Russian settlers 
were again to find an immense waste land, empty except for a few nomadic 
brigands raising their camels and horses. 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries (especially between 1870-1917) a water-
born trade was flourishing. Merchants from Europe went into joint ventures with 
local businessmen and cooperated with the branches of locally established foreign 
firms in South Russia, sometimes even representing the interests of local 
entrepreneurs and merchants (Minoglou, 1997, pp. 70-77). Greek and Jewish 
networks dominated foreign trade on the south of Russia, and on the eve of World 
War I, the main livelihood of 40 million people living in the South was foreign trade. 
(Koromila, 1991, p. 27). 
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Their activities were mainly focused on the export-import trade with western 
Europe. In 1912, sixty per cent of Russian exports went through the ports of the Black 
Sea and the Sea of Azov. They included mainly grain and petroleum products (the 
later being exported from the port of Batumi and Novorosiisk) while a few industrial 
exports (wood, glass, cotton, metals and rubber articles) were directed to the Balkans 
and Turkey. A trade, banking and shipping network was established by Greek 
businessmen who were attracted to the shores of the Black Sea by the special 
advantages granted to them such as free land and no obligation to pay taxes. At this 
time Odessa, located in the Northwest, became a credit market for the entire Black 
Sea region and the ports in the Sea of Azov such as Rostov, Taganrog and Mariupol 
also flourished. The multi-business networks were extended to several cities around 
the Black Sea, in central and western Europe, changing the local social fabric and 
opening up the local economy. The development of those regional networks was 
interrupted by World War I and later on by the Russian Revolution which halted 
entrepreneurship. 
Historically, the balance between the north-south (Russia-Ottoman Empire) 
and later the east-west (Communist/Soviet-Capitalist) axes in the Black Sea has 
conditioned the regional political economy. The north-south axis has been 
considered as the backbone of the balance of power in the region, reflecting 
throughout time, i) the influence of the Byzantine and Ottoman authorities in the 
south, ii) the Russian and Soviet authority in the north, or iii) even earlier the Greek 
city-states dominant role in the eco~omic life of the region. The east-west divide that 
kept the Black Sea frozen for half of the 20th century introduced Significant barriers 
among the local population and structures, thus strengthening the argument that the 
Black Sea world lacks a unifying factor. 
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A dominant perception has been that Black Sea unity can not be attributed to a 
common denominator of civilization. Far from constructing a unity, the Black Sea 
area and all eleven members of the BSEC group fall into the 'fault lines between 
civilizations' as reflected in the work of Huntington, i.e. 'The clash of civilizations' 
(Huntington, 1993, p. 33). Being on the northern border of the Islamic world, the area 
has been prone to conflicts following the end of the Cold War, divided between 
Orthodox (Russians, Armenians, Romanians, Georgians, Bulgarians, Greeks, 
majority of Ukrainians) and Muslim people (Azeri, Turks and Albanians). The two 
main poles, Russian (Orthodox) and Turkish (Muslim), have kept the land and its 
people divided. Russian fears about the security of its southern borders are thus not 
just an issue of state politics but also contain a cultural anthropological element. The 
Russian concerns are captured as follows: 
Much of Russian history concerns the struggle between the Slavs and 
the Turkic people on their borders, which dates back to the foundation of the 
Russian state more than a thousand years ago. In the Slavs' millennium-long 
confrontation with their eastern neighbours lies the key to an understanding 
not only of Russian history, but Russian character. To understand Russian 
realities today one has to have a concept of the great Turkic ethnic group that 
has preoccupied Russians through the centuries (Roosevelt quoted in 
Huntington, 1993, p.33). 
At the same time, the legacy of Turkish-Ottoman rule in the regions 
neighbouring Turkey has a particular impact on perceptions and policy. This 
historical experience, as well as the territorial, ethnic and property questions 
inherited from the past have not been conducive to the establishment of mutual trust. 
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During the Soviet era, the Black Sea remained fragmented and economically 
paralysed, being divided into two political and economic blocks that allowed for no 
conununication. With the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea was given a chance to 
assume the status of a regional political economy. This is the first time in modem 
history that the Black Sea joins the international system, having a multilateral 
institutional framework and with the ambition to be dressed with a conunon political 
ability. As Ozveren has argued, the Black Sea deserves regional status as an entity, 
forecasting that the Black Sea of this century is likely to replicate the politically 
polycentric, economically market-integrated model of the nineteenth century 
(Ozveren, 2001, pp. 61-79). 
Historically the social and economic unity of the Black Sea area is not evident. 
It can be argued that the constitution of law and order within the Black Sea area has 
been a prerequisite for regional economic networks to flourish. Depending on the 
balance of power at the international level and the geopolitical situation each time, its 
unifying factors have been reinforced or undermined. What seems clear is that 
whenever economic life around the Black Sea flourished, it has done so in connection 
to increased economic interaction either (primarily) with the western markets or the 
eastern ones. Entrepreneurial spirit has not been absent from the region, but it was 
rather artificially interrupted through most of the 20th century, an interruption that 
resulted in the absence of the private sector in the early 19905. Going through an 
overview of the history of the Black Sea we identify entrepreneurial activities and 
private initiative as the main unifying factors, while political divisions often 
undermined this unity. In the 19905, it was state 'initiative that called for the creation 
of a common regional scheme of cooperation that would be based upon the 
activation of private actors. The fact that the economy has been historically the 
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unifying factor in the area is reflected in the name of the new cooperative structure: 
Black Sea EC01101llic Cooperation. 
3. Why the Black Sea Economic Cooperation? 
A review of the literature indicates that the Black Sea area as a regional unit has 
almost been ignored in the field of international relations. The literature is rich in 
references to other neighbouring areas or sub-groupings such as Central Asia, 
Central Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus or to large local players such as Turkey, 
Russia and Ukraine. The only reference to the Black Sea as a regional unity has been 
in terms of its ecosystem and the environmental issues or problems related to it. Neal 
Ascherson's (1996) book TIre Black Sea was an effort to bring to the front the richness 
of the political and cultural elements of the peoples of the region. For most of the 
twentieth century the political economy of this area was ignored. Politically divided 
between the 'East' and the 'West', the water body that today unites several peoples, 
was a zone of non-interaction and no conununication. A new regional political 
economy emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War. One of the early formations in the area was the BSEC process which established 
unified institutional capacity, in June 1992 thus marking the re-entrance of the Black 
Sea in to the political arena of international relations. 
This dissertation chooses BSEC as a research area for the following three 
reasons. First, the phenomenon of subregional cooperation in Europe lacks a 
comprehensive analysis especially from a theoretical point of view. Insights from one 
of those processes i.e. BSEC, will contribute to a .better understanding of the political 
economy of subregionalism. Second, the case of Black Sea subregionalism has almost 
been completely ignored by existing international relations literature with the 
exemption of some comparative studies on subregionalism (Cottey, 1999b; Hook & 
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Kearns, 1999). TI1is thesis thus, tries to fill in a gap in the existing literature and to 
shed light on new materials. Third, the Black Sea case can significantly contribute to 
the conceptualization of subregional cooperation as it dissolves some of the myths, 
e.g. 'the clash of civilisation' argument while reconfirming others, e.g. politics is the 
main driving force of cooperation. The overall transformation of the political 
economy of the Black Sea area through the emergence of new actors and the 
structural and ideational changes make this case an interesting laboratory where the 
power of traditional theories can be tested and tools of new analytical frameworks 
can be applied. 
Consequently, as a subregional entity, BSEC has a number of characteristics 
that make it a unique case compared with all other subregional structures: 
i. Although a subregion, it delineates a significant landmass stretching in 
two continents (Europe and Asia) and includes a large population. 
ii. It has a large (eleven states) and highly diversified (in terms of economic 
development, size, culture, security concerns) membership. 
iii. It has an advanced organizational structure and an international legal 
personality . 
iv. It is an indigenous structure that lacks any participation of a power 
external to the subregion. 
As we will see in Chapter 2, literature on BSEC is noticeably atheoretical with 
few exceptions (Sezer, 1992b). Most of the writings focus on the individual member 
states rather than approaching BSEC as a regional entity. BSEC has been hardly 
related to the regional processes in Europe and the world, nor has it been examined 
within the framework of the globalization-regionalization nexus. A large body of the 
existing literature is of a normative nature and policy orientation, addressing the 
calls for a more effective functioning of BSEC. Thus there is a paucity of research 
data on the dynamics of the configuration of BSEC. 
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4. Why the term subregionalism and other definitional clarifications 
Regionalism and regional cooperation have been used interchangeably to refer to the 
same phenomenon. A broad definition of regionalism which fits the perspective of 
this dissertation is one of a "col/sao·lts poliCtJ of states to coordinate activities and 
arrangements in a greater region" (Wyatt-Walter, 1995, p. 77). Robert Keohane (1984, 
pp. 51-52) describes the process of cooperation as a process of 'policy coordination' 
where actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others. 
Thus intergovernmental cooperation "takes place when the policies actually 
followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of 
their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination" (Keohane, 
1984, pp. 51-52). 
Subregionalism fits these definitions as a type of regional cooperation but it is 
better conceptualized as a coordination of policies among states in a circumscribed 
space and vis-a-vis a larger regional political project. It can not be conceived as an 
independent process but it takes place within a larger regional context, aiming at the 
inclusion of its members in a broader integration process. Therefore, here the prefix 
'sub' refers to the suggestion that the cooperation process is embedded in a broader 
regional political project. By using the term subregionalism we try to emphasize the 
fact that the BSEC process cannot be viewed without reference to the framework of 
an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-wide region and the 
effects of the ongoing EU process. At the same time it is used to distinguish the case 
study from lower levels of micro regionalism promoted at a subnational level'. 
Chapter 1 of the dissertation examines the elements of the concept of 
4 On the levels of regionalism see Hook &: Kearns, 1999, pp. 6-8. 
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subregion(alism). In the conceptualization of the term subregionalism, emphasis 
should be put on the cooperation dimension rather than integration within the area it 
delineates. Thus, subregionalism has an extrovert character and it is a form of intra-
regional cooperation process and governance rather than integration in its classic 
definition.s Subregionalism does not aim at higher levels of economic integration 
with the aim of achieving a union as described by classic integration theory. A broad, 
inclusive definition of subregionalism that stems from a study on subergionalism in 
post-Cold War Europe by the East West Institute6 is as follows: 
Subregionalism can be defined as a process of regularized, 
significant political and economic interaction among a group of 
neighbouring states. This interaction takes place between national 
governments, local authorities, private business and civil society actors 
across a wide range of issues. It trends to be characterized by a low level of 
institutionalization and to be directed at the specific challenges negotiated 
by a particular group of - usually - neighbouring states. 
The concept of a BSEC subregion is ambiguous and lacks a clear empirical 
reference. For reasons of clarity, let us refer here to the distinction between Black Sea 
coastal states and BSEC members. The BSEC subregion covers the territory of eleven 
countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova 
Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine) while the Black Sea area covers six coastal states 
(Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia Turkey, Ukraine). In this dissertation we do not 
5 In its conventional use regional int~gration refers to a deeper process than regional 
cooperation. Generally, the concept is broken down into economic integration (formation of a 
transnational economy, often referred to as negative integration), political integration 
(formation of a transnational political system, often referring to a minimum degree of transfer 
of sovereignty or functions to supranational organs), and social integration (formation of a 
transnational society). Regional cooperation may (or may not) form part of the process of 
regional integration. 
6 See the three volumes produced by the EastWest project: Cottey, 1999; Dwan, 1999; Dwan & 
Pavliuk, 2000. 
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follow the above-mentioned strict definitional distinction, but we use both terms -
Black Sea and BSEC subregion - interchangeably, for reasons of convenience.7 
Scholars of international relations have generally referred to the geographical 
dimension of the Black Sea but have not regarded it as an international subsystem or 
purposive regional actor. When referring to the BSEC subregion itself, even the 
element of geography fades away. The BSEC area expands from the Caspian Sea 
(Azerbaijan) to the Adriatic (Albania), including countries that are considered to 
belong to Central Europe (Ukraine), the Balkans (Bulgaria, Romania), the 
Mediterranean (Turkey), the Caucasus (Armenia). The existing literature hardly 
focuses at the Black Sea level but rather refers to its sub-groupings such as the 
Caucasus (and partly Southeast Europe). 
Here the term subregionalism is used to describe a formally constructed 
intergovernmental grouping which covers an area smaller than any of Europe's 
region-wide organizations. Subregionalism and subregional cooperation are used 
interchangeably as both terms place emphasis on the process of policy coordination 
between governments. 
s. Introducing the analytical framework 
The scope of this dissertation is limited in several ways. First, it is limited by the 
research object. We do not undertake a comparative analysis but we focus on one 
specific process, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. The aim is to conceptualize 
7 The same approach has been applied by the organization itself and it is met in all BSEC 
official documents. 
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that scheme of subregional cooperation and to address a particular issue: BSEC's 
reconfigura tion. 
The second limitation is related to the factors that the dissertation takes into 
consideration in examining the object" of analysis. The author's belief is that no single 
theoretical proposal can fully explain a complex phenomenon such as regional 
cooperation, particularly when this has a broad, 'comprehensive' agenda and it does 
not fit into the classic categories of security alliance or trade blocS formation. 'Region 
building' in international relations studies has been associated primarily with types 
of integration, governance and delineation of borders (not merely political but also 
economic, security and cultural borders). Rational and cognitive approaches provide 
a rich variety of theoretical maps and analytical tools for the study of regionalism. 
The value of each theory notwithstanding, given the complexity of contemporary 
'new regionalism', we select a set of causal factors that we deem necessary in 
answering the question that this dissertation has placed at its centre. In this 
perspective, questions are raised regarding the role of states and their political elites 
as agents of integration on the one hand, and the impact of transnational demands 
and economic difficulties, on the other hand. Regional institutions, such as the EU, in 
fostering cooperation elsewhere, become the third factor. 
Schools of thought conflict on a salient issue. What is the balance between 
domestic and systemic factors of regional integration? On the one hand, domestic 
factors play an important role in developing new regionalism: the will of nation-
8 A trade bloc is "an association of countries that reduces intra-regional barriers to trade in 
goods (and sometimes in services, investment and capital as well) ... seek[ing] to 1) generate 
welfare gains through income and efficiency effects and trade creation; 2) augment 
negotiating leverage with third countries; and 3) sometimes promote regional political 
cooperation", Schott, 1991, pp. 1-2. 
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states and mainly of leaders to rescue their sovereignty and recover their 
international bargaining power. The second cause is the private interest of export 
industries lobbying and networking on a regional basis. Thirdly, there is the internal 
functional spill-over as a consequence of successful - even if limited to relatively 
marginal sectors and branches - cooperation agreements. Finally, there is the desire 
of countries to cope gradually with global competition. On the other hand, many 
researchers focus on the impact of systemic causes which can make it easier to 
underline what is common among regional organizations. As R. O. Keohane points 
out, without an overview of common problems, constraints and challenges set by the 
international system, we would miss the analytical basis to better understand the 
weight of domestic factors and distinguish them from external causes (Gold thorpe, 
1984). 
The particular approach of this dissertation combines both these classical 
schools of thought. Apart from exploring the role of leadership from within the 
subregion, we put into the picture the structural, systemic changes that have shaped 
the context within which BSEC evolved. We place BSEC within a hemispheric 
regional (Europe-wide) level since subregional groupings in post-Cold War Europe 
are more about the new European order and less about the globalization -
regionalization nexus. Neighbouring the most advanced political and economic 
regional structure, European subregional structures have been primarily, if not 
exclusively, looking towards the European Union. The focus here is the actual 
relationship between regionalism (European integration) and subregionalism 
(BSEC). 
Nevertheless, we do not aim here to present a comprehensive theory of 
subregionalism that serves any case or any historical period. As we stated this 
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dissertation examines the factors behind BSEC's intergovernmental mode of 
cooperation whose nature and purpose is decisively shaped by the European 
integration process. We suggest that subregionalism's formation as an 
intergovernmental mode of cooperation has to be examined as the outcome of the 
interplay of four variables from the subregional level:9 transnational demands, 
economic difficulties, regional leadership and security concerns, and one variable 
from the regional level: the European Union. We have to clarify however that this 
dissertation places the member states and their political elites at the forefront of the 
analysis. The reasons for doing so are: i) BSEC's majority of members were newly 
established states, ii) the private sector has been either non-existent or too weak, and 
iii) the civil society fragmented. 
6. Issues in research methodology 
This research and its empirical oriented focus should be seen as an effort to enrich 
the debate over an ever evolving phenomenon: subregionalism in contemporary 
Europe. BSEC is a new case in international relations empirical research not 
theoretically conceptualized, empirically examined or policy evaluated. It has 
remained as a rather undefined political structure. The case study presented in this 
thesis is a detailed analysis of the evolution of regionalism in the Black Sea and as 
such it depends on the available historical materials, archived documents and 
recollections of those who were interviewed. 
In terms of the literature reviewed, the diyersity and quantity of literature on 
regionalism and the relevant terms has been impressive. Selecting what part of 
9 The analytical framework is presented in detail in Chapter 1. 
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literature would be examined and therefore influence the theoretical stand and 
method of this research was not an easy task. This dissertation was not meant to 
provide an economic analysis of BSEC nor to focus on security aspects alone. A 
strictly historical approach to what forms a Black Sea region would be an interesting 
and unique endeavour but that would be beyond the scope of this research. To 
comprehend contemporary subregionalism we applied an 'inside-out' and 'outside-
in' perspective accepting that both external and internal factors are necessary to be 
examined when conceptualizing a multidimensional phenomenon. A critical 
overview of the existing literature is therefore made which is informed with the 
empirical findings of the BSEC case. One dimension of this thesis develops at a 
conceptual level but the main emphasis is on the empirical part and the illustrations 
from field work in the Black Sea system. 
Apart from the literature review other sources which have been used include 
the internet, official publications and documents, agreements and data from national 
(state) and international sources (organizations). Documentary research was part of 
the methodology applied. The BSEC Permanent Secretariat together with the 
Secretariats of other BSEC related bodies, most of them based in Istanbul, provided 
the main bulk of documentary evidence. Intergovernmental agreements, reports and 
recommendations, declarations, work programs, internal regulations, statutes, 
speeches, progress reports and press releases related to BSEC (and to other BSEC 
related bodies) were directly obtained from the relevant Secretariats. All material 
produced by the BSEC Secretariat are in English, the official language of the 
organization. For further documentation of' other international organizations, 
information was obtained by their official web sites. Official documents from 
national governments were also used. As for the statistics on economic trends those 
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were mainly obtained by official publications of international institutions found in 
academic libraries and national resources. Some newspaper articles were also used. 
Interviews were conducted a~ several stages of the research (during the early 
writing as well as at the final stage) with BSEC officials, policy-makers and 
academics. Open and semi-structured interviewslO were mainly used due to the 
different background and position of each interviewer. Interviews yield rich 
resources of data on officials' experiences, opinions and expectations. To a certain 
degree opinions and conclusions presented in the dissertation stem from discussions 
with several people involved in the BSEC process whose names it is not always 
possible to include in the text. At an early stage of the research, a questionnaire was 
also formed and answered by the following persons: one BSEC bureaucrat, a member 
of the political elite from the region, a representative of the European Commission 
bureaucracy and a region expert. A list of the persons interviewed and consulted is 
provided. 
The author's work at one of the institutions of the BSEC organization for 
several years has greatly contributed to a better understanding of the subregional 
process. Working at the Economic, Commercial, Technological and Environmental 
Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC, based in Istanbul, the 
author was permitted free access to documentation relevant to the research 
(published or restricted). Thus, a unique experience of how 'subregionalism' is 
translated into policy terms and everyday life was accumulated through daily 
engagement of the author in the PABSEC Secretariat and participation in BSEC 
10 Open interviews are also called 'informal', 'unstandardized' or 'unstructured' interviews. 
Semi-structured interviews are based on questions normally specified, but the interviewer is 
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official meetings. This provided direct involvement in the negotiating processes and 
brought attention to pre-agreed, negotiated or even rejected documents. The author's 
researcher capacity was most of the time unknown to the officials. Nevertheless, 
employment at the PABSEC Secretariat did sometimes result in an overestimation of 
the ability of the regional institutions and the weight of the BSEC bureaucracy in the 
coopera tion processes. 
Several problems occurred during the research. One difficulty was to obtain 
valid and comparable data for the economies of certain countries in the region as 
well as the lack of literature on their social development and on the changes in the 
overall political economy environment around the Black Sea. The significant 
diversity of the countries involved in the BSEC endeavour as well as the 
multidimensional character of the cooperation ensured heterogeneity of the 
information and literature used. 
BSEC is engaged in a wide spectrum of fields including economic 
development, environment, transport, communications, trade, agriculture, tourism, 
'soft' security issues, etc. Due to the lack of a previous detailed reference to BSEC's 
engagement in those areas of cooperation, it was deemed necessary to examine 
developments and progress achieved. We also place emphasis on the dynamics of 
economic integration and political! security considerations in the subregion. The 
reason for doing so is that BSEC, although used as a political instrument, has placed 
particular emphasis on the role of the market for its final success. 
As far as the level of analysis is concerned, the dissertation proceeds on two 
levels. BSEC's identity is placed first within the context of the perceptions of the 
more free to probe beyond the answers in a manner which would often seem prejudicial to 
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participating states (subregional). Second, the EU factor is examined (regional level). 
This study shows how important politics remain and particularly how significant the 
influence of the EU has been on the effectiveness of subregion building. Although as 
the 'new regionalism' approach would stress, BSEC and the subregional groups of 
the same period are initiated from 'the inside'. However, the influence of external 
factors such as the EU should not be downplayed. 
Learning how BSEC developed up to the present is helpful to configure what 
the essence of sub regionalism is and what its role is in contemporary European new 
architecture. However, regionalism is a phenomenon in constant evolution. 
Acknowledging that, the author recognizes the limitations of the conclusions of this 
research, limitations that are, the least, time and geography related. 
7. The structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation is solely a case study which attempts to reveal the factors that shape 
the type of subregional process evolving within BSEC. We do not claim to produce a 
causal model that fits all cases. What we aim to do is to comprehend BSEC, cast light 
on the nature of subregionalism that has been thriving in contemporary Europe and 
generate a set of causal factors. 
The dissertation starts with an Introduction which summarizes the basic 
premises and points out its main concerns and the way forward to dealing with the 
central question of the evolution of the BSEC process. The first main chapter deals 
with theoretical approaches to regionalism' and provides a definition of 
subregionalism. The analytical framework of the dissertation and the variables used 
the aims of standardization and comparability (May, 1996, p. 93). 
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to explain BSEC's reconfiguration are presented here. The second chapter refers to 
the existing literature on BSEC, its origins and the cooperation motivations. 
Unfolding the BSEC history we disclose the significance of leadership in initiating 
the process and the large diversity of motivations among the member states. The 
third chapter introduces BSEC as a structure and mode of governance and describes 
the institutionalized expression of subregionalism as an effort to create vested 
interests and to stimulate cooperation. The institutionalization of BSEC and the 
empirical evidence from its performance indicate that rather than being conceived as 
a tool of 'integration' among its member states, BSEC should be better understood as 
a mode of governance which still remains of a strictly intergovernmental nature 
(similar to many other subregional structures in post-Cold War Europe). 
The following chapters - four, five and six - explain the why of the mode of 
governance of BSEC. Its intergovernmental character is explained on the basis of four 
variables from within the subregion: transnational exchange and demands, economic 
difficulties, the presence of a benevolent leading country and transformation of the 
security dilemma. In chapter four, we focus on transnational exchanges within the 
subregion as manifested by trade and investment flows and the organized business 
community. We indicate that, if any, transnational demands within BSEC were about 
compliance with WTO principles and EU requirements. Economic difficulties have 
two conflicting effects: they triggered subregional cooperation but they also hindered 
its realization. Chapter five focuses on the political and security dimensions and 
shows how the lack of a benevolent leading country and the - lack of -
transformation of the security dilemmas among the member states led to an 
intergovernmental mode of governance around the Black Sea. The sixth chapter 
incorporates a factor external to the subregion in explaining the reconfiguration of 
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BSEe on the basis of its interaction with the European Union. Here we show how the 
EU itself has influenced BSEe. This chapter indicates the asymmetry between the 
EU's approach towards BSEC and the expectations of the latter's members. The 
empirical findings, theoretical proposals and future research directions are presented 
in the last concluding chapter. 
We propose that the most adequate framework for understanding BSEC' s 
reconfiguration is a two level approach: the subregional one (Black Sea) which 
consists of four variables: transnational exchange and demands, economic 
difficulties, a leading country and security concerns, and the regional level 
(European) which brings in the variable of the EU. The second level of analysis i.e. 
the regional (European) on which brings in the variable of the EU, is of primary 
importance for understanding the character, evolution and limitations of BSEe. 
Referring to two main elements of this research we can say the following: First, 
we indicate that subregionalism is not a static process but its nature evolves 
throughout time according to the preferences of the actors involved and in particular 
depending on their perceptions of a broader - hemispheric - regional process. The 
BSEC case shows that the agenda of subregional groups is thus determined by a 
more powerful external or broader regional process such as that initiated by the EU. 
Second, we provide a set of proposals regarding the factors behind the 
intergovernmental nature of BSEC arguing that its mode of functioning is explained 
on the basis of insufficient supply conditions (such as the lack of a leading country) 
and a redirection of demands beyond the subregional level. 
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CHAPTER 1. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
1. Introduction 
This chapter undertakes two tasks. First, we examine the central arguments of basic 
theories of international relations on conceptualizing regionalism and 
subregionalism and indicate the direction that we shall follow to analyze 
subregionalism. Second, we present the main elements of the analytical framework 
that we have chosen for this research. 
We begin by identifying the basic characteristics of an international region and 
collating it with a new notion in international politics, that of subregion. The search 
for the attributes of region and subregion is not an end in itseU but it serves the 
purpose of clarity while it constitutes the first step towards understanding why 
(sub)regionalism is of interest in contemporary international relations. The need for a 
definition of subregion sterns from the lack in international relations literature of an 
adequate theoretical and empirical reference to the term. In the European context, 
subregion(alism) has been used as an alternative to regionalism to describe primarily 
schemes of intergovernmental cooperation such as the Barents Group, the Baltic Sea 
Cooperation Council and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, which take place 
within a broader hemispheric or continent-wide regional context. 
We make no claim here that subregionalism and regionalism are two very 
different and diverse processes. In fact, both terms have been used as alternatives to 
describe the same phenomenon. Hence to trace significant differences in the 
theoretical underpinnings of ilie two processes is a difficult endeavour. 
Subregionalism is a type of regional cooperation which does not fall into the 
traditional categories of alliance formation and economic integration. It takes place in 
a geographical area smaller that than of a region and its primary feature is its 
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relevance to a broader regional process. Although a distinct phenomenon, 
subregionalism does not need a sui gelleris theory. 
Since there is little consensus over definitions in the literature, theorizing 
should start by clarifying concepts. A distinction should be made between 
regionalism and regionalization as a starting pomt. Regionalism is usually associated 
with institution-building and it has been defined as 'a state- or states-led project 
designed to reorganize a particular regional space along defined economic and 
political lines' (Gamble & Payne, 1996, p. 2). Regionalization on the other hand, is 
associated with non-formal processes of economic integration and it mayor may not 
be directed by formal regionalism. Another term that we make use of later in the 
dissertation is transnationalism. Transnationalism is a process driven by private, 
non-state actors which leads to the opening up of national political economies to 
increased transactions with abroad. 
2. Conceptualizing international (sub)regions 
2.1 Defining regions 
The notion of region gained a new momentum in the end of the twentieth century as 
the level of analysis of international affairs has moved away from the traditional 
state unit. An 'international region' as a unit of analysis lies between the state and the 
world system. How and by whom is a region defined? What are the criteria used to 
draw a region? Is there anything permanent about it? Are there overlapping regions? 
These are questions that have occupied political scientists and have generated 
different definitions and theoretical construc~ons of what a region is. Applying 
however the criteria suggested by several scholars until now we might be able to 
delineate a region but we might find it difficult to say what is not a region. 
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Definitions of region vary from ones emphasizing the geographical variant to 
ones completely ignoring geography and focusing only on political attitudes (such as 
voting attitudes in the United Nations). It goes without saying therefore that an 
international region does not mean ~he same thing to all analysts at all times. It could 
refer to a continent such as Europe, or to a broader geographically specified area 
such as the Asia - Pacific or a single territory covering parts of several states ('Euro-
regions') or to a non-geographic area. It could be de fflcto or de jure depending on 
whether it is institutionalized or not. What are the main approaches to what 
constitutes a region in international relations and what criteria have been used by 
scholars to delineate regions? 
Most scholars emphasize to different degrees geography, history, economy, 
culture and common interests as the underlying forces of region formation. The 
central hypothesis is the general idea that states and societies of a given geographic 
area share the same concerns (strategic, economic, ecological) and they are 
interdependent. Seen from this standpoint, an international region is viewed as Ita 
limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a 
degree of mutual interdependence" (Nye, 1968, p. xii). The geographical connotation 
is particularly important in defining regional security systems, thus Buzan's 
definition has stressed the "relations among a set of states whose fate is that they 
have been locked into geographical proximity with each other" (Buzan, 1991, p. 188). 
A systematic attempt to define international regions has been made by 
Thompson (1973) who after assembling all available definitions, lists twenty-one 
attributes used to identify what he calls 're~onal subsystems'. Most definitions 
include proximity or primary emphasize on geography and the exhibition of a 
particular degree of regularity of actors' pattern of relations or interactions as the 
main attributes of a region. In this sense, proximity (the miriimal regional criterion) 
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and regular interaction come closest to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
applying the concept of 'regional subsystem' (Thompson, 1973, pp. 93-94). In 
addition to that, internal and external recognition of the region as a distinctive area 
are equally important features (Tho~pson, 1973, p. 101), an element that adds to the 
ambiguity of the notion and it is not shared by all (Calley a, 1995, p. 51). In another 
work by Russett (1967) regions are classified as: 
1. Regions of social and culhlTallromogeneihJ; that is, regions composed of states 
which are similar with respect to several kinds of internal attributes. 
2. Regions of states which share similar political attitudes or external belw'viollr, as 
identified by the voting positions of national governments in the United Nations. 
3. Regions of political interdependence, where the countries are joined together 
by a network of supranational or intergovernmental political institutions. 
4. Regions of economic interdependence, as identified by intra regional trade as a 
proportion of the nations' national income. 
5. Regions of geographical proximihJ (stress on the original). 
Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Speigel, conceptualized region as 'subordinate' 
to a more' dominant' system of interaction at the global level, featuring competition 
between the 'world's great powers' (Cantori & Spiegel, 1970, p. 3). In this context, 
geographic proximity is only one feature of a region. Other more important variables 
include: the nature and level of sociopolitical cohesion or integration among would-
be members of a regional arrangement; the frequency of their communications 
(transportation, mass media and elite exchanges); the extent to which their national 
decision-making is adjusted to accommodate the interests of other regional actors 
(e.g. the transfer of power); and the sources and intensity of their cooperative or 
conflicting behaviour toward each other (Cantori & Spiegel, 1970, pp. 10-20). 
Stressing the evolutionary character of region-building, Hettne identifies five 
levels of regionness that may also suggest a certain level of development of a region 
(Teunissen, 1998, pp. 204-205): i) region as a geographical unit delimited by more or 
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less natural physical barriers and ecological characteristics, ii) region as a social system 
with widening trans-local relations between human groups (e.g. a security complex), 
iii) region as transnatiollal cooperation which may be institutionalized or informal, iv) 
region as cil,if socien} with an orga~zational framework (formal or not) promoting 
social communications and convergence of values, and v) region as acting subject 
with a distinct identity, actor capability, legitimacy and structure of decision making. 
From a social constructivist perspective a region can be comprised of states 
with a shared sense of communal identity. The process whereby a society first comes 
to imagine itself is neither materially determined as Marxists used to claim, nor 
simply a matter of instrumental rationality, as utalitarians would have it (Ruggie, 
1998, p. 184). 
Forging these diverse criteria of geography, proximity, culture, economic 
interaction, etc. into a unified perspective has proved to be an almost impossible 
task. l Stubbs and Underhill (1994, pp. 331-332) trying to incorporate those criteria, 
suggest that a region in a definable geographic area may develop - not necessarily 
equally - in three dimensions: i) the extent to which countries in that area have 
significant historical experiences in common and find themselves facing the same 
general problems (post-Cold War Eastern Europe), ii) the extent to which countries 
in that area develop socio-cultural, political and/or economic linkages that 
distinguish them from the rest of the global community (USA-Canada), and iii) the 
extent to which a group of countries develop organizations to manage crucial aspects 
of their collective affairs (European Union). 
Most of the literature agrees on two factors underlying the persistence of 
regions (Russett, 1967, pp. 2-7). These are, a higher degree of mutual dependence 
1 For other definitions of region see Hettne et aI., 2000; Katzenstein, 1996; Lake & Morgan, 1997. 
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within an area than in relationships outside that area (this leads to the feeling of 
being part of a region - loyalty) or/and an ad hoc problem (e.g. Southeast Asia's 
principal claim for regional status was a result of the threat coming from Communist 
China). As Haas has put it, actors. who make integrative decisions do not always 
worry about the naturalness of their region (Haas, 1975, p. 8). Therefore, a way of 
overcoming difficulties that emerge from dealing with 'geographic proximity' or 
'cultural homogeneity' is to see region as a policy-making space. A space whose 
emergence lies first, on the recognition of the existence of regional as opposed to 
state policy problems and second, on the existence of sufficiently strong policy 
networks/ communities that see the need to articulate policy responses to questions 
and problems in the context of a regional economic/corporate political space 
(Rosamond, 1996, p. 5). When both of the above conditions exist then it makes sense 
to think in terms of 'regional arrangements' in addition to existing national 
arrangements. 
Finally, an important feature of regions is their 'global influencing 
characteristics' (Groom, 1994, p. 45). In this sense, the main international regions 
such as the EU, NAFTA and APEC reflect interrelationships in large parts of the 
world. This feature is in fact what makes regionalism substantially different to 
subregionalism. 
2.2 Defining subregions 
The distinction between regions and subregions is at least unclear. Both terms have 
been used alternatively to describe inter-state ~r cross-border cooperation schemes. 
To give an example, the EU itself has been approached as a 'higher level' of regional 
structure (Hook & Kearns, 1999, p. 6) while others have indicated that it is actually a 
'subregional' one (Wallace, 1997, p. 202) at least at its early stages given its restricted 
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membership to the Western European states. Another term, which has been used 
instead of subregion is that of 'infraregion' implying 'low' or 'limited' cooperation 
among states engaged in a wider regional integration process. Clarifying and 
empirically informing the term subregion(alism) is thus a challenging task. How is a 
subregion defined and how does it differ, if it does, from a region? 
Subregion has generally been defined as part of a region whether it involves 
more than one state or some transnational composition (border areas) (Buzan et al., 
1998, pp. 18-19). It may neighbour or be a constituent part of a regional project such 
as the EU or NAFTA. Cooperation between two or three countries within the EU 
framework aiming at supporting their particular interests within the EU integration 
process has thus been described as subregional cooperation (Seabra, 1998). Such has 
been the case of the Benelux or the two Iberian countries. 
Outside Europe, the term has also been used by scholars to describe mainly 
security subregional groups that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s listing among 
others Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), the Arab League, the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARq, etc. In this framework, Tow (Tow, 1990, p. 4) 
defined subregion as "a group of geographically contiguous states united by their 
mutual susceptibility to a specific threat, a common interest in neutralizing that 
threat in ways beneficial to their individual national securities, and a means of 
collaboration to reduce individual and collective vulnerabilities to future threats". In 
the 1970s and '80s, subregional security groups emerged as tools of addressing local 
problems and as responses to the inefficiency Qf 'collective security' plans of global 
or bigger regional institutions. As Tow shows most subregional security actors are 
relatively small or underdeveloped nation-states that need not share the same 
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language or commensurate levels of economic or political development (Tow, 1990, 
p.4). 
The term subregion has been extensively used to delineate groupings of states 
in post-Cold War Europe having a geographic connotation such as Central 
European, the Baltic, South-East Europe, Western Balkans and so on. Some 
subregions have existed as entities without being institutionalized, e.g. the Balkans, 
while others were defined post factum as the result of institutionalization, e.g. BSEC. 
Although all the above subregional structures emerged simultaneously and their 
purpose has been the reconstruction of Europe, they have been divided into two 
types in terms of membership and motives (Bailes, 1997, p. 27; 1999, pp. 161-163). The 
first type consists of groups with large memberships which encompass a diverse 
range of states (e.g. BSEC, BEAC, CBSS and CEI). The second type consists of the 
Visegrad and Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) with small 
memberships and good chances of rapid integration in west European structures. 
Subregional groups of the first type do not have a joint integration strategy but they 
seem to have an instrumental role as they can relativize the loss felt by those who do 
not enter the EU/NATO at first attempt and mediate some of the tensions between 
existing membership of those groups, applicants and local powers opposed to 
enlargement. The small homogeneous groups were created as training grounds for 
integration and devices for maximizing their members' hopes of entry. 
The literature has identified four common features in all subregional groups 
(Hook & Kearns, 1999, pp. 248-250). First, subregional projects are of a 
multidimensional character in terms of their ,:,ctivities. Second, they are driven by 
liberal economic ideas, therefore being of an 'open' nature representing an attempt to 
promote exports and trade liberalization. Third, seen from a constructivist point of 
view, they do not form exclusive identities and reqUire no public awareness. There is 
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in fact little evidence to suggest that new identities are challenging old ones. 
Following that, it is concluded that those projects are in fact elite-driven. Fourth, as 
far as security is concerned, they are dealing only with 'soft' security issues (e.g. 
organised crime). 
Subregional groups vary in terms of their institutionalization. Some groups 
such as EFT A have barely become institutionalized at all, while others such as BSEC 
have witnessed high institutionalization (Hook & Kearns, 1999, p. 251). It would be 
wrong however, to conclude that the level of institutionalization is a guide to how 
deep or how effective the resultant cooperation will actually be. It seems furthermore 
that wherever ambitious institutional structures have been set out, they often slide 
into disuse or become an additional source of potential tension between the states 
involved. 
Regarding the regime types involved in subregional cooperation, we can argue 
that the process of democratization (in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) 
has helped to create a climate facilitating cooperation. Nevertheless, there are cases 
in East Asia and Africa where subregional groups are underway or led by non 
democratic regimes, weakening the argument that democratic regimes are more 
likely to cooperate with one another than non-democratic. 
A subregion theoretically may exhibit all characteristics of an international 
region. Empirically however, subregions do not have 'global reaching effects' as 
purposive actors. The fundamental difference between a region and subregion may 
not be related to geography itself nor to the economic and political weight of their 
members but it is to be found in "their rationale which points to the subordinate 
character of a subregional formation vis-A-vis larger regional structure(s) which in 
the European context is primarily the EU. Here we use the term subregion to refer to 
formally constructed inter-state cooperation which is embedded in a wider region. 
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2.3 Regions and Subregions 
As we saw earlier in this chapter, there are three elements which are stressed in 
different degrees in the definition of an international region. First, geographical 
spatial indicators, second, interdependence and the existence of networks (of 
transaction, communication), and third, cognitive elements (e.g. collective identity). 
Are all of those equally important when defining a subregion? 
While proximity (the minimal regional criterion) and regular interaction come 
closest to be the necessary conditions for applying the concept of a region 
(Thompson, 1973, pp. 93-94) this is not the case for a subregion. Proximity still 
remains a central definitional feature of a subregion. Regular interaction, however, 
even more the establishment of networks of transaction and communications, rather 
than being a pre-existing feature is an objective. Subregion-building embarks upon 
geographical indicators, with the aim of strengthening interdependence and 
developing networks as a step towards qualifying membership of a region and not 
with the view to establish trade blocks or security alliances. 
A subregion just like a region may be conceived as a cognitive map. In fact it is 
the case that the weakness of the material foundations of a subregion is compensated 
by cognitive elements. Demonstrating elements of imagined communities2 
subregions form "structures and processes that are desired and believed to be 
susceptible to creation as means of linking together the interests, values and futures 
of people who do not know each other but who are nonetheless regarded as fellow 
members of the same collectiveness. They are imagined communities in the sense 
that while they may not have achieved politic.al autonomy, economic viability and 
social coherence, the mental and emotional predispositions necessary to establish 
2 We owe the term to the work of Benedit Anderson (1991) who showed how imagination can underlie 
the formation of historic communities in particular nation building over the last several hundred years. 
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them are sufficiently widespread to foster hope that the imagined can be transformed 
into the real" (Rosenau, 1997, p. 129). 
As we mentioned earlier, a fundamental difference between regions and 
subregions is to be found in their rationale which points to the subordinate character 
of a subregional formation vis-A-vis larger or more powerful regional structure(s) 
which in the European context is primarily the EU and the OSeE political space. 
Subregionalism has been used as the best alternative to indicate the relevance of the 
cooperation processes with a broader hemispheric integration in Europe. As a 
consequence, subregion-building may reflect an effort to conceive a group of states 
as a part of a region thus enabling them to share in the associated benefits. 
Although the common element of all definitions of subregionalism has been its 
relevance to 'larger' or 'macro' regions, the actual relation between these two 
processes has not been empirically or theoretically investigated. The basic 
assumptions for establishing a subregion are considered to be the same as in the case 
of a region and the differences between the two processes seem to be restricted just at 
the level that they evolve. However, the differences between the two processes are 
more than just at the level they evolve and they relate to their substance and nature. 
Geographic proximity is an element of any subregion with many of them 
emerging around a natural, physical border such as a sea (Baltics, Black Sea, North 
Sea) or/and at the borderlands of a region. It is the neighbourhood to, inclusion in, 
or geographic vicinity to an international region that becomes a basis of cooperation. 
Evidence both from the declaratory aims as well as from the actual 
development of subregional groups in Europe ~hows that they do not aim at political 
nor at economic integration in the classic definition within the area they delineate, 
rather they aim at coordination of policies in issue specific areas with a strategic goal 
to integrate with 'the rest'. The 'rest' could refer to a hemispheric integration process, 
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the EU, or adherence to broader political structures such as the OSeE. On this basis, 
subregionalism may be regarded as a form of cooperation and not intra-regional 
integration.3 Its success depends on the inclusion of its members into a broader 
regional project and not on the creation of strong economic blocs or political-security 
communities per se. 
Common cultural elements, historical experience and social interaction do exist 
among neighbouring peoples and ignoring them in the formation of a subregion 
would be an omission particularly when assessing its effectiveness. It is however, the 
claim for a cultural continuity between the subregion and the broader region that is 
of importance here. From a cognitive point of view, sharing a broader cultural 
identity, not creating an exclusive, separate identity is what a subregion is about. 
Thus the shared call for the 'return to Europe' that underlined all subregional 
formations in the post-Cold War era was also an identity call of their members for 
acquiring once again their place in the 'European identity' that they had lost in the 
second hall of the twentieth century. European subregional groups are portrayed as 
parts of the 'European identity' and as 'concentric circles of allegiance' (Smith, 1993, 
pp.129-135). 
Lacking cohesion, subregions' delineation generates difficulties. Where do the 
borders of a subregion lie? The answer to this question is often an artificial one such 
as in the case of BSEC where the subregion covers the territories of the eleven 
member states as specified in the Charter of the organization. Borders are of a flexible 
nature and membership in a subregional group does not have an exclusive character 
with one member participating in several su~regional formations or being at the 
same time member of an economic union or security alliance. Although the term 
subregionalism acquires some importance from a policy-making perspective, the 
3 For the difference between the two, see Introduction, footnote S. 
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actual geographic, economic or cultural delineation of a subregion is highly abstract. 
In fact, this abstract geographic delineation should not be considered in negative 
terms as one of the functions of the subregional groups is exactly to overcome new 
dividing lines. 
Summing up the main features particular' to subregions, we may identify tlle 
following: i) geographical proximity is the main definitional element; ii) they lack 
global influencing characteristics; iii) they have no grand integration strategies nor 
do they form security alliances, and iv) they depend on or are part of a broader 
regional process. The reference to an external centre of power is a feature that results 
from the fact that subregions are not independent processes but they are embedded 
into a broader regional process. Even in those cases where a benevolent country does 
exist, the real power centre rests outside the subregion itself. The direct influence of 
the neighbouring regional actor sets the course of action and the agenda of a 
subregional group. Global, transnational forces are in fact filtered by the dominant 
region. 
3. A review of theories of international relations and the regional phenomenon 
International relations literature on regionalism is vast. Fawcett & Hurrell's 
Regionalism in World Politics (1997) has provided a systematic review and evaluation 
of the mainstream theoretical approaches to regionalism. Most theoretical 
approaches have focused on intra-regional relations, the conditions that are likely to 
promote or hinder regional cooperation and the link between economic cooperation 
and political community. Historically, two forces catalyzed the study of regionalism 
as a phenomenon; the birth of the European Community I Union, the most 
institutionalized regional group in the world, and the force of globalization which 
alters the fundamentals of the international system. 
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The rationalist line of thought which is based on the assumption that states 
behave as rational utility maximizers, has been dominant in the theoretical debate on 
regionalism. Governments are seen as rational actors, using international 
organizations to the extent that they. serve their interests. Rational approaches which 
will be examined here include system theories i.e. (neo) realism and structural 
interdependence/ globalization (outside-in perspective), and interdependence 
theories i.e. neo-functionalism and neo-liberal institutionalism (inside - out 
perspective). 
The limitations of the rational approach have been stressed by the 
constructivist or reflective variant which concentrates on the question, how different 
culturat legal, political or other backgrounds shape the perception an actor has of a 
specific situation. In this respect, regionalism is believed to "reflect historically 
distinctive combinations of material circumstances, social patterns of thought, and 
individual initiative. Rationalistic theory can help to illuminate these patterns, but it 
cannot stand alone" (Keohane, 1995, p. 297). The dominant line of regional 
cooperation research follows to different degrees the rationalistic variant as it offers 
greater possibilities for operationalization. But the constructivist - refIexivist 
approach has gained the status of the most innovative theory in international 
relations in recent years (Wendt, 1995, pp. 71-81). 
Here we will not reflect on economic theories. Insights from a strictly 
economic approach especially vis-a-vis the viability of trade blocs and economic 
unions are important but our view is that contemporary subregionalism has been 
primarily a political endeavour, thus this sec~on focuses on international relations 
literature. 
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3.1. Traditional theories of international relations and regionalism 
Tile Systemic Lepe[ of A1IIllysis 
Systemic theories underline the impact of outside pressures on a region and stress 
the importance of the broader political and economic structures within which 
regional schemes are embedded. Regardless of the degree of emphasis they place on 
structural factors, most authors agree that "analyzing state behaviour from inside-
out alone can be misleading as it leads observers to ignore the context of an action" 
(Keohane, 1984, p. 25). 
Kenneth Waltz (1979) tried to show the error of theorizing at the unit level 
without reflecting on the effects of the international system as a whole and he 
emphasized the importance of external configuration of power, the dynamics of 
power-political competition, and the constraining role of the international system. 
Under this perspective, regionalism is examined as a response to external challenges 
and has much in common with the politics of alliance formation (Walt, 1987). 
Proponents of realism emphasize the fundamental importance of the geographical 
framework (Mearsheimer, 1990) and argue that the success of regional groups is 
contingent upon the policies of major powers who dominate international structures. 
In the case of the European Community, integration was encouraged by the US 
hegemony and. was embedded within a transantlantic security framework. The 
acceptance of security dependence was therefore one of the essential compromises 
on which European cooperation and integration was built. 
In the neorealist version, a few elements of institutional thinking have been 
used such as the assumption that a"narchy under certain conditions may be modified 
by inter-state cooperation and that institutions which are set up to organize such 
cooperation represent a buffer. Nevertheless, institutional elements are not given 
much credit by the neorealists. 
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One of the central elements of the neorealist perspective is that there are no 
essential differences between economic and political regionalism. Economic 
objectives of regional integration do not derive from the pursuit of welfare (as classic 
economic theory suggests), but from the close relationship that exists between 
economic wealth and political power and from states' inevitable concern with 
relative gains and losses. Applying a mercantilistic perspective, neorealism sees 
regional integration as a response to the loss of competitiveness. It is perceived as a 
bargaining chip in the negotiations that determine the international order (NAFTA 
as a stick to increase pressure in Japan to open its markets, APEC in applying 
pressure to the EU in the final stages of the Uruguay round of GATT). Economic 
integration (and the market forces underlining it) therefore is not 'autonomous' but 
is determined by the structures of the international political system and the policies 
of major states. 
On the basis of the neorealist assumptions, hegemonic theory has advanced on 
power struggle-based assumptions about regional groupings. There are several 
applications of hegemonic theory. Waltzean neorealism claims that rising big powers 
are sooner or later balanced by single states or by coalitions of states therefore, 
regional institutions are instruments of secondary and minor states trying to balance 
the dominant state. In this respect, regionalism may be seen as a response to the 
existence of an actual or potential hegemOnic power or an attempt to restrict the free 
exercise of hegemonic power through the creation of regional institutions. On the 
other hand, weaker states might seek regional accommodation with the local 
hegemon in the hope of receiving special re~ards ('bandwagoning').4 The general 
4 "This kind of behaviour is most likely when power differentials are very great, when there are few 
external alternatives to accommodation with the hegemon and when the small state finds itself ill close 
geographic proximity" (HulTell, 1997, p. 52). On traditional realist account in which states are fearful 
of unequal power 'bandwagoning' will be an exception. 
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argument that neorealists such as Robert Gilpin (1975) and Stephen Krasner (1976) 
bring forward on regional cooperation is that it is heavily dependent on the presence 
of a hegemon who bears the cost of establishing institutions through which 
interdependence can be maintained: One way to determine whether a single regional 
hegemon is present is to examine the distribution of intraregional overall national 
capacities, while another is to examine the distribution of issue-specific capacities. 
Hegemonic power must have control over raw materials, control over resources of 
capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of 
highly valued goods. Placing emphasis on one's incentives to project one's power 
abroad, hegemony can be perceived as a situation in which 'one state is powerful 
enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations and willing to 
do so' (Keohane & Nye, 1977, pp. 44,49-54; Keohane, 1980). Since the hegemon is in a 
dominant position, institutions and institutionalized regionalism are unnecessary or 
marginal. A hegemon itself however, might also want to become involved in the 
construction of regional institutions. Why should hegemons need such institutions? 
It is declining power which makes cooperation more necessary, as it may press the 
hegemon towards the creation of common institutions to pursue its interests, to share 
burdens, to solve common problems and to generate international support and 
legitimacy for its policies.s Regional institutionalization can be seen from the big 
power of the region as a way of preventing balancing and promoting regional 
'bandwagoning'. Apart from that, regional big powers have an interest in preventing 
defection (military, political, economic exit from the zone of influence of a big 
power). 
The strategy of 'cooperative hegemony' is most appropriate for major powers 
with one (or more) of the following characteristics: major powers which suffer from 
5 This argument has been made in relation to the Asia Pacific region by Crone (1993). 
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certain relative weaknesses, either in terms of geostrategic location, material 
resources or prestige; major powers in decline; major powers which possess great 
strength in terms of soft power (technology, ideology, culture). Thus 'cooperative' 
hegemony has four advantages as. seen from the perspective of the regional big 
power (Pedersen, 1998, pp. 8-9): 
a) advantages of scale: if the cooperative hegemon is economically the most 
efficient state in the region, the advantages of a unified regional market may be 
very considerable. For a regional big power surrounded by small or tiny states, 
the advantages of scale gathering from regionalism are marginal; 
b) advantages of stability: preserving the established status quo; 
c) advantages of inclusion: enabling the hegemon to influence other states, 
secure access to scarce raw materials and the possibility of integrating 
diasporas; 
d) advantages of diffusion: diffusion of hegemon's ideas. 
The explanatory power of neorealism is significant at the stage of the initiation 
of a regional group but it says little about the character of regionalism once 
established especially when the last has no features of an alliance or a coalition. It is 
poor on conceptualizing contemporary market-led or multidimensional 
regionalization processes involving other than state actors, which are spontaneous 
and are not envisaged in national policies. Although power struggle and self-interest 
might well be the motivation behind regional projects, there is little evidence that 
those (power and interest) are confined to nation states alone. Furthermore, it has 
little interest in examining how or by whom power and interest are defined, claiming 
that the state as a unitary agent is of importance. In the structure-agent dilemma, 
neorealism reveals the powerful role of external structural conditions in the decision 
making process but it ignores domestic level fa€tors, downplaying at the same time 
factors such as individual expectations and beliefs or in particular in the case of 
regionalism factors such as identity, cohesion and awareness: 
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Neorealist assumptions are nevertheless significant in understanding the 
interstate relations in eras of structural transformation of the international system 
such as the one in the aftermath of the Cold War where reconfiguration of power is 
taking place and aspiring hegemons might attempt to fill in power vacuum. One of 
the criticisms is however that the neorealist piCturing of the international system is 
misleading as it oversimplifies the nature of the system and neglects the competitive 
dynamics of change over time (Hurrell, 1997, p. 54). The interdependence theory of 
the 1970s opened up this criticism and shifted attention to the importance of 
interdependence in specific fields and the regimes and norms that manage it. 
Another strand of systemic perspectives stresses the effect of structural 
interdependence and globalization on the patterns of cooperation (and conflict). 
Interdependence is 'mutual' but 'unequal' dependence among states and societies 
(Keohane & Nye, 1977, pp. 8-11). It is therefore argued that interdependence or the 
ways in which states and their societies are linked through the interactions and 
structures of the market, affect the politics of the state in the domestic and 
international context (Stubbs & Underhill, 1994, p. 22). 
The most significant element in the context of contemporary regionalism is 
provided by globalization (economy, production, technology, social forces, culture 
and capital). The literature has in these terms focused on globalization and 
regionalism as complementary or contradictory to each other. Regional processes are 
generally seen as responses to three aspects of globalization (Underhill, 1998, p. 44): 
the replacement of national markets by world markets, the decline of geographical 
determinants of financial location and the internationalization of the division of 
labour, the continued strengthening of multinational and private policy-making 
structures vis-a.-vis the public authority of the state. 
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Structural approaches have great explanatory power as far as the establishment 
and emergence of regionalism is concerned to the degree that systemic changes in 
the world affairs condition the choices available to actors. However, systemic 
approaches are not sufficient in explaining the substantial differentiation regarding 
the evolution of a cooperative scheme and its particular features. 
The Regional Level Perspective 
The core idea of inside-out perspectives is that regional cooperation is essentially a 
response to increased social and economic interdependence within a specific area. 
Functionalism investigates how transnational ties and interdependence at a 
regional level lead to integration. The basic argument of functionalism is that 
collaboration in one particular technical field or functional area would lead to further 
collaboration in other related fields ('ramification'). As states and societies become 
increasingly integrated due to the expansion of collaboration to technical issues in 
which all parties gain, the cost of breaking these functional ties would be great and 
hence give leaders reason to pause before doing so. Economic unification contributes 
to political integration as exemplified by the EU. Functionalism focuses on the role 
of societal actors as opposed to that of political institutions as agents of integration 
(Mitrany,1975). 
NeofunctionaIism defines integration as a process "whereby political actors in 
several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations 
and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national sta~es" (Haas, 1958, p. 16). Haas argued 
that integration must be perceived by political elites to be in their self-interest and it 
will be attained and sustained only if actors believe their own interests are best 
served by making a political commitment to an international organization. 
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Neofunctionalism parted company with functionalism in its rejection of the notion 
that one can separate technical tasks from politics or welfare from power. Its basic 
argument is that high and rising levels of interdependence would lead eventually to 
political integration. Beginning with technical and non-controversial issues, 
cooperation will 'spill over' into high politics. Neofunctionalism was developed and 
refined between 1955 and 1975 as the most comprehensive attempt to provide a 
general theory of European integration. Despite the richness of its insights, 
neofunctionalism is regarded as having offered an unsatisfactory account of 
European integration (Haas, 1975; Cornett & Caporaso, 1992). The most widely-cited 
reason is empirical: neofunctionalism appears to mispredict the trajectory and the 
process of EU evolution as the process of Community building has proceed through 
a series of intergovernmental bargains. 
Neoliberal institutionalism has been the most influential theoretical approach 
to the study of international cooperation (Keohane, 1989; Keohane, 1984). Its basic 
argument is that increasing levels of interdependence generate increased I demand' 
for international cooperation. Institutions are perceived as purposively generated 
solutions to different kinds of collective action problems. As Keohane puts it 
"regimes are established by states to achieve their purposes. Facing dilemmas of 
coordination and collaboration under conditions of interdependence, governments 
demand international institutions to enable them to achieve their interests through 
limited collective action" (Keohane, 1993, p. 274). The institutional approach is 
heavily statist, concerned with ways in which states conceived as rational egoists can 
be led to cooperate (unlike realism it argues tha~ co-operation is possible). The extent 
of cooperation will depend on the existence of mternational institutions or regimes 
whose main contribution is that they change the context within which states make 
decisions based on self-interests. Cooperation fostered by awareness of bounded 
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rationality U does not require that states accept common ideals or renounce 
fundamental principles of sovereignty" (Keohane, 1984, p. 13). In contrast to 
neofunctionalism the state is viewed as the gatekeeper between the domestic and the 
international. Institutions matter because of the benefits that they provide and 
because of their impact on the calculations of the players and the ways in which 
states define their interests. Cheating or defection is considered the main obstacle to 
cooperation rather than, as neorealists argue, distributional conflict and concern for 
relative gains. The trend has been to apply institutional theories to non-region 
specific questions but to economic and environmental fields. 
Criticism directed to integration theory (and neoliberal institutionalism) starts 
with its focus on the experience of Western Europe. Neofunctionalism is further 
criticized that it underestimates the resilience of the national state and ignores the 
differences between 'low politics' and 'high politics'. The evolution of the European 
Union itseU did not follow the path assumed by the neofunctionalists, where the spill 
over effect into the political sphere did not take place in the deterministic way 
envisaged in neofunctionalism. Another criticism is that regional affairs are 
presented as static and the changing influence of external factors, political, economic, 
security is ignored (Hurrell, 1997, p. 60). Neofunctionalism lost most of its relevance 
to contemporary regionalism as the latter in most cases especially outside Europe, 
has followed an informal, non-institutionalized form. Furthermore, it does not have 
explanatory power as far as the motivation of regional cooperation is concerned 
although it tells about the role of supranational institutions once created. Second, its 
hypothesis on the weakening role of the state in. relation to supranational institutions 
has little applicability beyond the EC/EU example (Hurrell, 1997, p. 60). At the same 
time, integration theory (trade or market integration, functionalism and 
neofunctionalism, institutionalism etc.) is deficient inasmuch as it understates power 
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relations and fails to offer an explanation of structural transformation (Mittelman, 
1999, p. 26). 
Constnlctil'iSIH 
The last half of the 1990s has witnessed the emergence of a new dichotomy in 
international relations theory pitting rationalist scholars who generally depict 
regional institutions as the products of conscious state design, against constructivist 
scholars who posit a more profound role of institutions in socializing and 
constituting the actors within them. Constructivism allows us to see the extent to 
which regime building is influenced by ideology, beliefs and knowledge and 
especially the evolution of consensual knowledge positions among crucial actors 
(Underhill, 1998, p. 45). Constructivism analyzes ideational constructs at a regional 
level as the development of 'inter-subjective structures' (and not merely as rational 
responses to interests) which consist of a II shared understandings, expectations and 
social knowledge embedded in international institutions and threat complexes, in 
terms of which states define (some of) their identities and interests" (Wendt, 1994, p. 
389). 
One variant of constructivism stresses the idea that the character of interstate 
(or inter-societal) relations can be understood in terms of a sense of community, 'we-
ness', mutual sympathy, loyalty and shared identity and that the process by which a 
community emerges is related to the compatibility of major societal values (i.e. 
capitalism, liberal democracy) and to processes of societal communication based on 
an increase in the level of transactions between t:wo or more societies. 
The second variant argues that attention 'must be paid to the processes by 
which interests and identities are created and evolve, to the ways in which self-
images interact with changing material incentives, and to the language and discourse 
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through which U1ese understandings are expressed. Boili interests and identities are 
shaped by "particular histories and cultures, by domestic factors and by ongoing 
processes of interaction WiU1 the oiliers" (Hurrell, 1997, p. 65). Interests change as a 
result of learning, persuasion, knowledge and ideology. 
The sources of the ideas underwriting regional cooperation are not to be found 
simply in the interests identified by state policy-making elites (Underhill, 1998, pp. 
43-45), but also in the influence of emerging communities of like-minded corporate 
sector actors, scholars, research brokers and practitioners engaged in the definition of 
regional identities, problems and putative policy proposals. Therefore, integration 
might not be the result of purposive interstate interaction but the manifestation of 
cognitive change resulting from increased communication. This transactionalist or 
communication theory of integration of Karl Deutsch (1958) sees the building of 
networks of communication and exchange as a primary condition for integration to 
take place among nation-states. When communicative charmels are multiple and 
well-developed, views converge and building of a shared feeling or security result. 
Integration was thus defined as 'the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of 
community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough 
to assure for a'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its 
population' (Deutsch et al., 1958, p. 5). 
Constructivist approaches have been criticized as overestimating the 
importance of regional identities. Indeed critics employ examples of conflict in areas 
of sharing values to highlight the weaknesses of regional identity as a tool. Criticism 
of cognitive approaches also points to th~ problems of measurement and 
operationalization. Another line of criticism particularly of the Deutsch approach 
concerns the unclear process by which informal interactions generate formal 
institution - building and how socio-psychological interactions feed into 
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authoritative action. This brings us to another question which relates to the 
assumption that cognitive changes necessarily result from increased communication 
(Rosamond, 2000, pp. 47-48). 
Domestic le'vel Perspectil'es 
Domestic level approaches have gained weight particularly in explaining the features 
of the current wave of new regionalism, the latter being defined as a process 'from 
within' and not imposed by outside powers. They claim to have more explanatory 
value in explaining the variety of roads that regional groups have taken, contrary to 
sh'uctural perspectives which identify the commonality of various regionalist 
projects throughout the globe. In general, domestic level approaches put light among 
others on the significance of a viable state, of the regime type and the convergence of 
domestic policy preferences (Hurrell, 1997, pp. 66-71). 
The absence of viable states (effective state functioning and accepted territorial 
boundaries) makes the process of region-building difficult. Regionalism and state 
strength do not stand in opposition as states are the building blocs with which 
regionalist arrangements are constructed. In fact, weak states and problems related 
to legitimacy between states and within them have undermined regionalist projects 
in parts of Africa as well as the post-Soviet area. Furthermore, political elites' main 
concern to secure legitimacy may lead them to seek regional collective action as the 
only option to maintain national social/ economic arrangements and policies (Hirst & 
Thompson, 1996, p. 162). 
Regime type has been considered as important in facilitating or hampering 
cooperation. On the basis of the democratic peace argument, democratic regimes are 
supposed to be conducive to the success of integration or cooperation. The decade-
long process of democratization and transplant of liberal democratic ideas in the 
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transition countries has indeed been accompanied by cooperative attitudes in 
interstate affairs and a strong support for the establishment of regional structures. 
Nevertheless, several of the countries which strongly advocate regional cooperation 
are far from being considered as fully consolidated democracies (e.g. Azerbaijan, 
Georgia). Criticism therefore, points out both the contentious concept of 'liberal 
democracy' and the fact that the democratic nature of states has not been necessary 
for regional cooperation to emerge (Solingen, 1996). 
A third cluster of domestic level rooted hypotheses evolves around the 
assumption that domestic ruling coalitions and the convergence of their political -
economic strategies shapes the dynamics of regional cooperation (Snyder, 1989). The 
core assumption is that the kinds of ties binding different actors (institutions, 
economic sectors, bureaucracies) to international processes do affect their conception 
of interest within the regional context (Solingen, 1997, pp. 68-100). Domestic policy 
convergence has been a factor in the resurgence of regionalism particularly in the 
developing and transition states that have adhered to market and trade liberalization 
policies and export expansion. 
3.2 The new regionalism approach 
In spite of the obvious importance of traditional theories for understanding 
regionalism, the complexity and plurality of the regional phenomenon urged a new 
framework to explain what contemporary regionalism is all about. The starting point 
of the 'new regionalism' approach is that contemporary regionalism is a new 
phenomenon that warrants a new type of ana~ysis which transcends the dominant 
theories of regional integration. It claims that the mainstream theories in the field 
provide valuable insights but cannot capture the multidimensionality, pluralism of 
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contemporary regionalism, its comprehensiveness and its social consh'uction (Schulz 
et al., 2001, p.2). 
The origins of the new regionalism are traced in the eclectic theoretical 
framework which employs an inter-disciplinary method in international relations. 
New regionalism has been differently defined by authors but in general it refers to a 
second wave (as opposed to the first wave of the 1960s) of regional 
cooperation/integration witnessed in the post-Cold War era and within the context 
of globalization. It represents something qualitatively new" as it is no longer created 
from the outside and 'from above' but 'from below' and from within" (Joennieni, 
1995, p. 11). The new regionalism is a political response to the market-driven process 
of globalization and the social eruptions associated to it (Hettne, 1998, p.201). 
Research within the UNU /WIDER project undertaken by B. Hettne, A. Inotai and O. 
Sunkel showed differences between the old regionalism and the new type of 
regionalism, the latter having the following features (Hettne et al., 1999, p. 7). 
First, the structure of the international system differs, with the new regionalism 
taking place within a multipolar world order. In those terms, the end of the Cold 
War led to the dissolution of artificially hostile regions and allowed for the creation 
of new ones. Second, while the old regionalism was created' from above', often being 
initiated by big power intervention, new regionalism is a spontaneous process from 
within the regions. States merge in response to global pressures and domestic needs. 
Third, new regionalism is of an 'open' character thus compatible with an 
interdependent world economy. Regional groups do not aim at constructing power 
or economic blocs through protectionist measl;lres. On the contrary, their concern is 
the liberalization of economic activities and eicport promotion. Fourth, while old 
regionalism was either aiming at security alliance formation or at the building of 
trade blocs, the new regionalism is a comprehensive, multidimensional 
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phenomenon. It thus includes in its goals, political, economic, social, security issues. 
Fifth, old regionalism was a state-centric process while new regionalism is a process 
which involves non state actors at different levels. Sixth, regions are defined post 
factum (Hettne et al., 2000, p. xx) so there are many different regionalisms supported 
or challenged by many different ideological arguments and reflecting various 
positions in the world economy as a whole. 
In new regionalism, the political ambition of establishing regional coherence 
and regional identity - apart from security and welfare - seems to be of primary 
importance. This 'pursuit of regionness' can be compared to the 'pursuit of stateness' 
in classic mercantilist nation-building (Hettne, 1998, p. 203). Regionalism is thus 
related to the world order and any particular process of regionalism has systemic 
repercussions in other regions, influencing the way in which the world order is 
organized. 
Short of being a theory itself, the new regionalism approach provides us with a 
full set of analytical tools for researching both the foundations and the particular 
features of specific regional projects world wide. The new regionalism's merit rests 
on its analytical power and applicability in researching contemporary subregional 
cooperation schemes. 
4. Conceptualizing Europe' 8 8ubregionalism 
Contemporary subregionalism represents a new pattern of international relations 
(Hook & Kearns, 1999). It is fostered by forces related to the end of the Cold War, 
globalization and changes in the domestic political economy. European 
subregionalism bears most of the features claimed by new regionalism: 
multidimensionality, 'open' character, post foctum definition and initiation from 
within the subregion. 
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Nevertheless, its conceptualization has been dominated by traditional systemic 
level approaches and an emphasis on inter-state politics. Consequently, concerns 
related to the structural power of states or to security issues have been identified as 
the basic motivations behind subregion-building. In particular neorealist 
explanations have dominated institutional ones as subregional institutions wherever 
they exist, have not by any means taken over the direction of matters. In most cases 
subregional institutions have been weak and there has been no re-direction of 
expectations and loyalties away from the national centre. 
With the exception of the comparative research on subregional groups around 
the world by Hook and Kearns (1999) which draws upon the 'new IPE' approach 
(seeking to overcome the divisions in the classic integration theories), other works on 
(particularly European) subregionalism have focused on security related analysis 
(Dwan & Pavliuk, 2000; Dwan, 1999; Cottey, 1999b; Bailes, 1997). Subregions have 
not been conceived or examined as security alliances but they have been positively 
assessed as exerting great influence on the EU enlargement process, promoting 
indispensable links between the 'ins' and the 'outs'. As Alyson JK Bailes has shown 
in the security spectrum of subregional groups in Europe, they may exercise 
influence in tackling existential and 50ft security issues (Bailes, 1999, p. 171; 1997, pp. 
27 - 31). 
Neorealism's emphasis on systemic factors has placed it as the most 
appropriate theoretical approach, given the fact of the fundamentally new structure 
of the international relations in the post-Cold War Europe (Rosecrance, 1991; 
Varyrynen, 2003). The multilateral world order that followed the collapse of the Cold 
War structures, the influence of powerful regional economic groups (i.e. EU and 
NAFT A) and the globalization forces serve as explanations of the spur of subregional 
groups around the globe. Since subregionalism is embedded into broader regional 
55 
and global processes, systemic analysis provides useful analytical tools in explaining 
its contextual framework. It also explains partly the common features of subregions 
such as their intergovernmental and elite-driven character. 
The central hypothesis of the structural approaches has been that the only way 
for poor and violent areas to become less peripheral in structural terms is to become 
more regionalized i.e. to increase their levels of 'regioness'. Their only other power 
would rest in their capacity to create problems for 'core' regions (chaos power), 
thereby provoking some sort of external engagement (Hettne, 1998, p. 211).6 The 
basic similarity across subregional groups becomes the main concern of their 
members to avoid (further) marginalization hence, regional cooperation is seen as a 
way of achieving this (Lahteenmaki, 1999, p. 217). Weak states thus organize to avoid 
marginalization and complete collapse, but their subregional arrangements are 
fragile and ineffective as their state structures and civil institutions. At the same time, 
they must tackle acute domestic violence and poverty. Their overall situation makes 
'security regionalism' and 'developmental regionalism' more critical than the 
somewhat irrelevant creation of free trade regimes, or even adherence to the more 
cautious 'open regionalism'. As a conclusion, it seems that the literature agrees that 
subregional projects are "promoted by the weaker states in the global political 
economy which are seeking to strengthen cooperation in a more circumscribed space 
than at the regional level. In this sense, subregional projects take on their significance 
within the context of the more embracing regional projects and identities promoted 
by the more powerful states" (Hook & Kearns, 1999, p. 6). It is not however only 
weaker states that have been engaged in subregionalism. European subregionalism 
6 The Core regions are economically advanced and have stable regimes. Those organize in order to 
better control and gain access to the world outside their own region. The Peripheral regions are 
politically turbulent and economically stagnant. Domestic unrest, conflict, economic underdevelopment 
plunges them to the bottom of the system (Hettne, 1998, pp. 206-207). 
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in the 1990s emerged mainly at the 'intermediate' and 'peripheral' zones, but it has 
also been initiated and supported or at least it has involved countries from the 'core' 
zones as well. This is the case with the Council of Baltic Sea States where the 
European Commission is a member itself. When putting this into the picture, 
subregionalism seems not just a tool only of weaker states to avoid marginalization, 
or to change their structural position, but it might well reflect policy choices of 
external powers and their own security or economic priorities. 
A significant part of literature on subregionalism points to the role of a regional 
hegemon. Assumptions of the cooperative hegemony approach are of importance 
here, as subregional groups initiated 'from within', may be seen as initiatives of local 
hegemons (Pedersen, 1998) in an effort to pursue advantages of stability, inclusion 
and diffusion in their immediate space. Cooperative hegemony does not however 
explain the emergence and in particular the persistence of subregionalism in the 
absence of a hegemon or in the case that the real or potential hegemon does not 
support subregion building. Furthermore, it is the case that often subregional groups 
exhibit a 'horizontal' structure excluding hegemonic policies. 
Although the rhetoric of subregion-building uses arguments of 
neofunctionalism and neoliberal institutionalism, the regional level of analysis has 
found limited applicability in theorizing over subregionalism. Neoliberal 
institutionalism explains subregionalism as a functional response to the need to 
ensure a minimum of institutionalization in order to maximise welfare gains and not 
as an awareness of regional identity. There are two specific dimensions that deserve 
attention here. First, there is not sufficient evidence to support the basic assumption 
of integration theories that subregionalism comes as a response to increased social 
and economic interdependence. On the contrary, transnational ties and socio-
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economic interaction are weak or disrupted and subregional institutions are built to 
promote them. 
Second, as the main concern of subregionalism is how to integrate within a 
broader region rather than to achieve deeper integration within the area it delineates, 
emphasis has been placed on the sequence approach. The sequence approach tries to 
link integration processes at different levels, arguing that regional cooperation or 
even integration should be considered as a stepping stone towards larger integration 
and global competitiveness. Sequencing theory goes in line with the training ground 
approach that has been revitalized with strong reference made to the history of 
European integration processes. According to this view, countries should first of all, 
learn the rules of the game in the regional framework in order to become 'global 
players'.7 However historical experience shows that with the exception of the core 
countries of the EU itself, more fundamental (sub)regional cooperation was the result 
of, and not a precondition for, efficient integration into the global (or 'anchor') 
economy (Inotai, 1997). 
Neorealism's emphasis on the structural determinants of states' behaviour has 
downplayed domestic factors in the conceptualization of European subregionalism. 
Although the literature pictures subregionalism as a process generated from 'within' 
and not imposed from 'outside', the domestic level of analysis has been neglected. 
This neglect contrasts with the contemporary dominant trend in international 
relations research to bring to the forefront domestic factors underlying large regional 
formations in Europe, Southeast Asia and North America. In particular, given the 
fundamental changes at the domestic level resulting from the double transition to a 
market economy and democracy, the absence of domestic level analyses indicates a 
7 Frequent allusions to the imitation of the European Payments Union by the transforming countries are 
good example for this approach. 
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gap in the literature. However, there seems to be a consensus resulting from existing 
literature that subregionalism in Europe has been a foreign policy tool, driven by 
political elites. This approach has led economic analysis to the margins and resulted 
to a poverty of empirical research on possible private interests in subregional 
processes. 
The paradox, however, is that although subregionalism is presented as an elite-
driven phenomenon being conceived 'from within', the actual empirical work 
focuses on the structural dimension, ignoring the preferences or the change in the 
priorities of the leaderships. A leadership's choice to form or join a subregional 
group becomes merely a response to systemic, regional changes and not a domestic 
policy choice. Given the fact that often subregionalism involves states in transition, 
national institutions are weak and characterised by poor output efficiency, elite 
interaction is paramount for understanding the emergence of an 'elite network' type 
of regional cooperation (Steen, 1997, p. 114). Elites' attitudes, behaviours and beliefs 
in cases of newly established state entities or in the presence of 'failing states' have 
consequences for the type of subregion that develops. A balance between domestic 
and systemic level analysis needs thus to be established in the study of subregion-
building. 
An analysis of the regional phenomenon which moves away from interest-
based explanations to ones that point out the role of ideas in shaping attitudes 
towards regional cooperations would have applicability in explaining not only the 
why but also the how of subregionalism. In the presence of vague structural 
pressures, certain ideas (such as neoliberalism) acquire significance for subregion 
building. Subregional cooperation may be understood in terms of converging 
domestic policy preferences among regional states. Convergence of national 
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economic policy preferences centred around certain ideas such as economic 
liberalization and deregulation may thus lead to regional integration as a way of 
consolidating market - liberal policies. 
Limited references to cognitiye elements in the formation of a subregion as 
opposed to strictly utilitarian stands exist in the literature as elements of common 
culture and identity have been weak within the subregions. 
The above illustrate that the conceptualization of European subregionalism 
has evolved around the factors underscoring its emergence. What has been missing 
is a framework explaining the reconfiguration of the mode of governance of the 
subregional groups once they have been established. 
5. The analytical framework 
Despite its variations in institutionalization, subregionalism remains a process of an 
intergovernmental nature. The analytical framework deployed here aims at 
disclosing the causal link between a set of factors and the mode of governance that is 
shaped at a subregional level. 
Modes of governance 
Interstate cooperation is often difficult to achieve because of problems of collective 
action, i.e. when states in the absence of international governmental agencies act as 
'rational egOists' they often end up with suboptimal outcomes because they cannot 
see the advantages of cooperation (Young, 1989, pp. 1-2). However, this does not 
mean that international relations 'are in a permanent state of disorder or chaos. 
• As proposed by Parsons, 2002; Wendt, 1995; Rosamond. 1997, 
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Instead states have found a way to respond to the collective-action problem by 
developing international institutions.9 
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998, pp. 8-9) place international institutions along 
a continuum that stretches betwee~ the ideal-typical modes of intergovernmental 
and supranational governance. The concept of governance has been used to denote 
similar arrangements in issue areas such as telecommunications, transport and 
environmental policy. A definition of the term governance might be suggested as 
follows: "Governance denotes the structures and processes which enable a set of 
public and private actors within an issue area to coordinate their interdependent 
needs and interests through the making and implementation of binding policy 
decisions in the absence of a central political authority" (Krahmann, 2001, p. 7). 
In intergovernmental politics, the national executives of the member states 
bargain with each other to produce common policies (Young, 1989, p. 8; Mattli, 1999, 
pp. 28-31). This mode of governance is characterized by at least three assumptions 
(Karlsson, 2000). First, sovereign states are assumed to be the dominant actors. Other 
actors, such as international secretariats or transnational movements, are of 
secondary importance because they do not possess enough meaningful autonomy. 
Thus, the primary function of an international organization is to enhance the 
efficiency of interstate bargaining by lowering the transaction costs for governments. 
For instance, by providing logistical coordination a secretariat can reduce the costs of 
information, policy innovation and negotiation. Second, state preferences are 
assumed to be the result of bargains among domestic actors. Intergovernmentalists 
tended originally to view states as Unitary actors, but due to criticism some of them 
have shifted towards a two-stage approach in which a domestic process of 
9 International institutions are social institutions covering governing the activities of the members of 
the international society (Young, 1989, p. 6). . 
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preference formation precedes interstate bargain (liberal intergovemmentalism). 
Finally, the outcome of interstate bargains is assumed to reflect the relative power of 
the member states. International cooperation is therefore usually interpreted as an 
expression of the preferences of the ~eat powers. 
In supranational politics centralized governmental institutions make binding 
rules presenting constraints and opportunities for the member states in any given 
policy domain (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998, p. 8). The establishment of a 
supranational mode of governance requires that the member states voluntarily 
transfer their authority over an area of national policy towards the supranational 
level. The essence of supranational politics therefore is not that the supranational 
institutions replace governments, but that within some given policy domains they 
are able to prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations of 
other actors, including the member states. 
The purpose of this section is to present the factors that help explain the 
reconfiguration of BSEC and in particular its intergovernmental mode. I will restrict 
here the analysis to some factors that are being emphasized in the following two 
frameworks of understanding regional integration. 
Demand conditions 
The first of these is the transaction-based theory offered by Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz (1998). One of the propositions of their model for European integration is 
that "increasing levels of cross-border transactions and communications by societal 
actors will increase the perceived 'need for European-level rules, coordination and 
regulations" (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998, p. 11). Thus, as transnational exchange 
increases such as trade, investment, the establishment of non-governmental 
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networks and associations (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998, p. 2), so will the demand 
for supranational governance. 
Furthermore, because the business community has the greatest material stake 
in cross-border exchange, it is ex.pected that they should have the strongest 
preferences for a change (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998, p.1S). Once transnational 
actors have expressed a need for supranational governance, the crucial point 
becomes the political willingness to meet those needs. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 
have a rather optimistic view on this point. Because transnational exchange increases 
the cost of keeping separate national rules, governments are assumed to have strong 
incentives to begin a movement towards integration so that the generation of wealth 
and prosperity is not hampered. Governments may resist or try to slow down 
movements towards supranational governance, but the cost of such a policy is 
expected to be considerable. So instead of actively pressing on for more integration, 
governments are perceived as I reactive' and I constantly adjusting' to more 
independent forces of integration (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998, p. 12). 
Subsequently theorizing by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz is devoted to the internal 
dynamics of integration. However, since the BSEC has not left yet the stage of 
intergovernmental governance, I will leave this part of their theory aside. The theory 
offered by Sandholtz and Stone has some affinity with neofunctionalism. For 
example, the proposition that social exchange and transaction generate demands for 
supranational governance appears in neofunctionalism. However, in contrast to nee-
functionalism the dependent variable in the work of Sadholtz and Stone Sweet 
remains the mode of governance rather than the formation of identities or the 
process of state-building (Sandholtz &Stone Sweet, 1998, pp. 5-6). 
Supply conditions 
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The second framework for understanding regional integration has been developed 
by Walter Mattli (1999). Being influenced by political economy, this theory contains 
propositions that stress the importance of both market and institution factors. The 
starting point for Mattli's theorizing. is basically the same as in the first framework, 
but after this it develops in another direction. First, "the potential for economic gains 
from market exchange within a region must be significant .... market players will 
then have an incentive to lobby for regional institutional arrangements that render 
the realization of these gains possible. The demand for regional rules, regulations 
and policies by market players is a critical driving force of integration" and second, 
"there must be a fulfilment of supply conditions. These are the conditions under 
which political leaders are willing and able to accommodate demands for regional 
institutions at each step of the integration process" (Mattli, 1999, p.42). 
Thus while Sandholtz and Stone Sweet expected a more immediate 'reactive' 
response to transnational demands, Mattli assumes that there are also a number of 
supply conditions that must be fulfilled before the integration process actually takes 
off. Three supply conditions are identified (Mattli, 1999, pp. 50-57). First, it is 
assumed that economic difficulties can work as a background condition of regional 
integration. As long as national economies prosper, governments are less likely to 
move towards supranational governance "because their expected marginal benefit 
from integration in terms of improved re-election chances (or simply in terms of 
retaining political power) is minimal and thus not worth the cost of integration" 
(Mattli, 1999, p. 51). However, this is expected to change in times of economic 
difficulties. This means that if integration is perceived to improve the economic 
conditions, the domestic political payoff of such a move is expected to become 
higher. 
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Second, it is assumed that movements towards supranational governance are 
facilitated by I the presence of a benevolent country'. This is perceived to be a key 
supply condition because even if governments are willing to respond positively to 
demands for integration they may still be Wlable to do so because of the problem of 
collective action. However, a benevolent leading country can help the region to 
respond to this problem by assuming the role of coordinator or 'regional playmaster' 
(Mattli, 1999, p. 56). The function of a 'playmaster' is primarily to ease the 
distributional tensions that usually follow from integration, for example by making 
side-payments. Finally, once the member states have concluded an integration 
agreement, it is expected that the process towards supranational governance will be 
favoured by the establishment of 'commitment institutions' i.e. institutions which 
could monitor and implement rules (Mattli, 1999, p. 54-55). However, since the BSEC 
still is a case of intergovernmental governance we will not insist on this third 
condition. 
Security conditions 
Another variable included in our framework is security related conditions. The 
frameworks of Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, and Mattll do not explicitly address this 
issue. However, Mattli does in fact emphasize that the quest for national security and 
the role of military alliances can playa significant role in integration (Mattli, 1999, 
pp. 17-18). This assumption rests among others on the observation that trade is 
generally higher among militarily allied countries.tO From a broader perspective, 
military alliances can be seen as part of the security dilemma i.e. the circumstance 
that many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the 
security of others (Sperling & Kirchner, 1997). The intensity of the security dilemma 
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is among other things, affected by changes in the defence balance and by estimates of 
the behaviour of others. As the dilemma becomes less intense, it is reasonable to 
expect that it will positively affect the political willingness to meet demands for 
integration. This hypothesis is not le~st suggested from the post-war development in 
Western Europe (Wyatt-Walter, 1997). 
The actual status of the security dilemma in the post-Cold War era is a much 
disputed matter within the academic community. Quoting Wyatt-Walter, the 
scholarly debate is divided between "those on the one hand who see Europe as 
transcending the security dilemma in a potentially unique institutional manner and 
those on the other hand who see it as vulnerable to an eternal cycle of structural 
repetition" (Wyatt - Walter, 1997, p. 9). Among the former are Sperling and 
Kirchner, who argue that the transition to post-Cold War Europe has 'transformed' 
the security dilemma and made it much less intensive (Sperling & Kirchner, 1997, p. 
8). Mark Webber on the other hand, argues that the dilemma has not been removed 
since Russia's nuclear and conventional capabilities still arouse strong concern - at 
least in NATO (Webber, 1996, p. 213). 
An external center of power 
As the systemic approach points out the regional phenomenon cannot be examined 
in isolation from broader processes and pressures that come from the international 
system or from 'outside'. This is particularly important when examining the 
evolution of subregions whose center of power or modernizing anchor is often 
outside the delineated subregion and the states involved. Subregionalism may not be 
simply a response to outside pressures as neorealism would argue (Waltz, 1979), but 
its contents and character are significantly shaped by external factors that result 
10 For references on this literature see Mattli, 1999, p. 31. 
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either from the nature of the international system (e.g. globalization) or from specific 
states, international organizations or other regions. 
As we argued earlier, a generic element of subregionalism is its dependence on 
broader (hemispheric) regional processes or powerful neighboring regional 
organizations. Certainly, the EU in this respect is the most powerful actor at the 
continental level and it dominates the political and economic developments in the 
BSEC subregion too. The EU becomes a 'soft hegemonic regional power' organizing 
the continent in concentric circles, integrating norms and interests (Telo, 2001, p. 
180). 
What we are looking for here is not just to indicate whether the EU has spurred 
regionalism or not, but how it has influenced the reconfiguration of subregionalism. 
6. Conclusion 
Given the complexity of the regional phenomenon every approach presented here 
has its own merits. In this dissertation we formulate an analytical framework in 
order to answer the basic question posed; the dynamics of the formation of BSEC. 
The theoretical proposals examined earlier in this chapter suggest that the 
following model (figure 1.1) could help us in the search for an answer to why BSEC 
has so far developed into an intergovernmental mode of governance. The model 
contains four variables from within the subregion: transnational exchange and 
demands, economic difficulties, the presence of a benevolent leading country and 
transformations of the security dilemma. Of the four variables, transnational 
exchange and demands is assumed to function as an initial causal mechanism, while 
the others are decisive on whether or not governments are willing and able to meet 
transnational demands for a supranational mode of governance. The fifth variable, 
the external factor (Le. the EU) adds an 'outside-in' perspective and it is decisive both 
as a factor shaping subregional structures themselves and directly influencing the 
above-mentioned factors from within the subregion. 
Figure 1.1 Explaining the mode of subregional governance 
I EU J 
Benevolent Mode of governance Security 
leading country (BSEC) dilemma 
f 
I I 
Transnational Economic 
exchange & difficulties 
demand 
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CHAPTER 2. UNFOLDING BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION: 
ASSESSING NATIONAL PRREFERENCES 
1. Introduction 
The idea of BSEC belonged originally to the Turkish ambassador to the United States, 
Sukru Elekdag, who announced this project for the first time during a panel 
discussion organized in Istanbul in January 1990 i.e. prior to the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. The first positive reaction came from the then Soviet ambassador 
Albert Chemichev. It was after the meeting of Turgut Ozal, the then Turkish 
President, with Sukru Elekdag that the Turkish government adopted the project 
(Elekdag, 1994, pp. 203-206). Sukru Elekdag believed that "the climate just after the 
historical changes in the world and the beginning of a new era of peace and 
cooperation could be reflected to the Black Sea Region to create favourable 
conditions and to establish institutional arrangements among the Black Sea countries 
for the development and diversification of their economic relations" (Neacsa, 1996, p. 
I). 
In November and December 1990 several preliminary meetings were organized 
in Ankara which included delegations from Bulgaria, Turkey, Romania and the 
former Soviet Union. At those preliminary meetings, the issues of socia-economic 
and environmental nature were put on the agenda. A draft 'BSEe Frame Agreement' 
was submitted to Bulgarian, Romanian and Soviet officials at a preparatory meeting 
in Ankara in December 1990, and ·it was agreed that the delegation of the Soviet 
Union would include six Republics i.e. Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine (llkin, 1993, p. 59). Follow-up meetings took place in 
Bucharest on 12-13 March 1991 (technical level), in Sofia on 23-25 Apri11991 (Deputy 
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Foreign Ministers), and in Moscow on 11-12 July 1991 at which Greece and the 
former Yugoslavia were invited to attend as observers (Genckaya, 1993, p. 549). At 
these preliminary meetings a draft document determining the framework for 
subregional cooperation was prepared. When the project could have possibly 
remained stillborn due to the lack of enthusiasm of certain states and on account of 
the initial confusion caused by the break-up of the Soviet Union, Turkish officials 
continued to press for the project's adoption (Athanassopoulou, 1994, pp. 37-41). The 
final document was signed on 3 February 1992 by the delegates of nine countries 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, 
Ukraine). In a document released after the meeting, it was stated that the cooperation 
would be open to other states that would accept the BSEC Declaration. It was also 
specified that if formal applications were received by the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
from Yugoslavia and Greece they would be invited to join BSEC as founding states 
(Genckaya, 1993, pp. 549-557). Greece and Yugoslavia had sent observers for the first 
time to the meeting of the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Moscow Guly 1991). 
Indeed, Greece applied for membership on 28 February 1992. The disintegration of 
Yugoslavia rendered its application for membership meaningless. As to Albania, it 
was hesitant to the end whether to accept or not the Turkish invitation to attend the 
meting for the signing of the Bosphorus Declaration (To Virna, 27 October 1991; 
Macedonia, 25 June 1992). It was due to the strong diplomatic efforts of Prime 
Minister Demirel that Albania took its place at the Summit (Ozuye, 1992, p. 53). 
At the end of 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the scope of the 
initiative. The newly independent states immediately expressed their interest in 
participating in BSEC but their priorities were to facilitate their political-economic 
transition, to ensure participation in the European affairs and integration in the 
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world economy and to enhance stability and security in the region. None of them, as 
The Economist (27 June 1992) put it was "famous for their ability to cooperate". BSEC 
was formally established on 25 June 1992 at the meeting of Heads of State and 
Government in Is~anbul by eleven countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
BSEC as established in 1992 and actually developed later was less ambitious 
than the originally proposed Turkish scheme. In a special speech given in Istanbul in 
September 1992, President Ozal presented the Turkish view on the objectives, 
membership and character of the future 'Black Sea economic zone'. Turkey's initial 
idea included plans to create 'a zone of economic and commercial cooperation' a 
kind of 'Black Sea economic community' with a' free movement of goods, people and 
capital'. It was to be relatively closed in character and unite only the Black Sea states 
from the Balkans to Caucasus. A 'Black Sea customs union' was planned for a later 
stage (Elekdag, 1991, pp. 19-21). However, even during the first preparatory 
meetings of the expert groups, the representatives of the former Soviet Union, 
Bulgaria and Romania rejected the Turkish suggestions for the relatively closed 
character of the 'Black Sea zone', insisting on the inclusion of non-Black Sea countries 
such as Greece and Yugoslavia and declaring themselves against its premature 
institutionalization (Christakoudis, 2000, p. 6). The participating states agreed in 
principle to create a rather more open (not institutionalized) organization in whose 
name the controversial word 'zone' was substituted for 'cooperation'. The Summit 
Declaration in June 1992 did not finally refer to a free trade arrangement but spoke 
on the reduction or the progressive elimination of obstacles to trade while it referred 
to the free movement of only businessmen, rather than persons. 
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The foundations for the transformation of BSEC into a regional organization 
were set out in the Bucharest Declaration of 1995. At their next meeting in Moscow 
(25 October 1996), the Heads of State and Government of BSEC defined BSEC as an 
'international economic organizatio!". It was the eleventh BSEC MMFA on 30 April 
1998 that approved the Charter of BSEC, which constitutes the basic legal document 
establishing the new organization. In May 1999, BSEC was finally transformed into 
an international organization. One of the most important decisions for the future of 
the organization was taken on 17 April 2003 when the BSEC Council proceeded with 
the enlargement of the organization and invited two new states to accede: the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as well as Serbia and Montenegro. 
Based on a purely geographical concept (itsell rather unclear), the new 
grouping presented important differences in terms of the members' size, population 
and ecohomic development. Ranging from a country (Greece) fully integrated in the 
Euro-Atlantic structures to states with virtually no relationship with the same 
institutions (EU, NATO, WEU) there was practically no common feature in terms of 
political orientation. There was, however, a common willingness to profit from the 
new opportunities brought about by the new European and regional environment 
and to join forces in common projects. For almost hall the participating states (i.e. for 
the NIS and for the, until then, sell-isolated Albania) it was above all a historic first in 
their appearance on the international scene. 
2. BSEC in the literature 
BSEC has received less scholarly attention than any other subregional group. It is 
interesting to note that with the exception of Siskos (1998) and Borisenko et al., (1998) 
there is no other published book on BSEC in English, French, Greek and Turkish 
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language. Aybak's edited book (2001) and Adams et al., (2002) are the only works 
which put the Black Sea in a regional perspective.1 Any other substantial reference on 
the Black Sea subregional dynamics is included in volumes of comparative research 
(Hook & Kearns, 1999; Cottey, 1999b) or research papers. Consequently literature on 
BSEC itself as an organization or on the Black Sea as a subregion has been limited 
and bears two characteristics. First, it is poor on conceptualizing Black Sea 
subregionalism or moving beyond normative and policy oriented approaches. 
Second, structural explanations have dominated the literature, picturing BSEC as a 
result of the fundamental changes in the international system following the end of 
the Cold War. The emphasis on the systemic imperatives of regional formations in 
post-Cold War Europe has triumphed in analyzing BSEC. 
BSEC is officially defined as a 'regional economic organization' (Charter, 1998) 
placing trade and economy-related activities as the priority issues on its agenda 
hence, almost all of its Working Groups have focused on trade, finance, SMEs, 
agriculture, transport, etc. This being said, there has been no evaluation or 
assessment of BSEC's welfare impact or economic effects wit h a few exceptions 
(Shchetinin, 1996; Sayan, n.d.; Salavrakos, 1997). The reason is that on the ground 
BSEC has not developed into a trade bloc, or a FTA (despite initial efforts), nor have 
its members taken trade related commibnents. The BSEC agreement does not directly 
provide for any trade preferences for countries within the group (DECO, 1996; 
DECO, 1997; Sayan, n.d.) and for this reason neither trade diversion nor trade 
creation effects arise - in the sense that it would change the relative costs in domestic 
markets of imports from member and non-member countries (Sayan, n.d.). 
I There have been however a few published papers such as Valinakis, 1999; Emerson & VahI, 2001. 
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There are two aspects of Black Sea subregionalism that relate to each other and 
have attracted scholarly attention. First, attention has been placed on the formative 
stages of the initiative hence on the issue of what has allowed for the emergence of 
BSEC. Second, BSEC has been examined within the framework of its relevance to 
security and viewed under a normative approach as to whether subregionalism 
contributes to the stability of post-Cold War Europe and should be encouraged 
(Bailes, 1997; Cottey, 1999b; Dwan, 1999). 
As far as BSEC's emergence is concerned, two popular accounts of the forces 
driving cooperation are frequently encountered: securing peace and cooperative 
hegemony. From a normative point of view, the argument of peace through 
cooperation has dominated the understanding of subregionaIism and encouraged a 
positive approach to subregionalism according to which regional cooperation 
weakens power politics and makes armed conflict less possible. Most analysts agree 
that it was the concern about securing peace which contributed to the set-up of 
BSEC. Therefore, although BSEC has been described as a multidimensional, 
comprehensive process being part of Europe's new subregionalism (Cottey, 1999a; 
Hook & Kearns, 1999), what has been stressed is its 'indirect approach' to security. 
We have to clarify however, that BSEC has never been pictured as a security alliance. 
The power of the securing peace argument notwithstanding, it does not explain why 
all eleven countries participate in the process. There is no evidence that either Greece 
or Albania joined BSEC out of concerns about peace. Yet this does not change the fact 
that conflict is still very dominant around the Black Sea. 
Neorealist explanations of BSEC have been dominant with the most influential 
one the early work of Sezer (1992b). Sezer summarized the logic behind initiating 
BSEC as the call of the regional hegemon (Turkey) to its neighbours lito cooperate 
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rather than defect". Although this provides for a good understanding of the 
motivation behind the policy of the hegemon it does leave several aspects of the 
process unexplained. First, one has to investigate the degree to which there has 
actually been a regional hegemon in the area. Hereafter, in this research we indicate 
that the organization itself lacks a clear hegemonic leadership. Sezer's 
conceptualization of the BSEC process points out the role of a particular state driving 
the BSEC process but there has been no follow-up to explain the evolving features of 
the subregional process, e.g. its high institutionalization or to explain the interests of 
the rest of member states and their elites, within the context of regional hegemony. 
Thus, the analytical tools employed to conceptualize BSEC are limited, coming 
from the most classical aspect of the (neo)realist reading of international relations. 
Much of the literature on subregionalism in the Black Sea suffers from focusing 
solely on security issues, downplaying such factors as the role of ideas, beliefs, civil 
society, knowledge or attitudinal change. In spite of BSEC's comprehensive nature 
there has been no analysis of the role of non-state actors and the impact of economic 
interests on the BSEC process. Part of the problem is that many aspects of the 
regional market forces and transnational actors have yet to develop and to be studied 
in depth. 
In an effort to readdressed some imbalances in the literature we focus here on 
three main aspects. First, we disclose the expectations of all eleven BSEC member 
states. This takes place in the next section. 
A second step is to cast some light on the domestic level of analysis and the -
changed - preferences of the leadership. We try to indicate that the change in favour 
of cooperation has reflected a shift in preferences of the local elites and segments of 
the society. It was only recently, in the 19905 that the region started to generate a 
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common vision: the perspective of integration within the European structures, even 
of an EU membership. The basic preconditions for eventual EU membership, such as 
the Helsinki principles, the Copenhagen criteria and the adoption of the acquis 
commullautaire are more and more .becoming the guiding principles and the role 
model for political and economic reform and institution-building in the countries of 
the subregion. A set of explanations focuses specifically on the notion of leadership. 
As we see later, the imaginative leadership of Ozal, the President of Turkey in the 
early 1990s, may explain both the timing and the early stages of BSEC's 
development. Despite leadership's importance in·the formative years of BSEC we do 
not claim however that it can explain all aspects of BSEC's reconfiguration. A focus 
on the preferences of Turkish leadership's preferences would fail to explain why 
BSEC did not develop in accordance to the initial ideas of its founding fathers. It also 
fails to explain why other leaderships adhered to the idea of subregional cooperation. 
Third, we undertake an effort, as we said in the introduction, to address the 
issue of BSEC's formation rather than simply its emergence. In this endeavour we 
place BSEC within a hemispheric regional process led by the ED. Although literature 
places BSEC within the new European order, little has been said on the influence of 
neighbouring regional actors such as the EU on the subregional processes in general 
and on BSEC particularly. Analysts acknowledge but have not systematically 
researched the high level of dependency that subregional groups have on 
neighbouring strong regional actors or broader regional processes. Although some 
preliminary efforts have been made to relate BSEC to the EU process (Adams et at 
2002; Genckaya, 1993; Emerson & Vahl, 2001), those are mainly focused on.policy 
related issues of normative nature. In chapter six we attempt to fill this gap in the 
literature as far BSEC is concerned. 
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3. Leadership's choice 
Leadership is a key factor shaping the identity of BSEC as the latter has been created 
and conceived by political elites rather than societal groups. It thus reflects the main 
orientations, specific understandings· and expectations of the local political elite. The 
role of leadership and personal influence in the constellation of emerging regional 
orders cannot be overestimated particularly in periods of sweeping changes in the 
system of international relations such as the end of the 1980s. 
Turgut Ozal, Prime Minister (1983-89) and President (1989-93) of Turkey was 
an important factor that affected foreign policy in Turkey during the 1980s 
(Abramovitz, 1993, pp. 164-181; Robins, 2003, pp. 53-57; Hunter, 1995, pp. 90-94). He 
was also the leader who realized the BSEC project along with a number of other 
regional projects in the areas neighbouring Turkey. Ozal's ideology was a synthesis 
of technological westernization and cultural Turkish and Islamism (Ataman, 2002, 
pp. 120-153). One part of his ideology was the Ottoman and Islamic culture. The 
second half was economic and political liberalism. He claimed that modernization 
could only be achieved through liberalization and used economic liberalism to 
achieve political pluralism and vice versa. 
New types of alliance patterns were pursued with Turkey shifting its strategic 
priorities and focusing on regional issues rather than playing largely with global 
powers. While previous leadership led Turkey to follow a strictly Western-oriented 
alliance pattern, the Ozalleadership led Turkey to follow a more diversified policy to 
serve as a bridge between the West ,and the East and attempted to transform it into 
the political and economic centre or the 'regional hegemon' of the evolving orders in 
Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. Ozal was however aware that without 
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the Western support it would be difficult to maintain its regime in one of the most 
strategic and unstable regions in the world. 
Full membership in the EU ~as not the only alternative for Ozal's leadership 
who aimed to benefit from the EU in economic terms as he believed that economic 
competition within the EU market would benefit the Turkish economy (A taman, 
2002, p. 143). He thus viewed the EU as a means to improve Turkey's 
industrialization and economic development rather than a political objective and 
stressed that II still by keeping the priority of the European context, we have to attach 
great importance to the United States, Black Sea Economic Cooperation and East 
Asia" (Ozal, 1991, p. 35). He therefore attempted to restructure Turkey's foreign 
policy from being 'the tail end of Europe' into the centre of its own newly emerging 
world (Fuller, 1997, p. ix). Building a network of alliances was one of the tools to 
reduce dependency on the Western bloc. The initiation of 'alternative patterns' such 
as BSEC, Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the East Asian market 
would balance its Western partnership. This 'alliance pattern' improved Turkey'S 
relations with the Newly Independent States (NIS), the Islamic world and the 
neighbouring eastern European countries (Ataman, 2002, p. 132). 
Furthermore, making use of the religious element he forged closer relations 
with countries having a high percentage of Muslims. When Ozal paid an official visit 
to Bulgaria, FYROM, Albania and Croatia in February 1993, it was interpreted by 
many as a historical step taken by Turkey towards building ties with Muslims while 
challenging the aspirations of form~r Yugoslavia and Greece. After his visit, Ozal 
stated that for Turkey "the most effective power in the region is Islam" and he 
advised religious organizations in Turkey to activate in theses states (Tanil, 1995, p. 
280). 
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Ozal's approach to foreign policy characterized by his aspiration "to depart 
from established policies, to take calculated risks, and to search for new alternatives 
and options" (Sayari, 1992, p. 18) led a more diversified, active and outward-oriented 
foreign policy. During the Ozal administration more international agreements than 
any other administrations in Turkish history were signed while improving relations 
with the Soviet Union/Russia and with other socialist countries (before the collapse 
of the socialist bloc) was part of a foreign policy increasingly focused on 
multilateralism. Turkey opened the border station at Sarp (Turkish-Georgian 
borders) in September 1988, which had been closed since 1937. It signed a number of 
agreements with the Soviet Union during the period of 1986-1990, including the 
agreement on Exchange Commodities, the Convertible Currency Protocol, and the 
Long-term Program: Economic, Trade, Scientific and Technological Cooperation 
(A taman, 2002, p.139). During Ozal's Presidency further cooperative acts were also 
taken. Turkey solved the 17 year old problem of the Flight Information Region over 
the Black Sea in 1989. Russia and Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation in 1991 and Turkey opened its consulate in Baku, and the Soviet Union 
opened a consulate in Trabzon. In spite of problems, similar improvements in 
political and economic fields continued with Russia. In the first several years 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, over 300 agreements of all kinds were 
concluded between Turkey and the newly emerged states - particularly the Turkish 
speaking ones - covering such diverse subjects as civil aviation and prevention of 
double taxation. 
Ozal was an exponent of classical liberal concept of international relations and 
the notion of complex interdependency according to which growing levels of 
economic integration can stabilize difficult bilateral relations as they increase the cost 
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of and the likelihood of tension and conflict thus generating better political relations. 
Consequently he advocated multilateralism. Multilateral/regional cooperation was 
not thus just a security strategy but it was also a foreign economic policy to spread 
Turkish economic and political power (Robins, 2003, pp. 56-57). None of the 
initiatives launched at the time, had a strictly security orientation, they rather aimed 
at fostering economic interaction and promoting Turkish economic interests in the 
area. The Turkish Cooperation Development Agency was thus founded in the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry in 1992 to organize relations with the NIS and to foster 
cooperative opportunities. 
Ozal needed no persuasion to include economic interests in foreign affairs as 
he viewed foreign policy 'as a branch of international trade relations'. To benefit 
from the new foreign economic opportunities Ozal had to II galvanize his own 
business sector" (Robins, 2003, p. 59). He did that by taking Turkey's most influential 
businessmen along with him wherever he travelled abroad and sought to ensure that 
Turkey, with its recent export oriented economy, took advantage of every foreign 
opportunity and every high-level personal contact made in the sphere of political 
affairs. With this practice he pushed Turkish businessmen towards investment, trade 
and contracting abroad. Those businessmen alerted by the opportunities offered to 
them, were in turn ready to support Ozal's policies in the interior while drawing the 
attention of European critics, who were concerned that his authority was acquired 
under a military regime, to the positive results of his policies (Robins, 2003, pp. 59, 
85). 
The documents establishing the BSEC process mirrored the liberal economic 
and political ideas exposed by Ozai. The Summit Declaration of the BSEC (1992) was 
based on West European liberal ideas and the rule of law. The Turkish government 
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argued for the integration of the principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act into the 
draft documents of the BSEC, including those of democracy, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. This demonstrated the extent to which the country was 
striving to act as a bridge between the European organizations and the states of the 
Black Sea region (Muftuler Bac, 1997, p. 45). Consequently, a flexible cooperative 
structure was originally envisaged for BSEC to pursue four freedoms: the free 
movement of people, goods, capital and services. 
4. Assessing motivations of BSEC cooperation 
4.1 Turkey's interests and geopolitical considerations 
Turkey's geostrategic location2 at the opening of the Black Sea gives to the country a 
central role in developments in any sphere of subregional cooperation (military, 
political, economic, environmental, energy, etc.). As we saw earlier, the initiative for 
BSEC came from Turkey, whose political elite wished to foster intra-Black Sea 
relations and at the same time recover a leading role in the area. Since BSEC occurred 
at a time of considerable bilateral tension among its members, the advantages of 
stability were very important. Turkey found it necessary to adopt a cooperative 
strategy in its relations with the neighbouring states to promote its foreign 
(economic) policy interests and to this end it first of all tried to create a good 
relationship with Russia. It should be emphasized that Ankara's interest in the Black 
Sea area dates before the collapse of the Soviet Union. What have been the main 
considerations behind the Turkish call to establish BSEC? 
The BSEC process gained momentum in the overall foreign policy orientation 
of Turkey within a relatively short period of time. At the opening of the BSEC 
2 See among others Tashan, 1992, pp. 20·28; Mughisuddin, 1995, pp. 189·201; Winrow, 1996. 
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Summit in June 1992 the then Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel underlined the 'top 
priority' of BSEC within the country's overall strategy: "The reason why we attach 
such importance and priority to this cooperation is simply our belief in the existence 
of a fundamental base for this project and in the prospects for its improvement under 
the present conditions" (Demirel, 1992). As the Speaker of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly stated, Turkey had taken a historic step toward a comprehensive 
multilateral cooperation scheme covering the Balkans and the Caucasus: "Turkey is 
stepping for the first time into multilateral economic cooperation of such a large 
portion and scope" (Cindoruk,1994). 
The Black Sea project was seen as another symptom of Turkey's confidence and 
a reflection of its re-emergence on the post-Cold War scene (Fuller & Lesser et aL, 
1993, pp. 103, 157). Subregionalism was thus employed as a foreign policy tool, and 
initiatives such as BSEC under Turkish leadership were seen as enhancing Turkey's 
place in the changing post-Cold War era. Turkey aimed at using BSEC in such a way 
as to raise its profile within the new European architecture while it could facilitate 
cooperation with the Balkan countries and the ex-Soviet states (Ataman, 2002, p. 
140). Particularly, the inclusion of Balkan countries in the BSEC process was seen as a 
means to replace the Balkan Conferences, seen as rather ineffective, with a more 
eastward-oriented cooperation framework. 
As we said earlier, exporting its own ideology and regime based on western 
ideas and ideals and cultivating cultural and economic relations may be identified as 
another goal of Turkish active role ~ subregional efforts in the area (Sezer, 1996, p. 
87). Additionally, geographical proximity, mutual complementarity among the 
economies of the Black Sea region and the Turkish reform experience that began in 
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the early 1980s were seen as "natural advantages whose expeditious exploitation 
could yield significant mutual benefits" (Sezer, 1992b, p. 158). 
Furthermore, Turkey had a strategic interest in several of the former Soviet 
republics, given the perceived potential of the Turkish world which had been under 
Soviet control for decades in the Caucasus and Central Asia. BSEC was still in a 
preliminary stage when the Soviet empire began to collapse, offering Turkey what it 
saw as a historic opportunity to increase its influence in a region of roughly forty 
million people encompassing Turkish-speaking Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Accordingly, Turkey has continued to 
exploit this opportunity in the post-Soviet era, bearing in mind Russia's strategic 
interest in this region (Athanassopoulou, 1995, pp. 279-285). 
In addition, with the demise of the Soviet Union, BSEC was perceived as an 
instrument of Turkish policy vis-a-vis Iran and the CIS. Turkey's role within BSEC 
has served to enhance the perception that it has become a regional power, a 
perception that is essential to Turkey's relations with Iran, which it considers as a 
potential rival due to the latter's influence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia 
(Glenny, 1995, p. 105). 
Nevertheless, there are two central factors that have filtered Turkey's policy 
towards BSEe. First, Ankara has given priority to its relations with the EU which is 
considered a strategic foreign policy orientation - hence EU orientation filters 
Turkey's attitude towards any (sub)regional forum while conditions the level of its 
integration within it. Second, Turkish policies vis-a-vis BSEC go through its relations 
with the historically rival state; Russia.3 
3 On Russian - Turkish relations see Chapter s. 
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Russia is considered the most important partner for the stabilization of the 
Black Sea area (Fuller G., 1993, pp. 33-40). Instability in the newly established 
republics has been a main structural factor at the centre of Russian - Turkish 
relations in the 1990s as the region is vital for both countries' interests. During the 
decade of the 1990s both states considerably shifted their foreign policies towards 
their borders and away from their global role (for Russia) and their relations with the 
United States (for Turkey) (Hill, 2002). As existential security concerns on Russia's 
role were eased in Ankara, rivalry between the two states was replaced by 'managed 
competition' (Sezer, 2001). The Black Sea and Central Asia became the main scene 
where this new stage of bilateral affairs has been tested. With reference to BSEC, we 
may argue that the new initiative provided a framework for the strengthening of this 
'managed competition' or the 'virtual rapprochement' between Moscow and Ankara. 
It should thus be noticed that the BSEC idea was embraced by both administrations 
in the year 1990 when bilateral relations were going through what has been called as 
a 'golden period'. With the break up of the former Soviet Union, BSEC offered for 
Turkish diplomacy the appropriate multilateral framework to maintain and improve 
its relations with Moscow and explore possibilities of enhancing its influence in the 
region. 
Expanded relations with the NIS seemed simultaneously to offer new 
possibilities for cultural and economic development especially at a time when 
Turkey's position in Europe was faltering. The post-Cold War era brought to the 
surface the inner tensions between Turkey and its western allies as its European 
identity was questioned in view of the redefinition of 'Europe' and the expansion of 
the EU (Sezer, 1996, p. 87). Turkey perceived and promoted itself as a middleman 
between the former Soviet/Warsaw Pact nations and the West, with BSEC being one 
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vehicle for triangular cooperation (Muftuler Bac, 1997, p. 46). The argument that 
Turkey could be drawn away from the West by new opportunities in Central Asia 
and elsewhere - that it might seek a 'Middle Eastern' or 'Turkic' identity rather than 
a 'Western' one - has been disputed by most observers who point out that the 
supposed new choices are not contradictory or competitive, they are complementary. 
Most analysts suggest that BSEC was motivated primarily by Turkey's 
geopolitical interests as a state that is torn between the western and eastern culture 
(Uuzeyir, 1992; Connely, 1994, p. 32). In fact, Turkey's political elite thus liked to 
present its country as a bridge between Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. 
However, there was a risk for western Europe, which might prefer to see it as a 
barrier against a hostile 'other', left outside European structures. In the absence of 
closer ties with a Western Europe, this line of argument suggested that Turkey 
would explore new areas of opportunity, such as the NIS of central Asia and the 
Black Sea (Fuller & Lesser et a!., 1993, pp. 102, 129; Hale, 2000, p. 193; Sezer, 1992, pp. 
17-46). Turkey'S increasing role in the area was in fact encouraged by its western 
allies as it was in the interest of Western Europe and the United States to regard 
Turkey as an 'integral component' which could also "maximize its relations with the 
Middle East and Central Asia" (Fuller & Lesser et aI., 1993, p. 2). Indeed most of the 
economic assistance programs that Turkey developed for these republics were in one 
form or another funded by the United States, Japan, the World Bank or others 
(Hunter, 1995, p. 95). 
It could thus be argued that (or Turkey an active policy outside Europe was 
important partly because it increased its significance for policy-makers in Western 
Europe in the post-Cold War environment. BSEC's geographical basis and 
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membership reflected exactly Turkey's concern to look simultaneously to both the 
East and the West. 
Political eCOl1011lY considerations 
Turkey's embrace of the Black Sea region was not, merely an alternative security 
strategy. The opening up of the exports markets in the former Soviet Union which 
had previously been restricted by the state-controlled economic system, was offering 
new economic opportunities particularly for the Turkish businessmen. Accordingly, 
it has been argued (Fuller & Lesser et al., 1993 p. 157) that the main aim of Turkey in 
establishing BSEC was "to get into the Soviet market and to have access to Soviet raw 
ma terials" . 
The policies of an open market economy applied by Ozal in the early 1980s 
which altered the decades long statist policies not only brought a significant growth 
in the national economy but they also lent it an international orientation that had an 
effect on Turkish foreign policy (Onis, 2000; Fuller & Lesser et al., 1993, p. 39). The 
principal source of economic growth during the 1980s and 1990s was the expansion 
of exports, which increased at an average of 4.1 per cent per annual during the 
period 1988-1995 (WTO, 1998, p. 9). 4 Turkey's new export-oriented policiess 
increased its interest in the neighbouring economies: Middle East, the NIS and 
Eastern Europe. The liberalization of the Turkish economy to be successful generated 
demands in the foreign policy. Turkish governments needed to increase the 
4 Exports rose from 13 billion USD in 1990 to $31.1 billion in 1998, and imports from $22.6 million to 
$45.5 billion over the same period. As a result, total foreign merchandise trade, as a proportion of 
GNP, rose from 23.5 per cent to 36.5 per cent. See EIU, 1993, p. 3 and Briefing, 22 March 1999, p. 32. 
, By the early 1980s, Turkey had an economy that was more export oriented in approach than the 
import substitution model of old. Its export profile was shifting from agricultural output to 
manufacturing. Thus the composition of exports moved from 64 per cent agric-food products in 1980 
to 71 per cent industrial products in 1989 (Robins, 2003, p. 208; Onis, 2000). 
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country's exports and service earnings, so as to avoid the frequent balance-of-
payments crises which had bedevilled the economy up to the 19805 and secure access 
to foreign markets (Hale, 2000, p. 208). This meant that Turkish governments had to 
try to prevent political conflicts. with important trading partners and avoid 
isolationist policies. Consequently, an increasingly central business interest was that 
political problems with neighbours should not be allowed to interfere with 
commercial operations. Thus Turkish businessmen tried to promote economic 
interaction with Armenia.6 At the same time, during the Chechen conflict in the 
Russian Federation, Turkish businessmen lobbied behind the scenes to persuade 
Ankara not to introduce economic sanctions against Russia for its crackdown on the 
Chechens for fear that this would damage growing commercial interaction with 
Russia (Robins, 2003, pp. 84-86). 
By the end of the 1980s there was the first wave of excitement about new 
economic opportunities in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union where geographic 
proximity was an additional asset of the Turkish products to compete. The Black Sea 
project thus built on an expanding volume of Turkish trade and investment across 
the Black Sea, embracing Russia and the NIS. Turkish enterprises, led by the 
construction and pharmaceutical industries, have been particularly active in 
developing commercial ties with those republics. In 1989, Turkish trade with the 
former Soviet Union was worth $1.2 billion, triple what it had been in 1986 rising to 
$1.9 billion in 1990 (Robins, 2003, p. 57). Apart from the normal trade passing 
through regular commercial channels, there was also an unexpected flow of what is 
6 A Turkish business leader, Ishak Alaton of the Alarko corporation, attempted to use his business 
contacts with American-based Armenians to try to promote economic interaction between Turkey and 
Armenia. He arranged a meeting between Hirair Hovannian whom he accompanied and Turkish 
foreign minister Hikmet Cetin, at which Hovannian argued for the opening of a border gate for trade to 
enable Armenia to benefit from transit via the Black Sea port of Trabzon .. See Sabah. cited in Turkish 
Press Review, 19 February 1992. 
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called 'suitcase trade'7 The Turkish Central Bank began by 1996 to show 'suitcase 
trade' (which consisted entirely of exports) as a separate item in the balance-of-
payment figures, though it gave no breakdown by countries. However, assuming 
that 90 per cent of 'suitcase' exports went to the CIS countries, it can be assumed that 
in 1998 such exports were worth around $3 billion, in addition to normally recorded 
exports to CIS of $2.7 billion and imports from the CIS of $3.7 billion (DEIK, n.d., p. 
15). Including the 'suitcase' exports, trade with the CIS now accounted about 12.7 per 
cent of Turkey's total foreign trade - a far higher proportion than during the Cold 
War. Meanwhile the share of the Middle East in total trade had shrunk to 5.9 per 
cent. 
Such was the promise of the new trading relationship that Turkey lubricated it 
with export credits. Turkey's Eximbank extended two credit lines to the value of $150 
million in 1989 for the purchase of Turkish consumer goods. A further $350 million 
by way of investment credit was extended to help finance the foreign direct 
investment activities of Turkish contractors which by the end of 1989 were involved 
in 30 projects ranging from hotels to a copper wire plant to a show factory (Robins, 
2003, p. 57). Between 1991 and mid 1994, Turkey signed over 160 protocols and 
cooperation agreements, pledged more than $1.2 billion export credits, and worked 
to build ties in transport and telecommunication infrastructure, to extend financial 
and business contacts, and to reinforce cultural relations by developing scholarships 
and student exchange programs (TUSIAD, 1993, pp. 83-90). 
The situation can be summ~d up by saying that the 1990s saw a marked 
increase in Turkey's economic links with what had been previously the Soviet Union. 
However, the dominance of the main western industrial countries was repeated in 
7 'Suitcase trade' is purchases in Turkey by citizens of the former Soviet republics, and other eastern 
European countries who took clothing, household goods and other supplies home with them. 
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Turkey's trade in services, and in financial flows, though the NIS was also gaining an 
increased role. 
Energy as a transforllling force 
By the late 1990s, Turkey was facing an economic problem which had an important 
impact on its foreign policy. Because of the paucity of domestic reserves of carbon 
fuels, especially oil and natural gas, the country faced a large and potentially very 
critical energy deficit, as total demand for energy was rising at over 10 per cent per 
year, and this increase was expected to continue. In 1997, total annual energy 
consumption ran at around 72 billion tons oil equivalent, of which 46 billion tons was 
imported. Importing crude oil did not appear to raise important political problems, 
since there were potential suppliers. The only problem was that of price, over which 
Turkey had virtually no control. From a political viewpoint, natural gas was the most 
critical item, since it was relatively cheap and served as pollution-free fuel for 
heating and power generation. Turkey had chosen natural gas to be as John Barham 
in the Financial Times has put it, lithe fuel of choice" to power its new generation of 
power stations.s As a sign of this, Turkey's consumption of natural gas which was 
mainly imported from the Soviet Union and later from Russia, rose from 1.2 billion 
cubic metres in 1988 to an estimated 13 billion cubic metres in 1999, with forecasts of 
annual consumption of around 50 billion cubic metres by 2010 (Hale, 2000, pp. 211-
212). Some gas was being imported by special tankers on liquid form but it was 
considered to be more economical to build pipelines directly to the producing 
countries. However as of 1999, the only such pipeline in operation was that from 
Russia, passing through Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria, which had been 
• 'Survey on Turkey; Energy't Financial Times, 31 March 1998. 
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inaugurated in 1987 but Turkey needed both to arrange a new and more direct 
pipeline from Russia and to diversify its sources of supply. Standing at some 6 billion 
cubic metres in 1998, Turkey's gas supplies through the above mentioned pipeline 
represented 67 per cent of its total gas imports. 
Soviet gas offered the possibility of a motor for bilateral trade. A gas accord 
was first forged between Ankara and Moscow in 1984 providing for a combination of 
Turkish manufactured goods, products, and contracting services to be used in 
payments. This was the mechanism that permitted Turkish contractors to enter its 
domestic market and to establish close relations with members of the new emerging 
post-Communist elite at a time when its potential competitors were too cautious or 
unimaginative in seeking complementary alliances. As the relationship thickened 
and became more sophisticated the Turkish companies formed joint venture outfits 
with their partners in Russia. The profile of Turkish contractors increased to such an 
extend that by early 1994 it was claimed that Turkish companies had completed $5.5 
billion worth of housing contracts in Russia out of an accumulated portfolio worth 
$30 billion9 (Robins, 2003, pp. 56, 222-223). The signing of the so-called Blue Stream 
in December 1997 during a visit to Turkey by the then Russian Prime Minister, Victor 
Chemomyrdin marked a new era for the economic and political relations not only 
between Russia and Turkey but for the whole region. Under the terms of the $20 
billion accord Russia was to supply Turkey with as much as 16 billion cubic metres 
of gas a year over a 25 year period, via a new 1200 km pipeline to run 2000 metres 
under the Black Sea (International Herald Tribune, 13 December 1997). The arrival of 
Chemomyrdin, the day after Turkey's disappointment at the outcome of the EU's 
9 Minister of State Ibrahim Tez during a visit to Russia, see BBC/SWBIEE, 3 February 1994. For the 
period 1990-1999, Russia attracted 3S per cent of the works of Turkish contractors abroad (this figure 
represents 304 projects). See briefing material produced by the Union of.Intemational Contractors in 
Turkey (www.tca-ujc.oN.tr). and Planck, 1998, p. 16. 
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Luxembourg Summit, led to a mood swing which inflated the expectations about 
Russia (Robins, 2003, pp. 224-225). 
The importance of energy in Russian-Turkish relations has been also stressed 
by the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia who stated at the last BSEC Summit Meeting 
(Istanbul, 2002) that II fuel and energy industry is the leading field of the Russian -
Turkish cooperation" (Matvienko, 2003, p. 71), while Russian Prime Minister M. 
Kasianov in 2000 stated that "Russia and Turkey are not rivals but partners, and our 
governments will from now on proceed from this understanding".lO Part of Ozal's 
vision, the gas deal grew into a means to foster stable relations with Moscow, 
through the establishment of economic interdependence. 
4.2 Russia's considerations vis-A-vis the Black Sea 
The signing of the Istanbul Declaration in June 1992 establishing BSEC was amongst 
the first foreign policy efforts undertaken by the new leaders of the Russian 
Federation after the Soviet Union fell apart. However the case of Black Sea as a 
regional entity that would require a new 'regional' policy developed by Moscow, 
presented difficulties as the Russian traditional position over the centuries has been 
that the Black Sea does not constitute a single region but together with the 
Mediterranean forms a common Mediterranean-Black Sea space (Kusnetzky, 1996, p. 
205). Thus Russia could not envisage the emergence of the Black Sea as a separate 
regional political entity with international acclaim.l1 
While examining the Russian factor in BSEC's development one has to note 
that it was the Soviet Union back in 1990 that first embraced and supported the idea 
10 Cited in Freedman, 2002, p. 9. 
II Interview, Mikhail Savva, 3 June 2003. 
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of initiating a scheme of Black Sea cooperation. Thus Russia's initial stand towards 
BSEC has to be placed within the framework of the foreign policy changes during the 
last years of the Soviet Union and the first years of the new Russian Federation. 
Domestic changes in the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s did not leave its 
foreign policy untouched (Adomeit, 1998, pp. 40-43) as the liberalization of economy 
and politics was bringing positive effects on opening up interstate relations. In 1990 
Moscow's main concern was to develop links of communication with the 
neighboring countries which had been ignored during the previous decades. The 
Soviet Union's global approach in foreign policy (competition with the US) changed 
as superpower politics were replaced by emphasis on relations with the 'near 
abroad'. The dominant perception of BSEC during 1990-1992 among the policy 
making elite was the one of cross-border cooperation and not of interstate regional 
integration as modelled in Western Europe.12 At that time, the Soviet Union 
embarked upon a process of exploring new possibilities of creating cooperation 
between border areas of the Soviet Union (particularly in its southern and western 
borders) and border areas of neighbouring countries. The main idea was how to 
promote the development of the peripheral regions of the Soviet Union by opening 
up links of communication and exchange with the countries on the other side of the 
borders. That took the form of an increasing independent role played by the Russian 
regions and their active engagement in subregional groupings where Russia 
participated (Ivanov et al, 1999, pp. 134-153; Kuzmin, 1999, pp. 112-121). The 
majority of Russia's 89 regions have since then opted for a limited autonomy that 
allows economic and political engagement with a range of external actors (Dwan & 
Pavliuk, 2000, p. 8). Subregional processes, emphasizing practical interaction often at 
12 Interview, Mikhail Savva, 3 June 2003. 
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the substate level, offered Russia's regions one way of pursuing that goal both 
through participation in intergovernmental processes such as the BEAC and through 
the initiation of relations with neighbouring regions, particularly in the Baltic and 
Barents areas such as the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Barents Euro-
Artie Council (BEAC) (Shklyar, 2000, p. 87). 
Therefore, subregionalism had emerged as one of the means through which 
Russia and its regions could engage with the outside world (Shklyar, 2000, p. 87) and 
the concept of regional cooperation was thus further supported by Russia in a zone 
i.e. the Black Sea, where historically it had strong interests. In addition to geopolitical 
considerations and historical links, Russia had comparative economic advantages in 
the area as its products could compete in those markets. Economic concerns were 
gaining in weight in the formulation of relations with the nearby states in particular 
with Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. Relations with Turkey had been 
dramatically improved in the late '80s and early '90s, a period described as the 
I spring' time or 'golden age' for Russian-Turkish relations with many political issues 
solved and economic relations expanding. At that time (1989-1991) there were no 
hegemonic concerns on behalf of the Soviet Union since the main pillars of foreign 
policy of Russia had been revised and the country was pursuing a more liberal 
foreign policy. The initial Russian perception of BSEC as a practical means of mainly 
economic cooperation among border areas was close to the Turkish perception of a 
flexible initiative oriented towards advancing economic relations around the Black 
Sea. This approach however was soon to be challenged, as the organization was 
undermined in the midst of increasing security dilemmas. 
Russia's policy towards BSEC did not continue in the same liberal line as it 
reflected the interplay of two approaches that dominated Russian foreign policy as 
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early as in 1992: liberal internationalism eloquently expressed by Foreign Minister 
Andrei Kozyrev and nationalist lines expressed by Russian Vice-President Aleksandr 
Rutskoi and the parliamentary speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov. 
According to the liberal approach, economic/political interstate cooperation 
and integration with the international political economy was a demand of the 
Russian policy elite (Lynch, 2002). Liberal premises were imposing that Russia 
should observe international norms of behaviour, thus participating in subregional 
organizations such as BSEC. However it became apparent to Russian policy-makers 
that whatever Russia's real chances for integration into the Western political 
economy and security community, there were far more pressing issues - all 
unexpected throughout Russia's immediate post-Soviet periphery. Those included 
the presence of nuclear weapons on the soil of independent Ukraine (as well as in 
Kazakhstan and Belarus); the disruption of economic ties in what had been a 
previously integrated economic space; the outbreak of wars, secession movements 
and streams of refugees along Russia's borderlands, especially in the Caucasus, and 
the existence of tens of millions of Soviet Russians living as national minorities in the 
NIS.13 
The above strengthened the nationalist lines urging a reorientation of Russian 
foreign policy towards the CIS and the re-establishment there of old Soviet economic 
and security, if not political ties (Lynch, 2002, pp.164-167). Accordingly Russia 
should opt for its own dominance in what was now referred to as the old 'Soviet 
geopolitical space' or the 'near abroad'14. The centrality of classical geopolitical rather 
13 In 1989 the Russian population in the countries around the Black Sea was as follows: 11,356 million 
(22.1 per cent) in Ukraine, 562 thousand (13 per cent) in Moldova, 341 thousand (6.3 per cent) in 
Georgia, 52 thousand (1.6 per cent) in Armenia, 392 thousand (5.6 per cent) in Azerbaijan (Baev, 2000, p. 
222). 
14 By spring 1992 the term 'near abroad' crept into the Russian political vocabulary, denoting a peculiar 
status for and special relations with the NIS (Adomeit, 1998, p. 36). 
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than liberal criteria in Russia's policy towards the Black Sea gained in the concern of 
the Russian policy elite whose main concern now was to maintain the policy 
objective of establishing Russian diplomatic and security hegemony throughout the 
territory of the former Soviet Union, which would also support Russia's Igreat 
power' status in international fora. Therefore, by 1992 political considerations 
prevailed in Russia's engagement with BSEC and the latter's political dimension 
became more apparent since Russia had to determine its new position in the regional 
and international system and to preserve its influence over the NIS that were once 
part of the Soviet Union. Consequently, Russian policy towards BSEC became rather 
subordinate to its broader policy towards the former 'Soviet geopolitical space'. In 
general, Russian interest in the Black Sea has been explained mainly by the following 
set of factors (Kusnetzky, 1996, pp. 205-206; Kovalsky, 1994, pp. 113-119). 
a) Many Russian regiOns have maintained strong economic links with the Black 
Sea area. Thus, the central part of Russia, the Volga region and the Ural region 
cooperate closely with the areas adjacent to the basins of the Black Sea and the Azov 
Sea, even those that have become part of Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova. 
b) The Black Sea has always been a gateway to the world ocean for Russia. The 
Black Sea routes accommodate about 25 percent of the Russian foreign trade. 
c) Participation in BSEC offered an additional opportunity to solve economic 
and social problems of the transition period in its south, in the Krasnodar territory 
and the Rostov region. 
d) The Black Sea constitutes a natural security line for Russia. Even though 
virtually no military threat emanates from other states in this region at this time, 
armed conflict in Chechnya poses the main security threat coming from the area. The 
fact is that the Black Sea and bordering areas are marked by potentially destabilizing 
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factors, e.g. alarming situation in Transcaucasia, charged situation around Iraq and 
Iran, etc. (Hunter, 1994, pp. 142-156). 
e) Finally, the entire history of the Black Sea region made a substantial impact 
on the shaping of the Russian national identity (e.g. Christianity came to Russia 
through the Black Sea zone, the liberation of the Crimea in the late 18th century and 
once again in the 20th century - during World War II) and the Russian mindset was 
always responsive to the developments in the Black Sea. 
4.3 Engaging Greece in the BSEC process 
Historically, Greece has been engaged in regional cooperation in its immediate 
neighborhood, the Southeast Europe.15 Inter-Balkan cooperation, rather than Black 
Sea cooperation, had become a Greek foreign policy priority where a multilateral 
mechanism was set up as early as in 1975 (Veremis, 1994/1995, p. 5; Descan, 1990, 
pp. 134-147). The failure, of the different efforts aiming to promote Balkan 
Cooperation, did not impede successive Greek governments from hoping to revive it 
at some point. 
Consequently, Greece viewed the initial efforts to establish BSEC with 
suspicion (Kazakos, 1994, pp. 168-202). Turkey'S active interest in promoting the idea 
in 1990-91 was seen as a diversion from a more Europe-oriented Balkan cooperation 
scheme. Indeed, Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Balkan countries 
were regularly taking place during these same years, Albania had joined for the first 
time ever, and several ministerial and expert meetings were also planned. The 
eastward orientation (at least as far as the membership was concerned) of the 
proposed BSEC scheme was therefore met initially with Greek resistance 
IS The term Southeast Europe is used interchangeably with the term Balkans. 
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(Couloumbis & Yannas, 1995, p. 43). This was also manifested by the fact that Greece 
joined the P A BSEC in 1995, two years after its establishment. Although Greece's 
participation in BSEC as a founding member had been made possible due to the 
invitation extended by the Turkish President T. Ozal in 1992, its accession to PABSEC 
was not considered to be an automatic procedure and it encountered resistance. 
Greek membership was the only case where unanimous agreement could not be 
reached and Greece finally joined PABSEC with the vote of seven out of nine 
members (Turkey and Azerbaijan abstained).16 As the representative of the Turkish 
delegation argued, the delegation was not against the accession of Greece but it had 
serious doubts over the commitment of Greece to the whole BSEC project since 
"despite PABSEC's persistent invitations in the past... Greece had turned down all of 
them" while "in the past... it even stopped its efforts in BSEC" (PABSEC, 1995c, p. 6). 
Indeed, Greece had reservations over the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly 
and its mode of functioning. According to the Greek perceptions, BSEC should be 
confined to economic spheres of cooperation and not acquire a political dimensionP 
Those concerns were expressed as follows: 
The Parliamentary Assembly constitutes a kind of Black Sea Parliament 
where the Ministers of the BSEC member states will be asked to reply to 
questions posed by the parliamentarians. However, there is no organic link 
between the Parliamentary Assembly (which unilaterally defined the above 
mentioned- role) and the Ministers who, of course have no statutory obligation 
to appear at the Parliamentary Assembly even more when this is for issues 
(social, political, cultural) which go beyond the goals of the BSEC founding 
document. Strangely, national representatives i.e. members of the parliaments 
of the BSEC member states undertake for themselves the role of making 
16 On the debate concerning the accession of Greece to PABSEC, see PABSEC, 1995a, p. 3; 1995b, pp. 
2-4; 1995c,pp. 5·7. 
17 Information based on discussion with member of the Hellenic delegation to the PABSEC, 3 July 
2003. 
97 
recommendations to the Ministers etc. what in other terms happens in national 
parliaments. Maybe the authors of the text [Rules of PABSEC] were inspired by 
other examples (European Parliament, Council of Europe) while forgetting that 
the ratification of the role of those Parliamentary Bodies was done through 
Conventions i.e. through ratification by the national parliaments themselves. 
This shows the urgency of the authors which in most cases reveals the 
inexperience of the new democracies while in other cases indicates simply the 
lack of real parliamentary practice. In addition, there is a Secretariat in Istanbul 
which in addition to other functions, it will forward the results of the 
Assembly's work to the national delegations, to the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and to other parties.18 
In the course of 1991, developments in Europe had progressively changed 
Greece's position. The crisis and subsequent war-fighting in Yugoslavia blocked any 
effort to reconvene the Balkan cooperation bodies. Fearful of the regional 
destabilization potential, Greece was reluctant to accept the faits accomplis in the area 
and the collapse of Balkan cooperation (Valinakis, 1994, pp. 227-228). Its participation 
as a founding state in BSEC was seen as an insurance policy in case of a prolonged 
disorder in Yugoslavia or diplomatic deadlock impeding the revival of Balkan 
Conferences. At the same time Greece's participation in BSEC following Ozal's 
invitation was welcome by Turkey (contrary to what would happen three years later 
with Greek accession to PABSEq. It, like the inclusion of Armenia, enhanced 
Turkey's role as a 'bridge' between this region and the Euro-Atlantic space, and 
supported Turkey's ongoing interest in long term European integration, as well as a 
reluctance to define its interests in terms of bloc politics and hence to avoid the 
polarization of critical policy issues (Kirchner, ed., 1997, pp. 45-46) . 
• 1 Information Paper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic,.9 June 1993 (original in 
Greek). 
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Commending on the Greek policy toward BSEC, the Greek Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, G. Panandreou (2002, p. 18) has argued that until 1995, Greece preferred to 
adopt a relatively low profile. However, since early 1995, Greece increased its 
interest and started playing a more active role. Several factors influenced this new 
attitude: 
(a) The progressive disillusionment as to the cooperation potential in Southeast 
Europe. The ravaging war in Bosnia allowed no realistic hopes for a regional 
cooperation framework to be re-institutionalized in this part of Europe, thus inviting 
a fresh new look at other possibilities. 
(b) New considerations regarding Greece's position within the EU as a result 
of the enlargement/ deepening process and its role in the neighbouring to the EU 
countries in the wider Southeast Europe. 
(c) Greece came to realize the importance of the challenge it faced as the only 
EU member in BSEC.19 As a result, it started to respond and seek to be seen by its 
BSEC partners as a possible bridge between them and the EU. 
(d) Considerations of economic nature also surfaced in Greece and acted as an 
additional incentive. The Black Sea region came to be seen as constituting a natural 
economic outlet for the expansion of the Greek private sector. The exploitation of 
new markets where businessmen and investors did not have access in the past 
provided new opportunities and dynamism to the Greek economy. 
As however, Greek officials have stated, regardless of the economic and 
security considerations there is another factor that heavily influenced the decision of 
Greece to engage in initiatives concerning the Black Sea. That has been the existence 
19 "The application of Greece, a member of the EC, to become a member of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation project is clear evidence of the complementary nature of this model and its compatibility 
with other European groupings", (Ozuye, 1992. p. 52). 
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of a population of Greek origin in almost all of the new independent states which 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union faced immediate survival problems.20 It 
was expected that the presence of Greece in BSEC would complement the efforts of 
the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide economic assistance to the Greek 
communities of the Black Sea.21 
4.4 Ukraine: a 'buffer' state 
Ukraine like the other NIS joined BSEC in an effort intended above all to underline 
its autonomous presence in international affairs and diversify its international 
contacts. At the same time, it aimed at reinforcing bilateral and multilateral relations 
in its immediate vicinity which was undergoing a process of radical restructuring of 
economic and political relationships. As BSEC was perceived to be serving both aims 
mentioned above, the newly independent Ukraine was among the Istanbul Summit 
Declaration (1992) signatories and displayed an active interest in the process. 
Subregionalism for Ukraine was a tool in support of its declared policy of 
neutrality, on the one hand, and its two main foreign policy priorities on the other 
hand: integration within the European structures and balancing the Russian factor. 
Ukraine had found itself caught between two conflicting pressures: its desire to join 
the European institutions on the one hand, and its close economic dependence on 
Russia on the other (Larrabee, 1996, pp. 143-165; Van Ham, 1994; Strekal, 1995). The 
country's future participation in the EU has been one of the priorities of Ukrainian 
foreign policy, while normal interaction with Russia is regarded as a precondition of 
20 In the beginning of the 19905, the population of Greek origin was estimated in Armenia at 7,000, in 
Azerbaijan at 2,000, in Georgia at 105,000, in Ukraine at 150,000 and in Russia at 90,000. A large 
proportion 0 fthat population left to Greece following the collapse of the Soviet Union. F or further 
information on the subject see Agtzidis, 1997, pp. 589-698. 
21Infomllltion based on discussion with senior officials of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 
2003. 
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Ukrainian integration into Europe (Kulinich, 1995, p. 131). President Kuchma and 
other officials have stressed that Ukraine's integration in European structures and a 
deepening of trans-Atlantic cooperation are the country's strategic goals. At the same 
time they have added that "though Ukraine will continue to push for full integration 
with the European Union, relations with Russia and the CIS are equally vital".22 In 
his speech at the Moscow BSEC Summit (25 October 1996) President 1. Kuchma 
emphasized Ukraine's determination to define and carry out a general strategy 
aimed at the country's full-scale integration into European structures, both directly 
and through regional institutions. 
Regional cooperation became an important tool in Ukraine's foreign policy as 
the latter joined all European organizations23 putting particular emphasis however in 
the 'Central European' identity of the country rather than the Black Sea one. It also 
became a member of the CIS in which twelve of the former Soviet republics 
participate.24 However, given Russia's predominance within the CIS, Ukraine did not 
want to limit its international presence to the CIS framework but sought 
participation in other regional groups. The main concern of Ukraine throughout the 
1990s was to reduce dependence on Russia, particularly in the security sphere, 
through diplomatic means, collaboration with international organizations or 
participation in regional cooperation schemes (Rainow, 1999, p. 53). Subregional 
cooperation thus became a foreign policy tool to increase the international leverage 
of the country vis-a-vis Russia. 
22 'Ukraine: Kuchma stresses stability in Relations with Russia', Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS) - SOY -96-137, 16 July 1996, p. 44; 'Ukraine: Kuchma seeks further Integration into 
Europe', (FBIS) - SOV- 96-110, 6 June 1996, p. 44. 
23 In February 1994 it became the first CIS state to join NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
Programme and the second to be admitted to the Council of Europe. . 
24 On Russo-Ukrainian relations see Sherr, 1996, pp. 77-84; Lapycbak, 1996, pp. 6-8. 
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The fact that it was mainly security and geopolitical considerations that 
underlined Ukrainian's perceptions of subegionalism is clearly manifested in its 
security-related proposals both in the framework of CEI and BSEC. It therefore 
promoted the idea of Baltic Sea -Black Sea regional cooperation, i.e. a belt of 
independent states extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Such ideas found 
however little support, since most of the countries concerned seem to prefer direct 
links with the EU and NATO (Larrabee, 1996, pp. 158-159). 
In conclusion, Ukraine's participation in BSEC was dominated by geopolitical 
considerations, seen particularly as an effort to diversify its international relations 
beyond Russia and to present itself as a link between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, 
stressing therefore its Central European identity. Furthermore, it wished to take 
advantage of any opportunities available to overcome the current economic 
limitations resulting from its dependence on the structures inherited from the former 
Soviet Union, by approximating its economic and organizational infrastructure to 
those of the rest of Europe. 
4.5 Between Southeast Europe and the Black Sea: Albania, Bulgaria and Romania 
Bulgaria and Romania showed their support for the BSEC idea early in 1990 (thus 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union) and participated in the preparatory meetings. 
Originally it was their geographic location and the economic and environmental 
dimension of the Black Sea cooperation that weighted heavily in their decision to join 
BSEC. Their strategy towards BSEC has however evolved gradually around two 
factors. First, their EU membership aspiration and second their place within other 
subregional initiatives that developed in Southeast Europe in the 19905. Another 
consideration for both countries has been to 'keep an ey~1 on the Russian and 
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Turkish endeavours in an area of strategic importance to their interests. The 
Albanian case is however different in terms of the fact that Albania although a 
founding member never showed a strong interest in the BSEC process. As we said 
earlier, its inclusion in BSEC was advocated by Turkey on the basis of cultural and 
religious criteria. 
Romania and Bulgaria placed emphasis on the fact that they held physical 
assets for international cooperation within the context of BSEC such as the Danube-
Black Sea Canal and the port of Constanza for Romania (Iliescu, 1996, p. 8) and the 
Varna port for Bulgaria. It was their geographical location rather than their 
geopolitical importance that brought them into the project and their governments 
were not enthusiastic from the beginning (Fuller & Lesser et a1., 1993, pp. 157-158). 
Additionally, Bulgaria has stressed the fact that among BSEC members are to be 
found Bulgaria1s most important trade and political partners. 
Economic cooperation around the Black Sea was positively assessed only as 
long as it served their strategic foreign policy goal, i.e. integration in the Euro-
Atlantic structures and in particular their EU orientation as both countries became 
Associate Members of the EU (Hartwig, 2001; Roussev, 1996; Karaganov & Valinakis, 
1996). Subregional cooperation has been deemed instrumental since settling all 
disputes and good neighbouring relations has been a requirement for joining the EU. 
Bulgaria and Romania thus considered their membership lias a transitional stage of 
adaptation to the European standards" (Christakoudis, 2000, p. 10). Indeed, after the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the priorities of these states in their foreign policy 
orientation were first, the reinforcement of their .bilateral and multilateral relations 
and second, the accessibility to the Western European economic and political 
institutions (Ecobescu, 1996, pp. 50-65). Both countries estimated that subregional 
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cooperation among others through BSEC was supporting these objectives. After all, 
the most important advocates of the two countries in the EU and NATO were also 
their BSEC partners, namely Greece and Turkey. 
In addition, given the war in former Yugo~lavia and the subsequent failure of 
the Balkan Cooperation, the Balkan states found themselves in a situation where both 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation had become a necessity. In this spirit, both 
countries attended the Foreign Ministers meeting of the Southeast European 
Multilateral Cooperation which was held in Sofia in July 1996 and became members 
of the CEL Both countries have advocated that participation in various regional 
structures is not mutually contradictory but rather constitutes a complementary 
process which helps foster cooperation among and between the various regions: the 
Black Sea, Southeast Europe and Central Europe (Iliescu, 1996, pp. 3-4). 
In regard to BSEC, the main concern of particularly Bulgaria and Romania has 
been to avoid the 'Russification' of the process or to find themselves under the 
Russian orbit. Unlike many other BSEC members (particularly the NIS), the Balkan 
states were presented with other alternatives of subregional cooperation which were 
more lucrative and were enhancing their European identity. This is the case with 
Bulgaria's and Romania's application and subsequent admission to the CEI which 
could be attributed to their desire to be treated as Central European rather than Black 
Sea countries. 
The reluctance of the Balkan states to become fully involved in BSEC is better 
illustrated by the late accession of Bulgaria to th~ PABSEC which happed as late as in 
1997 during the PABSEC Hellenic Presidency. It was after the joining of Greece itself 
in 1995 and consultations with the Greek side that Bulgaria was persuaded to join 
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in.2s Bulgaria feared that "a closer involvement with BSEC could harm her future 
relations with the EC (EU) and slow down the process of Euro-integration. Romania 
has similar fears and doubts" (Christakoudis, 2000, p. 5). 
Although a founding member~ Albania seemed to have little interest in the 
process. Included in BSEC upon a Turkish proposal (which aimed to increase the 
moderate Muslim element in the process) Albania never formulated a BSEC strategy 
or shared any 'Black Sea identity' with the other BSEC states. It however shared the 
view of BSEC as a part of the integration processes going on in Europe and a means 
"to speed up the economic and social development of the respective nations, to help 
overcome the transition period difficulties and economic restructuring in the area 
and to make all these economies genuine partners in the evolving European 
economic space" (Bala, 1996, p. 3). Although Albania saw some economic advantages 
in the creation of links eastwards (including projects such as the construction of the 
gas pipeline from the Caspian to the Adriatic port of Vlora) it never had a strong 
position on how to serve those interests through BSEC. Being geographically remote 
from the Black Sea, it has placed priority in developing contacts westwards. 
4.6 Small state policy: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova 
BSEC membership for a number of NIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova) 
marked their entry into international networking. Signing the February 1992 
agreement to establish BSEC was for many of them the first international act. We 
have to recall here that their political elites were familiar with the BSEC process as 
25 Infonnation based on discussion with member of the Hellenic delegation to the PABSEC, 3 July 
2003. 
they had participated in the elaboration of the preparatory BSEC documents in 1990 
and 1991 as members of the Soviet Union team. 
Subregionalism was not initially perceived as a means of economic 
development but as a way to reinforce bilatefal and multilateral relations. As 
newcomers to the international scene, the NIS had an additional motive to 
emphasize cooperation as a way to foster statehood, consolidate their national 
identity and increase the legitimacy of their goverrunents.26 Indeed, for many of these 
countries BSEC was the first international forum in which they participated under 
their new flag and not under the umbrella of the Soviet Union. What was important 
in 1992, was the recognition of the statehood of all new independent states not just 
by the international community but above all by the countries in their immediate 
neighbourhood and above all by Russia. BSEC provided the ideal forum for that. 
A second motivation was to open up links of communication among the 
political elites in the area. Six out of nine states around the Black Sea and the 
Caucasus were lacking established links of communication with their neighbours. 
BSEC was generally expected to reduce to a certain extent political tensions and to 
create favourable conditions for direct contacts between leaders and experts. Fearful 
of isolation and of an unstable regional framework, these states opted for a 
subregional system of cooperation which allowed for more predictability, interaction 
and a reduction of tensions. 
As statehood was taking root, political economy and broader foreign policy 
considerations weighed more heavily. First, subr~gionalism was used to support the 
transition period and consolidate their independence. Second, as all countries 
developed institutionalized links with the European Union, their participation in 
26 Interview, Valery Chechelashvili, 6 December 2001. 
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subregional structures was used to confirm their good neighbourly relations. 
Regional cooperation was expected to be politically and economically rewarded by 
the European Union. 
In fact preserving communication links in the subregion was vital in the early 
1990s as many of the NIS were, directly or indirectly, involved in conflicts with their 
neighbours (see Chapter 4). Therefore, it was BSEC meetings which back in early 
1990s offered the only permanent forum of communication between the political elite 
of the Armenia and those of Turkey and Azerbaijan. Particularly for Armenia, which 
was under trade embargo, BSEC was important in breaking the country's isolation 
and gaining guarantees for its national security. Those were Armenia's primary 
foreign policy objectives27 which would be better served through rapid integration 
into the world economy (Adalian, 1995, p. 312) and BSEC was a first step towards 
that direction. Deprived of access to the Black Sea or any other sea, and with strained 
relations with its neighbours, Armenia required a regional system of cooperation 
with an emphasis on the opening of transport routes and free circulation of goods. In 
this regard, Armenia became gradually more interested in addressing issues of 
practical cooperation in the field of infrastructure and trade cooperation. 
A stable environment around the Black Sea was also a priority for Azerbaijan 
in view of the construction of new oil pipelines and the security of the unimpeded 
flow of oil emanating from the shores of the Caspian. Even though subregional 
groups such as BSEC could do little if anything to directly influence decisions on 
energy production and transportation, their cO!ltribution in cultivating cooperative 
attitudes was important to Azerbaijan. Regional cooperation was also important for 
27 The other objective is to the question of Nagomo - Karabakh. 
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the country's political elite in its efforts to secure legitimacy, international 
recognition and break its isolation.28 
Particularly for Georgia which at that time was torn by civil war and whose 
state structures were far from being consolidated, BSEC was the only means of 
communication with the neighbouring countries while it served as a 'training' forum 
for managing international affairs.29 Georgia's support to BSEC was further based on 
the latter's extended geographic delineation from East to West (Caspian Sea to the 
Adriatic), which stressed the importance of the Black Sea as a major trading route 
and put forward the idea of the Euro-Asian Corridor. This axis would facilitate the 
free movement of goods, services, and capital and eventually lead to an arc of 
stability in the area (Chikvaidze, 1994, p. 115). 
Not unlike other countries from within the area, for Moldova too, BSEC was 
perceived as a forum to consolidate its sovereignty. In its 'Principal directions of 
foreign policy for the period: 1998-2002' the Moldovan government listed 
multilateral cooperation among its four main priorities (Lowenbhardt et al., 2001, p. 
617).30 
For the newly independent states (excluding Russia) the choice of 
subregionalism was not underwritten by any conceptual foundation or by clearly 
identified interests vested in the process. 
28 In 1992 the US Congress demanded the suspension of most fonns orus aid until there was an end to 
the economic blockade of Armenia. On Azerbaijan's politics see Fuller E., 1996, pp. 35-39; Alieva, 
1995, pp. 286-307. 
19 Interview, Valery Chechelashvili, 6 December 2001. 
30 The other three are i) consolidation of sovereignty and independence, ii)integration in the EU, and 
iii) bilateral cooperation. 
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5. Conclusion 
Broadly speaking there are three types of motivations that theory identifies in 
forging regional arrangements: geopolitical interests, political economy 
considerations and domestic rooted interests. As we indicated here, BSEC is a case 
where geopolitical interests have prevailed. 
Since BSEC is an elite-driven process we deemed it necessary to explore the 
agenda and interests of the BSEC member states. This endeavour was also motivated 
by a lack in the literature regarding the motivations of all BSEC members. First, we 
need to keep in mind that BSEC is not merely a post-Cold War structure but it has set 
an example of the liberal foreign policy envisaged by Ozal at the end of 1980s. It was 
nevertheless, soon overtaken by political developments in the area. Despite the 
rhetoric on the economic character of subregionalism - which might be partly 
attributed to the influence of Ozal's ideas - BSEC developed primarily as a foreign 
policy tool to serve the strategic priority of the political elites in the newly 
independent states; their 'return to Europe'. 
Beyond, however, the common ground provided by the 'return to Europe' call, 
little commonality was to be found in the members' agendas. Given the wide 
diversity of BSEC members and their con flicting foreign policies, it has become 
difficult to identify common interests behind BSEC that would shape real consensus 
on how BSEC should function. Therefore, one of the fundamentals upon which BSEC 
has evolved is a minimum of a common understanding of what BSEC represents and 
what interests serves. 
We have identified two aspects that have been ignored by the literature on 
BSEC. First, there has been no research on the role of leadership and its beliefs and 
ideas in shaping the character of the initiative. On the contrary BSEC has been simply 
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pictured as a product of and response to systemic changes in post-Cold War Europe. 
Earlier in this chapter we cast some light on the way that a shift in the leadership 
(and its ideology) particularly in. Turkey and the former Soviet Union (Russia) 
underwrote the conceptual basis of subregional~m and of BSEC. The second aspect 
not covered in the literature is a detailed research on BSEC itself as an organization 
and mode of governance as well as an investigation of the factors that shape its 
reconfiguration. The subsequent chapters address those issues, starting with the 
presentation of the institutional aspects of BSEC. 
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CHAPTER 3. AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL MODE OF COOPERATION: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
1. Introduction 
The definition of BSEC subregion is strongly linked to institution-building. Although 
it was initially envisaged that subregionalism within BSEC would be characterized 
by institutional parsimony, cooperation soon developed in the opposite direction. 
Organizational complexity may come as a surprise. Given the persistent 
politico-security problems and mistrust as well as the questionable commitment of 
the member countries to the implementation of subregional binding agreements, the 
political preconditions for a well-developed institutionalization have been lacking. 
The years of 1994 and 1998 are landmarks in the institutional development of BSEC. 
Until 1994, permanent bureaucratic structures were non-existent. By 1994, a 
permanent secretariat was established but BSEC's organizational structures were still 
kept less rigid. The turning point for BSEC's institutionalization is the year 1998 
when the BSEC Charter was signed signalling the transformation of BSEC from an 
'initiative' into an 'international economic organization' equipped with articulated, 
firm organs and mechanisms with increased capacity and responsibilities. The 
transformation of BSEC into an organization, originally initiated by Turkey in 1996, 
met the reluctance of several member states and in particular of Russia and Greece. 
Both countries shared the view that although developing a legal basis for BSEC was 
important, this was not an urgent issue given the-actual capabilities/resources of the 
member states and the financial implications that such a development would bear.1 
I On these views see Chapter 5. 
What are the main forms and features of institutionalized subregional 
cooperation? How is this linked to the actual decision making mechanisms and the 
redirection of the loyalties of the national based cenh·es, if any? What does the 
institutionalization and decision making process show about the nature of 
subregionalism? Those are the questions to be addressed hereafter. 
2. The institutional design 
The process of BSEC's institutionalization has lasted for a considerable period, it has 
absorbed a lot of resources and it has attracted most of interstate bargaining. It is 
worth mentioning that a formal type of cooperation is encountered at all levels of 
interaction be that intergovernmental, inter-parliamentary, sub-state or business-
related. Notwithstanding a web of permanent secretariats, working groups and 
committees, those institutions have failed to create a regional regime in terms of 
multilateral agreements, conventions not to mention common attitudes. In fact, the 
existence of subregional institutions per se has provided the main argument or proof 
for the existence of the BSEC subregion itself. 
The structure of BSEC resembles that of many other European subregional 
formations but exhibits a higher degree of institutionalization (figure 3.1). The fact 
that BSEC is an organization rather than a forum or an initiative justifies partly its 
well-developed institutionalization. Other reasons for the necessity of such a web of 
organs was the absence of prior or other subregional structures of this scope; the 
reluctance of its members - at leas~ at the early stages - to take major decisions other 
than the ones related to the internal affairs of BSEC; the need to accommodate and 
balance national interests vested in BSEC institutions; the effort to create vested 
interests by tying together the member states around conu:non organs; the urge to 
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demonstrate to the rest of Europe that institutionalized relations with neighbouring 
countries are a priority for the newly established states around Ule Black Sea and 
thus such an attitude should be politically rewarded. 
However, in 1992 the intention of the founding members was to create a 
scheme of economic cooperation with the least possible bureaucracy. The sole 
institution foreseen in the Istanbul Declaration (1992, para.17) was the Meeting of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs to be convened "regularly on rotation basis at least once 
a year in order to review progress and to define new targets". The participating 
states refrained from creating an international secretariat as it was seen necessary "to 
ensure institutional flexibility" (BSEe, 1992a, para.17). They proposed however, the 
establishment of a Black Sea Foreign Trade and Investment Bank, renamed when 
established to Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, in order to expand economic 
and commercial cooperation. BSEC functioned during its first two years of existence 
without a secretariat, its administrative load undertaken by the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs of the member states and in particular by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.2 This system however, was soon to be changed and in 1994 it was deemed 
necessary to establish a permanent bureaucratic structure for the administration of 
the BSEC affairs. This change was also a sign that the role of the governments in the 
BSEC process, which was initially perceived as subordinate to the role of the private 
initiative, was going to increase.3 Institution-building became so complex that it was 
later contested. The document that sets out the strategy of BSEC for the future 
identifies "too much bureaucracy" as an obstacle to the development of effective 
multilateral cooperation (BSEC, 2001, p. 2). 
2 'Progress Report of the Operations and Activities of the BSEC Permanent International Secretariat 
(March - June 1994), in BSEC PERMIS, 1995, p. 99. 
3 Interview, Tansu Blenda, January 2002. 
The BSEC Charter (1998), apart from summit meetings and meetings of the 
Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, envisages subsidiary organs formed upon 
the decision of the Council (Chapter IV and V). It also envisages a troika system, a 
committee of senior officials, a permanent secretariat and a chairmanship. Apart 
from those, a number of Related Bodies are also recognized in Chapter VII of the 
Charter, being of mainly consultative nature: a Parliamentary Assembly; a Business 
Council; a Development Bank and other Affiliated Centres. 
The eleventh MMF A (30 April 1998) decided to establish the position of 
Permanent Representatives and Permanent Missions to BSEC whose role would be to 
follow the main subjects being negotiated in the Subsidiary Bodies and the Council 
and to maintain links with all of the other BSEC institutions. The Summits of Heads 
of State and Government organized at irregular intervals determine the strategic 
direction of BSEC. Six Summits of BSEC have so far taken place (in Istanbul, 1992; 
Bucharest, 1995; Moscow, 1996; Yalta, 1998; Istanbul, 1999 and Istanbul, 2002). 
TIle Chairmanship 
In the early years of BSEC, the Chairmanship was responsible for the bulk of 
organizational and policy matters. Its role however, became more marginal in the 
latter years as the Charter did not leave much room for policy initiatives to come 
from the Chairmanship (BSEC, 1998a, art. 13). It envisages rotating Chairmanship 
every six months and the Chairman-in-office (Minister of Foreign Affairs) prepares 
the agenda, coordinates and cha~rs meetings at all levels but always under the 
recommendations of the Council while it represents the organization in the 
international arena. 
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Although the Chairmanship prepares the program of activities of the 
organization and gives the direction of its work, it has played a marginal role. The 
Work Programs of the Chairmanships which were introduced during the Moldovan 
Chairmanship in 1997, have been very general'in terms of their political directions 
indicating no intention by the member states to promote a particular dimension of 
the organization or to pursue their own priorities through BSEC,4 
The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
The decision-making body of the intergovernmental component is the Council of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs - MFA (prior to 1999 called the Meeting of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs - MMFA).s The Council functions on a regular basis and meets no 
less than every six months taking all policy decisions, establishing working groups 
and granting observer status to new states. In Apri11995, the Troika System was 
introduced in an effort to increase coordination and efficiency but it has played no 
prominent role until today. 
The agenda of each session of the Council is worked out by the Committee of 
Senior Officials representing the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The Meeting of the 
Senior Officials is held regularly before the Council Meetings and whenever deemed 
necessary. The Committee is entrusted with a variety of competencies. It has a 
central place in the function of the organization and the decision-making process as it 
reviews the activities of the subsidiary organs, evaluates the implementation of 
decisions of the Council and ela1;>orates recommendations to it. It also considers 
issues related to coordination and cooperation with BSEC Related Bodies, 
4 The Work Programs of the Chairmanships are available at http://www.bsec.gov.tr 
S Hereafter called the Council. . 
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organizational aspects of the BSEC activities, and the elaboration of the preliminary 
calendar of events. It takes decisions on relevant matters except the issues under the 
competence of the Council and the Chairman and submits to the Council for 
approval the aJU1ual budget of BSEC (BSEC, 1998a, article 15). 
The Subsidiary Bodies 
Working Groups (WGs) and Groups of Experts (GEs) are the basic Subsidiary Bodies 
which carry the main bulk of work for BSEC. They are established by the Council 
which has the power to terminate their mandate if their work is accomplished or 
when in general it is deemed necessary. These bodies are assigned to draw up the 
cooperation projects as well as to consider the possibility of implementing joint 
projects in their respective areas of activity (BSEC, 1993, art. 5, par. 3). The Subsidiary 
Bodies adopt recommendations that /I are for the consideration of the Council of 
MFAs" and "will bear effect upon their approval by the MMFA" (BSEC, 1993, art. 
19). These bodies have been functioning on a rather regular basis. There are eleven 
WGs established by the Istanbul Declaration: a) agriculture and agro-industry, b) 
informatics, c) science and technology, d) tourism, e) energy, f) veterinary and 
sanitary protection, g) exchange of economic and commercial information, including 
statistics, h) health care and pharmaceuticals, i) mining and processing of mineral 
raw materials, j) standardization and certification of products, and k) transport and 
communications, including their infrastructure. This latter WG in November 1993 
split into two WGs, one on transport and another one on communications. As BSEC 
moved towards the 'soft' security field, two more WGs were established in 1998: one 
on combating crime and one on emergency assistance. 
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There are no permanent representatives in the WGs but they consist of 
specialists of the relevant national ministries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
controls all communication, distributes the documentation and decides upon 
participation, prepares and coordinates the national positions. The WGs mostly 
negotiate over detailed proposals for BSEC action on the basis of drafts from national 
delegations, the Secretariat and interested third parties. The Council usually 
indicates earlier to the Secretariat or the WGs that it requests a recommendation on a 
particular issue. Something like ninety per cent of the Council's texts is agreed in 
WGs, another nine-ten per cent at the Senior Official Meetings, leaving only the 
signing or one per cent to the Council itself. The proceedings of the WGs are 
managed by the Chairmanship while for the preparation of the agendas the 
Secretariat plays an important role, always under the guidance of the Chairmanship. 
The WGs act as fora for discussion on BSEC projects and proposals. They do so 
through negotiations, by trying to establish a consensus. Habits of consensus seeking 
are deeply ingrained and actual votes are relatively rare, even when technically 
possible. 
The institution of Country Coordinators for the WGs was first introduced in 
1998 (Sofia, Twelfth MMFA) and it is implemented on a rotation basis of two year 
term. The level of mobilization of the country coordinators until now was 
comparatively limited. The country coordinators present a two-year Plan of Action 
in the relevant sphere of cooperation; consult with each successive Chairman-in-
Office on the manner in which the latter would integrate the priorities of the country 
. . 
coordinator in the Chairmanship program of activities; are responsible for convening 
at least one meeting of the Working Group annually; may chair or co-chair meetings 
of the WGs whose activities they coordinate; establish a focal point, a person 01' 
Illl 
service, who is the contact point for the PERMIS, the Chairmanship and the member 
states.6 
Figure 3.2 and 3.3 provide information on the frequency of the BSEC Meetings 
and the Subsidiary Bodies. In gene~al the number of meetings throughout the years 
has remained relatively stable with small variations, with a noticeable increase since 
1998. A few of the WGs such as the ones on health care and pharmaceutics, mining 
and processing of mineral raw materials, standardization and certification of 
products, veterinary and sanitary protection remained inactive throughout the years. 
The lack of interest of the member states, of expertise as well as the technical nature 
of the subjects made those WGs defunct. With the exception of the WG on health 
care, which was held once in 1996, the others were never convened. Transport and 
communications (23 meetings), followed by the WG on organizational matters (11 
meetings) have by far attracted most of BSEC resources. The large number of 
organizational sessions is easily explained due to the internal needs of BSEC's 
constant institutional evolution and enhancement. The WG on transport is the most 
successful one not only in terms of the frequency of meetings but also in terms of 
outcome. The intensive function of this WG is to be attributed to its interface with 
transport projects of other organizations (such as the EU and the UNECE). 
At the same time, Groups of Experts (GEs) have been established on an ad !toe 
basis to prepare the technical aspects of an agreement or of a specific project such as 
1) technical cooperation in the field of tourism, 2) transport networks, 3) electrical 
networks, 4) promotion of technology transfer and 5) promotion and protection of 
investments. 
6'Tenns of Reference for the Institution of the Country Coordinator' in BSEC, 2002b. 
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Figure 3.2 Frequency of Subsidiary Bodies, 1992 - 2002 
Source :Figure based on information provided by BSEe PERM IS, Istanbul, 2002 
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,. Subsidiary Bodies 
Participation in the BSEC meetings varies but is relatively high (figure 3.4). 
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and Romania are the most frequent participants, followed 
by Greece. The least involved country in the work of the Subsidiary Bodies is 
Azerbaijan, followed by Armenia, Albania and Moldova while Bulgaria and Georgia 
are in the middle. Apart from the frequency of participation what is of more 
importance is the fact that i.n several cases the member states are represented not by 
officials from the national institutions but by their diplomatic representatives in the 
counh'y where the meeting is held. There is no regularity as far as the participants 
are concerned, and whenever diplomatic personnel participate in meetings, they act 
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as observers with no power to bargain and reach agreements? The problem of the 
irregularity of participation was pointed out by BSEC itself as early as in 1995.8 
During the last couple of years, participation by diplomatic personnel has increased 
while the meetings of the WGs have been realised at the headquarters of the 
Secretariat, in Istanbul rather than in the territories of the member states as it used to 
be. The level of participation for each country differs and depends on a variety of 
reasons. Armenia's poor participation, especially at the early stages of BSEC, is due 
to the lack of diplomatic relations with Turkey, where several meetings are held, and 
with Azerbaijan as well as due to economic constrains. Armenia is the only country 
which appointed a special permanent representative to BSEC to follow closely the 
work of the organization in an effort to overcome the above mentioned difficulties.9 
Though Russia's participation has been the most regular one, it has been rather 
passive, as in ten years it has initiated only one agreement (on emergency situations) 
while it has not signed the Additional Protocol on the Agreement on Combating 
Organized Crime and the Memorandum of Understanding on Road Transport 
Facilitation (table 3.4). At the same time, there are some striking absentees such as 
the frequent absence of Azerbaijan from the WG on energy. Albania's limited 
involvement in the work of the Subsidiary Bodies has been mainly due to poor 
interest as it has increasingly paid more attention to other subregional structures 
1 Participant's observations. Also information based on .the List of Participants in the Meetings 
available at the BSEC PERMIS. . 
8 ..... taking into account the fluidity of the composition of national delegations to the meetings ofWGs 
and GEs. it will be desirable to appoint delegates on a more permanent basis so as to ensure better 
continuity of the activities of the BSEC bodies and a more effective follow-up process" quote from 
'Progress Report on the Operations and activities of the BSEC Permanent International Secretariat 
(April-October 1995)' in BSEC PERMIS, 1996, p. 24. 
9 For all other member states, the duties of the special representatives are performed by their diplomatic 
missions in Turkey. 
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established in its immediate Southeast European neighbourhood such as the Stability 
Pact.10 
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Figure 3.4 Participation in Subsidiary Bodies (per cent) 
Source: Figure based on information provided by BSEC PERM IS, Istanbul, 2002 
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Meetings of Ministers other than the Ministers of Foreign Affairs are also 
considered Subsidiary Bodies. Those take place on an ad hoc basis and their operation 
is subjected to the program of the Chairmanship. They may adopt Joint Declarations 
and Action Plans but their deliberations require the approval of the Council of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Indicating the existence of basis for consensus around 
functional issues until today Ministerial meetings have been held in the field of 
transport and communications, energy, environment, SMEs as well as in the domain 
of 'soft' security. Such meetings although not realised at the early stages of BSEC, are 
held regularly since 1996 to meet the need of increasing the authority and efficiency 
of the Working Groups whose attendance was considered poor.n 
10 Albania's participation in the Stability Pact meetings is more active and regular. In his speech 
delivered at the Third BSEC Council of MFA (Bucharest, 20 October 2000) the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Albania, Pascal Milo referred almost exclusively to the Stability Pact rather than BSEC. 
II ..... on the basis of positive experience of some regional structures (for example APEC), the 
Participating States may wish to consider the possibility of either upgrading the Working Groups on 
Energy, Transport and Trade and Industrial Cooperation to the Committee level, which would ensure 
the participation in their activities of respective Ministers or their deputies, or to create committees in 
addition to the WGs" quote from 'Progress Report on the Operations and activities of the BSEC 
Permanent International Secretariat (April-October 1995)" in BSEC PERMIS, 1996, p. 24. 
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Although meetings of Ministers have become necessary for the conclusion of 
agreements and Action Plans on specific issues, their weight in the decision making 
process is limited as the only organ entitled to decide remains the Council. 
Documents thus adopted by the ministerial meetings are not valid until endorsed by 
the Council. The seniority of the Council rests, first, on the presumption that foreign 
ministers have an overarching and coordinating role inside the member 
governments. Second, it rests on the domination of foreign policy concerns in the 
intra-regional affairs which meant that any agreement reached should also be 
consistent with the foreign policy/security priorities of the members. 
Tile Permanent International Secretariat 
The Permanent International Secretariat (PERMIS) of BsEC established by an MMFA 
decision, works under the authority of the BSEC Chairman-in-Office, in full capacity 
in Istanbul as of 10 March 1994. It is headed by a Secretary General and its main tasks 
are of a strictly administrative and technical nature. The staff of the PERMlS makes 
up the BSEC civil service, formed by diplomatic personnel appointed across the 
member states. The diplomatic background of the small bureaucracy that runs BSEC 
affairs and the lack of experts has been another indication of the primarily politically 
oriented approach that member states have taken to the BsEC process. The role of 
the PERM IS has been confined to providing administrative and secretarial support to 
the meetings, acting as a centre of cOlnmunication and exchange of information. 
The PERMIS has however reached its lio:lits vis-a-vis the real needs of the new 
phase of BSEC which requires more corltrol on project elaboration and 
implementation (BSEC, 2001, p. 26). Moving towards this direction, the PERMIs has 
initiated regular meetings among the Secretariats of the BSEC Related Bodies on a 
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consultative basis (the first meeting held in 2001). The BSEC Charter recognized that 
the PERMIS should become a dynamic and effective organ at the core of BSEC, but it 
did not grant the Secretariat additional functions and responsibilities. The member 
states are still reluctant to transfer any of their policy-making powers to a central 
bureaucratic structure. The division of labour and responsibilities between the 
PERM IS and the Chairmanship is today an issue of debate. 
3. Multilevel governance 
A feature of the BSEC landscape is its intention to open direct contacts between BSEC 
bodies and the subnationallevels of governance. The rationale for this rests on two 
points. First, it was considered that national governments should not monopolize the 
contacts within the subregional policy-making level and second, that engagement at 
the BSEC level would reinforce the phenomenon of regionalization. To achieve the 
above, three policies were applied which we examine hereafter: i) establishment of 
Related Bodies, ii) sectoral dialogue with NGOs, and ii) support for substate 
interaction. 
3.1. BSEC Related Bodies 
The BSEC Charter (Chapter VII, art. 20) recognized three Related Bodies that II •• • shall 
perform their functions in accordance with their basic instruments and with due 
respect to the principles of the BSEC set forth ih the 'Summit Declaration on BSEC' 
... ". Those are the Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC (PABSEC), the BSEC 
Business Council (BSEC Be) and the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank 
(BSTDB). The Related Bodies however, have very loose institutional links with the 
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organization itseli and the basis of their interaction is strictly consultative. 
Additionally, BSEC decisions are not mandatory for them while tl1e latter cannot 
impose their decisions on the organization. 
Tile Parliamentary Assembly 
The PABSEC was established by a Declaration on 26 February 1993 by the 
Parliaments of nine states (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, 
Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine). The Hellenic Parliament became a full 
member in 1995 and the Assembly of Bulgaria in 1997. 
The administrative work of PABSEC is carried out by a Permanent Secretariat 
and the Assembly's main bodies are the Presidency, the Bureau and the Standing 
Committee. Its President is appointed from among the speakers of the parliaments of 
the member cow1tries in alphabetic rotation for six months. The Assembly consists of 
national delegations whose members are deputies of national parliaments. 
Population is the criterion of the size of each national delegation. At the present the 
Assembly consists of 70 members - Alb~nia, Armenia, Moldova (4 seats each), 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria Georgia (5 seats each), Greece (6 seats each), Romania (7 seats 
each), Turkey, Ukraine (9 seats each), and Russia (12 seats each) (PABSEC, 1993). 
The bulk of work is realized by the three P ABSEC Committees: i) the 
Economic, Commercial, Technological, and Environmental Affairs; b) the Legal and 
Political Affairs, and c) the Cultural, Education~l and Social Affairs Committee. The 
Committees meet on a regular basis to discuss relevant problems and submit their 
reports and recommendations to the General Assembly which after being approved 
are forwarded to the BSEC Council for consideration. 
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The basic functions of the PABSEC are laid down in its founding Declaration as 
follows:12 
to provide the legal ground for the realisation of the principles and the goals of 
respect for human rights, rule of law and democratic values as embodied in the 
Declaration signed on 25 June 1992 by the Heads of State and Government of the 
Participating States of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation, as well as the 
Bosphorus statement issued on the same date, 
to assist and contribute to the realisation of these principles and goals, 
to provide for the democratic participation and support of the peoples by 
communicating the principles of the BSEC to the people of participating states 
with the help of the parliaments considering the important role of the 
parliaments and the parliamentarians will play, 
to develop friendly relations and co-operation between the parliamentarians and 
Parliaments of the BSEC Participating States, thus further promoting the 
atmosphere of confidence and good neighbourhood among peoples, 
to help the BSEC Participating States to act in concert in the international 
organisations to which they are parties. 
The decision-making process in the Assembly is on a majority basis. Reports 
and recommendations after being debated within the Committees are adopted by the 
General Assembly by majority. However, all important decisions are taken by the 
Standing Committee and require consensus. The work of the Assembly shows that 
the actual bargaining process is moderate and the negotiable documents reflect an 
effort to maintain consensus among the members, leaving aside controversial issues. 
The Assembly has developed its own agenda parallel to the work of BSEC but 
its influence is limited as its recommendations are not followed by action either by 
the member states or BSEC organs. The Assembty has however played a Significant 
role in expanding the BSEC agenda. It was the first body to engage in social, cultural 
12 'Declaration on the Establishment of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation' in P ABSEC, 1994, p. 7. 
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and soft security matters.13 Much before BSEC itself placed similar issues on its 
agenda, PABSEC recommendations were forwarded to the Council on issues of 
combating organized crime and trafficking in people. Its Cultural Affairs Committee 
is the only subregional forum where cultural and social matters (such as protection 
of cultural heritage, social reintegration of jobless people, etc.) are addressed. 
PABSEC has tried to insert itself more effectively into the decision-making 
process but its powers are limited as the BSEC Charter states that the Assembly 
" ... provides consistent support to the Black Sea cooperation process on a 
consultative basis" (BSEC, 1998a, art. 20). The Council bears no other obligation apart 
from simply taking into consideration the PABSEC recommendations. The document 
on the 'Relations between the BSEC and the PABSEC' approved in April 1996 by 
BSEC is of a general nature indicating the opposition of the Council to give more 
powers to the Assembly. Therefore, it simply refers to the necessity of measures by 
the Assembly to realize legislation necessary to put into action the Council's 
resolutions and decisions and to mutual participation at each other's sessions at 
various levels. 
Tile BSEC Business Counci[14 
The first structure to receive observer status in BSEC in December 1992 was the BSEC 
Business Council (BSEC BC). The BSEC BC was established on 6 December 1992 with 
the aim to contribute to private and public sector cooperation in line with the 
13 Recommendations have been forwarded to the Council among others on: 'Cooperation among the 
PABSEC Member Countries in Combating Organized Crime' (Recommendation 15/1996), 'Social 
Guarantees during the Transition Period in the PABSEC Member Countries' (Recommendation 
14/1996), 'Guidelines of the Program of the Protection of the Cultural Heritage in the Black Sea 
Region' (Recommendation 18/1996), 'Rights and Social Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons 
in the Black Sea Region' (Recommendation 2111997), etc. (available at www.pabsec.org). 
14 We examine the BSEC Business Council in detail in Chapter 4. 
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objectives of BSEC (BSEC Business Council, 1992, art. 1). It was initially seen as the 
locomotive of economic activities in the region, in line with the Turkish concept of a 
business-led BSEC process and it was created on the basis of bilateral associations of 
Turkish businessmen. Its main scope of activities is to identify private and public 
investment projects and develop a network of contacts through the existing channels 
of bilateral business councils. Today it operates through its Secretariat based in 
" Istanbul and it is run by a Board of Directors, headed by the Chairman who rotates 
on a six-month basis. Although its establishing agreement envisaged the operation of 
14 WGs (energy, transportation, telecommunication, trade and industry, banking, 
finance and insurance, fair trade practices, harmonization of commercial legislation, 
tourism, environment, agriculture, mining, training, business information, research 
& development, and technological cooperation) recommending measures to the 
BSEC, such WGs have not been formed. 
The functioning of the BSEC BC has been hindered by the underdevelopment 
of the business sector across the Black Sea. In spite of that, it has become increasingly 
more involved in BSEC affairs as it has been a main source of knowledge and 
expertise. It has lobbied BSEC for the generation of new policies and instruments in 
particular in the fields of SMEs, transport and project financing. Its role, however, 
remains consultative just like all other Related Bodies (BSEC, 1998a, art. 21). 
TIle Black Sea Trade and Development Bank 
The idea of a regional financial institution has to be traced back to the Summit 
Declaration on BSEC (1992, art. 15) which refers to the possibility of establishing a 
'Black Sea Foreign Trade and Investment Bank' which was followed by the 
'Agreement Establishing the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), 
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signed in Tbilisi on 30 June 1994. The BSEC member states had realized that for the 
BSEe's plans of economic development to flourish, a developmental machinery was 
necessary. Thus, the financial component of BSEC, i.e. the BSTDB, was formally 
established in 1998 WiU1 its headquarters placed in Thessaloniki (Greece). 
The Bank's three largest shareholders are Greece, the Russian Federation and 
Turkey with 16.5 per cent each of U1e total subscribed capital. Bulgaria, Romania and 
Ukraine account for 13.5 per cent each with the five remaining members, Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova each contributing 2 per cent of the total 
subscribed capital. The Bank benefits from a subscribed capital base of 1 billion 
Special Drawing Rights (approximately $1.35 billion) and concentrates primarily on 
the following areas: i) project finance, including economic infrastructure investments 
with strong cooperation and development impact, preferably involving participation 
of several member countries, ii) trade finance aimed at fostering trade and economic 
cooperation among member countries, and iii) private enterprise sector development 
by providing credit lines and equity investments, in particular to medium sized 
companies. 
There is no institutional link between the Bank and BSEe. It was only in 2000, 
that the Council adopted a text on the 'Modalities for BSEC-BSTDB interaction' 
which identifies the areas and mechanisms of interaction but still has a very loose 
approach including only participation in each other's meetings, regular high-level 
meetings for the coordination of the activities of the two bodies and information 
exchange.15 Nevertheless, the Council has no authority over the financing activities 
and projects of the Bank which is an independeht financial actor. 
IS 'Modalities for BSEC-BSTDB Interaction' (Chisinau, 27 April) ill BSEC PERMIS, 2002, pp. 65-67. 
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3.2 Sectoral dialogue 
Article 19 of the BSEC Charter refers to 'sectoral' dialogue with international 
organizations and institutions while Article 24 refers to Affiliated Centres, which are 
established upon approval of the CQuncil to serve all the interested states on specific 
areas of cooperation. Affiliated Centres have an advanced level in BSEC recognized 
as Related Bodies but their work is taken into account by the Council only on a 
consultative basis. 
BSEC's multilevel approach of including non-governmental actors in the 
policy-making process reflects its effort to shift attention from politics to 
entrepreneur and civil-oriented images of subregionalism. It aimed at turning BSEC 
into a developer of networks of experts or epistemic communities while it served the 
purposes of: i) involving experts as promoters of ideas and techniques and ii) 
involving groups from the civil society in the WGs of the organization in 
brainstorming - rather than negotiating mode - through an institutionalized dialogue 
with specialized groups. 
The International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) is the first Affiliated 
Centre which was set up in Athens in 1998 with the task of carrying out policy-
oriented and practical research aimed at the realization of the BSEC goals. It 
functions as the think-tank of BSEC, stimulating the scientific potential and getting 
the academic community involved into the process. Its legal status has been 
strengthened being recognized as the 'facilitator/coordinator of the Academic 
Cooperation' (BSEC, 1998a, article 23) and thus all ad hoc Related Body. The Statute of 
the !CBSS (art. 4, paras. 1, 3) guarantees the openness of the centre to all the member 
states and the organization as such through the de jure participation of the Secretary 
General of the BSEC PERMIS in the Board of Directors with full voting power. The 
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ICBSS functions under the guidance of the Council and it has played a significant 
role in directing the work of the organization. The first draft of the Economic Agenda 
for the Future, the document that sets out the organization's policy priorities for the 
years to come, was elaborated by the ICBSS. The ICBSS also lobbied and succeed in 
organizing the first group of experts on security issues which has been placed on the 
agenda of BSEC 
Furthermore, a network of specialized centres and NGOs has a sectoral 
dialogue of partnership with BSEC Those include the BSEC Coordination Centre for 
the Exchange of Statistical Data and Economic Information (Ankara), the Balkan 
Centre for SMEs (Bucharest), the Black Sea Regional Energy Centre (Sofia), the Black 
Sea International Ship-owners Association - BISNA, the Black Sea Region 
Association of Shipbuilders and Ship-repairers-BRASS and the Black Sea Universities 
Network - BSUN (Sofia). 
This multilevel approach has managed to generate a web of partners but the 
networks established are without power to influence decision-making. In the next 
section we focus on the subnational level to indicate that despite the increase of 
interaction among actors at the subnational level those have not been benefited by 
policy empowerment as a result of their engagement in BSEC 
3.3. The subs tate level 
Subregionalism was soon to be followed by formal microregionalism16 as an effort of 
the local authorities to enhance" governanGe at the substate level (table 3.1). 
Microregionalism was perceived as both the outcome and promoter of political and 
16 "Microregionalism refers to subnationallevels of region ali sat ion, whether in the political, economic, 
security or social dimensions", (Breslin & Hook, 2002, p. 13). 
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economic interdependence. From its initial stages though, it has been conditioned by 
the lack of genuine economic forces in the area and by the suspicion with which the 
national centres have responded to any active role undertaken by subnational 
authorities. As a result a de jure microregionalism17 has emerged which bears the 
characteristics of any formal organization (regular meetings, international 
secretariats, bureaucracy, etc.) and asks for the credentials of the national centre 
while very often is seen as the extension of national policies and interests (Manoli, 
2002b, pp. 193-214). 
Cooperation among city-ports in the area was the first to be established, 
motivated by the potential of economic activity involving shipping and sea trade. 
The Varna-based International Black Sea Club (IBSC) was founded on 5 December 
1992 with the aim to create a basis for formal cooperation among city-ports for 
economic and social development through promoting collaboration among the 
private sectors of those cities. It has an open-ended participation and observer status 
in BSEC. Another similar forum operating under the auspices of BSEC is the Black 
and Azov Seas Ports Association (BASP A) which functions through the organization 
of Conferences of the Heads of the Black Sea Ports Authorities (e.g. in Poti (Georgia), 
on 24-25 March 1999 and in Istanbul on 26 November 1999). 
The most institutionalized forum however has been the Round Table of Black 
Sea Capitals' Governors and Mayors whi ch was transformed into the Black Sea 
Capitals Association in 1998. Roundtable meetings focus on issues concerning urban 
facilities (transport, housing, communal services, water supply, sewerage etc.) as 
11 The distinction between de jure and de facto regionalism has been used in the literature to describe 
regionalism (or state-led regional integration) and regionalization (or market-led regional integration) 
respectively. See among others Higgott, 1997, p. 167. 
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well as on democratic municipal governance.IS Recognizing that the solution to the 
above problems is closely related to the overall political and economic progress of 
each country, the Round Tables have tried to put forward ideas and initiatives aimed 
at improving the living conditions of the citizens of the whole region. However, the 
real purpose of its existence is to assist in the fulfilment of the goals of BSEC and this 
is clearly stated in its Resolution adopted in Kyiv on 14 September 1995, which says 
that the Round Table" ... serves towards attaining the overall objectives of the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation". Consequently its objectives are:19 i) promotion of 
systematic exchange of information and experience, ii) support and encouragement 
of cooperation among companies, enterprises, investor institutions chambers of 
commerce and industry, legal institutions, universities, iii) facilitation of multilateral 
projects elaborated by BSEC, iv) encouragement of twin-city relationships between 
the member cities, v) development of human contacts and cultural cooperation, vi) 
protection of the environment, historical and cultural monuments, and vii) close 
collaboration with other bodies of the BSEC process. 
Being mainly a discussion forum, it has limited power either to mobilize the 
private sector or to influence decision making at a national or regional level. Its 
products still remain declaratory documents. In fact, the initiation of the Round 
Table did not come from the cities themselves and it cannot be seen as a 'bottom-up' 
demand. It has been set up by the PABSEC under whose auspices it has been 
functioning. In launching the initiative of the Black Sea Capitals' Association, the 
PABSEC, "proceeded from the conviction that local authorities, rendering direct 
service to the public and addressing everyday problems encountered by citizens, 
18 'Declaration of the Black Sea Capitals' Governors and Mayors Round Table', Istanbul, 7 September 
1994. 
19 'Statute of the Black Sea Capitals' Association', Bucharest, 15 May 1998. 
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could make a major valuable contribution to attaining the aims of the Black Sea 
Economic Co-operation" (PABSEC, 1998, para. 1). 
Table 3. 1 MICROREGIONAL SCHEMES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE BSEC AREA 
Participants Objectives - Features 
Illtematiollal Black Sea Club (IBSC) 
Burgas (Bulgaria), Varna (Bulgaria), Piraeus 
- Exchange of information and 
(Greece), Thcssalokini (Greece), Constanta 'development of partnerships between 
(Romania), Taganrog (Russia), Ilichevsk its city-members in the fields of 
(Ukraine), Nikolaev (Ukraine), Odessa ecology, tourism, transport, 
(Ukraine), Kherson (Ukraine) communications, sports and culture. 
- Economic promotion of the Black Sea 
region 
- Observer status in BSEC 
The Black Sea Capitals' Govemors aud Mayors Association (BSCA) 
Capitals of the BSEC states - To develop cooperation and exchanges 
among the capital cities of BSEC 
Participating States 
TI,e Black alld Azov Seas Ports Association (BASPA) 
Poti (Georgia), Burgas (Bulgaria), Constanta - To enhance interaction among the 
(Romania), Ilichcvsk (Ukraine), regions ports 
-
To support activities under the auspices 
of BSEC 
Association oJBlack Sea Area ReKiolls (ABSAR) 
Regions of the States in the Black Sea which - Created within the CPMR and acts as 
are also members of the CPMR (Peripheral its Geographical Commission 
Maritime Regions of Europe) - To act as the political voice of the 
regions of the Black Sea Basin 
Source: Manoli, 2002b, p. 202 
The actual outcome of subnational endeavours involved in BSEC is yet to be 
seen. The International Black Sea Club (lBSC) being concerned with customs 
difficulties in the area initiated a joint action by the cities to simplify and harmonize 
procedures in the region. Its efforts channelled through BSEC brought no results.20 
At the same time, issues related to the decentralization process that is still going on 
in post-communist political systems undermine the actual potential of regional 
authorities. Some states worry that much cross-border autonomy could erode their 
own central authority or create alliances between regions from both sides of the 
border eventually bypassing them. 
20 Assembly of the IBSC (n.d.), 'Appeal to the Parliaments and Governments of the Black Sea 
Economic Co-operation', adopted by the Tenth Assembly Meeting. 
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Although the agendas of the above-mentioned schemes are broad, their actual 
influence both in the realization of projects and the mobilization of the private sector 
as well as on the BSEC decision-making process is limited. Two main reasons can be 
identified: first, the absence of a "genuine economic regionalization and second, the 
security problems existing in the region which mainly involve border areas. Formal 
cooperation among sub-state actors has developed as a response to or upon the 
initiative of BSEC. The role of the formal microregional groups has been that of 
pressure groups and the extent to which they are able to influence policies of the 
states or of BSEC depends primarily on the other levels (i.e. intergovemmental). 
4. Comprehensive subregionalism: ambitions and limitations 
Along with experimenting with multilevel governance, BSEC attempted to foster a 
comprehensive type of subregionalism. This section discloses that despite BSEC's 
advancement in this direction, implementation of commitments especially in the key 
areas of economic cooperation presented problems. 
Subregional cooperation has gone through two stages. Until 1998, BSEC was 
almost exclusively preoccupied with economic issues, trade and infrastructure. Since 
1998, increased emphasis has been placed on political and security aspects. This is 
manifested by the creation of new working bodies such as the WG on combating 
organized crime and the CEs on security along with the conclusion of relevant 
agreements. Despite the limited success in the economic domain, the scope of 
subregional cooperation widened to include social and security issues. Before 
proceeding we have to clarify that the domains of economic cooperation and security 
are examined in more detail in chapters four and five respectively. 
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Economic cooperation 
All WGs envisaged in the Summit Declaration (1992) were of a functional nature 
covering the fields of economy, technology, environment, energy and infrastructure. 
Cooperation in the social, cultural. and political domains was set aside. With the 
exception of the first paragraph that refers to the need of "shaping a new era of peace 
and security on the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act" (BSEC, 1992, para. 
1) all other paragraphs of the Surrunit Declaration refer strictly to the economic and 
environmental domains. 
Although BSEC is defined as a 'regional economic organization', it was 
recognized during the preliminary discussions for the establishment of BSEC that 
full economic integration would not be an a priori commitment for the participants, 
even though consideration of such integration could be given later on. The 
participating states agreed to promote cooperation by contributing to "... the 
expansion of their mutual trade in goods and services and ensure or progressively 
eliminate obstacles of all kinds, in a manner not contravening their obligations 
towards third parties" (BSEC, 1992a, para. 14). Their commitment to facilitate trade, 
led to the 'Declaration of Intent for the Establishment of a Free Trade Area' (1997), a 
plan which was however later characterized as 'ambitious' (BSEC, 2001, p. 7) and its 
implementation lost priority while "trade facilitation and liberalization [was seen] as 
a more realistic goal for the BSEC member states at this stage" .21 The aim of the 
Declaration of Intent was not the creation of a trade bloc. The free trade area was 
seen as a complementary step to the process of national reforms towards market 
economy. Notwithstanding the declaratory statements in this direction, the BSEC 
partners did not take practical steps to liberalize trade policy among themselves 
21 'Chart of the Implementation of the BSEC Economic Agenda' in BSEC PERMIS, 2002, p. 238. 
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and I or harmonize their policy towards third parties. A number of meetings on 
cross-border facilitation as well as on non-tariff measures' reduction took place 
jointly with the WTO and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) but they have not produced concrete actions or commitments. The creation 
of a Free Trade Area (FTA), six years since its announcement in February 1997 has 
remained on paper as many countries (e.g. Greece, Romania and Bulgaria) withdrew 
their commitments arguing that their international obligations particularly vis-A-vis 
the EU contradict with a BSEC FT A. On the other hand, Azerbaijan steadily refused 
to consent to deepening economic integration prior to the settlement of the security 
issues in the Caucasus and primarily the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict, while Russia 
has remained passive. Furthermore, the FT A original plan was soon to be abandoned 
due to the lack of transnational demands as we will see in the next chapter, while the 
political support for a FTA ceased to exist. The FT A plans did not go beyond the 
drafting of a 'Recommendation for the procedure to eliminate quantitative 
resb·ictions and measures with equivalent effect on trade in BSEC region' and an 
'Exemplary list of quantitative restrictions and measures with equivalent effect on 
trade' in order to prepare a model of actions for the liberalization of trade in the 
BSEC region. Neither of the two documents, prepared by Turkey, received active 
support of the other members. Detailed negotiations never took off. 
The lack of consensus and of real commitment on behalf of the member states 
left economic cooperation without a concrete task. Over the years the WG on 
economic cooperation remained without a plan of action and its priorities have 
become less clear. It has so far met ten times; which is a small number, given the 
primacy placed on the economic character of cooperation while its main bulk of 
work has been forwarded to ad hoc meetings of experts which have a business 
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orientation and deal with issues such as inveshnent promotion, avoidance of double 
taxation and visa facilitation for businessmen. A redirection of priorities from trade 
towards improving the business environment was hence witnessed. Negotiations 
have been hard to succeed even on issues such as visa facilitation where a draft 
'Agreement on visa facilitation for businessmen' has been negotiated but has yet to 
be signed due to the reluctance of at least three countries. Bulgaria and Romania 
were not in a position to sign due to their international obligations (i.e. EU accession 
negotiations) while Russia was prevented by the ongoing updating of its national 
legislation on its visa regime.22 
In accordance with the BSEC philosophy of transplanting the rules of the WTO 
into the region - since only few of its members were members of the WTO in its early 
stages - the same approach was applied in the field of investments. The member 
states agreed on basic principles of investment collaboration but on a non-binding 
basis: transparency, non-discrimination, investment stimulation, investment control 
exportation and compensation, convertibility, entry and sojourn of key members, 
eliminating of resh'ictions on exporting capital, investors' conduct and settlement of 
disputes.23 However, no other action was taken beyond declaratory measures. It was 
again Turkey that initiated measures in the investment domain. In cooperation with 
the OECD and the BSEC Business Council it designed a concept to promote 
investments in the BSEC region, which was approved at the meeting of Ministers of 
the Member States responsible for SMEs (Istanbul, 27 September 2001) named as 
'Black Sea Investment Initiative' (BSU). 
22 'The Progress Report of the Secretary General on the operations and activities of the BSEC 
Permanent International Secretariat (November 2002 - May 2003)" in BSEC PERMIS, 2003, p. 7. 
23 'Basic Principles oflnvestment Collaboration in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation' (Moscow, 25 
October 1996), in BSEC PERMIS, 1996, pp. 21-22. 
138 
The initial ambition to create a business-led cooperation process was not 
realized as the private sector remained by and large outside the BSEC decision-
making process never taking the place envisaged in the founding BSEC documents. 
The representatives of the business community preferred bilateral contacts and their 
own channels of interaction with their counterparts while they showed no interest in 
lobbying BSEC. BSEC's interest therefore, moved away from trade related issues. 
Infrastructure 
An overview of the functioning of the WGs shows that the ones whose activities 
have had an interface with projects supported by the EU or other international 
organizations indicate a higher degree of activity. This is the case of the WG on 
transport which is the most frequently convened group (convened 16 times since its 
establishment). Beyond the actual need for infrastructure rehabilitation, the necessity 
of coordinating actions in implementing projects initiated by the European 
Commission and the UNECE (e.g. PETrA, TRACECE) in the area has often dictated 
BSEC's focus on infrastructure. 
Despite that, even the most frequently convened WG on transport has met little 
success due to lack of resources and expertise while the international community did 
not always consider BSEC as a reliable partner in realizing projects. The Black Sea 
Pan-European Transport Area (PETrA) project initiated by the EU was therefore, 
negotiated outside the BSEC framework. Although BSEC was involved in the 
development of the concept of Black Sea PETrA, it has been given only observer 
status with the PETrA project and it has been declined full membership, hence any 
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real influence on the project's implementation.24 In 2002 a decision was taken to 
incorporate PETrA in the TRACECA, despite the strong reaction of the BSEC 
members and their proposal to host the Secretariat of PETrA in the BSEC PERMIS in 
Istanbul. In parallel to PETrA, BSEC has developed another concept the one of the 
'Black Sea Ring Corridor' (proposed by Turkey) which builds upon the existing or 
projected transport corridors in the area and attempts to generate multimode north-
south links in addition the west-east ones. A comparative analysis of the transport 
policies of BSEC and PETrA (UNECE Secretariat, 2001) indicated that "they appear 
to address substantially similar objectives and priorities". Nevertheless, neither the 
BSEC policies nor the 'Black Sea Ring Corridor' were considered by the Ee. 
The UNECE involvement in BSEC resulted in the conclusion of a 
'Memorandum of Understanding on facilitation of road transport of goods in the 
BSEC region' in March 2002. The 'Memorandum of Understanding' (MoV) was 
mainly concluded due to the strong support by the UNECE and it was seen as 
complementing the similar MoU concluded within the SECI. Even here though 
Russia and Romania were reluctant to jOin in (postponing their signature to a later 
date) while Azerbaijan and Turkey signed with reservations regarding the 
application of the MoU in Armenia.2S Economic infrastructure (transport, 
communications) has met some success as joint projects have been funded by the 
international community but not by BSEC itself. Projects in those fields (such as 
Black Sea Submarine Fibre Optic Cables - BSFOCS) usually involve a number but not 
24 The issue of the upgrading of BSEe in I.>ETrA was discussed at the WG of Transport in Istanbul on 
and the request was rejected, 'Report of the Meeting of the BSEC Working Group on Transport' 
(Istanbul, 14-15 June 2001) in BSEC PERMIS, 2002, pp. 430-435. 
25 "The Republic of Azerbaijan declares that none of the rights, obligations and provisions set out in 
the Memorandum ... shall be applied by the Republic of Azerbaijan in respect to the Republic of 
Armenia" and "The Republic of Turkey does not consider itself bound by the provisions of the 
Memorandum ... as it relates to transport between Turkey and Armenia" in the 'Protocol on Opening of 
the Signing Procedure of the Memorandum of Understanding on Facilitation of Road Transport of 
Goods in the BSEC Region' (Kyiv, 6 March 2002), para. 5 and 6 in BSEC,·2002b. 
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all of the BSEC countries and they should not be considered as BSEC projects since 
they have not been negotiated within its organs.26 
Energy 
Energy has been identified as one of the most promising fields of subregional 
cooperation given the geopolitical significance of the Black Sea in the transport of 
Caspian energy, hence the chances it offers for integration with the rest of Europe. 
Actual cooperation in this domain has been however restricted to electricity, leaving 
aside the politically sensitive sectors of the oil and gas industry. The 'Memorandum 
on Cooperation in the Field of Electric Power Industry' (1998) signed at first by eight 
out of the eleven BSEC states (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey jointed later) was 
concluded in a view to create a BSEC Interconnected Power System (BSEC PERMIS, 
2000, pp. 198-203). Negotiations over the Memorandum revealed once more the 
reluctance of several countries to commit themselves to cooperative projects that 
might be perceived as contradicting their EU membership aspirations. Those 
concerns are best expressed in Bulgaria's Declaration attached to the Memorandum 
(BSEC, 2000, p. 202) which stresses that "Bulgaria implements its national strategy 
for energy development with the priority aim to interconnect the Bulgarian electric 
power system to the UCPTE",27 Accordingly, Romania's Declaration referred to the 
fact that "",Romanian is a Central European Country"," and "[tlop priority for 
Romania is the preparation of national electric system for the interconnection with 
UCPTE" (BSEC, 2000, p, 203). 
26 For a brief overview of projects in the area see PABSEC, 2000. 
27 The Union for Power Production and Transport Coordination (UCPTE) is based in Brussels and 
regulates the electric connection of the EU countries. . 
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Environmental protection 
Environmental protection is the most advanced example of Black Sea policy-making 
evolving around the Bucharest Convention (1992) and the Black Sea Environmental 
Programme (supported by the UN). The six littoral states adopted a 'Strategic Action 
Plan for the Rehabilitation and Protection of the Black Sea' in 1996 which has been 
implemented through advisory groups around the Black Sea and a Secretariat based 
in Istanbul. All activity develops outside the BSEC framework despite the fact that 
Black Sea environmental protection was given priority from the very beginning of 
the organization. Despite the fact that the Surrunit Declaration establishing BSEC 
makes particular reference to cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection 
in two separate paragraphs (para. 4 and 15), the relevant WG has been among the 
least active, while there has been no BSEC Action Plan or any other project in the 
field. It was under the BSEC Turkish Chairmanship (2000) that the organization 
became involved in the negotiations of drafting a 'Convention for Fisheries and 
Conservation of living resources of the Black Sea'. The Convention was originally 
proposed by the six littoral states on 25 June 1997. However, negotiations within 
BSEC were unsuccessful and were transferred back to the UN Black Sea 
Environmental Program due to the fact that the 'BSEC principle' i.e. inclusion of all 
eleven member states (and not only the six littoral states) should be respected for the 
Convention to be signed within BSEC (BSEC PERMIS, 2002, pp. 256-257). The 
evolving environmental regime in the Black Sea is therefore, shaped by the UN and 
EU (through programs or legal instruments) beyond the BSEC framework. 
Agriculture 
Cooperation in the field of agriculture has in fact developed not among the BSEC 
states, but between BSEC and the UN FAO on a project basis. It evolves around the 
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project on 'Institutional Strengthening to Facilitate Intra- and Inter-regional 
Agricultural Trade among BSEC Member States' which includes technical assistance 
and training workshops.28 It has a geographic focus on eight BSEC member states, 
namely: Albania, Armenia, Azerba.ijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania and 
Turkey. Despite some training programs by the UN FAD and a few project proposals 
(e.g. plant genetic resources) no substantial progress has been registered. 
Science alld Tec1molog1j 
The inclusion of a science and technology dimension in BSEC has the aim of 
applying "the achievements of science and technology to concrete fields of 
cooperation and thus to accelerate the process of multilateral cooperation in the 
region" and this is done 'by promoting a closer link between the academic circles and 
concrete projects of the BEC, conducting joint scientific studies in an interactive 
manner with the decision - making and working bodies of the BSEC" (BSEC 
PERMIS, 1997, p. 24). It is in fact a dimension which was strengthened by the 
Secretariat at the early years of the functioning of BSEC.29 It has nevertheless been 
confined in regular meetings and ongoing negotiations over the establishment of a 
BSEC Center on Innovation Technologies. 
EmergenClj situations 
Although not envisaged as a field of cooperation in the founding BSEC documents, 
emergency situations has been one of the most successful fields of common BSEC 
action. An agreement signed in 1998 by ten out of eleven member states covers cases 
21 The Project ofS342,OOO started in November, 2002. 
29 Information by directorial staff of the BSEC PERMIS. 
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of extraordinary situations of natural and teclmological character with which the 
parties can not cope alone (BSEC, 1998c). Strong Russian support resulted in the 
conclusion of the agreement within just a year after its proposal and the creation of 
an International Rescue Centre in Gelendhik (R~ssia). However the agreement was 
not signed by Turkey, the latter raising concerns over its compatibility with other 
international agreements.3D 
Securitt} 
The above indicate that advancement on cooperation in functional or technical issues 
has been very slow and limited. The poor tangible results on 'low policy' issues such 
as environment, transport, communications, etc. do not provide a strong case of 
'spill- over' effect into the field of security. Nevertheless, after ten years of 
functioning BSEC moved to the domain of security although in an informal way.31 
The first meeting of the ad-hoc Study Group for considering ways and means of 
enhancing the contribution of BSEC to strengthening security and stability took place 
in March 2003.32 Following the adoption of the BSEC Economic Agenda, the member 
states had become more amenable to the idea of expanding exchanges of views and 
collaboration in security affairs, stressing however (e.g. Turkey) that such a 
development should remain a 'second track', informal process. This new attitude to 
including sensitive spheres of high politics on the subregional agenda is primarily to 
be attributed to two factors. First, it was the subregional structures such as the ICBSS 
and the BSEC PERMIS rather than.the states themselves which took the initiative to 
30 See chapter 5. 
31 See chapter S. 
32 'Report of the Meeting of the Ad Hoc Study group for considering ways and means of enhancing 
contribution of the BSEC to security and stability in the Black Sea region', (Athens, 26-27 March) in 
BSEC PERMIS. 2003. . 
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include security in the draft document of the BSEC Economic Agenda which was 
later accepted by the member states. Second, it was an after effect of developments in 
the international arena in 2001 when security concerns increased in significance. 
BSEC's previous engagement with security. was restricted only to 'soft' security 
aspects such as combating organized crime where a relevant agreement was 
concluded in 1998 by all eleven members (BSEC, 1998e). It is the only agreement 
which is almost universal as it has been signed by all and ratified by ten members 
(Albania has not ratified the Agreement) without reservations.33 Beyond the 
agreement itself, mechanisms of practical cooperation have been also considered 
which have led to the creation of a BSEC network of Liaison Officers. 
Tile BSEC Economic Agenda 
The BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future (2001) was negotiated during the period 
of two years and was meant to set up the course of action of the organization. 
Initially drafted as a primarily economy oriented document, it later became a more 
general one with political connotations, indicating however a low degree of 
commitment and not clarity as far as its aims are concerned. A reservation on behalf 
of Armenia indicates the obstacles resulting from the security concerns in the area, 
the climate of mistrust and the lack of consensus over which negotiations took 
place.J.I 
33 See however the Declaration of the Georgian Parliament, accompanying the instrument of 
ratification of the Agreement: "Georgia will not be responsible for violations of the provisions of the 
Agreement on the territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region, before the full restoration of the 
territorial integrity of Georgia". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia (2000), Note, no. Nt 0-\7/197 
dated 12 June. 
34 "Amlenia finds inappropriate the use of term 'aggressive separatism' in the BSEC Economic Agenda 
and believes that the use of such a term is uncommon in international practice, politically charged and 
reflects subjective qualification for ongoing conflicts in the BSEC region" (BSEC, 200 I, p. 30). 
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Table 3.2 THE BSEC ECONOMIC AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 
I. ACCELERATION OF EFFECTIVE MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND ATTAINMENT 
OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
Concerted Actions for Economic Expansion of the BSEC Member States 
Project Based Approach 
Project Elaboration and Promotion 
Intra-Regional Trade Investments 
Banking and Finance 
Defining Priorities for Cooperation in Specific Sectors of the Economy 
Energy: Oil and Gas Projects, Interconnection of Electricity Networks 
Transport 
Telecommunications 
Environmental Protection 
Science and Technology 
Information and Communication Technology 
Investment in Education and Training 
Regional Strategy for Agricultural Development and Food Security 
Tourism 
Strengthening of the BSEC Business Dimension - SMEs 
Exchange and Harmonization of Economic and Statistical Data and Economic 
Information and Adoption of Common Accounting Principles 
II. COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF INSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL AND GOVERNANCE 
III. SOFf SECURITY MEASURES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF MULTILATERAL COOPERATION 
Cooperation in Combating Organized Crime, Illegal Trafficking of Drugs and Arms, 
Terrorism, Corruption and Money Laundering in the Wider European Context 
Cooperation in Emergency Situations 
IV. BSEC: TOWARDS THE MATURE PARTNERSHIP, COMMON ENDEAVOUR AND SHARED 
VALUES 
Broadening the Basis for Multilateral Cooperation among Governmental and 
Parliamentary Structures, NGOs, Businessmen and Academic Communities 
The Role of the PABSEC and National Parliaments of the BSEC Member States 
Further Development and Improvement of the BSEC Implementation and Coordination 
Mechanisms 
The Role of the BSEC PERMIS 
V. EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE BSEC ORGANIZATION 
The BSEC Role in the New European Architecture 
The BSEC-EU Platform of Cooperation 
BSEC and the World - Cooperation with other International Organization 
Source: BSEC (2001) 
The document reaffirms a comprehensive approach of defining subregional 
cooperation from functional issues such as cooperation on environment and 
infrastructure all the way to social and cultural development and to the field of soft 
security (illegal trafficking of drugs and arms, terrorism, etc.). Concerted actions for 
accelerating multilateral economic' cooperation are set out as the first aim of the 
Agenda but concrete commitments or timetables are not included, the Agenda 
remaining rather a document of general orientation. 
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The lack of clarity in defining the priorities of the organization is manifested 
throughout the first ten pages of the document that constitute its main body and 
include every possible field of economic action without, though, presenting which 
field is a priority: trade, inves?nent, energy, transport, telecommunications, 
environmental protection, science and technology, information, education, 
agriculture, tourism and SMEs. Chapters three and four of the BSEC Economic 
Agenda expand cooperation in soft security, democracy building, social and cultural 
development and education, fields that for the first time since the initiation of BSEC 
are placed on subregional level. The commentary on the sectoral policy headings 
often does not distinguish between national policies and specifically regional projects 
where BSEC could have a comparative advantage (Adams et al., 2002, p. 10). The 
overall picture of the Agenda confirms that cooperation around the Black Sea might 
have been broadened but has not deepened, being conceived more as a mechanism 
of foreign policy rather than a tool of integration. 
Table 3.3 Examples of BSEe cooperation 
Field Project lnitiator/Year 
Trade Establishment of a BSEC Trade and Investment Center Turkey (1998) 
(proposal) 
SMEs BSEC Information System for Support and Development of Armenia (1998) 
SMEs. (prOJ1osaI) 
Investments Black Sea Investment Initiative OECD, BSEC BC, 
Turkey (2001) 
Energy BSEC Interconnected Power System Russia (1998) 
Transport Black Sea Ring Corridor Concept Turkey 
Unified System of voluntary satellite monitoring of ships Russia (2000) 
sailing in the Black Sea (proposal) 
Emergency International Rescue Centre in Gelendhik (Russia) Russia (1998) 
Situations 
Organized Network of Liaison Officers Turkey (2000) 
Crime 
Agriculture Institutional Strengthening to Facilitate Intra- and Inter- BSEC/UNFAO (2002) 
regional Agricultural Trade among BSEe: Member States 
, 
Promotion of Beekeeping Among Low Income Rural Turkey (2002) 
Families for supplementary earnings in the Black Sea 
(proposal) 
Turkey (2002) 
Plant Genetic Resources and Bread Wheat Network 
(proposal) 
Note: Initiator and year where appropriate. 
Source: Table based on information provided by BSEC PERMIS, Istanbul, 2002. 
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5. Policy-making and intergovernmentalism 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, the decision-making process in the BSEC 
framework is structured in an intergovemmentallogic with all authoritative power 
resting in the Council and the Conunittee of the Senior Officials of the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs. 
Institutional evolution has left approaches to bargaining and decision-making 
process untouched. The decision-making process in BSEC relies on proposals being 
made exclusively by the Subsidiary Bodies (WGs, GEs and Ministerial Meetings) 
which are approved by the Council. Decisions are made by consensus or on a 
majority basis depending on the issue on question. Consensus is required on all 
important issues concerning: admission of new members, granting of observer 
status, creation of new organs and modification of such organs, mandates, adoption 
and modification of the Rules of Procedure, adoption of the agenda of the BSEC 
meetings; approval of cooperation projects; dialogue partnership with third parties 
and financial commitments affecting all members. Less substantial technical issues 
are settled by a two thirds majority. In this case those who voted in favour of a 
proposal have to abide by the provision adopted. However, in practice consensus-
building is the most frequent way of reaching an agreement. Across all policy 
domains the participants tend to base cooperation on consensus even in those cases 
where majority applies. So far there is little evidence of majoritarian methods 
emerging to resolve disagreements and this has led to the minimum possible 
common ground and a poor outcome. 
Institutional dynamism has not facilitated substantive outcomes. The actual 
number of agreements signed and projects elaborated falls behind the expectations 
and the organizational input (table 3.3 and 3.4). The lack of consensus has led to poor 
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subregional regime making. In ten years of functioning, there have been only two 
agreements signed strictly within the BSEC framework. Only one of them is signed 
by all eleven countries while the second agreement does not include Turkey.35 Non-
obligatory Memoranda of Understanding, Action Plans and Declarations (e.g. on a 
BSEC FTA in 1997, on Tourism in 2002, on SMEs in 2001), Memoranda and Action 
Plans (Transport, 1999) which require a minimum of political commitment have been 
the most commonly negotiated documents. Even for those declaratory documents, 
long drawn-out negotiations take place with an average time of two years of 
bargaining for a Declaration or a Memorandum to be agreed upon. 
Table 3.4 
Agreements reached within BSEC (as of September 2003) 
Country Agreement on Agreement on Additional Memorandum Memorandum of 
Emergency Combating Protocol on the on Cooperation Understanding on 
Assistance and Crime, in Establishment of in the Field of Facilitation of 
Emergency particular in its a Network of Electric Power Road Transport of 
Response to natural Organized Liaison Officers Industry Goods in the BSEC 
and man - made Forms Kyiv, 15 May Yerevan, 15 region 
disasters Corfu,I-2 2002 ... • April 1998 Kyiv, 6 March 
Sochi, 15 April October 1998·· 2002 
1998· 
Albania M M M M M 
Am\enia R R M M M 
Azerbaijan M R N M M 
Bulgaria M R R M M 
Georgia M R M M M 
Greece M R Ma M M 
Moldova R R R M M 
Romania R R M M N 
Russia R R N M N 
Turkey N R R M M 
Ukraine R R M M M 
N: non participating M: member R: Ra tification 
a: joined on 16 April 2002 
• in force on 15 March 2003 •• in force on 4 October 1999 .... in force on 16 April 2003 
Source: Table based on information provided by BSEC PERMIS, IstanbuL 2002. 
The declaratory nature of the bulk of BSEC activities discloses the member 
countries' main concern to indicate I good neighbourly relations', a political condition 
imposed by the EU vis-a-vis its relations with third members and candidate 
counh'ies rather than a real interest in deepening subregional integration. The 
application of a comprehensive approach in defining subregionalism has made 
3S The first one is the Agreement on 'Combating Crime, in Pa11icular in its Organized Forms' (1998) 
and the second one is on 'Collaboration in Emergency Assistance and E01ergency Response to natural 
and man - made Disasters' (1998). 
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progress as far as the expansion of the areas of cooperation is concerned but not its 
deepening. 
As table 3.3 indicates most initiatives have by far resulted from Turkey which 
. 
has been the single most active member in the organization. Evidence shows that 
member states have been divided in practice into two groups regarding their 
negotiating attitudes and on the basis of their EU relations. The EU candidate states 
(Bulgaria and Romania) have refrained from undertaking initiatives and 
participating in binding agreements to avoid complications for their EU orientation. 
It is significant to note that Turkey though an EU candidate country has with but a 
few exceptions not followed the Bulgarian and Romanian attitude. At the same time, 
a variable geometry option has developed in practice where not all countries 
participate in certain agreements. A sharp subregional focus has been absent with 
most sectoral policy coordination being a mixture of national policy priorities (the 
latter not always being clearly defined themselves but being at the stage of 
formulation). 
The institutional structures are the same for all domains of policy-making. 
Subregionalism may be defined as a multidimensional process as far as the spheres 
of engagement (trade, environment, 'soft' security, etc.) are concerned, but the 
decision-making processes and their structures remain exclusively in the hands of 
the governmental elites. The member states have resisted handing over any real 
power to subregional institutions. The form of policy-making indicates that there is 
no transfer of powers from the. national to the subregional level. Subregional 
structures are thus far from developing into a supranational type of governance. 
The subregional institutions are very loosely connected to institutions within 
the member states. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs contro1.all communication with 
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the organization and set the overall policy. National agencies and authorities may 
become part of the BSEC architecture through their direct involvement in the 
functioning of the WGs where projects and programs are initiated and which 
constitute the first stage of bargaini~g but they a.re not engaged in the final stage of 
decision-making. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in several cases it is 
experts and senior officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (rather than other 
Ministries) that participate in WGs even of technical nature (e.g. on transport and 
communications, etc.). Issues of trade and economic development are permanently 
addressed by officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs strengthening thus the 
general perception that economic cooperation is conceived as a foreign policy tool 
rather than a genuine integration process. In spite of the increase in the density of 
interaction among many actors from within the subregion, the BSEC dimension of 
policy has not become a significant part of the work at the national level (such as 
national officials, lobbyists not to mention ministries). 
The founding declarations of BSEC did not refer to any central institutions, 
'Related Bodies' or' Affiliated Centres'. This changed, however, with the approval of 
the BSEC Charter which assigned a consultative role to 'Related Bodies' and 
provided observer status to NGOs as a point of access to the policy process for socio-
economic groups. Still, most of those involved in the institutional structures are 
members of governmental elites, with the process operating at a distance from the 
wider population. The Assembly and particularly the BSEC Business Council as well 
as the Affiliated Centres with sectoral dialogue have increasingly become active but 
they still remain without any real power in the policy-making process. Associations 
representing societal interests, the environmentalists, businessmen, and increasingly 
a range of other advocacy groups and NGOs have taken pains to develop links with 
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BSEC institutions mainly since 1998. A multilevel institutionalization involving 
substate and transnational actors is backed by BSEC, but only as long as an 
intergovernmental policy-making mode is preserved. The clearly expanded level of 
activity of transnational actors should not thus, be confused with real influence. 
Lobbying of BSEC by transport and shipbuilding associations is indicative in this 
respect. The BSEC UTRA and the BRASS have participated in the WG on transport 
preparing an agreement for 'Visa Facilitation of Professional Drivers Nationals of the 
BSEC member states' (since May 2002) and an agreement on 'General directions of 
governmental policy of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) countries in the 
sphere of shipbuilding, marine fleet and ship-repair'36 (negotiations held between 
2000-2002) respectively. After approximately two years of negotiations both 
processes have reached a stalemate. Until today no agreement or project initiated 
outside the governmental bodies has been approved or completed within the BSEC 
framework. 
What do BSEC institutional configurations tell us about the way that interests 
are defined, ideas are propagated, and issues are addressed? First of all BSEC 
institutions are conceived and used as fora for addressing foreign policy concerns of 
a comprehensive character and consequently vested interests are primarily defined 
by the governmental elites. TIlis is despite the rhetoric on the supremacy of the 
private sector as the driving force of cooperation. The above is reflected in the 
institutional evolution of the organization, its decision making process and the type 
of participation in the meetings. Transnational. actors have refrained from lobbying 
BSEC partly due to lack of knowledge over 'the BSEC modes of function and 
36 'General directions of governmental policy of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 
countries in the sphere of shipbuilding, marine fleet and ship-repair' draft document presented at the ad 
hoc Meeting of Experts on Shipbuilding, Shiprepairing and Shipping (Istanbul, 6 February 2002). See 
also BSEC, 2002b. 
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primarily due to the fact that their demands are directed towards other centres as we 
will see later. BSEC policy making is a process of mutual learning in which both 
interests and ideas shape the search for a consensus. The significance of the extensive 
sb'uctures which characterize the Black Sea subregionalism (WGs, GEs, 
parliamentary committees, etc.) lies in the role that they play in transmitting detailed 
information and ideas. 
We suggest here that in identifying the policy entrepreneur in this process, 
primacy is to be given to the individual governments as the agenda setters 
(intergovernmental approach). The policy initiatives emerge mainly from the 
member governments and not by the subregional structures with only a few 
exceptions (as we saw earlier). It follows from this, that policy outcomes are the 
product of deliberate bargains among strategically oriented rational actors 
(governmental elites). Notwithstanding the declaratory intentions of generating a 
comprehensive cooperation scheme, BSEC has a strong intergovernmental character 
with state elites and governments at the core of the process. 
6. Conclusion 
What conclusions can we draw from the above analysis on the mode of governance 
that BSEC represents? As this chapter indicates, subregionalism around the Black Sea 
has acquired significant institutionalization, despite the fact that contractual 
commitments within BSEC remain low. On the contrary, its member states have 
refrained from equipping the organization wi~ supranational organs while they 
have undermined its authoritative capacity. 
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What spurred institutionalization at first place? The degree of the interest in 
the institutionalization of BSEC has varied among its member states as we will also 
see later. None of the founders wished immediately the creation of central 
bureaucratic structures. However, practical and. political considerations motivated 
some states (particularly the small NIS) to push for institutionalization. Interest in 
institutionalization has had a qualitative aspect as well. Thus, while Turkey has 
supported an increased role of the central bodies and the Secretariat in order to meet 
the needs of administrating a FT A, other members have preferred a more 'horizontal' 
institutionalization strictly preserving the intergovernmental nature of the 
coopera tion. 
In the 1990s, the newly formed countries around the Black Sea witnessed a 
fragmented regional environment with no established links of direct communication 
with the neighbouring states. At the same time, the national administrations lacked 
the resources, experience and expertise to efficiently respond to the demands of 
multilateral cooperation. The creation of subregional organs thus corresponded to 
both above-mentioned needs. The institutionalized approach of subregionalism 
corresponded as well to the dominant understanding by - primarily the former 
Soviet - elites that all intraregional communications has to be formal and government 
controlled. Intraregional relations, notwithstanding the rhetoric behind the 
establishment of BSEC, were perceived by the local elites as intergovernmental 
relations where state diplomacy was given the main floor. On the other hand, as we 
will see in chapter four, transnational flows had been weak hence the need for 
, . 
subregional institutionalized mechanisms that would stimulate such flows was an 
urgent one. At the same time, it was understood by the govemmental elites, that the 
creation of and participation in subregional organs was viewed positively by the EU 
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which had proclaimed good neighbourly relations hence, regional cooperation as a 
prerequisite for membership for those states aspiring to membership or closer links 
with the EU. Furthermore, building institutions was also expected to stimulate a 
regional identity both among policy elites and ,people. Regularity of contact and a 
pattern of socialization meant that the Council and the Subsidiary Bodies would 
develop a kind of insider amity. The proliferation of centres and NGOs linked with 
BSEC undertook the mission to develop a Black Sea identity within the society. 
Advanced organizational structures should not however be confused with 
deepening. In fact, the lack of political commitment by the member states to pursue 
binding agreements and common positions, redirected their attention towards 
establishing institutions that politically were effortless. 
The institutional setting and performance show the distinct features of BSEC 
subregionalism which support the intergovernmental scenario. Policy-making in the 
area during the 1990s has been marked by intergovernmental entrepreneurship 
rather than by the demands of transnational interests. BSEC should therefore be 
placed within the context of the EU paradigm of institutionalized regional 
cooperation but there is as yet no multilevel governance approach here. Thus, 
despite the fact that a number of Related Bodies were established around BSEC and 
NGOs were granted observer status or I sectoral' dialogue with the organization, this 
was not translated into actual multilevel governance. First, the activation of those 
actors has been weak and second, central governmental authorities kept the decision 
making process strictly a state to st~te process. 
The clear stand of BSEC members against a supranational mode of governance 
has been reflected in the following ways. First, member states have rejected all 
organized forms of close political cooperation. Second, they have refused to upgrade 
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the role of the Secretariat into a policy-making body following the transformation of 
BSEC into an organization. Third, more emphasis has been placed on the issue of 
enlargement (on the necessity of which all member states agree) rather than 
deepening. 
How has this institutionalism reflected the level of subregional transactions 
and respective demands? Does BSEC illustrate an integration trend taking place in 
the field of trade and investments? Those are the issues that we examine next. 
Empirical evidence as we will see in the next chapter indicate that contrary to 
functionalist expectations there has been intensification of BSEC institutionalization 
without corresponding increases in intraregional transactions such as trade and 
investments. 
Table 3.5 The evolving BSEC governance 
Trade Declaration on Intent on establishing a BSEC Ff A (rurkey, 1997) 
An exemplary list of quantitative restrictions and measures with equivalent effect on 
trade (rurkey, 2(01) 
Recommendation for the procedure to eliminate quantitative restrictions and 
measures with equivalent effect on trade in BSEC region (rurkey, 2(01) 
SMES Declaration on SMEs at the Dawn of the 21st Centu.IYJIurk~ 
Investments Basic principles of investment collaborationJIurkE!J, 2001} 
Transport Transport Action Plan (1999) 
Memorandum of Understanding on Facilitation of Road Transport of Goods in the 
BSEC Region (UNECE-BSEC, 2002) 
Tourism Plan of Action (2002) 
Declaration of the Ministers of Tourism or Heads of Delegations of the BSEC 
Member States (2002) 
Combating Agreement on Combating Crime, in particular in its Organized Forms (rurkey, 1998) 
Organized Additional Protocol to the 1998 BSEC Agreement on Cooperation in Combating 
Crime Crime, in particular in its organized forms (2002) 
Emergency Agreement on collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to 
Situations Natural and Man-made Disasters (Russia, 1998) 
Visa facilitation Draft Agreement on Simplification of Visa Procedures for the Businessmen Nationals 
of the BSEC Member States 
Draft Agreement on Simplification of Visa Procedures for Professional Drivers 
Nationals of the BSEC Member States (BSEC URTA, 20021 
Energy Declaration on Energy Cooperation in the BSEC Region (2003) 
Memorandum on Cooperation in the Field of Electric Power Industry (Russia, 1998) 
Draft Agreement Peaceful Uses of Nucfe~r Energy (rurkish Atomic Energy Agency) 
Draft Agreement on Early Notification and Exchange of Information in the Event of a 
Radiological Emergency 
Note: Initiator and year of signature where appropriate. 
Source: Based on information provided by BSEC PERMIS, Istanbul, 2002. 
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CHAPTER 4. LIMITING INTEGRATION: ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND 
TRANSNATIONAL DEMANDS 
1. Introduction 
One assumption of our analytical framework is that the mode of cooperation that 
develops in the subregion reflects the level of transnational exchanges and demands 
as well as the existence of economic difficulties that would normally trigger 
cooperative attitudes. The main idea is that as transnational exchange increases, so 
would the demand for a change of governance (chapter one). The business 
community is expected to be the most interested in lobbying for a change as it would 
be the one to benefit most. As indicators of transnational exchange, we use the 
volume of intra-BSEC trade and investment flows as well as the significance of non-
governmental organizations and associations. We also examine trade and investment 
flows between BSEC countries and the EU to indicate the level of reorientation of 
transnational exchanges outside the subregion and towards a larger neighbouring 
market. 
The second dimension to be examined is the effect of economic difficulties on 
subregionalism. In times of economic difficulties, it is expected that incentives for 
economic integration would increase. 'Economic difficulties' are here defined as an 
economic growth rate below the average of the OECD countries. Typical problems 
that characterize the transition economies are also included as indicators of economic 
difficulties. 
Should the intergovernmental mode of BSEC be attributed to the fact that there 
is lack of transnational exchange and demands? What has been the effect of economic 
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difficulties in the shaping of BSEC? It could be hypothesized that BSEC's evolution 
into an intergovernmental mode of cooperation would be due to the fact that there is 
no transnational exchange and demand for change and integration (to be led by 
supranational institutions) or that e~onomic difficulties did not trigger demands for 
more supranational mode of cooperation. In this chapter we test those two 
assumptions. 
2. Economic conditions 
2.1 Economic fragmentation 
Before moving to the examination of the economic difficulties in the subregion we 
have to refer to some of the historical parameters and indigenous structural 
conditions under which subregional arrangements around the Black Sea were 
shaped. 
BSEC consists of a group of states which exhibit different levels of economic 
development. In 1992 only Greece and Turkey had market oriented economies and 
were OEeD members, whereas the other nine countries were still planned 
economies. Greece was a full member of the EU and Turkey was negotiating a 
customs union with it. Only a few of the founding members were members of the 
WTO, namely Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania (Albania and Georgia joined in 
2000 and Moldova in 2001), leaving the majority of the participating states outside 
the framework of the multilateral trade system. Such an institutional and normative 
variation hindered integration with the global eConomy on the one hand, and created 
a fragmented subregional economic regime on the other. Differentiation persisted 
throughout the 1990s with Bulgaria and Romania advancing their links with the EU 
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(conclusion of Europe Agreements) which brought another type of normative west-
east division around the Black Sea. 
Among the factors that impaired the process of economic transformation and 
cooperation, which need to be mentioned here, ale the location disadvantages of the 
subregion (in terms of its distance from the important west European markets), the 
highly unfavourable starting conditions (in terms of inherited economic distortions) 
and the lack of historic traditions of institutional development (UNECE, 1999, p. 2). 
Regarding the patterns of pre-BSEC trade between current members, those 
indicated first, a sizeable trade among the former Soviet bloc countries, and second 
the relatively insignificant volumes of trade that these countries had with Greece and 
Turkey despite their geographic proximity (Sayan, n.d., p. 5). The collapse of the 
CMEAj COMECON (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) had led to the drop in 
the foreign trade volumes of the former socialist countries especially among the 
countries of the former Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, from a geographical 
perspective most of the NIS, except Russia, continued to depend on intra-NIS flows 
(OECD, 1997). The development under the Soviet planning of strong input-output 
linkages between industries in different Republics had led to a Significant degree of 
complementarity between member economies which diverted trade away from non-
members. The feasibility of barter tradel among members had also contributed to this 
process. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union both the NIS and the formerly 
socialist states of Eastern Europe became exposed to competition for global markets. 
At the same time, a new dynamic ~ppeared in the trade flows of all countries in the 
subregion: the geographic reorientation of their trade towards other (western) 
European markets. 
I Exchange of goods and services directly without the use of money. 
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Table 4.1 BSEC Countries in Transition: Indicators of Economic Perfonnance, Liberalization, Democracy and 
Initial Conditions 
CounIIy Avg Avg 0UpJIFaD. ruput GNPpc. J..ibeal l.ibeIal Demn: Dmoo: 
Qowth (",rowlh 19l).~ . Rm7.8)' (Sf Irax Irax Irax Irax 
19l).19.l3 mt-19B 19l).~ 19.13 19l).19.l3 19)1.~ 19l).19.l3 19)1.~ 
Albania -8.83 5.68 60.38 26.02 340 . 0.40 0.63 0.479 0.517 
Armenia -22.98 5.68 31.00 9.84 660 0.25 0.57 0.479 0.483 
Azerbaijan -14.53 -2.86 36.96 . 6.65 730 0.16 0.45 0.313 0.250 
Bulgaria -7.40 -1.94 63.69 2.23 1160' 0.58 0.63 0.729 0.783 
Georgia -25.80 3.08 25.38 7.42 '560 0.23 0.55 0.354 0.483 
Moldova -12.33 -9.90 32.36 0.00 1180 0.26 0.62 0.375 0.567 
Romania -6.45 0.18 74.99 1.10 1120 . 0.40 0.65 0.396 0.717 
Russia -7.80 -4.82 55.89 0.00 2350 0.31 0.67 0.563 0.567 
Ukraine -10.63 -10.02 36.76 0.00 1810 0.13 0.52 0.563 0.583 
Sources: EBRD (2002), EBRD (2003), World Bank (1996); State Institute of Statistics (2003). 
Notes: Output Fall is the lowest level of GOP attained between 1990 and 1998, with 1989=100. Output Recovery is the 
cumulative increase in GOP since reaching the lowest level. GNP per capita in 1989 is in USD at purchasing power 
parity. Liberalization Index ranges between zero (no liberalization) and one (complete liberalization). Democracy 
Index is the average of political rights and civil liberties, respectively and range between zero (no democracy) and one 
(complete democracy). 
·current prices 
2.2 Economic difficulties 
Economic difficulties have had an ambivalent effect on subregional cooperation: 
constituting either a mobilizing force for change and support of subregional 
cooperation or an impediment to integration. In this section we primarily concentrate 
on the economic difficulties witnessed in the subregion in the early 1990s. Upon the 
establishment of BSEC, nine out of eleven member countries were in transition to a 
market economy and were undergoing the most severe recession compared with 
other transition economies in Central Europe. The inherited economic difficulties 
from the dissolution of the centrally planned economic system were rather complex: 
high inflation requiring stabilization, a distorted economic structure with high 
unemployment, collapse of foreign trade, decline of output and recession, the lack 
and/ or exorbitant cost of capital. 
Addressing those urgent economic difficulties became thus a primary 
motivation for engaging in cooperative schemes. The assumption that regional 
cooperation could assist them either directly (rebalancing foreign trade) or indirectly 
(building a good political climate for macroeconomic stability) is reflected in all BSEC 
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founding documents which claim the necessity of subregional cooperation in view of 
"the particular problems of the countries in transition to market economy" (BSEC, 
1992a, para. 10). However, economic difficulties alone were not sufficient to trigger 
cooperation as they also constituted ):<ey obstacle~ to transactions. 
One way to measure economic difficulties is the rate of GDP growth in BSEC 
countries (table 4.2). A comparison of the BSEC countries and the DECD countries 
shows that there is a performance gap and that this gap is slowly shifting in favour of 
the former as one would expect after ten years of transition period. Data indicate that 
during the initial stages of BSEC (1991-1993), the majority of the countries experienced 
an extremely steep economic decline. The cumulative output decline in the BSEC 
transition states was approximately 50 per cent before starting its recovery.2 In the 
decade of the 1990s, BSEC's GOP remained lower than the DECD (average of 2.4 per 
cent) for all the decade and it was in the year 2000 that all states recorded positive 
GDP growth. The fluctuation of GOP growth rate reflects the structural difficulties 
which these economies experienced. Especially for the countries which emerged from 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, where poverty has also risen the most, the shock 
was bigger because of the collapse of the internal networks between the Republics. The 
most severe growth decline was registered in the small former Soviet economies of 
Georgia (-45 per cent), Armenia (-42 per cent) and Moldova (-29 per cent). Growth in 
Bulgaria and Romania was sharply interrupted by serious macroeconomic crises 
brought on by insufficient structural reform in the mid 19905, and their GDP in 2000 
stood at four-fifths of its 1990 level (World Bank, 2002, p. xv). In the NIS, early 
reformers such as Armenia and Georgia whose Gnp fell sharply, have been growing 
in the past five years. But Russia, barring a short-lived upturn in 1997, did not begin to 
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grow until 1999, while Ukraine did not return to growth before 2000. In most of the 
NIS, the GDP in 2000 stood at only 63 per cent of its 1990 levels while in 1998 one in 
five people in the region survived on less than the $2.15 per day standard poverty line 
(World Bank, 2002, p. xiii). Annual ~DP growth ~veraged 3.5 per cent in the 1990s for 
Turkey but its growth has been volatile. After two years of very robust growth in 1992-
1993 the Turkish economy contracted by 4.7 per cent in 1994. 
Table 4.3 presents evidence regarding inflation. In 1992 hyperinflation of more 
than 1000 per cent characterized most of the former Soviet Republics (e.g. Armenia 
with 1346 per cent and Ukraine with 1219 per cent) while the Balkan countries of 
Bulgaria, Albania and Romania had the lowest inflation on average. The high and 
persistent inflation in BSEC countries was accompanied by very high interest rates 
rendering the cost of capital extremely high and putting pressure on commercial and 
investment activities. 
The problems of the two market economies of Greece and Turkey have been 
different. For the Greek economy the main issue was neither its transformation, nor its 
integration in global economy. The strategic economic goal was the fulfillment of the 
Maastricht criteria (reduction of public deficit, inflation and debt) and the joining of the 
European Monetary Union. Turkey, on the other hand, had to deal with the 
implications of the customs union with the EU and the improvement of its 
macroeconomic indicators (recession, public deficit and high inflation). 
Transactions within the subregion were not only obstructed by the bad 
macroeconomic performance but also by structural problems such as the 
underdevelopment of the financial structures and legal system. Financial sector 
reform did not occur at the initial stage of the transformation process, therefore, 
2 By way of comparison in Central and South Eastern Europe and Baltic c~untries output declined by 
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banks and other financial institutions emerged as a major problem for the reforms. 
The problems of the financial sector can be classified as follows: i) the absence of 
important institutions of financial intermediation (such as specialized savings and 
loans organizations, security firms, ~quity and bond markets, etc.), ii) the small capital 
base of the existing commercial banks, iii) the excessive dependence of banks on a 
limited number of clients (mainly large state enterprises), iv) the lack of experience in 
credit operations, and v) the absence or the ineffectiveness of prudential regulations 
and bank supervision (UNECE, 1995, p.13). The implications of the failure to reform 
the financial sector at the start of the transition were important. The most important 
was probably the rapid accumulation of bad loans in commercial banks. A second 
important implication of the failure to reform the financial sector has been the 
development of the informal (pyramid) financial markets. The insufficiency of the 
legal framework is another indicator of economic difficulties. Labor legislation, 
legislation on land, on property rights and on foreign direct investment were some 
examples of factors affecting the legal environment. In many cases the problem has 
been concentrated on the unstable nature of the existing legal framework. 
The theoretical interpretation of the above data, suggests that the existence of 
economic difficulties in the early years of the formation of BSEC (1992-1995) would 
create the condition, or a 'window of opportunity' for changes at the subregional level. 
Economic difficulties may thus partly explain 'Why BSEC was established in the first 
place. However, there is no evidence, as we shall see below, that the business 
community seized the opportunity to demand a significant change of BSEC to a more 
supranational mode of governance. Expectations were directed towards the EU rather 
about 14 per cent (World Bank, 2000, p. 11). 
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than BSEe. Nevertheless, they did influence BSEC's structure and functioning as an 
economic organization. 
Table 4.2 Annual change in real GOP in BSEC countries 
(percentage over the previous year) 
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Albania -28.0 -7.2 9.6 8.3 13.3 9.1 -7.0 8.0 7.3 7.8 
Armenia -n.8 -8.8 5.4 6.9 \ 5.9 3.3 7.3 3.3 6.0 
Azerbaijan -22.6 -23.1 -19.7 -11.8 1.3 5.8 10.0 7.4 11.1 
Bulgaria -11.7 -7.3 
-1.5 1.8 2.1 -10.9 -6.9 3.5 2.4 5.8 
Georgia -44.8 -25.4 -11.4 2.4 10.5 10.8 2.9 3.0 2.0 
Greece 3.2 0.8 -1.6 2.0 2.1 2.4 3.5 3.1 3.4 4.0 
Moldova -29.1 -1.2 -31.2 -1.4 -5.9 1.6 -6.5 -3.4 2.1 
Romania -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.1 -5.4 -3.2 1.8 
Russia -18.6 -13.0 -13.5 -4.2 -3.4 0.9 -4.9 5.4 8.3 
Turkey 0.5 5.9 8.0 -4.7 8.1 6.9 7.6 3.1 -2.3 7.0 
Ukraine -9.7 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 -10.0 -3.0 -1.9 -0.2 5.9 
BSEC -16.6 -6.3 -7.4 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.7 2.1 5.6 
OECD 1.7 0.9 2.9 2.3 2.8 . 2.9 3.2 2.8 3.9 
Source: data based on EBRO (2002), IMF (2001), OECO (2000), national sources. 
Table 4.3 Annual inflation in BSEC countries 
(percent) 
Country 
Albania 
1991 
35.5 
1992 
226.0 
1993 
85.0 
1994 
22.6 
1995 1996 
7.8 12.7 
1997 
33.2 
1998 
20.6 
1999 
0.4 
2000 
0.1 
274.0 1346.0 
107.0 912.0. 
333.5 82.0 
1822.0 
1129.0 
73.0 
4962.0 
1664.0 
96.3 
175.8 
412.0 
62.0 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
l3ulgaria. 
Georgia 79.0 887.4 3125.4 15606.5" 162.7 
Greece 
Moldova 
Romania 
Russia 
Turkey 
16.0 
98.0 1,276.4 
170.2 210.4 
92.7 1526.0 
67.0 
788.5 
256.1 
875.0 
10.9 
329.7 
136.7 
311.4 
9.2 
30.2 
32.3 
197.7 
93.6 
Ukraine 91.0 1210.0 4734.0 891.0 377.0 
, .~ •• ""'¥'.~ -_. ~ -- ,~ .... - ...... 
Source: EBRO (2003) EIU, CollI/try Profile (several years). 
18.7. 14.0 8.7 0.7. -0.8 
19.7; 3.5 
123.0: 1082:0. 
-0.8 -8.5: 1.8 
I .. 
22.2 0.71 9.9 
39.4 7.1 
8.2) 5.6; 
3.619.2" . 4.1 
2.3 2.2 
23.5' 11.8 7.7i 39.3 31.3 
38.S·· 154.8 59.1 45.8. 45.7 
47.8 14.7 
80.4' 85.7' 
27.6 86.1! 20.8 
84.6 65.1' 
80.0 15.9' 10.5 22..7 28.2 
Table 4.4 Absolute PovertY Rates of Transition Economies in BSEe countries 
Country 
Albania· 
Armenia 
. A:iC;baij~~ 
Bulgaria 
Georgia 
Moldova 
Romania 
Survey year 
1996 
; 1999 
1999 
1995 
1999 
1999 
1998 
Russia 1998 
Ukraine 1999 
SOu'rce~ World Bank, -2000, p. 35.' 
3. Transnational exchange 
..... (st!lectt!~years) ... 
Headcount Index 
S2.1S/day 
,.~ ••• "-p,'q. ,~" ~'"'-'-"~'~~'''''''. _."., 
: 'Headcount index 
$4.30/da), .. 
11.5 • 
43.5 . 
23.5 • 
3.1 
18.9 
55.4 
6.8 
18.8 
3.0 . 
·n"·'_·· .. _~~_ .~. __ .• " 
• The survey did not cOver th;capitai city Tiran~ 
3.1 Trade barriers and trade regime(sl 
58.6 
86.2 
64.2 
18.2 
54.2 
84.6 
44.5 
50.3 
29.4 
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This section presents a review of the trade barriers to economic cooperation among 
BSEC COWl tries that have existed particularly in the early 19905, i.e. during the first 
stages of BSEC. According to an OECD study (1997) most of the trade barriers 
mentioned in the early 1990s \-yere due to: a) the small number of trade 
relations/ agreements, b) the large amowlt of state trading, c) the great number of tariff 
and non-tariff measures in exports and imports, d) the large share of barter trade 
transactions, e) the non-liberalization of the foreign exchange system, and f) the 
existence of protectionist lobbies. 
Although several of those barriers were partly alleviated in the process of the 
economic transformation of the member states, regionalization was restrained due to 
either the persistence of trade obstacles or the preservation of a diversified trade regime 
among the BSEC members.3 Four BSEC states, among which the two most important 
trade partners in the subregion i.e. Russia and Ukraine, remain outside the multilateral 
trade system of the wro (the other two are Armenia and Azerbaijan). A comparative 
analysis of trade regime in the area indicates significant normative variation: 
• Greece's EU membership 
• Free trade agreements among the CIS countries 
• Customs Union between Armenia and Russia 
• Customs Union of Turkey and the EU 
• Free trade agreements between Bulgaria, Romania and the EU within the 
framework of the Europe Association Agreements 
Although the member states have recognized the need for a multilateral 
framework for the conduct of commerce in the area, they have refrained from 
. . 
undertaking commitments at a subregional level. Instead, they have indicated a 
preference for managing economic relations with their neighbours through bilateral 
3 For a comprehensive analysis of the obstacles to economic cooperation in the area see Vlachoutsikos 
& Liargovas, 1997; OEeD, 1996c; 1996d. 
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agreements (table 4.5). Thus FTAs signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine and Russia within the CIS framework do not remain in effect but 
have been supplemented by bilateral agreements. To give an example, Georgia's 
FTAs within the CIS framework, ~hich stipul~te zero import duties on products 
from those countries, have not been ratified by its Parliament. As a result, Georgia 
does not enjoy a zero import tariff and in turn levies full import tariffs on all 
neighbouring countries. Romania and Bulgaria however, are implementing FT As on 
industrial products as part of their obligations from their participation in CEFTA as 
well as the Europe Agreements. On the other hand, exports by BSEC countries 
towards Greece are subject to EU regulations, induding special restrictions on 
agricultural products and the wide use of quotas. 
Table 4.5 Free Trade Agreements among BSEC countries 
Country Albania Armenia Azerbaija : Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia :Turke .Ukraine 
; 
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bulgaria X 
Georgia 
Greece 
Moldova 
X~ 
X~ 
n 
X 
X~ 
X 
X~ 
.x~. 
X~ 
X~ 
X~ 
X~ 
X~ 
i 
'x 
,x 
i 
X 
Romania X :xp.FrA} X(Eq. X 
R,:,ssia .. . ...:X~ X~ .... : x:~._... X:.f=§'''Hi ..' Turkey x :X 
Ukraine X~ X~· X~ X~. :~ 
Source: Based on wro, Tradt Policy Reviews. several years; PABSEC (1999) and national sources. 
3.2 Intra-BSEC trade integration4 
i 
I 
y 
:X ! .. 
1._ ... 
! 
As stated earlier, while the development of economic regionalization within BSEC is 
being reshaped, each party maintains a different status vis-a-vis its economic 
relationships, its international and bilateral commitments. This analysis shows that 
4 Data are based on IMF. Direction of Trade Statistics, Washington D.C., several years, unless 
otherwise stated. 
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transnational exchange within the subregion has been stimulated but it has not 
reached high levels of intensity. 
We should start by saying ~at as a trade group, BSEC' s significance remains 
small as it represents only 2.8 per- cent of world trade. There are two important 
features of intra-BSEC trade. First, its volume remains low relatively to the size of the 
market covered and second, trade flows are dominated by Russia due to the latter's 
energy exports (Russia is today the second largest energy exporter in the world). 
Table 4.6 Growth Rates of Intra-BSEC trade, 1991-2000 
(percentage of annual change) 
Growth rates of exports to BSEC by country 
Country 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 1994-2000 
Albania na na -28,0 88,9 0,0 -11,8 40,0 -4,8 2,5 19,1 
Armenia na na 35,8 11,0 12,9 -26,3 -31,0 -15,5 36,7 
-2,0 
Azerbaijan na -39,5 -42,1 -13,1 31,0 45,5 -12,6 -24,8 26,6 8,8 
Bulgaria 0,0 13,4 81,4 79,7 -0,5 -5,3 -19,6 -19,5 31,8 11,1 
Georgia na na -27,5 0,0 18,5 9,5 27,3 -12,2 13,9 9,5 
Greece 0,0 149,7 40,2 19,1 17,3 3,3 -11,4 -5,4 32,0 9,2 
Moldova na 1,6 20,5 20,6 3,5 9,4 -28,9 -38,7 4,6 
-4,9 
Romania 0,0 -14,8 ·1,0 21,1 -5,6 8,9 .15,7 15,7 51,3 12,6 
Russia na 1,2 262,8 9,0 11,3 0,7 -18,8 -14,0 36,0 4,0 
Turkey 0,0 3,8 57,2 48,2 18,8 31,3 -14,6 -32,8 9,1 10,0 
Ukraine na 170,3 284,3 57,2 -3,1 -24,5 -16,9 -14,2 41,1 6,6 
Total 0,0 17,7 141,1 27,S 6,9 .1,8 -17,1 -15,9 33,3 5,5 
BSEC10 ... 19,3 165,0 28,6 6,6 -2,8 -19,4 -19,2 31,5 4,2 
Growth rates of Imports from BSEC by country 
Country 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 1994-2000 
Albania na na 75,9 58,9 -26,9 -25,7 39,7 14,4 16,7 12,8 
Armenia na na 34,3 58,4 0,5 56,0 -8,8 -9,4 -0,7 16,0 
Azerbaijan na -49,0 -4,1 -2,6 73,5 -8,2 15,8 -21,0 3,5 10,1 
Bulgaria 482,5 2,7 -14,4 57,8 2,1 -33,4 10,6 -0,5 65,9 17,1 
Georgia na na 32,9 163,4 65,8 15,2 18,3 -15,8 -31,6 35,9 
Greece 
-23,6 239,8 38,9 21,9 -0,6 3,8 -7,4 -1,2 53,3 11,7 
Moldova na 3,8 8,4 21,4 14,2 4,9 -27,5 4,7 -4,3 2,2 
Romania 38,8 259,3 20,4 31,6 -3,3 5,6 -12,8 -25,6 56,6 8,7 
Russia na -20,1 442,6 43,S -4,2 -21,0 -27,7 -27,0 37,8 0,2 
Turkey 318,0 58,7 -21,7 84,6 -4,5 17,1 -3,1 -0,8 55,9 24,9 
Ukraine na 117,2 1741,1 33,0 11,5 -9,4 -11,4 -20,0 3,8 1,2 
Total 410,7 38,6 122,5 43,0 2,6 -8,3 -11,8 -14,6 31,5 7,1 
BSEC10 ... lS,O 162,2 476 3,6 -9,9 -12,7 -16,6 29,9 7,0 
Source: IMF, Directioll ofTrnde Statistics, Washington D.C. (several years). 
Note: Years 1992 and 1993 do not include the bilateral trade between Russia and Ukraine. 
BSEC 10: BSEC excluding Greece. 
Although increasing, the value of intra-BSEC trade, is only $48 billion (2000) or 
approximately 16 per cent of the total foreign trade of the BSEC states (average 
between 1992 and 2000). Since 1994 the total volume of commercial exchanges for the 
eleven countries with their BSEC partners has increased at a yearly average rate of 
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5.5 per cent for exports and 7.1 per cent for imports. The speed however at which this 
shift has taken place differs significantly from one country to another (table 4.6). The 
evolution of the BSEC foreign trade has had the shape of a 'curve' with significant 
trade expansion between 1993 and ~995. After 1996 there was a retreat of trade flows, 
though this varied from country to country. The picture given by Greece and Turkey 
is also one of a 'bell curve' but the increase of foreign trade is more solid and the 
fluctuations less sharp (TAD, 2001, p. 64). 
Subregional flows are dominated by the trade volumes of Russia and Ukraine 
which together represent approximately 67 per cent of exports and 50 per cent of 
import flows (figure 4.1). In fact the evolution of BSEC trade reflects, to a great 
degree, the evolution of Russian and Ukrainian flows in the subregion. The weight of 
Russia in BSEC trade became obvious when intra-BSEC trade declined by 15 per cent 
after the Russian economic crisis in 1998. 
r------- Figure 4.1 Share of each country In Intra-BSEC Trade, 1994-2000 
(per cent) 
Source: IIIIF. Direction of Trade Statistics. Washington D.C .• s8\1Orai )lears 
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To show the extent of this dependence, in 19945 Russia represented 49 per cent 
of intra-BSEC exports and 31 per cent of imports, followed by Ukraine (23 per cent 
and 31 per cent respectively). However, since then, their share in intra-BSEC trade, 
particularly in imports, has been slqwly but stea,dily declining to reach 18 per cent of 
intra-BSEC trade for Russia and 23 per cent for Ukraine (table 4.8). An illustrative 
example is Russian-Armenian trade where despite the latter's geographic location 
and economic/political problems (embargo) which make Russia its most significant 
partner, compared to 1994, Russian exports to Armenia dropped by 80 per cent in 
2000 and imports dropped by 17 per cent (appendix 4.1 - Russia). 
In fact it is the bilateral trade between Russia and Ukraine which dominates 
intra-BSEC exchanges. Russia's main BSEC trade partner by far is Ukraine 
representing 70 per cent of its gross trade with BSEC (appendix 4.1 - Russia). In the 
case of Ukraine more than three-quarters of its trade within BSEC is still conducted 
with Russia but over the last five years the latter's share has been steadily decreasing 
from 89 per cent in 1996 to 83 per cent in 2000. As the Ukrainian side has claimed that 
"this tendency testifies to a new political approach of promoting trade and economic 
contacts with other partners" (Supreme Rada of Ukraine, 2002). 
Turkey holds the third biggest share of intra-BSEC trade (11 per cent of exports 
and 18 per cent of imports), followed by Bulgaria (5 per cent and 7 per cent), Greece 
(7 per cent imports and exports) and Romania (5 per cent and 7 per cent). The rest of 
the BSEC countries (Moldova, Azerbaijan, Albania, Armenia and Georgia) added 
altogether account for less than 1~ per cent o~ intra-BSEC trade (figure 4.1). As the 
data show, Turkish share in BSEC trade has' substantially increased since 1994 
(particularly in imports). In 2000, for example, it accounted for almost 18 per cent of 
5 We use 1994 as the basis for the calculation ofintra-BSEC trade due to the fact that for 1992-1993 
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BSEC flows. This is not the case for the other important trade parh1ers (Greece, 
Bulgaria and Romania) whose share has remained unchanged or even decreased like 
in the case of exports. The significance of the NIS in intra-regional trade has been 
roughly stable. 
Table 4.7 Significance of individual countries in Intra-BSEC trade, 1992-2000 
(percent) 
Exports to nSEC countries 
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Albania - 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,2 
Armenia - 0,8 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 
Azerbaijan 10,0 5,1 1,2 0,8 1,0 1,5 1,6 1,4 1,4 
Bulgaria 6,0 5,7 4,3 6,1 5,7 5,5 5,3 5,0 5,0 
Georgia 
-
2,1 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,9 0,8 0,8 
Greece 5,1 10,7 6,2 5,8 6,4 6,7 7,2 8,0 8,0 
Moldova 5,5 4,7 2,4 2,2 2,2 2,4 2,1 1,2 1,2 
Romania 14,9 10,8 4,4 4,2 3,7 4,1 4,2 6,5 6,5 
Russia 38,0· 32,7* 49,1 42,0 43,7 44,8 43,9 45,8 45,8 
Turkey 14,3 12,6 8,2 9,6 10,6 14,2 14,6 9,6 9,6 
Ukraine 6,2· 14,3· 22,9 28,2 25,5 19,6 19,7 21,2 21,2 
BSECTotal 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Imports Crom BSEC countries 
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Albania 
-
1,6 1,2 1,4 1,0 0,8 1,3 1,7 1,5 
Armenia 
-
1,1 0,7 0,8 0,7 1,3 1,3 1,4 1,1 
Azerbaijan 9,6 3,5 1,5 1,0 1,7 1,7 2,3 2,1 1,7 
Bulgaria 22,7 16,8 6,5 7,1 7,1 5,2 6,5 7,5 9,5 
Georgia 
-
0,8 D,S 0,9 1,5 1,9 2,5 2,5 1,3 
Greece 4,3 10,6 6,6 5,6 5,5 6,2 6,5 7,5 8,8 
Moldova 6,9 5,2 2,5 2,2 2,4 2,7 2,2 2,8 2,0 
Romania 5,0 12,9 7,0 6,4 6,1 7,0 6,9 6,0 7,2 
Russia 22,1· 12,7* 31,1 31,2 29,1 25,1 20,6 17,6 18,4 
Turkey 27,0 30,9 10,9 14,0 13,0 16,7 18,3 21,3 25,2 
Ukraine 2,4· 3,8· 31,5 29,3 31,8 31,5 31,6 29,6 23,4 
BSECTotal 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Source: IMF, Directioll o/Troth Statistics, Washington D.C. (several years). 
• Bilateral trade between Russia - Ukraine not included 
The data show significant variations in the dependence of individual countries 
on BSEC trade measured as the ratio of intra-regional trade and the trade with the 
rest of the world. The countries most sensitive6 to intra-regional trade are Moldova 
(an average of 64.3 per cent) and Georgia (57.1 per cent) followed by Azerbaijan (43 
per cent) and Ukraine (45 per cent)., Those whic~ are least sensitive to intra-regional 
trade are Greece (8.9 per cent) and Turkey (10 per cent) followed by Romania and 
Russia. In the case of Russia, it is the BSEC group that is sensitive to the Russian 
comparable data for the bilateral trade between Russia and Ukraine are not available. 
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flows rather than lJ;ce l'ersa. The sensitivity of BSEC trade (in particular of Turkey, 
Ukraine) to the Russian market became evident in 1998 when following the Russian 
economic crisis of that year, official intra-regional trade as well as luggage trade 
decreased. In the middle of the spectrum lie Albania, Armenia and Bulgaria (figure 
4.2). 
Table 4.8 Intra-BSEC trade by country (1991-2000) 
$ millions 
Exports to BSEC countries 
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Albania ... ... 25 18 34 34 30 42 40 41 
Armenia ... ... 67 91 101 114 84 58 49 67 
Azerbaijan ... 699 423 245 213 279 406 355 267 338 
Bulgaria 329 417 473 858 1542 1534 1452 1167 940 1239 
Georgia ... ... 171 124 124 147 161 205 180 205 
Greece 278 354 884 1239 1476 1731 1788 1584 1498 1978 
Moldova ... 385 391 471 568 588 643 457 280 293 
Romania 269 1044 889 880 1066 1006 1096 924 1069 1617 
Russia ... 2656 2689 9755 1Q63.l 11840 11922 9681 8329 11324 
Turkey 347 1003 1041 1636 2425 2880 3782 3229 2171 2368 
Ukraine ... 437 1181 4538 7132 6911 5221 4340 3722 5252 
Total 1223 6995 8234 19855 25315 27064 26585 22042 18S45 24722 
BSEC10 60S 5610 6690 17725 22794 24302 23615 19025 15372 20215 
Imports from BSEC countries 
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Albania ... . .. 141 248 394 288 214 299 342 399 
Armenia ... ... 102 137 217 218 340 310 281 279 
Azerbaijan ... 618 315 302 294 510 468 542 428 443 
Bulgaria 252 1468 1507 1290 2036 2079 1384 1531 1523 2527 
Georgia ... . .. 76 101 266 441 508 601 506 346 
Greece 365 279 948 1317 1606 1597 1658 1536 1518 2327 
Moldova ... 449 466 505 613 700 734 532 557 533 
Romania 232 322 1157 1393 1833 1773 1872 1632 1215 1903 
Russia ... 1430 1142 6197 8895 8524 6736 4870 3554 4897 
Turkey 417 1743 2766 2166 3998 3817 4468 4330 4297 6699 
Ukraine ... 157 341 6278 8348 9305 8434 7475 5977 6204 
Total 1266 6466 8961 19934 28500 29252 26816 23658 20198 26557 
BSEC10 302 S299 6624 17369 25628 26544 23915 20885 17412 22614 
Source: IMF, Direction o/Track Statistics, Washington D.C. (several years). 
Note: Years 1992 and 1993 do not include the bilateral trade between Russia and Ukraine. 
BSEC 10: BSEC exc\udinjt Greece 
The opening up of the Black Sea economies has not always benefited intra-
regional trade. As the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK) has 
claimed regarding the potential" of Russian-Turkish trade, Turkey's exports 
decreased as the number of foreign firms operating in Russia increased. Turkish 
exporters have been negatively affected as Russia does not impose V AT and some 
6Countries for which BSEC trade accounts for more than 50 per cent of their foreign trade. 
171 
other taxes on some CIS countries while, on the other hand, EU countries have more 
financial resources to enter this market (DEIK, 2003). 
On the export side, opportunities have been restricted because of the lack of 
economies of scale and the high cost of transport to neighbouring or world markets. 
An important reason for weak export performance is the dearth of internationally 
competitive goods produced in the area apart from natural resources. While 
geographic proximity has been a positive factor in trade flows, the low demand in 
the area is a restraining factor that has been changing the direction of trade. 
Increasingly thus, trade flows are reoriented towards west European and other 
international markets. Poor infrastructure has further weakened proximity 
advantages. Although sea routes have facilitated trade links between Bulgaria and 
Romania and the opposite edge of the Black Sea, the volume of trade remains very 
low. For example, total trade with Bulgaria in 1998 accounted for 4.7 per cent of 
Georgia's foreign trade? 
The establishment of BSEC has not been followed by a considerable increase in 
dependence on intra-BSEC trade (table 4.9). On the contrary the fastest growing trade 
partners for all BSEC members (apart from Greece) have been the western European 
states as we will indicate later. The rate of trade growth with the EU differs 
significantly for each country but on average between 1994 and 2000 (table 4. 10 and 
4.11), exports grew by 5.5 per cent while exports from BSEC to the EU by 9.5 per cent 
(at almost twice the rate).1f in the intra-BSEC flows we exclude Greece (due to its EU 
membership) then the growth of intra-BSEC exports falls to 4.2 per cent. As far as 
, . 
imports are concerned, the growth rate is apprOXimately the same both for intra-
BSEC flows and flows with the EU. Although this reorientation is expected for 
7 These figures are based on registered data. 
172 
countries such as Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria due to their EU contractual links, it 
is interesting to note that it is also strong in the countries of the Caucasus. By the way 
of example, Armenia's exports to Russia have steadily declined from 73.3 per cent in 
1994 to 36.1 per cent in 1998 while. in Georgia, where Turkey and Russia are the 
largest trade markets for Georgian products, the fastest growing export markets in 
recent years were again the EU and the US. 
What is more important to note is that the more developed economy in the 
subregion i.e. Greece, and the two largest markets e.g. Russia and Turkey are the 
least dependent countries in subregional trade while there is no evidence that their 
Black Sea neighbours are becoming their main trade partners. 
Table 4.9 Share of BSEC trade in the total foreign trade of each BSEe country 
(per cent) 
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Albania ... 22,87% 37,02% 36,33% 28,75% 32,06% 34,07% 32,54% 32,54% 
Armenia ... 39,30" 35,74" 30,20% 28,82% 37,72% 32,77% 30,70% 29,20% 
Azerbaijan 51,27% 45,33% 38,66% 41,90% 49,56% 55,49% 53,30% 35,37% 26,77% 
Bulgaria 22,47% 23,43% 26,61% 32,47% 26,84% 26,89% 29,08% 26,39% 33,72% 
Georgia ... 53,12% 45,55" 71,82% 66,37% 56,98% 51,44% 54,27% 53,29% 
Greece 1,96% 6,25% 8,68% 8,35% 8,53% 9,03% 7,91 % 8,40% 11,16% 
Moldova 75,41 % 76,86% 79,74" 74,46% 68,99% 67,53% 59,72" 51,98% 47,69% 
Romania 12,67% 18,91 " 18,00% 16,56% 16,64% 16,03% 13,64% 12,84% 15,83% 
Russia 8,95%- 5,41%- 15,69" 15,75% 15,85% 13,57% 12,73% 11,57% 11,85% 
Turkey 7,04% 8,03% 9,18% 11,19% 9,94% 10,99% 9,84% 9,46% 9,66% 
Ukraine 17,12"- 25,52"- 52,47" 44,20% 50,70% 43,56" 43,26% 41,40% 40,15% 
Source: IMF, Dirtclioll o/Trod/! Statistics, Washington D.C., several years. 
• bilateral trade between Russia - Ukraine not included 
From the commodity perspective, it is the energy sector (oil, gas and electricity) 
particularly large volumes of energy exports of Russia, that dominates intra-BSEC 
trade. In the last decade, trade in agricultural products has decreased while the 
exports of industrial products have collapsed along with the collapse of the regional 
industry. Slow progress in improving busines~ climate and industrial restructuring 
has further limited export potential particularly for the NIS. Beyond the natural 
resources and semi-finished products of the Soviet-era plants, the South Caucasus 
countries have a rather limited export base. 
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The stable growth of trade turnover is based on increased purchases by Turkey, 
Romania and Ukraine of Russian energy as well as Azerbaijani energy exports. The 
categories of 'fuel and mineral resources, oil and its products' and 'ferrous metal' 
accounted for 78.6 percent of the aggregate Russian exports to Romania in 1994. In 
1995 the figure was 83.5 per cent and in 1996 it was 87.5 per cent (Borisenko, 1999, 
pp. 115-116). The same items account for two thirds of Turkish imports from Russia 
(DEIK, 2003). In addition to energy, other raw materials such as minerals are the 
main commodities traded within the region as well as foodstuffs which partly 
explains the modest progress in trade liberalization within BSEC. Therefore, 30 per 
cent of Turkish exports to the former Soviet republics involves foodstuff (WTO, 1998, 
p. 25). The three South Caucasus countries trade mainly energy, mineral resources 
and semi-finished products (e.g. Armenia exports copper). 
What does the above analysis suggest? We can conclude that trade with BSEC 
partners is not important for the majority of the Black Sea countries in their overall 
trade turnover and therefore is not a foreign economic priority. The structure of trade 
turnover shows that the subregion is divided only between exporters and importers 
of fuels. This is a sign of an absence of a subregional division of labour among the 
member states which is the cornerstone of any regional market. The limited range of 
commodities and a lack of balance in trade turnover, a considerable share of fuels 
and mining products are a natural barrier on the road towards liberalizing the 
foreign trade regimes in the region. From this it follows that i) cooperation in trade is 
not a priority created by the existing foreign economic relations among the member 
states (Borisenko, 1999, p. 116), and ii) the struc~re and level of trade flows is not 
such as to justify strong demands for subregional governance. BSEC's actions and the 
intention of its member states to establish a FTA (examined later) should be 
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connected to their strategy of pushing forward economic cooperation not only in the 
subregion but beyond it, but this does not reflect transnational demands. 
Suitcase trade 
Unrecorded trade is taking place in many parts of the region through the large 
volume of' suitcase trade' especially between Turkey and several Black Sea countries. 
Almost 65 per cent of suitcase exports from Turkey goes to Russia (Morgil, 2002). The 
'suitcase trade', which is largely unrecorded and untaxed, is estimated to range from 
$5 to $10 billion depending on the source.8 In certain cases such as the one between 
Armenia with Turkey where an embargo is in force, 'suitcase trade' is the only means 
of bilateral commercial exchange. However the volume of 'suitcase' exports from 
Turkey has been decreasing in the last five years from almost $6 billion in 1997 to $1 
billion in 2002 among others due to the regulation of commercial relations.9 
3.3 Redirecting trade to the EU market 10 
A central feature of the economic map of the BSEC subregion during the 1990s has 
been the reorientation of its trade links towards western markets and, in particular, 
the EU. Trade integration between BSEC and the EU might manifest itself in 
numerous ways including rising growth of exports and imports as well as rising 
shares of BSEC trade in total EU foreign trade. Here we focus particularly on the first 
aspect given the small weight of BSEC in EU external trade. 
• Turkey's DEIK estimated in 1995 that the suitcase trade was $10 billion. 
9 Data based on the State Statistics Institute of Turkey. 
10 Data based on IMF, Direction o/Trade Statistics. Washington D.C. (several years), unless otherwise 
stated. 
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The data show that over the last decade, the EU countries as a group have 
become the main trade partner of BSEC. The trade balance for all BSEC countries is in 
deficit (with the exception of Azerbaijan and Russia due to their exports of 
hydrocarbons). The growth rate of ~ade between BSEC and the EU is accelerating 
faster than the intra-BSEC one at an average growth rate of 9.5 per cent for BSEC 
exports and 7.4 per cent for imports since 1994 (table 4.11). 
,-- ------------------------~ 
Rgure 4.2 Share of BSEC trade in the total foreign trade of each BSEC country ( per 
cent). Source: Itvt=, Direction of Trade Statistics. Washington D.C., (several }ears) 
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By 2000 the EU absorbed approximately 38 per cent of BSEC exports and 48 per 
cent of its imports while the volume of EU-BSEC trade reached $140 billion (table 
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4.10}. However, the figures do not justify any claims for integration with the EU. On 
the contrary, the significance of individual BSEC countries in the total BSEC-EU 
trade varies (appendix 4.2). In 2000, just six countries (Russia, Romania, Turkey, 
Greece, Bulgaria and Ukraine) abso~bed 95 per cent of EU exports to the BSEC area 
and similar conclusions can be drawn regarding the total EU imports from the area. 
Russia is by far the most important trade partner as it accounts for 33 per cent of the 
EU-BSEC trade, followed by Turkey with 29 per cent and Greece with 15 per cent. 
According to a survey by the European Commission (TAD, 2001, pp. 70-71), the 
BSEC countries may be divided into three groups depending on the level of their 
integration with the EU measured by their trade exchanges. In the first group belong 
countries whose exchanges with the EU represent more than 50 per cent of their total 
commercial exchanges. These include Albania (80 per cent), Greece (54 per cent), 
Romania (60 per cent) and Turkey (51 per cent). The high level of dependence of 
Albanian trade to the EU is to be expected given its location while Greece's 
integration is also justified by its EU membership. Romania's and Turkey's high 
integration is significant taking into consideration their pre-accession status. 
Following the creation of a customs union between Turkey and the EU in 1996, and 
the free trade in industrial goods between Turkey and the EU, the latter has become 
increasingly an important trade partner of Turkey. The second group includes 
countries whose trade with the EU represents something between 25 per cent and 50 
per cent. They include Bulgaria with 45 per cent and Russia with 38 per cent. In the 
third group are countries whose trade with the EU represents less than 25 per cent of 
their total trade (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia): From the above we can see that in 
addition to Russia, the Balkan states are more integrated with the EU compared to 
their partners from the former Soviet space. This variation can be explained among 
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others by structural reasons (the Soviet legacy and the transition period), 
geographical criteria and the variation of institutional links between BSEC states and 
the EU. 
On the other hand, the BSEC group is no~ a major trade parh1er of the EU. For 
the period 1993-1999, BSEC represented approximately 3 per cent of the EU's total 
commercial exchanges (or 3.2 per cent of its exports and 2.6 per cent of its imports). 
On the EU end, during the period 1993-99, Germany accounted for 30 per cent of the 
exchanges between the EU and the BSEC group, followed by Italy (18.5 per cent). U 
we include Austria (3 per cent) then we can easily conclude that three Central 
European countries represent 50 per cent of EU trade with the BSEC group. Greece 
with 14 per cent of its exports going to Bulgaria, Romania and Albania becomes the 
fourth closest EU partner. 
To sum up, trade integration between the EU and BSEC is not yet at a 
significant level that would suggest a type of regional integration. Although flows 
are increasing, the absolute level of trade is still very low - approximately $113 billion 
in 1998, only $80 billion in 1999 and $140 billion in 2000 (excluding Greece). The 
difficulties of the majority of the countries in switching exports to alternative markets 
stem not only from the increased competitive pressures of western markets but also 
from the structure of their exports. In general, it is the internationally less 
competitive products, including machinery and equipment that are traded while 
exports consist mainly of intermediate products and some consumer goods produced 
under outward processing arrange,ments. Energy products (e.g. from countries like 
Russia and Azerbaijan) constitute the most important growth element in exports.ll 
II Azerbaijan's main export market in 1999 was Italy, which provided 33.7 per cent of export revenue 
because of shipments to the Trieste terminal (EIU, 2000c, p. 31). 
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Table 4.10 Evolution of EU- BSEC trade, 1992-2000 ($ million) 
BSEC exports to the EU 
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Albania 50 89 109 160 181 124 191 258 275 
Armenia 4 31 61 79 62 6 76 107 107 
Azerbaijan 22R 70 83 94 59 88 131 423 1054 
Bulgaria 1144 1090 1564 2013 1913 1942 2137 2054 2463 
Georgia 67 9 1 7 17 20 67 106 68 
Greece 6447 5637 4706 6709 6488, 5846 5729 5421 4683 
Moldova 12 31 39 86 78 90 79 95 102 
Romania 1536 2027 2970 4388 4271 4752 5253 5537 6630 
Russia 20227 19672 22411 26051 27189 27998 23073 24022 36881 
Turkey 7600 7287 8269 11078 11477 12247 13<140 143-18 14509 
Ukraine 806 1111 671 1716 1599 1762 2135 2130 2362 
Total 40113 39Q.17 42878 54376 55330 56872 54309 56500 71134 
BSEC imports from the EU 
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Albania 240 527 572 754 694 519 658 721 805 
Armenia 21 38 38 104 133 177 259 253 303 
Azerbaijan 106 58 70 84 136 102 224 191 227 
Bulgaria 1609 1908 2379 2098 1780 1628 2325 2638 2858 
Georgia 32 23 12 63 167 210 334 195 167 
Greece 15290 12076 13831 18213 18656 17800 19222 16715 16352 
Moldova 37 67 68 115 177 226 266 290 226 
Romania 2331 2686 3117 4811 4732 5316 6145 5673 6727 
Russia 15952 11198 15379 18003 15761 19578 15539 11101 11138 
Turkey 10048 12948 10278 16862 22704 24869 24076 21416 26610 
Ukraine 1045 2010 842 3135 2758 3378 3167 2399 2883 
Total 48703 45532 48580 66237 69694 75800 74213 63591 70296 
Source: IMP, Directioll ofTmde Statistics, Washington D.C. (several years). 
Table. 4. 11 Growth rates of EU -BSEC trade, 1992-2000 (percentage of annual change) 
BSEC exports to the EU 
Country 1992tJ3 199~ 1994/95 1995/96 1996/'¥1 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 1994-00 
Albania 78,0 22.5 46,8 13,1 -31,5 54,0 35,1 6,6 20,7 
Armenia 675,0 96,8 29,S -21,5 -90,3 1166,7 40,8 0,0 187,5 
Azerbaijan -69,3 18,6 13,3 -37,2 49,2 48,9 222,9 149,2 74,4 
Bulgaria 
-4,7 43,5 28,7 -5,0 1,5 10,0 -3,9 19,9 8,6 
Georgia 
-86,6 -88,9 600,0 142.9 17,6 235,0 58,2 -35,8 169,6 
Greece 
-12,6 -16,5 42,6 -3,3 -9,9 -2,0 -5,4 -13,6 1,4 
Moldova 158,3 25,8 120,5 -9,3 15,4 -12,2 20,3 7,4 23,7 
Romania 32,0 46,S 47,7 -2,7 11,3 10,5 5,4 19,7 15,3 
Russia 
-2,7 13,9 16,2 4,4 3,0 -17,6 4,1 53,S 10,6 
Turkey 
-4,1 13,5 34,0 3,6 6,7 9,7 6,8 1,1 10,3 
Ukraine 37,8 -39,6 155,7 -6,8 10,2 21,2 -0,2 10,9 31,8 
BSEC 
-2,7 9,8 26,8 1,8 2,8 -4,5 4,0 25,9 9,5 
BSEC imports from the EU 
Country 1992tJ3 199~ 1994/95 1995/96 1996/'¥1 1997/98 1998(99 1999/00 1994-00 
Albania 119,6 8,5 31,8 -8,0 -25,2 26,8 9,6 11,7 7,8 
Armenia 81,0 0,0 173,7 27,9 33,1 46,3 -2,3 19,8 49,7 
Azerbaijan 45,3 20,7 20,0 61,9 -25,0 119,6 -14,7 18,8 30,1 
Bulgaria 18,6 24,7 -11,8 -15,2 -8,5 42,8 13,5 8,3 4,9 
Georgia 
-28,1 -47,8 425,0 165,1 25-? 59,0 -41,6 -14,4 103,1 
Greece 
-21,0 14,5 31,7 2,4 4,6. 8,0 -13,0 -2,2 3,7 
Moldova 81,1 1,5 69,1 53,9 27,7. 17,7 9,0 -22,1 25,9 
Romania 15,2 16,0 54,3 -1,6 12,3 15,6 -7,7 18,6 15,3 
Russia 
-29,8 37,3 17,1 -12,5 24,2 -20,6 -28,6 0,3 -3,3 
Turkey 28,9 -20,6 64,1 34,6 9,5 -3,2 -11,0 24,3 19,7 
Ukraine 92,3 -58,1 272,3 -12,0 22.5 -6,2 -24,3 20,2 45,4 
BSEC 
-6,5 6,7 36,3 5,2 8,8 -2,1 -14,3 10,5 7,4 
Source: IMF, Dirtclioll ofTradt Statistics, Washington D.C. (several years). 
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3.4 Investment driven integration12 
Despite the size of the BSEC market, foreign direct investment in the area is the 
lowest in Europe. FOI remains below potential, reflecting economic volatility and 
political uncertainty. With respect to subreg~onal integration, this represents a 
significant disadvantage as it keeps the local economy bereft of the main agent of 
economic development and change - capital. 
According to the data (appendix 4.3), FOI inflows in terms of value have not 
increased substantially and have remained low during the last decade. In 2000, the 
inward FOI to the BSEC subregion accounted for just $8 billion or 0.5 per cent of 
world inward FDI. Although, the BSEC countries increased their stock of inward FDI 
by 112 per cent since 1995, in absolute terms it remains as low as $72 billion (table 
4.12). An analysis of the direction of FDI indicates that despite the large number of 
BSEC states, FOI is heavily concentrated on the triangle of the states of Russia, 
Turkey and Greece which together absorb more than two-thirds of the subregion's 
total inflows. Coupled with the fact that capital flows among those three BSEC states 
are low (as we shall see later in this section), this is an indication that international 
capital is attracted by opportunities in the national and not the regional market. 
BSEC's share in outward flows is even more insignificant. In 2001 it reached just $2.5 
billion or 0.4 per cent of world FOI outflows. 
Most of the inward capital comes from developed countries as the 
neighbouring transition economies are characterized by volatility and unstable 
currencies while they lack their own capital. The EU countries account for a major 
part of the foreign capital in the BSEC countries.' It is estimated at 40 per cent of the 
12 Data is based on UNCTAD, World Investment Report, New York (several years) unless otherwise 
stated. 
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total stock FOI in the subregion and it is particularly high in the Balkan states. 
However, exceptionally, in Moldova, 30 per cent of the foreign capital comes from 
Russia (UNCT AD, 2000). Thus, in Bulgaria, only 30 per cent of the FOI in the year 
2000 originated from outside the EV while in Romania, the EU accounted for 57 per 
cent of inward stock FOI (1999). The EU members as a single investor account for less 
in the NIS states (for example, 25 per cent in Russia and 28 per cent in Ukraine in 
1999). In Azerbaijan, one of the most successful CIS countries in attracting FDI, the 
largest foreign investor has been the USA with $1.2 billion, followed by the UK with 
$672 million while Turkey is the third biggest investor. However, an overwhelming 
60 per cent of the total FDI in the 1990s was directed to the oil sector and oil related 
industries (EIU, 200Oc, pp. 33-34).13 
Table 4. 12 FDIINFLOWS IN BSEC COUNTRIES, selected years 
{millions of USD and per cent} 
Stock by 1995 1995 Stock by 1997 1997 Stock by 2001 2001 
Economy mlnUSD % % mIn USD % % mIn USD % % 
Albania 48 0,00 0,03 68 0,00 0,01 775 0,13 
Armenia 34 0,00 0,01 103 0,00 0,01 714 0,12 0,02 
Azerbaijan 352 0,01 0,10 2094 0,06 0,23 3962 0,65 0,03 
Bulgaria 446 0,01 0,03 1059 0,03 0,11 3410 0,56 0,09 
Georgia 6 0,00 0,00 67 0,00 0,05 583 0,10 0,02 
Greece 10957 0,36 0,32 12999 0,36 0,21 12006 1,98 0,21 
Moldova 93 0,00 0,02 193 0,01 0,02 600 0,10 0,02 
Romania 821 0.03 0,12 2352 0,07 0,25 7638 1,26 0,15 
Russia 5465 0,18 0,44 14718 0,41 1,02 20142 3,32 0,34 
Turkey 14977 0,50 0,27 16504 0,46 0,17 17521 2,89 0,44 
Ukraine 910 0,03 0,08 2064 0,06 0,13 4662 0,77 0,10 
BSEC 34109 1,14 1,41 52221 1,44 2,20 72013 11,87 11,87 
CEE 40187 1,34 71629 1,98 155734 25,67 
World 3001996 100,00 100,00 3616576 100,00 100,00 606698 100,00 100,00 
Source: UNCT AD (2003}. 
Table 4. 13 FDIINFLOWS FROM EU CUNTRIES, selected years 
country FDlinflows FDlstock 
Min USD Percent MlnUSD Per cent 
1995 1999 2000 '1998 1999 2000 1995 1999 1995 1999 
Bulgaria 17.9 144a 50.9 43.3 . 67.9 374.8 1339.5 72.4 62.0 
Moldova 5.8 1.5 7.6 1.4 3.7 5.3 22.6 25.9 227 
Romania 2().1.9 4238 535a· 814.1 1753a 51.0 56.8 
Ukraine 170 375 576.0 421 28.1 
Russia 1131 1567 36.5 26.5 35.4 2776 5476.0 47.2 24.7 
Source: UNCTAD ~20(2); Eurostat. ·1999 a: Ecu/Euro 
\3 The other sectors being industry (16 per cent) and construction (8 per cent). 
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The case of intra-BSEC capital flows is more disappointing. Despite progress 
made by BSEC countries in developing FDI-related legislation and liberalization, 
they have not succeeded in attracting foreign capital either from their BSEC partners 
or from other countries. Although data concerning intra-regional FDI flows is 
incomplete, studies conducted (OECD, 1996d; PABSEC, 2002) estimate that among 
the BSEC countries, Turkey is the main investor in the area, followed by Greece, 
Russia and Bulgaria. The weight of the three Caucasian states (Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia) as well as of Moldova and Albania in intra-regional FDI flows has 
remained negligible. 
The weight of intra-BSEC investments, as should be expected has tended to 
grow over the decade but the speed at which this shift has taken place is slow and 
differs from country to country. Therefore, for small countries such as Moldova and 
Armenia whose economies are still strongly dependent on Russia, intra-regional 
foreign investment from BSEC countries has increased substantially due to capital 
flows from Russia. However, this is related to investments in the energy sector and 
infrastructure rather than in production. For example, in Armenia 30 per cent of 
Russian FOI was directed to energy and 39 per cent to telecommunications (EIU, 
2000a, p. 32). In the large economies of the subregion such as Greece, Turkey and 
Russia the weight of business operators from BSEC states is marginal. 
The limited and heterogeneous FOI outflow data (DECO, 1996d) available for 
two countries of the region - Ukraine and Turkey - for the early years of BSEC's 
formation (1992-1996) tend to confirm the growing weight of intra-regional foreign 
investment among BSEC countries. Western countries, transition economies and 
BSEC countries, as aggregate destination countries, were major destinations of FOI 
from Ukraine and Turkey in 1994 and 1995. They accounted for respectively 41, 48 
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and 37 per cent of Ukrainian FDI stock abroad by the beginning of 1996. When 
compared with the end of 1992, the share of BSEC countries in Turkish FDI stock 
abroad increased from 3 to 5 per cent by the beginning of 1996; over the same period 
the share of OECD countries as destination countries decreased from 70 to 63 per 
cent. 
One dynamic trend within the subregion concerns Greek investments in the 
three Balkan states - Albania, Romania, Bulgaria - which have benefited from 
location advantages and low labour costs (Karahalios, 1995; Bitzenis, 2001, p. 5). Over 
the past ten years, about 3000 companies, mainly small companies based in northern 
Greece have set up and formed joint ventures with local partners across the area. The 
investors are small trade companies as well as banks and food companies with the 
bulk of investments directed to trade or services. Limited investment is on 
manufacturing, as EU regulations permit part manufacturing outside the Union, with 
goods then returned for finishing and exported as EU products. The Greek 
manufacturers export cloth which has already been cut to be made up across the 
border particularly in Bulgaria and shipped back to a Greek factory for finishing, 
making cross-border workshops flourish (Financial Times, 1 June 1998). Greek 
investments in Albania are also concentrated in the southern part of the country but 
they deal mainly with the trade related services. Investments in the field of 
telecommunications are also important especially in Armenia, Romania and 
Moldova. However, in terms of value, Greek FDI remains low. By 2001, the stock of 
outward FDI accounted for $670 million in Albania, $950 million in Romania and 
$170 million in Bulgaria (Bitzenis, 2001). Thus; 22 per cent of the stock of FDI in 
Albania (by 1999) was of Greek origin, it was 7.8 per cent in Bulgaria (by 1998) and 
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2.7 per cent in Romania (by 1999).14 Investments in Albania are however 
concentrated in trade related activities, food, agriculture and construction with no 
major capital in industry or manufacturing. 
Of more importance is the role of Turkish ,investments in the subregion (table 
4.14). Turkey has 15 per cent of the total FDI in Azerbaijan while it is the largest 
investor in the non-oil sector, operating with 1267 companies (379 are joint ventures) 
in production (22 per cent), construction, transport and trade related activities. On 
the other side of the Black Sea and despite efforts to boost Ukrainian-Turkish 
bilateral links, Turkish investments represent less than 1 per cent (DEIK, 2003). 
One major observation in terms of the distribution of FOI is that large Russian 
investments in the BSEC area are concentrated on the energy sector (e.g. Lukoil 
Petrol in Bulgaria). Russia remains an important source of FDI only in Armenia (a 
quarter of the FOI flows in 2000) and Moldova (30 per cent) but in both cases the 
energy sector attracts the bulk of FDI. 
Another important aspect of intra-BSEC capital flows is their low level between 
the three most important sources of FDI from within the region namely Greece, 
Russia and Turkey. In 2003, Greek investments accounted only for 0.16 per cent of 
the total FOI in neighbouring Turkey and were estimated at $60 million (DEIK, 2(03). 
On the other hand, Turkish investments in Greece are even less significant reaching 
just $4 million.1S Turkish investments in Russia, amounted for $500 million or 4.4 per 
cent of the stock inward FDI in Russia in 2001, but they have been mainly 
concentrated on the construction sector with ,some investments going to the food 
industry, textile and banking. 
14 Sources: National Bank Albania, 1999; UNCI AD, 2000. 
U Information provided by the Greek Commercial Attache in Istanbul (2003). 
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Table 4. 14 Turkish FDI in the BSEC region, by host country (2001) 
Albania 
Azerbaijan 
Bulgaria 
Georgia 
Gwece 
Moldova 
Romania 
Russia 
Ukraine 
FDI Inflows Stock 
MlnUSD 
20 
869.4 
126.5 
45 
4 
360 
500 
32 
Source: DEIK, 2003. • year 1998, 
Per cent in 
total 
2.6% 
15% 
1.4 %* 
7.7% 
4.4 %** 
2.5% 
0.8% 
.. year 1999 
Sector 
Shoes, retail, health services housing 
Oil sector, production construction transport 
telecom. Etc 
Port administration, 
Glass, telecom., bottling, cleiU1 water, textile 
Irrigation fresh water, telecom 
Construction, business Centres, shopping malls, 
foodstuff, beverages, textile, banking, telecom 
Foodstuff, clothing, wood, mines, metals, 
construction 
Table 4. 15 FDI in Bulgaria by Foreign Investor Country, selected years 
Country/ FDI stock min USD FDllnflows min USD Cumulative 
region number of FIEs 
1995 1996 1999 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1995 1996 
Albania 
Armenia 4.8 71 
Azerbaijan 
Georgia 0.3 
Greece 33.1 36.7 416.8 2.1 4.1 20.9 2.3 99.1 573 867 
Moldova 0.0 0.2 
Romania 0.0 0.2 
Russia 37.9 37.8 144.6 0.2 15.1 99.5 21.5 191 374 
Turkey 37.8 20.5 0.1 1.3 22.4 12.3 25.4 304 
Ukraine 21 0.1 3 
EU 356.9 384.2 1339.5 60.2 370.7 273.1 354.8 679.8 1043 1492 
USA 54.8 33.9 85 171 
World 467.2 577.2 2160.4 109.0 504.8 537.3 818.8 1001.5 2954 5641 
Source: OECD, 1996a; UNCT AD, 2002. 
Table 4. 16 FDI in Romania bI ori!!n of Foreign Investor Country, selected rears 
country/ FDI Registrations min USD Cumulative number of committed FIEs 
region 1993 1994 1995 1996 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Albania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 2 10 12 15 
Armenia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01 8 14 16 18 
Azerbaijan 0.0 0.01 2 2 
Bulgaria 0.2 6.1 6.5 49 104 167 14 
Georgia 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 0 
Greece 11.2 0.0 26.5 43.5 602 857 1295 1501 
Moldova 1.0 15.8 4.0 5.0 188 304 550 609 
Russia 1.6 0.6 0.9 8 54 69 
Turkey 16.6 0.0 55.0 85.1 1872 2502 3591 4255 
Ukraine 0.0 29.6 0.2 0.7 15 35 51 61 
BSEe 29.0 51.4 920 142.2 '2693 3845 479 6724 
EU 361.4 459.7 0.2 0.7 7575 10663 15934 18229 
USA 64.4 720 103.0 886.8 105 1480 2030 2226 
World 535.9 751.1 1227.1 1721.4 20460 28896 42706 50183 
Source: OECD, 1996a. 
Notes: Data refer to registered foreign capital Md foreign investment enterprises which have not 
necessarilr Eaid in their caeital and started their oeerations. ' 
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Intra-BSEC FDI flows have two main aspects which should be kept in mind 
while trying to evaluate the power of transnational exchanges and demands. First, 
intra-BSEC investments (like trade) develop on a bilateral way between Greece and 
individual Balkan states, between Turkey and Azerbaijan and between Russia and 
several of the former Soviet Republics (such as Moldova and Armenia). Second, 
investments have not been directed to the production sector but to the energy related 
sectors and to infrastructure (particularly telecommunications and construction). 
The lack of a legal framework regarding the promotion of trade and 
investments led BSEC countries to conduct bilateral agreements as we saw earlier 
with the conclusion of FTAs. Members' preference was for bilateral agreements 
rather that a regional compact. An overview however, indicates a great asymmetry 
between countries which have bilateral agreements with most of their BSEC partners, 
e.g. Turkey, Russia, Greece, and other states (Albania, Bulgaria) whose record on 
bilateral agreements on investment promotion and double taxation is poor. 
Nevertheless, the lack of agreements on avoidance of double taxation between 
Greece, Turkey and Russia is noticeable. 
Table 4. 17 BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AMONG OSEC COUNTRIES (date of signature) 
Country Protection" Promotion of Investments Avoidance of Double Taxation 
Albania Greece (1991) Turkey (1992) Bulgaria (1994) Romania Romania (1994) Turkey (1994) 
(1995) Russia (1995) 
Bulgaria Russia(l993) Ukraine (199~ 
Greece Albania (1991) Romania (1991) Bulgaria (1993) Armenia Albania (1995) Armenia (1999) Bulgaria 
(1993) Russia (1993) Georgia (1994) Romania (1997) (1991) Georgia (1999) Romania (1991) 
Moldova (1998) Turkey (2000) 
Moldova Bulgaria (1996), Georgia (1997), Greece (1998), Romania Romania (1997) 
(1992), Russia (1998), Turkev (i994), Ukraine (1995) 
Romania Albania(1994) Bulgaria (1994) Georgia (1997) Albania (1994) Armenia (1996) Azerbaijan 
Grcece(l997) Russia (1993) Turkey (1991) Ukraine (1995) (1996) Georgia (1997) Moldova (1997) 
Russia (1996) Turkey (1986) Ukraine 
(1994) Greece (1991) Bulgaria (1996) 
Russia Albania (1995), Armenia (2001) ,·Bulgaria (1993), Greece Turkey (1993) 
(1993), Moldova (1998), Romania (1993), Turkey f1997, 
1990), Ukraine (1998) . 
Turkey Greece (2000) Albania (1992) Russia (1990,1997) . Russia (1993) Albania (1994) Romania 
Romania (1991) Ukraine (1996) (1986) 
Ukraine Turkey (1996) Armenia (1994) Bulgaria (1994) Greece Georgia (1997) 
(1994) Georgia (1995) Moldova (1995) Romania (1995) 
Azerbaijan (1997) 
Source; Based on UNCTAD, 2003. 
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4. Organized transnational demands 
Transnational exchanges (intra-regional trade and investments) around the Black Sea 
area, despite their low level, have increased thr,oughout the 1990s as we indicated 
earlier. Has this increase been followed by active lobbying by the business 
community? Has the business community been organized around BSEC? 
A few preliminary observations have to be made. We have to clarify that given 
the transformation of nine BSEC states from centrally planned to market economies, 
the presence of the private sector itself was limited in the early 1990s. Despite the will 
of the founding BSEC members to make the private sector as the locomotive of the 
initiative,16 the fact was that the business community was not yet formed throughout 
the BSEC subregion. 
It was the Turkish business community that showed some interest in the 
process, mainly at its early stages. A report on the future of BSEC as an economic 
forum was prepared by the Association of Turkish Industrialists (TUSIAD, 1993) 
while the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) undertook the burden of 
bringing together the area's businessmen by establishing a BSEC Business Council on 
6 December 1992. The latter has become the main body expressing the interests of the 
business community17 and its membership includes representatives from both the 
private and public sectors of the business community.18 The establishment of the 
16 As Mr. Ercan Ozer from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: "The driving force, the 
locomotive, is to be the private sector" (Murray, 1993, p. iv). 
17 Another structure is the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the Black Sea 
Countries (established in 1997) which has however remainea rather inactive. 
18 Each country participates in a different way. In Greece, a Hellenic Business Council has been 
established especially for this purpose with members from the major business associations and 
federations of the country. In the Russian Federation, there is a Russian National Committee consisting 
of the various business people. In Turkey, DEIK fulfils this role. The other countries are represented by 
their Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 
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Business Council was not a spontaneous process but it was strongly encouraged by 
the Turkish government which was supporting the strategy of advancing a 'business-
led' cooperation model. It was originally created on the basis of bilateral Associations 
of the Turkish Businessmen and ul:'til today its administration is primarily run by 
DEIK which undertakes most of the financial and administrative burden. 
According to the agreement establishing the BSEC Business Council, its aim is 
to contribute to private and public sector cooperation in keeping in line with the 
objectives of BSEC (article 1). At the same time the overall objective is to promote 
integration not only among the member states but with the global markets (Sutcliffe, 
2002, p. 78). The Business Council was the first structure to receive observer status in 
BSEC in December 1992, so as to give to the business community the chance to 
communicate its views easily to the Council of Ministers through its participation in 
all Working Groups of BSEC (such as the ones on trade and economic development, 
banking and finance, etc.). As we mentioned in chapter three, on the basis of its 
consultative role within the BSEC decision-making process, it recommends measures 
and submits its Reports of activities to the Council of MFA for information and, if 
necessary, appropriate action (BSEC, 1998a, art. 21). 
Despite its restricted, consultative role envisaged statutorily, the Business 
Council has been more influential. This was reflected in the BSEC Economic Agenda 
(2001, p. 16) which requested lithe active involvement of tIre business community in BSEC 
decision-making [emphasis added] and the implementation of joint projects. 
Representatives of private companies could be invited to meetings of the relevant 
working bodies of the BSEC to present their. proposals for joint projects when 
necessary". First, the Business Council has participated actively in the negotiation of 
BSEC agreements and documents. The incorporation of a chapter on Small and 
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Medium Enterprises and the strengthening of the business dimension in the BSEC 
Economic Agenda (BSEC, 2001, pp. 16-17) were initiated by it. Second, it has been 
functioning as a source of knowledge through the organization of seminars and 
workshops (always in cooperation ,with another international organization such as 
the EBRD, OECD or UNlOO) for the training of representatives of the public and the 
private sector. Another aspect that the Business Council has tried to address is the 
lack of information regarding business opportunities in the area. The Black Sea 
Business Network (BSBIN) established by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
of Romania in 1997 has been under the coordination of the Business Council and 
provides information on SMEs business proposals. 
Although the business community shares the assumption that the Black Sea 
area has a potential for economic gains from market exchange above the present level 
(TUSIAD, 1993) it has not systematically approached BSEC to make sure that such 
gains are realised. Business actors have put forward their demands through different 
channels. The largest business leaders of the BSEC area have lobbied directly their 
governments downplaying the effectiveness of BSEC institutions. This is also the case 
with the Turkish business community which although it administers the Business 
Council, it has not actively lobbied the organization. Rather than representing 
sectoral interests in the BSEC process, the Business Council is concerned with 
improving the business environment in general, facilitating the activities of the 
private sector and attracting investments to the region. In doing so, it has launched 
its main initiatives not in cooperation with the BSEC but with other organizations 
that have resources and expertise. The Black Sea Investment Initiative was thus 
launched in cooperation with the OECD while the Business Council participates in 
the UNECE program on building private public partnerships. 
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The business community of the Black Sea shows no interest in addressing its 
demands to BSEC as the latter is perceived mainly as a slow-moving bureaucratic 
organization without resources. At the same time, the business community is 
significantly fragmented. On the o~e hand, the business communities in Romania 
and Bulgaria are more interested in direct partnerships with EU and American 
interests, while on the other hand, the business community in the Caucasus is mainly 
interested in restoring links with the Russian markets. Greek and Turkish economic 
interests bypass BSEC using their own bilateral channels and Russian business 
consider BSEC too weak to serve its interests.19 
With regard to the demands of the business community, it is important to 
emphasize that these do not include requests for establishing a FTA or changing 
fundamentally the mode of function of BSEC. Claims concentrate on measures to 
deal with economic difficulties rather than establishing a trade bloc. There have been 
requests however to empower the Ministers of Economy with decision making 
capacity within BSEC so as to speed up economic cooperation. Accordingly, when 
the business community speaks of common rules they are almost exclusively 
referring to the rules of the WTO and the EU. For example when BSEC has been 
lobbied for measures to promote regional trade, what has been emphasized is the 
importance of WTO membership and compliance with WTO rules (BSEC Business 
Council, 1997). However due to the fact that trade regimes in the area are centred 
around the EU, business leaders have also come to the conclusion that what is 
needed are: 
• initiatives to facilitate liberal trade between the BSEC countries through 
transplanting the EU legislation; 
19 Discussion with directorial staff of the BSEC Business Council, June 2003. 
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• further efforts from the EU to allow increased market access for those 
products from applicant countries that are still subject to restriction; 
• the EU to design a strategy for a future economic relationship bet\veen the EU 
and the Black Sea area. 
It becomes clear that a second assumption of the business community, as 
expressed by the established transnational structures, is that BSEC's mode of 
governance is considered within the context of the EU. The business community has 
in several cases explicitly said that "since [emphasis added] we consider BSEC a 
facilitating component for the integration procedure and structure of Europe .... all 
BSEC activities are supported" (Miras, 1997, p. 2). According to the report prepared 
by TUSIAD in 1993, BSEC was not seen as a trade bloc but as a contribution to the 
"creation of a Europe-wide economic area and a higher level of integration of 
economies of member countries with global structures" while "in order to have 
relations develop in favour of BSEC an economic area between BSEC and EC may be 
established, similar to the 'European Economic Space' between EC and EFTA" 
(TUSIAD, 1993, pp. 103-104). 
Business leaders want a change with respect to regional economic integration, 
but they support the enlargement of the EU regime and the WTO rules rather than 
demand the transformation of BSEC into a trade bloc. Calls for a Black Sea FT A were 
not thus strongly supported but a scheme of bilateral free trade agreements was 
encouraged. 
5. BSEC as a means of economic cooperation 
Subregional economic cooperation was necessitated by the reform process and the 
structural adjustments in the transition economies and societies of the region and 
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spurred by geographic proximity (BSEC, 1992a, art. 3). It would serve as a 
contribution i) to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe - CSCE 
process, ii) to the establishment of a Europe-wide economic area, and iii) to a higher 
degree of integration of the participating states in the world economy (BSEC, 1992a, 
para. 5). BSEC is not a preferential trade agreement. Its members do not grant each 
other any specific preferences, thus BSEC does not have to be notified to the WTO 
under article XXN or be submitted to WTO examination and surveillance 
procedures concerning its conformity with WTO rules. 
It was recognized during the preliminary discussions for the establishment of 
BSEC that full economic integration would not be an a priori commitment for the 
participants, even though consideration to such integration could be given later in 
the process of cooperation. The participating states agreed to promote cooperation by 
contributing to "... the expansion of their mutual trade in goods and services and 
ensure or progressively eliminate obstacles of all kinds, in a manner not 
contravening their obligations towards third parties" (BSEC, 1992a, para. 14). The 
obstacles here refer to structural barriers rather than tariff and non-tariff barriers in 
the conventional trade theory sense of the terms. Second, given that Greece is a 
member of, and Turkey is in a customs union with, the EU there is little room for 
setting the levels of conventional barriers independently without contravening 
commitments with third parties. 
The 'open' character of subregional integration was declared from the 
beginning where article 5 of the. Istanbul Declaration set as a major goal lithe 
achievement of a higher degree of integration of the Participating States into the 
world economy". Also, article 7 made it clear that BSEC would not prevent its 
members from participating in and developing relations with "third parties, 
193 
including international organization as well as the EC", reasserting its role as a 
channel for the integration of its members into the world economy. It is thus 
stipulated that subregional cooperation is a step towards opening up the local 
economies to globalization forces. ~ooperation would develop gradually, taking into 
account lithe specific economic conditions, interests and concerns of the countries 
involved, and particularly the problems of the countries in transition to market 
economy" (article 10). 
The barriers in the BSEC context are not of the type that nations artificially 
erect by introducing tariff and non-tariff measures of protection which once decided 
may be lifted fast. Instead the barriers to trade among the BSEC states are primarily 
structural ones that have been formed over long periods of time and it would take 
time to eliminate them compared to more conventional barriers. Yet, it has been 
argued that to the extent that BSEC is successful in facilitating the reduction of these 
barriers, it will help create trade in a slightly different sense than the one suggested 
by the conventional definition of trade creation (Sayan, n.d., p. 3). The removal of 
these barriers which has to do with the inefficiency of channels for trade also requires 
major restructuring and reorganization in many sectors and areas including 
transportation and communications infrastructure. Fields of cooperation such as the 
standardization of products traded, the harmonization of customs regulations, the 
speeding up of the customs formalities and the easing of national visa regulations are 
at the centre of BSEC activities although they may not be typical priority areas for 
other regional organizations. 
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It is thus difficult to classify BSEC as an example of any of the regional 
arrangements varying from preferential trade agreements to economic unions.2o 
Conventional trade theory argues that the motivation behind regional arrangements 
is to improve the welfare of their members through a reduction or elimination of 
barriers to trade in the region. However, applying this to the case of BSEC requires 
some attention as the BSEC agreement does not directly provide for any preferences 
for countries within the group (DECD, 1997) apart from requiring the parties to 
lower trade barriers as described above. Notwithstanding declaratory statements in 
this direction, BSEC partners did not take practical steps to liberalize trade policy. 
BSEC does not require strong commitments towards harmonization of commercial 
policies vis-a-vis third parties, and the reduction in tariff or non-tariff measures for 
trade among members. Consequently, participation in BSEC does not imply direct 
trade creation or trade diversion effects. However, by helping diversify sources of 
imports for each of its members, BSEC could potentially help reverse the trend of 
diverted trade that had been going on between ex-Soviet partners prior to its 
formation (Sayan, n.d., p. 3). 
Given, on the one hand, the diversity of trade regimes in the area and, on the 
other, the need to stimulate transnational exchanges, emphasis was placed on 
improving the business environment and encouraging individual initiative rather 
than on directly affecting trade patterns. Therefore, priority was placed on (BSEC, 
1992a, para. 14): 
facilitating via bilateral ~egotiations, the prompt entry, stay and free 
movement of businessmen in their respective territories and encouraging 
direct contacts among enterprises and firms; 
20 For an attempt to evaluate BSEC against other forms of regional integration see Gultekin & Mumcu, 
1996, pp. 179-201. . 
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- providing support for SMEs; 
- contributing to the expansion of mutual trade in goods and services and 
ensuring conditions favourable to such development by continuing efforts 
to further reduce or progressively eliminate obstacles of all kinds, in a 
manner not contravening member states' obligations towards third parties; 
- ensuring appropriate conditions for investment, capital flows and different 
forms of industrial cooperation, notably by concluding and putting into 
effect, in the near future, agreements on the avoidance of double taxation 
and on the promotion and protection of investments; 
- encouraging the exchange of information on international tenders 
organized in the participating states, in accordance with national rules and 
practices; 
- encouraging cooperation in free economic zones. 
Consequently, BSEC slowly moved away from trade issues to other domains of 
economic cooperation. Although several attempts have been made for agreements in 
the field of visa facilitation, SMEs and investments, progress has been very slow. 
Negotiations on a BSEC Agreement on 'Simplification of Visa Procedures for 
Businessmen Nationals of the BSEC Member States' were concluded in April 2003, 
but signing was postponed as three countries were still reluctant to join. Bulgaria's 
and Romania's reservations are of particular importance. Both countries have argued 
that they are not in a position to participate due to their international obligations (EU 
accession), although they have signed similar agreements in the framework of 
Central Europe. Russia on the other hand has refused to sign due to the process of 
updating its national legislation.21 Negotiations over another agreement on 
'Simplification of Visa Procedures for Professional Drivers Nationals of the BSEC 
Member Countries' which is the first initiative by an NGO (the Union of Road 
21 Information based on participant's observation. See also BSEC PERMIS, 2003, p.7. 
196 
Transport Associations in the BSEC Region - BSEC UTRA) successfully forwarded to 
BSEC in 2002, are still pending. 
The SMEs were placed on the BSEC agenda as the primary engine for the 
realization of cross-border economk cooperation (BSEC, 1992a, para. 14; 2001, pp. 12-
13). The way that BSEC has dealt with SMEs is through the organization of training 
programs and workshops. A large number of workshops is organized every year 
mainly in cooperation with the Small and Medium Industry Development 
Organization of Turkey (KOSGEB) and the UNECE covering all aspects of SMEs 
functioning. The first step to coordinate actions for SMEs encouragement is the 
'Declaration on the Promotion of SMEs'22 which was however adopted only in 2001. 
It is comprised of a set of common principles on the development of the SME sector 
and establishes a special WG on SMEs to function on a permanent basis. 
The establishment of BSEC itself and the institutionalization of intra-regional 
affairs that has ensued are considered a contribution to the reduction of political risk, 
which has barred large-scale investment in the region. However, as we saw earlier in 
this chapter little progress has been achieved in attracting FDI. In accordance with 
the philosophy of BSEC to transplant the rules of the WTO into the subregion - given 
the fact that only some of its members are members of the WTO - the same approach 
of transplanting liberal policies and principles was applied in the field of 
investments. The member states agreed on basic principles of investment 
collaboration - transparency, non-discrimination, investment stimulation, investment 
control exportation and compensation, convertibility, entry and sojourn of key 
22 'Declaration on the Promotion ofSMEs' (Istanbul, 27 September) in BSEC PERMIS, 2002, pp. 331-
340. 
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members, elimination of restriction on exporting capital, investors conduct, 
settlement of disputes - but on a non-binding basis.23 
The BSEC Business Council, while taking practical steps for the actual 
improvement of the business climate, preferred to cooperate directly with the OECD 
in generating the 'Black Sea Investment Initiative' (BSII) which is a framework of 
policy reforms to eliminate the business disincentives in the region particularly as far 
as the SMEs are concerned. The BSII complements the work of the Investment 
Compact for South East Europe and its key features are the involvement of the 
private sector, the region-wide approach, the harmonization and partnership with 
related initiatives and actions for the implementation of reforms. The initiative 
concentrates in eight main policy areas: FDI policies and promotion strategies; SME 
support structures; fiscal reform and taxes; corporate governance; competition law 
and policy; financial sector development; corporate anti-corruption and public 
governance. 
5.1 A short lived Ff A project 
Discussions on the elimination of trade barriers including tariffs began in 1995 when 
a decision was taken to study the possible elimination of trade barriers within BSEC 
according to the WTO system. This decision has yet to be implemented.24 A year 
later, in October 1996, the leaders of the member states declared that BSEC should 
speed up the introduction of mutual trade preferences among participating countries 
and explore the opportunity for the creation of a Free Trade Zone (BSEC, 1996, para. 
2J'Basic Principles oflnvestment Collaboration in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation' (Moscow, 25 
October) in BSEC, 1996a, pp. 21-22. 
24 'Report of the fifth Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs' (Athens, April 1995) in BSEC 
PERMIS, 1995, pp. 120-121. 
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4). In February 1997, the 'Declaration of Intent for the Establishment of the BSEC Free 
Trade Area', was adopted proclaiming that the time to study the ways and means for 
gradual formation of a zone for free trade of BSEC as part of the European 
Architecture had arrived. The aim of the 'Declaration of Intent' was not the creation 
of a trade bloc. The free trade area was seen as a complementary step to the process 
of national reforms towards the market economy. In most of its clauses, hence, it 
refers to the commitments of the BSEC members vis-a-vis the EU resulting from full 
membership, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, European Agreements, 
Trade Commercial and Economic Cooperation Agreements, thus explicitly 
denouncing the formulation of a trade group.25 Taking a step forward, the ninth 
meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Istanbul, 30 April 1997) adopted the 
decision to develop an Action Plan for the formation of a regional zone of free 
trade.26 According to the general understanding at the time, such a plan should be 
developed in cooperation with the European Commission and proceed first 
primarily from the needs of the countries for the development of regional trade, 
taking into account the market transformation of their economies (Borisenko, 1998, p. 
70). The dominant understanding was that the BSEC FTA could be solely a trading 
alliance of secondary importance designed to prepare the member states for 
integration into an extended Europe. The free trade project is "important not so 
much because of direct economic advantages produced by wider regional trade, 
inflow of foreign investments and boosted economic efficiency. The FT A project is 
important as a stage that will prepare BSEC to become an inalienable part of the 
wider European economic space" (Borisenko, 1999, p. 111). 
25 'Declaration of Intent for the Establishment of the BSEC Free Trade Area' (Istanbul,7 February 
1997) in BSEC PERMIS, 1998a, pp. 113-116. 
26 'Report of the Special Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs with the Participation of the 
Ministers Responsible for Economic Affairs' in BSEC PERMIS, 1998a, p. 2. 
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The Plan of Action elaborated in 1999 was not officially adopted due to the 
restrictions resulting from the existing trade conunitments of the BSEC members. The 
concerns on how the Fr A would be connected to the EU were reflected in the 
decision of the MMFA which stated that the Action Plan " ... could be further 
developed in consultations with the European Commission in order to seek its views 
on and gain from the experience of the European Union in this context" .27 The 
priority policy areas identified for the realization of the long-term aim of a BSEC FTA 
were:28 
1. to promote bilateral free trade agreements between the BSEC Participating 
States, duly observing the obligations resulting from EU and WTO and 
other international arrangements; 
2. to review their foreign trade legislation related to manufactured products 
with a view to identify the existing tariff and non-tariff obstacles; 
3. to review the possibilities and future prospects in the trade of agricultural 
products with a view to further expanding it by way of progressive 
preferential treatment on mutually beneficial basis; 
4. to finalize the process of accession to the WTO and its relevant organizations 
and assist those who are in the process of accession by sharing available 
experience and information and consequently bring the national legislation 
in conformity with the GATT 1994 and its agreements regarding trade in 
goods and the GATS concerning trade in services; 
5. to gradually harmonize the customs, foreign trade and competition 
legislation and elaborate rules of origin in the framework of the FT A; 
6. to improve certification procedures in order to facilitate mutual recognition 
of certificates of conformity; 
7. to ensure cooperation among the national institutions of statistics; 
8. to improve border crossings; 
9. to develop frontier trade; 
27 'Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Resolutions, Decisions and Recommendations' (Tbilisi, 
30 April 1999), para.28 in BSEC PERMIS, 2000, p. 91. 
IS'Plan of Action for the Establishment of the BSEC Free Trade Area' (Istanbul, 27-29 January), para. 
1-12 in BSEC PERMIS, 2000, p. 251. 
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10. to conclude bilateral agreements between the BSEC participating states on 
encouragement and protection of foreign investments, avoidance of double 
taxation and transfer of technology; 
11. to reform and modernise economic and social structures giving priority to 
the adoption and the impl~mentation of technical support programs for the 
SMEs. 
The establishment of a FT A was however soon to be abandoned as it lost 
support from several of the member states. To lessen fears that the FTA would create 
a trade bloc opposing the EU, Turkey which had been the strongest advocate of the 
idea, sought the approval of the EU on a BSEC FTA stating that "the European 
Council has declared that they would approve the integration of the free trade area 
that is to be created within Black Sea Economic Cooperation with the EU" (Ciller, 
1997, pp. 4-5 ). Declaratory remarks notwithstanding, the FTA project found little 
support by the BSEC members and the EU itself. Only Romania expressed its views 
on the draft Action Plan for the establishment of a FT A while Armenia, Greece, 
Turkey and Ukraine sent their proposals for the drafting of the document which 
reflected different ideas about the stages, terms and major tasks of creating a free 
trade zone.29 It took however almost a year for the member states just to open 
negotiations on the elaboration of the Action Plan while poor participation led to the 
cancellation of several meetings. During the drafting of the Action Plan, Romania 
insisted in keeping all envisaged actions in line with the obligations resulting from 
the EU, the WTO and other international organizations.3D Greece, on the other hand, 
expressed its reservation that it would participate in the FT A only to the extent that 
29 'Comments of the Romanian Side on the Draft Plan of Action for the establishment of the BSEC 
Free Trade Area', 'Memorandum on the Plan of Actions' prepared by Armenia, 'Memorandum on an 
Action Plan' prepared by Greece, 'Working Paper on an Action Plan' prepared by Turkey 
'Memorandum on the Plan of Actions' prepared by Ukraine' presented at the Working Group on trade 
and economic development (Yerevan, 3-4 February 1998), unpublished. 
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this would not contradict the commitments deriving from its full membership to the 
EU)! The member states' positions indicated their different vision of subregionalism. 
Turkey has consistently favoured the FT A and the construction of wider subregional 
arrangements. However, this did n?t reflect a relatively greater dependence on the 
Black Sea markets but political developments in the subregion. On the contrary, 
despite the economic weight of Russia in the subregion, Russian policies have not 
favoured a BSEC FT A and arrangements reflecting its choice not to support 
deepening of any other regional group but the CIS. 
Given the lack of support for a FT A, BSEC applied a more flexible approach 
towards the liberalization of trade by compiling an 'Exemplary list of quantitative 
restrictions and measures with equivalent effect on trade' and focusing on the 
elimination of non-tariff obstacles. Little however has been done beyond a draft 
'Recommendation for the procedure to eliminate quantitative restrictions and 
measures with equivalent effect on trade in BSEC region', prepared by Turkey in 
June 2001.32 The BSEC Economic Agenda adopted in 2001 still considers the removal 
of the barriers that hamper free circulation of goods in a two-tier strategy (BSEC, 
2001, pp. 6-7). First, past trade relationships have to be thoroughly re-examined, and 
to the extend that they make sense, be encouraged and supported. Second, serious 
efforts have to be made to establish new trade relationships based on present and 
future comparative advantages of the states involved. As far as the creation of a FT A 
is concerned, it states that this remains an objective to be achieved gradually "in 
conformity with the Customs Union, the European Agreements as well as the 
30 'Comments of the Romanian Side on the Draft Plan of Action for the establishment of the BSEC 
Free Trade Area' presented at the Working Group on trade and economic development (Yerevan, 3-4 
February 1998), unpublished. 
31 'Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Resolutions, Decisions and Recommendations' (Thilisi, 
30 April 1999), para.29 in BSEC PERMIS, 2000, p. 91. 
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obligations resulting from membership in the EO, WTO and from other international 
organizations" (BSEC, 2001, p.7). 
6. Conclusion 
On the basis of the above analysis we can answer three types of questions which 
relate to BSEC's formation as a subregional structure. 
First, does the BSEC subregion constitute a market-led phenomenon? 
Describing the Black Sea subregion as a market-led phenomenon that exists beyond 
formal institutional formations would have been far from the reality. The data 
indicate an increase in economic transactions among the countries of the subregion 
but this does not qualify for the existence of an economic bloc. Subregional trade and 
investment links, though increasing in the 19905, are still relatively weak and have 
not brought changes in production. 
The establishment of BSEC itself played at most limited direct role in the re-
direction of economic flows. Particularly due to the economic disparities among the 
members and the diversity of their legislative basis, BSEC contributed little to the 
implementation of trade liberalization and harmonization of trade policies. In our 
case as in other cases of regional integration involving transition economies, the main 
purpose of regional integration has been to consolidate the autonomous trade 
liberalization process undertaken by these countries and by promoting trade and 
investment links within the regional context, to foster their gradual integration into 
the world economy (OECD, 1996; OECD, 1996b; OECD, 1996c). Transition countries-
which form the majority of BSEC members -, have placed greater emphasis on 
32 'Recommendation for the Procedure to Eliminate Quantitative Restrictions and Measures with 
Equivalent Effect on Trade in BSEC Region' in BSEC PERMIS, 2002, pp: 419-420. 
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political considerations than on genuine market-led forces. This is to be expected 
since the private sector is underdeveloped and cannot take a leading role in 
promoting intra-regional links, and second, due to the lack of adequate regional 
infrastructure facilities and finan~ial resources. As it has been argued before 
(Salavrakos, 1997, p. 29) the notion that an introvert economic development strategy 
(multilateral economic cooperation between BSEC states) will achieve economic 
prosperity is at best incomplete. It is FDI from other economic zones (in particular 
the EU) which offer to these countries the economic development they need. The 
dominant intra-BSEC activity is trade rather than investment, and the total capital is 
far less than the amount which companies from other countries have invested. The 
increase of intra-regional flows is also accompanied with an increased reliance on the 
extra-region, and particularly, on the EU. Intraregional trade can be a stimulus for 
growth as the size of the economies involved is significant, but the stimulus seems to 
be smaller than the one provided by closer integration with the west European 
markets. 
Second, what role did economic difficulties play in the formation of BSEC? 
The empirical findings seem largely to indicate that severe economic difficulties in 
the subregion did trigger inter-state cooperation in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the 
subregional level has not been conceived as the appropriate level where those 
difficulties can be addressed, hence calls for authoritative supranational institutions 
within BSEC did not develop. Economic difficulties around the Black Sea have not 
been classic difficulties related merely to growth or production but they have been 
structural in their nature. They are interlinked with a fundamental change of the 
politico-economic regime of the majority of the BSEC countries from central planned 
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to market oriented economies which has required a governance change first of all at 
the national level. 
Third, did the increase of tra.nsnational exchanges lead to demands directed to 
the subregional level? Transnational exchanges have been expanding and demands 
for change are voiced. Organized interests from the business community are 
increasingly involved in the subregional bargaining process, but their demands are 
connected to the trade regimes of the WTO and the EU and the transplanting of their 
principles in the subregion as well as to the facilitation of economic activities. The 
local elites have reached a consensus around liberal economic policies and on 
attracting foreign investment, etc., shaping thus accordingly the BSEC's structures, 
priorities and activities. There is no demand for deeper subregional integration but 
for loose cooperation, hence not for supranational organs in the Black Sea subregion. 
Thus, one reason why BSEC has moved to an intergovernmental mode of integration 
rather than to a supranational one is because the business community has not 
presented a clear demand for such a change. 
Transnational exchanges (in terms of trade and investment) have not 
developed subregional dynamics. First, western European countries have been 
increasingly becoming the main trade partners of the BSEC states. Intra-BSEC trade 
has increased but not as much as trade with the extra-region. As we saw earlier, this 
reorientation also reflects contractual links of the BSEC states with the EU. Second, 
FDI flows within the subregion remain low and they develop in a bilateral level 
(much like trade). What is more ~mportant is the fact that most of the economic 
activity within the subregion is not directed to manufacturing and production but to 
the energy -related activities, infrastructure and raw materials. Therefore, local 
investors have not yet perceived the Black Sea as a potential market. 
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Demands for subregional integration might have been expected to come 
primarily from Turkey given its leading role in establishing free trade conditions 
around the Black Sea. This however did not happen. First, the Turkish capital which 
was invested in Russia in early 1990s, was mainly concentrated on the construction 
sector and did not expand to other activities in production or manufacture. Despite 
its interest in the new markets, the Turkish private sector could not compete with the 
western capital and benefit of proximity advantages in the Black Sea area. Sectoral 
interests in BSEC - not only for Turkey but for all the other member states too -
focused mainly on activities such as raw materials, construction, agriculture where 
there is little room for liberalization thus for supranational governance or institutions 
to implement agreements on free trade. Second, readjusting to the conditions of the 
customs union with the EU (January 1996) attracted most of the attention of the 
Turkish private business. As far as the other main source of capital from within the 
subregion - the Greek private sector - is concerned, its interests were almost 
exclusively oriented to the Balkan market. Economic relations with the Balkan 
economies of Bulgaria and Romania were of course placed within the EU framework 
or bilateral agreements rendering BSEC's competence irrelevant. 
We can conclude that transnational exchange around the Black Sea developed 
in a bilateral way. To this bilateralism, the following obstructing factors have to be 
added. By 1997, those countries which had the potential to drive economic 
integration and stimulate transactions, had already developed or were developing 
contractual links with the EU (Greece, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria), therefore 
redirecting any demands for the governance of their economic relations to the EU 
rather than BSEC. Second, Russia's economic activities in the area - being the single 
most significant trade partner in the subregion - concentrate on energy sector and 
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not on production. Third, for all states in the subregion, expectations for relative 
economic benefit from the BSEC market were limited. The modemizing anchor (Le. 
source of capital) was not perceived to be within the subregion but in westem 
Europe and beyond. 
The dynamics of transnational exchange and demand within BSEC may not be 
fully understood unless we incorporate political considerations. Greece and Turkey, 
the two market economies that could have driven economic integration, have 
insignificant bilateral links due to their uneasy political relations. Beyond the 
persistence of trade embargos in the subregion (e.g. in Armenia) we shall recall that 
two of the BSEC states i.e. Moldova and Georgia can hardly be described as 
functioning 'national' economies since part of their territories and economic activities 
is not controlled by the central government. Furthermore, the Black Sea countries 
resisted subregional regimes which could imply integration with Russia. Regardless 
of the actual economic benefits of integration, particularly the NIS share the fear that 
increased integration within the subregion, which includes Russia, will result in 
continuing isolation from the international economy and perpetuation of the 
economic backwardness which this could produce. The security dilemma in the 
subregion has been so intense that economic relations were considered a state 
controlled activity, where transnational actors had to serve the national interest 
rather than the market dynamics. 
In the next chapter those concerns are brought into the surface. Economic 
difficulties and transnational demCl!lds were not sufficient to drive integration within 
BSEC. They have underwritten BSEC's reconfiguration to a loose economic 
cooperation organization rather than to a trade bloc which would thus request the 
development of central supranational institutions. 
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Appendix 4.1 Direction of Trade for each BSEC state, 1991 - 2000 
Source: IMF, Directio1l o/Trade Statistics Yearbook, Washington D.C. (several 
years). 
Notes: BSEC 10: BSEC without Greece 
(-): not applicable 
( ... ): indicates lack of data 
ALBANIA 
Direction of Trade, 1991-2000 
Millions of USD 
Exports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
World ... ... 122 141 202 211 
Armenia -
'" 
... ... ... ... 
Azerbaijan - ... ... 1 ... 
Bulgaria ... ... 1 1 ... ... 
Georgia - ... ... ... ... ... 
Greece ... ... 22 15 20 27 
Moldova - ... ... ... ... ... 
Romania ... ... ... ... ... .. . 
Russia - ... ... ... . .. ... 
Turkey ... ... 2 2 13 7 
Ukraine - ... ... ... ... ... 
BSECI0 3 3 14 7 
BSEC ... ... 25 18 34 34 
Total 
EU ... 50 89 109 160 181 
Imports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
World ... ... 604 737 976 909 
Armenia - ... ... .. , ... ... 
Azerbaijan - ... ... ... . .. ... 
Bulgaria ... ... ... .. . 67 36 
Georgia - ... ... ... . .. ... 
Greece ... ... 138 237 288 187 
Moldova - ... ... ... 1 ... 
Romania ... .. , 3 5 8 21 
Russia - . " ... .. , ... 2 
Turkey ... ... .. . 65 30 39 
Ukraine - ... ... ... ... 3 
BSECI0 ... ... 3 11 106 101 
BSEC ... 
'" 
141 248 394 288 
Total 
EU ... 240 527 572 754 694 
1997 1998 1999 
141 206 275 
.. . ... .. . 
... ... . .. 
. .. ... .. . 
.. . ... .. . 
29 41 39 
.. . ... ... 
. .. ... .. . 
'" 
... .. . 
1 1 1 
.. . ... ... 
1 1 1 
30 42 40 
124 191 258 
1997 1998 1999 
620 795 899 
... .. , .. . 
. .. ... .. . 
17 22 27 
. .. ... .. . 
165 232 249 
. .. 1 1 
2 3 6 
... 7 4 
27 27 49 
3 7 6 
49 67 93 
214 299 342 
519 658 721 
2000 
280 
.., 
'" 
. .. 
37 
.. . 
.. . 
1 
3 
.. . 
4 
41 
275 
2000 
1091 
.. . 
2 
26 
... 
280 
... 
11 
7 
67 
6 
119 
399 
805 
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ARMENIA 
Direction of Trade, 1991-2000 
Millions of USD 
Exports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World - 7 171 242 357 290 233 221 232 300 
Albania - ... ... . .. ... ... ... .. . 
'" 
... 
Azerbaijan - ... ... ... ... .. . ... .. . . .. ... 
Bulgaria - ... 1 ... ... ... .. . 1 1 1 
Georgia - ... 3 3 3 7 11 10 11 13 
Greece - ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. . 3 
Moldova - ... ... ... ... . .. ... ... .. . ... 
Romania - ... ... ... .. . .. . ... ... .. . ... 
Russia - ... 59 84 91 96 63 40 34 45 
Turkey· - ... ... .. , 3 6 7 3 1 2 
Ukraine - ... 4 4 4 5 3 4 2 3 
BSEC 10 - ... 67 91 101 114 84 58 49 64 
BSEC - ... 67 91 101 114 84 58 49 67 
Total 
EU - 4 31 61 79 62 66 76 107 107 
Imports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World - 51 259 396 696 862 891 902 843 885 
Albania - ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. . ... 
Azerbaijan - ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. . ... 
Bulgaria - ... ... 1 5 14 25 16 12 7 
Georgia - ... 20 18 62 51 38 27 27 28 
Greece - ... ... ... 6 5 10 9 13 54 
Moldova - ... ... ... ... .. . ... ... .. . 1 
Romania - ... ... ... 1 5 1 1 ... .. . 
Russia - ... 78 112 135 125 216 191 181 137 
Turkey· - ... ... 1 3 6 38 57 40 40 
Ukraine - ... 4 5 5 12 12 9 8 12 
BSECI0 - ... ... ... 211 213 330 301 268 225 
BSEC - ... 102 137 217 218 340 310 281 279 
Total 
EU - 21 38 38 104 133 177 259 253 303 
* Turkey's embargo on Armenia was imposed in 1992 thus officially trade is not registered. The 
figures presented here are estimations. 
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AZERBAIJAN 
Direction of Trade, 1991-2000 
Millions of USD 
Exports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World - 1571 993 637 544 631 781 607 929 1745 
Albania - 29 ... ... ... ... ... ... .. . 2 
Armenia - ... ... ... ... .. . ... ... 
'" 
... 
Bulgaria - 6 3 ... 1 1 4 11 2 3 
Georgia - ... 35 17 41 92 133 77 72 75 
Greece - 4 28 1 10 10 14 12 13 23 
Moldova - 15 17 13 3 4 1 1 ... ... 
Romania - ... ... ... ... . .. .. . ... 4 8 
Russia - 375 218 140 99 111 181 106 83 98 
Turkey - 126 65 16 26 39 41 136 69 105 
Ukraine - 144 57 58 33 22 32 12 24 24 
BSECI0 - 695 395 244 203 269 392 343 254 315 
BSEC - 699 423 245 213 279 406 355 267 338 
Total 
EU - 228 70 83 94 59 88 131 423 1054 
Imports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World - 998 635 778 666 961 794 1076 1036 1172 
Albania - 1 ... ... ... ... ... 
'" 
... ... 
Armenia - ... ... ... ... ... .. . ... .. . ... 
Bulgaria - 3 2 1 7 3 2 2 8 12 
Georgia - 19 20 8 19 28 37 25 9 10 
Greece - ... ... ... 1 1 2 4 ... 3 
Moldova - 5 11 13 4 9 8 3 2 2 
Romania - ... ... ... ... 1 1 1 2 2 
Russia - 275 147 118 88 158 152 194 226 249 
Turkey - 89 74 76 141 216 180 220 143 129 
Ukraine - 226 61 86 34 94 86 93 38 36 
BSEC10 - 618 315 302 293 509 466 538 428 440 
BSEC - 618 315 302 294 510 468 542 428 443 
Total 
EU - 106 58 70 84 136 102 224 191 227 
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BULGARIA 
Direction of Trade 1991-2000 
Millions of USD 
Exports 
Economy 1991 1992 . 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World 3225 3922 3729 3947 5359 6602 5323 4296 3925 4807 
Albania ... ... ... . .. 61 43 21 25 33s 24 
Armenia - ... ... 1 7 20 15 11 7s 6 
Azerbaijan - ... 2 1 7 14 12 12 5s 4 
Georgia ... ... . .. 2 39 79 110 70 43s 58 
Greece 143 144 179 294 368 348 378 377 337s 376 
Moldova - ... 5 9 43 91 89 45 19s 16 
Romania 58 84 65 59 96 75 60 53 535 85 
Russia - 189 222 314 536 480 339 235 1675 119 
Turkey 128 ... . .. 178 385 384 428 339 2765 492 
Ukraine - ... ... ... 
'" 
. .. 
'" 
... . .. 59 
BSEC 10 186 273 294 564 1174 1186 1074 790 607 863 
BSECTotal 329 417 473 858 1542 1534 1452 1167 940 1239 
EU 919 1144 1090 1564 2013 1913 1942 2137 2054 2463 
Imports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World 2537 4468 4720 4260 5661 6861 5224 4981 5409 6362 
Albania ... .. , 1 1 
'" 
... 
'" 
. .. ... . .. 
Armenia - ... 1 ... 5 ... 1 1 ... . .. 
Azerbaijan - ... 3 . .. 5 1 2 ... . .. . .. 
Georgia - ... 4 ... 12 10 5 4 Is . .. 
Greece 96v 245 331 497 249 196 191 297 322s 318 
Moldova - 17 18 11 20 12 7 4 4s 2 
Romania 66v 120 113 113 61 70 53 59 735 230 
Russia ... 1010 1036 521 1584 1694 1030 1038 953s 1581 
Turkey 90v 76 
'" 
147 100 96 95 128 170s 214 
Ukraine - ... 
'" 
... 
'" 
... ... .. . ... 182 
BSECI0 156 1223 1176 793 1787 1883 1193 1234 1201 2209 
BSECTotal 252 1468 1507 1290 2036 2079 1384 1531 1523 2527 
EU 1504 1609 1908 2379 2098 1780 1628 2325 2638 2858 
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GEORGIA 
Direction of Trade, 1991-2000 
Millions of USD 
Exports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World - 76 227 156 151 199 230 338 365 330 
Albania - ... ... . .. . .. .. . ... ... .. . ... 
Armenia - ... 10 13 18 21 19 24 24 13 
Azerbaijan - ... 15 . .. 13 24 25 23 9 21 
Bulgaria - ... 3 ... 6 12 9 4 1 2 
Greece - ... 5 ... ... .. . 1 6 10 8 
Moldova - ... . .. ... ... ... . .. ... . .. . .. 
Romania - ... ... .... .... 2 .. . . .. 1 . .. 
Russia - ... 103 52 47 57 69 58 45 68 
Turkey - ... 22 24 34 26 30 83 85 74 
Ukraine - ... 13 6 6 5 8 7 5 19 
BSECI0 - ... 166 124 124 147 160 199 170 197 
BSECTotal - ... 171 124 124 147 161 205 180 205 
EU - 67 9 1 7 17 20 67 106 68 
Imports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World - 55 238 338 392 687 931 1249 899 704 
Albania - ... ... ... ... . .. ... ... .. . 
Armenia - ... 5 1 11 17 22 11 12 14 
Azerbaijan - ... 12 24 48 79 116 85 79 55 
Bulgaria - ... ... 2 28 43 46 77 48 15 
Greece - ... 1 2 11 18 14 28 11 11 
Moldova 
-
... ... ... ... .. . .., ... ... .. . 
Romania - ... ... 3 30 41 15 71 56 10 
Russia - ... 10 26 48 127 125 113 64 94 
Turkey - ... 35 39 82 77 114 181 126 109 
Ukraine - ... 13 4 8 39 56 35 46 38 
BSEC 10 - ... 75 99 265 423 494 573 495 335 
BSECTotal - ... 76 101 266 441 508 601 506 346 
EU - 32 23 12 63 167 210 334 195 167 
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GREECE 
Direction of Trade, 1991-2000 
Millions of USD 
Exports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World 8671 9439 9093 8808 10961 11948 11128 10732 10475 10747 
Albania 12 41 125 216 262 329 251 192 222 249 
Armenia - ... . .. 3 7 4 7 9 11 45 
Azerbaijan - ... . .. 1 2 2 17 11 3 4 
Bulgaria ... ... 301 452 450 329 319 439 408 450 
Georgia - ... 2 5 15 19 25 25 10 7 
Moldova - ... 2 2 7 10 9 6 13 14 
Romania 76 71 90 94 169 177 176 218 209 379 
Russia 86 109 185 245 238 364 418 267 243 244 
Turkey 104 133 148 139 222 357 436 337 333 544 
Ukraine -
'" 
31 82 104 140 130 80 46 42 
BSEC 278 354 884 1239 1476 1731 1788 1584 1498 1978 
Total 
EU 5845 6447 5637 4706 6709 6488 5846 5729 5421 4683 
Imports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World 21564 22818 20200 20640 25944 28745 27046 28717 25433 27824 
Albania 12 18 15 34 38 36 36 36 38 40 
Armenia - ... ... . .. ... ., . . .. 1 . .. 1 
Azerbaijan - ... ... ... 1 ., . 2 . .. 12 7 
Bulgaria ... ... 196 324 487 371 416 383 349 392 
Georgia - ... ... 6 5 ., . 3 7 11 19 
Moldova - ... . .. 3 4 7 7 4 2 3 
Romania 93 51 66 91 122 145 204 191 208 301 
Russia 92 67 502 538 650 700 634 488 460 1063 
Turkey 168 143 137 173 211 233 297 362 366 386 
Ukraine -
'" 
32 148 88 105 59 64 72 115 
BSEC 365 279 948 1317 1606 1597 1658 1536 1518 2327 
Total 
EU 13785 15290 12076 13831 18213 18656 17800 19222 16715 16352 
213 
MOLDOVA 
Direction of Trade, 1991-2000 
Millions of USD 
Exports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World - 470 481 565 745 795 875 632 463 471 
Albania - .... 
'" 
... 1 1 1 ... .. . ... 
Armenia - 1 ... ... 3 5 ... ... .. . ... 
Azerbaijan - 8 31 13 5 6 1 ... 1 2 
Bulgaria - 13 17 10 21 12 10 2 5 4 
Georgia - 2 1 1 ... 3 4 ... ... ... 
Greece - ... 1 5 3 4 5 5 6 2 
Romania - 102 104 83 104 72 59 59 41 38 
Russia - 164 172 289 360 429 509 339 191 210 
Turkey - 13 2 1 12 9 5 4 3 2 
Ukraine - 82 63 69 59 47 49 48 33 35 
BSECI0 - ... 390 466 565 584 638 452 274 291 
BSEC - 38S 391 471 568 588 643 457 280 293 
Total 
EU - 12 31 39 86 78 90 79 95 102 
Imports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World - 640 631 659 841 1072 1164 1024 1101 1261 
Albania - ... ... ... .. . ... ... .. . ... .. . 
Armenia - 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... . .. 
Azerbaijan - 7 39 12 6 5 4 1 ... . .. 
Bulgaria - 19 5 10 32 32 62 28 20 17 
Georgia - ... 1 1 ... ... ... ... .. . 3 
Greece - ... ... 4 5 3 9 6 14 17 
Romania - 63 68 43 56 66 101 110 111 129 
Russia - 265 222 309 278 321 333 228 265 231 
Turkey - ... 1 3 7 11 14 10 12 . .. 
Ukraine - 94 130 123 229 262 211 149 135 136 
BSEC 10 - ... ... SOl 608 697 725 526 543 516 
BSEC - 449 466 S05 613 700 734 532 557 533 
Total 
EU - 37 67 68 115 177 226 266 290 226 
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ROMANIA 
Direction of Trade, 1991-2000 
Millions of USD 
Exports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World 4269 5203 4892 6160 8061 7644 8387 8128 8432 10367 
Albania 3 2 3 5 7 23 3 4 8 10 
Armenia - ... ... .. . 2 3 4 2 2 ... 
Azerbaijan - ... 1 3 3 7 3 3 3 3 
Bulgaria 60 116 103 103 71 68 57 78 110 290 
Georgia - 1 2 14 50 45 37 64 51 42 
Greece 53 116 84 141 207 173 175 198 215 324 
Moldova - 72 94 60 82 92 128 128 101 142 
Russia - 415 220 207 158 150 248 78 47 89 
Turkey 153 219 277 252 348 384 353 319 469 627 
Ukraine - 105 105 95 138 61 91 50 63 90 
BSEC10 216 928 805 739 859 833 921 726 854 1293 
BSEC 269 1044 889 880 1066 1006 10% 924 1069 1617 
Total 
EU 1576 1536 2027 2970 4388 4271 4752 5253 5537 6630 
Imports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 19% 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World 5203 5582 5929 6466 9443 9058 10129 10615 9358 11868 
Albania 3 ... ... ... ... 11 ... ... .. . ... 
Armenia - ... ... ... ... 11 ... .. . ... ... 
Azerbaiian - ... ... ... 3 1 1 ... 6 1 
Bulgaria 58 84 65 59 70 60 50 43 45 80 
Georgia - ... ... ... ... . ... 1 ... 1 2 
Greece 86 71 63 81 144 154 171 182 179 338 
Moldova - ... 79 86 95 49 56 56 37 38 
Russia - ... 695 894 1117 1144 1233 958 639 1019 
Turkey 85 167 134 137 228 168 191 242 211 247 
Ukraine - ... 121 136 176 175 169 151 97 178 
BSEC10 146 251 1094 1312 1689 1619 1701 1450 1036 1565 
BSEC 232 322 1157 1393 1833 1773 1872 1632 1215 1903 
Total 
EU 1636 2331 2686 3117 4811 4732 5316 6145 5673 6727 
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RUSSIA 
Direction of Trade, 1991-2000 
Millions of USD 
Exports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World - 39931 44047 63078 77595 83979 85077 71389 72453 102998 
Albania - 1 ... ... . .. ... 1 2 4 6 
Armenia - ... ... 154 127 103 96 128 57 28 
Azerbaijan - ... . .. 147 86 171 220 148 115 136 
Bulgaria - 1165 942 473 670 915 914 594 479 585 
Georgia - ... . .. 56 49 100 147 103 58 42 
Greece - 236 194 266 147 137 202 365 577 1273 
Moldova - ... . .. 542 398 388 381 322 241 210 
Romania - 605 475 459 627 776 739 565 395 922 
Turkey - 649 1078 949 1632 1667 1983 1923 1617 3098 
Ukraine - ... ... 67W 6898 7583 7239 5531 4786 5024 
BSECI0 - 2420 2495 9489 10487 11703 11720 9316 7752 10051 
BSEC - 2656 2689 9755 10634 11840 11922 9681 8329 11324 
Total 
EU - 20227 1%72 22411 26051 27189 27998 23073 24022 36881 
Imports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World - ... 26751 38600 46399 44504 52400 42939 30286 33853 
Albania - ... ... ... ... . .. 1 2 1 1 
Armenia - ... ... 53 75 85 60 39 28 44 
Azerbaijan - ... ... 141 107 150 261 165 98 135 
Bulgaria - 584 245 345 472 244 261 163 108 116 
Georgia - ... ... 52 58 67 150 63 50 77 
Greece - 32 134 185 257 204 185 125 122 125 
Moldova - ... ... 475 636 808 841 492 264 325 
Romania - 431 102 146 132 135 202 90 48 79 
Turkey - 383 661 400 542 575 794 512 312 348 
Ukraine - ... ... 4400 6616 6256 3981 3219 2523 3647 
BSEC 10 - 1398 1008 6012 8638 8320 6551 4745 3432 4772 
BSEC - 1430 1142 6197 8895 8524 6736 4870 3554 4897 
Total 
EU - 15952 11198 15379 18003 15761 19578 15539 11101 11138 
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TURKEY 
Direction of Trade, 1991-2000 
Millions of USD 
Exports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World 13723 14606 15348 18155 21650 23123 26246 26301 26587 27625 
Albania 21 21 38 59 57 53 41 44 66 61 
Armenia· - ... ... ... ... .. . ... ... ... .. . 
Azerbaijan - 102 68 132 161 239 320 325 248 230 
Bulgaria 76 72 86 134 183 153 176 213 233 253 
Georgia - 12 35 67 68 110 173 161 114 132 
Greece 144 146 118 169 210 235 298 369 407 438 
Moldova - 0.01 0.4 4 7 14 21 28 21 26 
Romania 105 173 152 175 302 311 359 467 268 326 
Russia - 442 505 820 1238 1494 2056 1347 589 644 
Ukraine - 36 39 76 199 267 337 274 226 258 
BSEC 10 203 857 923 1467 2215 2645 3484 2860 1764 1930 
BSECTotal 347 1003 1041 1636 2425 2880 3782 3229 2171 2368 
EU 7377 7600 7287 8269 11078 11477 12247 13440 14348 14509 
Imports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World 21132 24380 29355 23278 35760 42464 48656 44731 40687 52713y 
Albania 1 0.882 2 1 1 9 3 3 1 3 
Armenia· - ... ... ... ... ... ... .. . .. . .. . 
Azerbaijan - 35 34 9 22 38 58 50 44 596 
Bulgaria 140 224 243 195 402 358 409 367 295 465 
Georgia - 6 22 26 50 32 66 90 93 155 
Greece 77 88 120 105 201 283 431 320 303 431 
Moldova - 2 29 20 16 14 15 12 11 7 
Romania 199 256 301 229 368 437 394 344 401 647 
Russia - 1041 1542 1045 2,082 1800 2174 2155 2374 3886 
Ukraine - 90 473 535 856 744 918 989 774 981 
BSEC 10 340 1655 2646 2061 3797 3534 4037 4010 3994 6268 
BSECTotal 417 1743 2766 2166 3998 3817 4468 4330 4297 6699 
EU 9897 10048 12948 10278 16862 22704 24869 24076 21416 26610 
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UKRAINE 
Direction of Trade, 1991·2000 
Millions of USD 
Exports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 . 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World - 8Q.l5 7817 9531 14966 14400 14232 12637 11582 14579 
Albania - ... ... 
." . .. '" 1 2 1 4 
Armenia - ... 4 5 5 25 11 8 12 12 
Azerbaijan - ... 55 79 30 88 88 90 29 41 
Bulgaria - 206 412 127 171 137 155 205 295 383 
Georgia - ... 12 8 7 183 49 32 42 38 
Greece - ... 29 ., . 80 97 80 60 75 48 
Moldova - ... 118 367 208 238 294 180 123 176 
Romania - 141 121 , .. 176 157 149 161 76 165 
Russia - ... ... 3837 6015 5577 3723 2906 2396 3516 
Turkey - 90 430v 115 440 409 671 696 673 869 
BSECI0 - ... 1152 4538 7052 6814 5141 4280 3647 5204 
BSEC - 437 1181 4538 7132 6911 5221 4340 3722 5252 
Total 
EU - 806 1111 671 1716 1599 1762 2135 2130 2362 
Imports 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World - 7099 9533 11082 20054 17586 17114 14676 11844 13955 
Albania - ... ... .... .... .... 2 .. . ... .. . 
Armenia - ... 5 1 5 4 8 5 2 3 
Azerbaijan - ... 63 41 37 31 47 28 34 24 
Bulgaria - .... ... 68 210 126 143 101 68 60 
Georgia - ... 14 3 6 4 8 8 6 10 
Greece - 3 34 ... 114 60 65 34 55 39 
Moldova - 69 159 65 73 74 51 25 35 
Romania - 115 115 ... 151 80 87 48 52 48 
Russia - ... ... 5998 7588 8817 7838 7064 5592 5825 
Turkey - 36 41 8 172 110 162 136 143 160 
BSECI0 - 154 307 6278 8234 9245 8369 7441 5922 6165 
BSEC - 157 341 6278 8348 9305 8434 7475 5m 6204 
Total 
EU - 1045 201Dy 842 3135y 2758 3378 3167 2399 2883 
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Appendix 4.2 Share in BSEC - EU trade by country, 1992 - 2000 
. (per cent) 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Washington D.C. (se~ral years) 
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A~~ndix 4.3 FDI IN BSEC COUNTRIES, 1991 - 2001 ~mi1lions of USD} 
FOIINFLOWS 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Albania 20 45 65 89 97 42 45 41 143 181 
Armenia 2 1 8 25 18 52 232 130 133 140 
Azerbaijan 0 22 330 627 1115 1023 510 130 227 
Bulgaria 56 41 40 105 98 138 505 537 819 1002 689 
Georgia 0 8 6 54 243 265 82 131 160 
Greece 1135 1144 977 981 1053 1058 984 85 571 1089 1560 
Moldova 17 14 18 73 23 79 74 37 138 150 
Romania 37 73 87 341 417 415 1215 2031 1041 1025 1137 
Russia 409 1460 1657 4865 2761 3309 2714 2540 
Turkey 810 844 636 608 885 722 805 940 783 982 3266 
Ukraine 200 200 151 257 516 624 743 496 595 .772 
BSEC 2038 2341 2000 2716 4693 5325 10529 8736 7819 8082 10822 
World 158821 166967 225495 255901 333812 384960 478082 694457 1088263 1491934 735146 
FOIOUTFLOWS 
Economy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Albania 20 7 9 12 10 10 1 7 6 
Armenia 12 13 8 11 
Azerbaijan 175 36 64 137 336 1 158 
Bulgaria 1 -8 -29 -2 17 3 10 
Georgia 1 -1 
Greece -26 47 -22 16 42 -25 156 262 539 2102 -6(J7 
Moldova 18 1 1 1 -1 
Romania 3 4 7 1 3 2 -9 -9 16 -11 -17 
Russia 142 101 358 m 3184 1270 2208 3208 2618 
Turkey 27 65 14 49 113 110 251 367 645 870 497 
Ukraine 8 10 -5 42 -4 7 1 23 
BSEC 4 137 148 202 706 871 3697 2035 3789 6187 2693 
World 198042 201527 244253 287178 356572 395728 474010 684039 1042051 1379493 620713 
Source: UNCT AD, 2003. 
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CHAPTER S. SUBREGIONALISM WITHOUT LEADERSHIP AND UNDER 
SECURITY DILEMMA 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines two factors which relate to the mode of BSEC cooperation as 
suggested in the analytical framework. First, it tries to identify whether there is a 
benevolent leading countryl within BSEC. Second, it examines how the security 
dilemma in the subregion has developed and transformed in the 1990s. 
It is a common assumption that even if governments are willing to meet 
demands for more supranational governance they might be still unable to do so 
because of collective action problems. In line with the third variable of our analytical 
framework, the existence of a benevolent leading country may help governments to 
respond to collective action problems. Besides taking responsibility for coordination, 
such a country may help to ease distributional tensions by assuming the role of a 
'regional play-master'. What we examine here is whether there is a leading country 
directing BSEC affairs and how this factor has shaped the reconfiguration of BSEC 
and the latter's mode of governance. We thus identify interests, capabilities and 
actual initiatives of member states that would indicate their leading role or the 
absence of such a role. 
As we saw in chapter three each member state has equal votes within the BSEC 
Council guaranteeing an equal participation and power of all member states in the 
policy-making, irrespective their size. Member states however are divided into three 
categories in accordance with their contribution to the BSEC budget: the large 
contributors namely Greece, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine (16.5 per cent), the medium 
I There are coercive and benevolent versions ofleadership or hegemony of which the benevolent strand 
has probably been the most influential (Kindleberger, 1986). 
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ones - Romania, Bulgaria (8.0 per cent) - and the small contributors Albania, 
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova Azerbaijan (4.0 per cent). This categorization is useful as 
it also reflects to a degree the member states' political weight in the BSEC affairs. 
Another dimension examined 'here which constitutes the fourth variable used 
in our analytical framework, stems from the security domain. It is a common ground 
that security problems hinder collective action and the deepening of cooperative 
structures to more binding and supranational modes of governance. Apart from the 
existence of security problems per se, what is of importance here is the transformation 
of security dilemma and its effects on the demand for governance at the subregional 
level. The Black Sea is a zone of instability which contains most of the ongoing or 
I frozen' conflicts in Europe. Traditional security concerns notwithstanding, the 
definition of the very concept of security has acquired throughout the 1990s a more 
comprehensive content. What conclusions may we draw when relate the 
transformation of security dilemmas of the member states to the formation of BSEC? 
2. In search of leadership: ambitions, capabilities and constraints 
The search for a leadership within BSEC in general has to consider interests 
capabilities, actual policies and constraints. Chapter 2 disclosed in details the 
national motivations and interests of the BSEC members. Here we will move beyond 
interests to assess whether there has actually been a leading country within BSEC or 
not. 
Turkey has been singled out by most analysts as the state that has been 
performing such a role (Sezer, 1992b; Neasca, 1996; Gumpel, 1993; Gokyigit, 1992) 
motivated by geostrategic and economic considerations. Besides Turkey, another 
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indisputable 'regional play-master' is Russia, primarily due to its security and 
economic (i.e. energy) leverage over the majority of the states in the area. For reasons 
that rest on its economic development (relatively to its neighbours) and on its EU 
membership, Greece has also been considered as a potential benevolent leading 
country within BSEC Another country that has been expected to playa leading role 
is Ukraine due to its size as well as due to its strategic location stretching from 
Central Europe to the coast of the Black Sea. Several members of BSEC are small 
states (e.g. Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova) which neither had 
the capacity nor the experience to undertake leadership. At the same time, Bulgaria 
and Romania for reasons that relate to their foreign policy priorities refrained from 
becoming active in BSEC affairs, preferring other fora of cooperation in Southeast 
and Central Europe. Two concerns weighed heavily in both countries' reluctant 
involvement in BSEC 
First, their preference to be regarded as Southeast European countries rather 
than Black Sea countries (particular if the latter would mean exposure to Russian 
influence) and second their accession negotiations with the EU absorbed most of 
their resources as EU membership became their strategic foreign policy goal. None of 
the countries wished to jeopardize their EU orientation by advancing or leading 
integration within BSEC particularly given the total absence of institutionalized links 
between the EU and BSEC The absence of the European Commission from the BSEC 
organs (unlike its membership in the Council of the Baltic Sea States) was perceived 
as a denial by the former to treat BSEC as a European, economic or political partner 
(Siskos, 1998, p. 34). The above considerations underlined their hesitant rather than 
proactive BSEC membership which, as we saw in Chapter 3, was practically 
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translated into refraining from signing BSEC agreements and even less binding 
memoranda (e.g. in the field of electric power). 
Hereafter, we focus on those four countries (Turkey, Russia, Greece and 
Ukraine) that have had either the material basis, or might be expected to perform a 
benevolent leading role. 
Table 5.1 Key Economic Indicators of BSEC countries 
Country Population Surface Area GNP Inflation 
(1992) Thousand sq. per capita USD per capita Min USD (1996) (1992) 
km (1993)* USD (1996)* 
Albania 3360000 29 340 809 2678 2'l) 
Armenia 3500000 30 660 424 1599 1~ 
Azerbaijan 7200000 87 730 416 3181 912 
Bulgaria 8460000 111 1160 1142 10017 820 
Georgia 5400000 70 560 645 3044 fBi' 
Greece 10300000 132 7390 11855 87851*** 16 
Moldova 4400000 34 1180 471 1693 12i6 
Romania 22700000 238 1120 1563 35334 210 
Russia 148400000 17075 2350 6575 971300 1s!) 
Turkey 58500000 775 2120 2928 181077 61 
Ukraine 50400000 604 1810 1180 81519** 1210 
Source: State Institute of Statistics, 2003; EBRD, 2003. 
* current prices ** Hryvnia *** Euro 
2.1 The leadership role of Turkey 
Turkey is the only state which attempted to assume the role of a benevolent leading 
country within BSEC. A flourishing literature (Eren, 1993; Masty & Nation, 1996; 
Rubin & Kirisci, 2001) in the early 1990s pictured Turkey as a rising regional power. 
It was argued that "Turkish diplomacy has displayed an outstanding ability in using 
the influence thrust upon it as the new superpower in the region" while " ... the 
leaders of the member nations, induding the Russians and Greeks, they expressed 
their reliance on Turkey to keep [BSEC] Council members attached to their mutual 
security and economic growth" (Eren, 1993, pp. 52, 53). 
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Particularly in the late 1980s Turkey seemed to possess several attributes for 
such a leading role. In terms of size (market), population and military power2 (table 
5.1 and table 5.2) it has been an indisputable power in subregional affairs. What 
reinforced Turkish aspirations ~as the fact that it was seen as a model of 
development and governance by several NIS, particularly in central Asia and the 
Caucasus, during their state-building process. It appeared to be firmly anchored to 
Euro-Atlantic structures both in economic and politico-military terms. As a pillar of 
NATO in a highly sensitive and strategically important area, it was considered to be 
an essential and stable strategic partner and as a market economy it provided an 
alternative economic model to the former centrally planned economies. Furthermore, 
Turkey appeared to bear 'issue-specific advantages', having international experience 
in the fields in which it envisaged cooperation - trade, finance, communications, 
SMEs. It was expected to transfer knowledge and resources in technical fields of 
cooperation. 
Soon however it became apparent that Turkey lacked the financial and political 
capacity to establish itself as a dominant power in the subregion. The material basis 
for a leading role was proved weak particularly as its unstable national economy was 
prone to frequent crises, characterized by high inflation, external debt and inability 
to attract long-term foreign capital (Onis, 2000). On the other hand, Turkey slowly 
lost most of the I ideological' basis of its power as the closest exponent of western 
liberal ideas and a locomotive of modernization. More powerful states or 
organizations entered in the Black Sea system while the local leaderships soon 
directed their expectations to other centres of power which had either the military 
capacity (e.g. the US) or the financial power (e.g. the EU) to assist them in addreSSing 
2 Turkey has established a naval superiority in the Black Sea consisting of 116 vessels and 16 
submarines. Russia possesses 52 vessels and 4 submarines. 
225 
their urgent state-building and transition related problems. Turkey was unable to 
provide economic aid in the quantities needed by the countries in transition and by 
and large its attempts to extend its sphere of influence into the new republics were 
not met with the expected success. 
The locol1lotillt? of Black Sea subregionalism 
Turkey has been the locomotive of Black Sea subregionalism in several aspects. 
Turkish active policy in forming BSEC's agenda was more obvious at the formative 
stages of the initiative and until 1998. First, the founding goals and principles of 
BSEC reflect the perception of Turkish leadership of subregionalism as a tool of 
liberalization of foreign economic affairs and the opening up of markets. Turkey 
therefore was the single state that mostly influenced the ideational basis of BSEC. 
In 1991 Turkey assumed not only the political but also the administrative and 
financial cost of running BSEC. It undertook the administrative burden, drafting the 
preparatory documents, organizing meetings and working groups. Beyond 
establishing the intergovernmental dimension of BSEC, it initiated all other 
dimensions of Black Sea subregionalism, encouraging its multidimensional character. 
It was the Turkish Grand National Assembly that proposed the creation of the 
P ABSEC in 1993 while the BSEC Business Council was established on the basis of the 
bilateral associations of the Turkish businessmen. Hence, the secretariats of the three 
main BSEC Bodies (at the governmental, parliamentary and business level), 
established between 1992 and 1993, were hosted in Istanbul. The initiative of the 
transformation of BSEC into an international organization belonged also to Turkey 
which prepared the draft charter of the organization in 1996 just as it had done six 
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years earlier when preparing the declaratory documents establishing BSEC as a 
cooperation initiative. 
Acknowledging the economic difficulties of its partners (most of them in 
transition) Turkey financed the whole amount of the budget of the new initiative for 
the first three years of its existence.3 Still today it finances the total budget of the 
BSEC Business Council while it has established the BSEC Coordination Centre for 
Exchange of Statistical Information and Economic Information in Ankara under the 
State Institute of Statistics with the aim of remedying the lack of information on 
social and economic indicators of the member states. At the bilateral level, Turkey 
also extended economic assistance either directly or indirectly through special funds 
for economic operations. It thus established in 1992 the Turkish International 
Cooperation Agency (TICA) attached to the Prime Minister's Office in order to 
coordinate and direct assistance particularly to the NIS more efficiently.4 
Strengthening the international voice of BSEC has been almost an exclusive 
preoccupation of Turkey. It is important to notice that three out of the total six 
Summit Meetings until today have been hosted in Istanbul (in 1992, 1999 and 2002) 
while one of them (1999) was held within the framework of the OSCE Summit again 
upon a Turkish proposal. During its last Chairmanship (May - November 2001) the 
number of working groups and workshops (in total 15 meetings) outnumbered those 
realized by any other Chairmanship. Turkey's leading role as the locomotive of BSEC 
is more evident when one considers the number of project proposals that it has 
initiated most of them in the field~ of economy, trade, tourism, agriculture and SMEs 
(see chapter three). Nevertheless, Turkey's influence in directing BSEC's orientation 
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has decreased and there are signs that it has lost its initial interest in the organization 
altogether. 
Beyond the difficulties mentioned earlier and hindering Turkish aspirations, 
we have to stress the fact that Turkey's original intentions for the organization have 
not been realized. Turkish efforts to create some type of FT A or a zone of free trade 
were dismissed as unrealistic. On the other hand, BSEC failed to attract the interest of 
the business community as Turkey expected, since the private sector estimated that 
the opportunities offered through BSEC were limited.s Hence, soon the process was 
left without its envisaged central motor, the (Turkish) private interests. Seeing its 
initial intention to use BSEC as a tool of foreign economic policy and to turn the 
Black Sea into a zone of free trade, failing under the lack of support from the 
domestic private sector, the persistence of economic difficulties and political turmoil 
in the area, Turkey did not come up with another grand strategy for the 
organization. Therefore, despite the number of project proposals forwarded to BSEC 
organs, Turkey'S last significant initiative dates back to 1996 and the opening of the 
debate on the transformation of BSEC into an organization. The weakening of 
Turkish influence in leading BSEC is more clearly illustrated in the fact that the 
organization has moved steadily from being economy-oriented to acquiring a more 
explicit political and security dimension (e.g. the creation of a BSEC study group on 
security) despite Turkey's lack of enthusiasm for such a development. 
Since 1998, Turkey clearly became less active due to domestic economic 
difficulties as well as due to the redirection of the priorities of its foreign policy. The 
3 Turkey financed the total budget of P ABSEC until 1995, "The principle governing the budget of the 
BSEC shall also govern the budget of the Assembly. The whole of the budget of the Assembly for the 
financial years of 1994 and 1995 as well as the partial budget of the Assembly for the remaining 
months of the year of 1993 ... shall be financed by Turkey" (PABSEC, 1993, provisional article 1). 
4 For information on the main functions of TIC A see http://www.tika.gov.tr 
S Views expressed by staff ofTUSIAD International, June 2003. 
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Turkish administration had to deal with the EU negotiations and the destabilization 
in the Balkans, Middle East and particularly in the Gulf. As regards to capabilities, it 
should be noted that in the 1990s the Turkish economy endured three severe crises 
(in 1994, in 1998 and 2001) that hav~ hindered the realization of its plans towards the 
Black Sea region. The economic blow in 1994, the serious downturn in economic 
activity after the Russian crisis in 1998, and later on the outburst of the financial crisis 
of February 2001, with the latter being the most serious economic crisis that Turkey 
had faced in approximately fifty years,6 reduced the capacity of Turkey to act as a 
modernizing pole. Turkey faced relatively high levels of unemployment (7.3 per cent 
in 1999), persistent double digit inflation (93.6 per cent in 1995) and an urgent need 
for international assistance. Turkish foreign dept stock was 101.8 billions of USD at 
the end of 1999 or just over 50 per cent of GDP, up from about 80 billions of USD or 
45 per cent of GDP in 1996 (EIU, 200b, p. 48). Furthermore, the social and economic 
impact of the disastrous earthquake of August 1999 had already forced the Turkish 
governments to put more emphasis on issues of internal affairs rather than foreign 
policy. At the political level, on the other hand, the Turkish enthusiasm for the Black 
Sea project had to be tempered by a more realistic view of the situation as conflicts in 
the area persisted and intensified in the first half of the 1990s. Although Turkey was 
not directly involved in any of the conflicts, its tense relations with some of its 
immediate neighbours (e.g. Armenia, Greece and Bulgaria) topped with the 
suspicion of Russia, undermined its role as a leading country. 
Turkey's strong geopolitical and economic considerations regarding the 
benefits of improved relations with its neighbours around the Black Sea, in particular 
with the Soviet Union and its successor states, were not always seen to be best served 
6 According to the Central Bank of Turkey, only between 21 February and 23 February 2001, the 
Turkish lira was devaluated by 56.6 per cent. . 
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through BSEC. As we indicated earlier, Ozal's leadership was the key factor in 
Turkish proactive policy towards BSEC. New leadership in Turkey in the second half 
of the 1990s did not show the same enthusiasm for the project as Ozal did. 
Thus, although the first half of the 1990s witnessed a strong and active interest 
on behalf of Turkey, not only in BSEC affairs but generally in establishing 
multilateral fora of cooperation, the second half of the decade witnessed a more 
hesitant Turkish policy than expected. The diversity of BSEC members and of their 
priorities vested in subregionalism - which did not always coincide with Turkish 
priorities - pushed Turkey to actually develop relations with its Black Sea neighbours 
either at a bilateral level or at a more circumscribed space (e.g. involving only the six 
coastal states). 
2.2. Russia: a regional playmaker 
Russia's passive involvement in BSEC affairs should not be interpreted as lack of a 
strategy vis-a.-vis the organization. The' core' of the delineated BSEC area constitutes 
a top priority in its foreign policy (Adomeit, 1998, p. 43). Although a 'weakened great 
power' in the Black Sea or a medium power with nuclear capability (Sezer, 1997, p. 
3), Russia has had significant leverage over many of the BSEC members thus being 
one of the most influential factors in the organization's development. However, 
Russia's reduced presence in the Black Sea has impeded further its efforts to 
maintain its role in the area. The Black Sea coast line inherited by the Russian 
Federation is a modest 30 plus percent of its former grandeur. Russia acquired only 
three of the 20 major coastal cities and only one technologically advanced sea port -
in Novorossisk. Nevertheless, it has several tools in its use to exercise its influence. 
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These include the presence of Russian minorities in all former Soviet states; the 
dependence of several BSEC states on Russian oil, gas and pipelines; Russian 
military basis, forces and equipment on their territory; the inability of the new states 
to protect their external borders or, secure the stability of their regime; and Russia's 
engagement in territorial and ethnic conflicts (Adomeit, 1998, pp. 43-44). Throughout 
the 1990s Russia preserved mainly its security leverage over the NIS due to its 
military strength, engagement in conflicts and its power to influence political and 
economic developments in the whole region. Perceptions of Russia have been an 
important consideration particularly in the developments of Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Moldova and Georgia's international relations as well as in the course of the conflicts 
and their cease-fires and negotiations. Even though Russia continues to overshadow 
the area, its power has declined relative to that of other external players and relative 
to the increasingly independent and assertive governments in Baku, Tbilisi and to a 
lesser extent Yerevan (Herzig, 1999, pp. 102-108). 
Most NIS have remained however energy-dependent on Russia (particularly 
Moldova and Ukraine) while for their state survival and internal stability they had to 
take into consideration the Russian factor (e.g. Georgia, Moldova). Notwithstanding 
the Russian leverage over the NIS, that leverage was not expanded to all BSEC states 
since almost half of the member countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, 
Greece and Turkey, for different reasons each, were less susceptible to the Russian 
influence. 
We can say that two factors undermined the capacity of Russia to undertake a 
leading role. First, the country's dire economic situation and second the increasing 
direct or indirect influence of other external actors. Russia was not seen as the 
modernizing factor by any of the states in the Black Sea subregion who directed their 
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expectations to international financial institutions and the EU as guarantors of their 
economic restructuring and survival. At the same time, Russia was seen as part of 
the problems of the subregion thus making the Black Sea states at least cautious 
about and even strongly hostile to any leading role of Russia within the newly 
formed structure of BSEC. The fear of a revival of the Russian dominance as 
experienced within the former Soviet Union was leaving Russia with little room to 
undertake initiatives within subregional structures. Russia might have been 
perceived as a coercive hegemon, at least by the NIS, but increasingly 'Russification' 
was identified with backwardness. The choice of the local political elites to be within 
the orbit of the European influence was not a merely interest-based calculation but it 
reflected their views on what represented modernization. 
Russia's participation in BSEC was not accompanied with active involvement 
in the affairs of the organization but more with political apathy and reluctance. 
Russia has shown preference for using the CIS framework for advancing its relations 
with the NIS rather than any other subregional forum. As we argue here 
undermining BSEC's deepening rather than undertaking leadership within it, was 
closer to Russian interests. 
Undermining BSEC 
Although some analysts present Russia as having a positive engagement in BSEC 
(Kovalsky, 1996) others argue that in fact cooperation around the Black Sea was 
perceived 11 either as irrelevant, or as driven by Turkey's strategic aim (which Ukraine 
tactically supports) to penetrate into the Caucasus" thus with suspicion by Moscow 
(Baev, 2000, p. 132). The performance of Russia in BSEC organs inclines to the second 
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argument, indicating Russia's political decision not to encourage BSEC's deepening 
or functioning as a full-fledged mechanism. 
Given Russia's geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in the area, one would 
expect its active engagement in BSEC affairs. Furthermore, being a 'weakened great 
power' Russia should theoretically be interested in regional institutionalization. The 
first ten years of BSEC's existence indicate that this did not happen. First, the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not have a clear strategy of engaging in 
subregionalism.7 Second, Russia's preferred cooperation tool in the area has been its 
own 'child', the CIS, formed at the meeting in Minsk in December 1991, rather than 
BSEC. The CIS has been the primary integration tool used by the Russian political 
elite while BSEC did not receive an equivalent status within the Russian foreign 
policy ever. This is not difficult to understand given the diversity of BSEC's 
membership (Turkey, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria) which poses limitations on the 
influence that Russia can exert on the organization while on the other hand, BSEC 
unlike CIS could not be used as a means of 'reintegration' of the former Soviet space. 
It is therefore not surprising that although Russia systematically resists the formation 
of a FTA within BSEC, it has concluded FT As with all CIS members apart from 
Ukraine. 
Furthermore, Russia unlike the rest of BSEC members, did not place emphasis 
on the role of BSEC within the European architecture, neither did it expect to use its 
participation in BSEC in its relations with the EU, hence having no interest to 'show 
good performance' in subregionalism. Although all BSEC members have stressed 
their participation in regional structures during their talks with the EU (either to 
meet the ' good neighbourhood' condition or to increase their bargaining power) this 
7 Interview, Michael Savva, 3 June 2003. 
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has not been the case with Russia. Relations between the ED and Russia developed 
their own dynamic away from BSEC, as subregional cooperation was not offering 
any additional leverage to Russia. Subregionalism was thus used by Russia as a 
foreign policy tool almost exclusi~ely vis-a.-vis its relations with the NIS. A shift in 
Russia's stand towards BSEC took place in 1996 when it organized the Moscow 
Summit (Smirnov, 1997). Russia's priorities however for BSEC's agenda evolved 
around the field of emergency situations and other non-economic issues. Its only 
initiative within the organization has been the agreement on emergency situations, 
indicating its intention of using BSEC as a forum for undertaking confidence-
building measures rather than as a tool of economic integration. Furthermore, Russia 
has no interest in paying particular interest to BSEC's economic dimension as the 
lion's share of its foreign trade has been with countries outside BSEC (see chapter 
four). The lack of a proactive BSEC agenda in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Mfairs 
was manifested during its last Chairmanship (November 2000 - April 2001) when 
Russia organized just six meetings of Working Groups. 
Russia has been more of a coercive hegemon but it has not pursued a role of a 
benevolent leading power within BSEC. Its cautious policy however has influenced 
fundamentally BSEC's governance as it has constituted a factor of keeping 
subregionalism as a loose non-binding mode of governance. 
2.3 Greece: a reluctant player 
Greece has remained very cautious of all efforts for further deepening, politization 
and policy expansion of BSEc.s Outlining the Greek positions on BSEC's 
development, ambassador Emmanuel Spiridakis, chairman of the coordinating 
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committee for BSEC Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, clarified in 1995 that 
Greece" still considers as premature the conversion of the BSEC into an international 
organization, but does not rule this out in the future. Besides, there is the precedent 
of the CSCE (Conference on Securiry and Cooperation in Europe), which carried on 
its work for a number of years without having organization status, which it only 
recently acquired after 19 years of activity" (Drakopoulos, 1995, p. 4). This cautious 
stand regarding the character and potential of Black Sea subregionalism which made 
Greece a reluctant rather than a pro-active power within the organization was also 
manifested during discussions on the Black Sea 'Convention on Cooperation in the 
Fields of Culture, Education, Science and Information'9 as follows: 
As far as the Greek position is concerned, in general, Greece should cooperate 
but without any obligations ..... it has to be stressed that the 'cultural' aspects 
have been included .. . in BSEC but its goals and aims require the 
preservation of its strictly economic - functional character. On the contrary, 
expansion towards the parliamentary field or even more towards issues of 
minorities, nationalities, population groups etc. which have become so 
popular lately, will be out of any control later and they will anyway require 
another type of engagement. Relevant is also the issue of overlapping. It is 
necessary to remind that only confusion will result from the wish of some 
members to undertake parallel activities with the CSCE (that covers the same 
issues), the Council of Europe and at the same time to sign agreements such 
as the one of the BSEC. If Russia and others intend to preserve their control 
over or to secure their population in the former Soviet Union republics, for 
others (e.g. Bulgaria, Ukraine) this idea, may not be pleasant particularly 
when e.g. there is the possibility for anyone to transmit any type of material 
through 'Cultural Centres', B,SEC publications, tapes and other material. 
8 "While Greece is expected to lobby for a cautious approach and to propose the creation of a special 
committee to assess the effectiveness of proposed change concerning the bloc' (Athens News, 24 
October 1996), it might be better to opt for a more pro-active policy" (Triantaphyllou, 1996). 
9 The Convention was signed on 6 March 1993 in Istanbul. It is not a BSEC Agreement but it is signed 
by most BSEC members: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, 
Turkey and Ukraine. 
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Even more attention should be brought to the issue of the languages as there 
is no reference to the official languages of the member states but in general to 
'those spoken in the region'.lO 
Greece never saw or supported a political potential in BSEC and it remained 
indifferent in assuming a leading role in the process - particularly until 1995. It is of 
interest to note that Greece in ten years of the functioning of BSEC institutions did 
not undertake any effort to occupy high positions in the bureaucracy that would 
permit it to exert influence both on the political direction and the actual functiOning 
of the organization, refrained from undertaking any political initiatives and did not 
participate in BSEC meetings at the highest political level. On the contrary, it 
pursued a policy of stressing the economic and 'practical' nature of BSEC 
cooperation, hosting the BSTDB (in Thessaloniki) and supporting activities directed 
to non-political issues. The 'project oriented approach' proclaimed in the BSEC 
Economic Agenda reflects that policy.ll Undermining the political dimension and 
institutionalization of BSEC was a conscious policy of Greece due to the fact that 
given the limited political leverage of Greece in the Black Sea area, BSEC could tum 
into a tool of serving foreign policy goals of countries such as Russia and mainly 
Turkey. 
On the other hand, both economic and political factors restricted Greece from 
undertaking the role of a benevolent, leading country within BSEC. Although Greece 
was better off than any of the other ten countries in terms of economic development 
and indicators of prosperity as well as its membership in the most developed 
international economic organizations it lacked the economic power and experience 
first to influence developments around the Black Sea and second to assume the role 
10 Information Paper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, Athens, 10 June 1993. 
II It is worth noticing that the draft of the BSEC Economic Agenda (2001) was prepared by the ICBSS, 
the think -tank of BSEC which is funded by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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of a 'bridge' between the EU and BSEC. In 1993 and upon the establishment of BSEC, 
Greece's GNP per capita equalled the aggregated GNP per capita of all its BSEC 
partners excluding Turkey (table 5.1). However, being a country of limited resources 
and capacity in pursuing multipl~ (foreign) policy tasks, priority was placed by 
Greek governments on internal economic restructuring and the requirements of 
joining EMU as well as in managing its immediate neighbourhood in the Balkans 
which experienced instability and conflict throughout the 1990s. 
The Greek presidency of BSEC in the first half of 1995 however acted as a 
catalyst in pushing the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Karolos Papoulias into 
adopting a new policy profile in the area. Organizationally, a coordinating 
committee on BSEC affairs was formed in January 1995 within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. New ideas were worked out as to Greece's more active participation 
in the BSEC process and to the role it could playas the link between BSEC and the 
EU. The outcome of this shift was that Greece hosted both of the two newly 
established BSEC related bodies - BSTDB and ICBSS - in an effort to exert influence in 
two fundamental machineries of subregional cooperation, the financing body and the 
think-tank of the BSEC. Thus today Greece contributes financially more than any of 
the other ten countries in BSEC's operation, among others through covering 16 per 
cent of the annual budget of BSEC, the Parliamentary Assembly, the BSTDB, 
supporting the BSEC Project Development Fund, operating a Special Technical Fund 
within the BSTDB, funding the total amount of the annual budged of ICBSS as well 
as financing the BSEC Business Council. 
A bridge between the EU and BSEC? 
237 
The central piece of Greece's policy vis-a-vis BSEC increasingly became its potential 
as a bridge between the EU and BSEC in particular after 1995.12 However, at the 
beginning Greece did not envisage for itself a strong political role but wished to 
make use of its comparative advantage as an EU member to step up "efforts to 
provide funds for the implementation of various BSEC programs, particularly in the 
fields of energy, communications, transportation, strengthening of small and 
medium-size enterprises and personnel training",13 One should not exaggerate either 
the political will of Greece to actually assume the cost of advancing BSEC - EU 
relations or Greece's power to influence the EU's external policies. However, BSEC 
recognized an enhanced role for Greece, and at the Thessaloniki Meeting of MFA (27 
October 1999) with its Resolution (Resolution I.A, para.5) requested that "For the 
purpose of making the dialogue between the EU and BSEC, envisaged in the 
Platform for Cooperation, more effective, Greece, as a member of the European 
Union, could be consulted by the BSEC troika". Another dimension to be taken into 
consideration is the fact that Greece placed the Balkan area (rather than the Black 
Sea) as a foreign policy priority and wished to insert the interests of the Balkan states 
into the EU. In March 2002, Greece adopted a Plan for the Economic Reconstruction 
of the Balkans which provides 550 million Euro (from which 70.93 to Romania, 54.79 
to Bulgaria and 49.89 to Albania) for the period 2002-2006 aiming at promoting 
infrastructure development, investments, democratic institutions etc,14 No such plan 
was developed for the Black Sea countries. 
12 "Indeed, Greece is determined to playa constructive role in the process of developing further 
relations between the EU and BSEC and to encourage a more energetic policy by the EU towards the 
countries of the area" (Kranidiotis, 1997). 
13 Speech of Mr. Nicolaos Akritidis, Head of the Hellenic National Delegation following the accession 
of Greece to PABSEC, Fifth Plenary Session, PABSEC General Assembly, Moscow, 6 June 1995. 
14 'The International Development Cooperation policy of Greece and the case of the Hellenic Plan for 
the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HIPERB), Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002 
(htpp:llwww.rnfa.grlEnglishiforeignj>olicy. 30/07/03). 
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Initiatives in BSEC were seen as complementary to the cooperative initiatives 
in Southeast Europe and special emphasis was placed on enhancing cooperation 
between BSEC and the Southeast European initiatives. Accordingly, in 1999, it 
proposed to prepare a protocol on .institutionalized cooperation between BSEC and 
SECI with the long-term objective of adopting a cornmon regional framework 
agreement on road transport.IS 
The first initiative by the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to prepare 
the 'Platform of Cooperation between the EU and BSEC' adopted by the 13th BSEC 
MMFA in Tbilisi on 30 April 1999. It was presented by the Hellenic Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to its counterparts at the EU General Affairs Council of June 1999 but 
without positive result as it was met with reluctance by the EU. The European 
Commission even as late as 2003 was still not enthusiastic on developing 
institutionalized relations with BSEC. As senior officials from the Greek Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs have said, they could not reverse the prevailing reluctant attitude of 
the EU towards BSEC.I6 Thus during the Hellenic Presidency of the EU, no initiative 
was taken to develop a type of 'Black Sea dimension' of the EU despite previous 
claims of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs,17 The objective limitations on the 
Hellenic PreSidency (Iraq crisis, EU enlargement) notwithstanding, Greece did not 
lobby or push forward ideas for advancing relations of BSEC with the EU. 
Although the European Commission remained negative to the idea of 
elaborating a framework of relations with BSEC, the European Parliament became 
IS Thessaloniki MMFA (27 October 1999), Decision II. A. para. 48, in BSEC PERMIS, 2000, p. 138. 
16 "The European Commission is steadily negative in opening discussions on the issue of BSEC's 
relations with the E U" quoted by senior 0 fficial 0 f t he Hellenic Ministry 0 f Foreign Affairs during 
discussions with the author, June 2003. 
17 ...... Greece will be in the Presidency of the EU in the first half of the year 2003. We intend to make 
the EU-BSEC cooperation one of our priorities. We will ensure that, in the meetings of the relevant 
working groups, the BSEC dimension will be present in all the EU programmes or policies directed to 
this region", statement by George Papandreou (BSEC, 2003, p. 80). 
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more involved and in a direct way in BSEC affairs. Preliminary meetings between the 
PABSEC and the European Parliament were initiated by the PABSEC Hellenic 
Chairmanship (June 2002 - November 2002) and led to a request by the European 
Parliament to PABSEC to elaborate.a political document on the modes of cooperation 
between the EU and BSEC and second to forward its opinion on the Communication 
of the EC to the European Parliament on the 'Wider Europe' which will draw up the 
lines of the relations of the EU with its neighbours in the post-enlargement period 
(Koukiadis, 2002 and 2003). 
In addition to the objective difficulties resulting from the EU policies 
themselves (examined in chapter six), Greece could not function as a bridge between 
the EU and BSEC and thus perform the role of a benevolent, leading country due to 
reasons related to its own foreign policy priorities. Greece's strategic foreign policy 
concern at the end of the 1990s was the successful implementation of the EU 
enlargement process that would include Cyprus as well as its participation in the 
EMU, the resolution of the long-standing disputes with Turkey (which is a constant 
Greek foreign policy concern) and the integration of the Balkan countries into the 
European structures in order to secure stability in its northern borders. Most of the 
resources in the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs were directed to managing the 
effects of conflict and instability in the Balkans (e.g. securing its borders from illegal 
activities and migration) and addressing new challenges i.e. the dissolution of the 
former Yugoslavia and the ethnic wars that erupted afterwards or formulating 
policies vis-a-vis its new neighbours i.e. the FYROM (such as the diplomatic struggle 
to resolve the dispute over the name of the FYROM, its flag and the references on 
territorial claims in its Constitution). 
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In conclusion we can argue that Greece did not formulate a comprehensive 
policy vis-a-vis BSEC rather its policy was fragmented. Its limited resources and the 
lack of political interest undermined Greece's leading role in the organization. 
2.4 Ukraine: balancing of power policy 
Ukraine is the third largest BSEC country on the basis of population and territorial 
criteria (table 5.1). Its geographical location on the one hand, stretching from the 
Black Sea to Central Europe and its size in terms of territory and population, on the 
other hand, are assets that have placed Ukraine among the 'large' countries in BSEC 
structures. Ukraine however lacked the economic basis or political weight to 
undertake a leading role in such a large organization such as BSEC not least due its 
transition and nation-building related problems. Given those restrictive conditions 
Ukraine did not seek to assume a leading role. 
Rather than acting as a benevolent leading country, Ukraine sought through 
BSEC to strengthen its economic and political independence, find new markets for its 
goods and services, and new suppliers of goods and services for its own national 
economy and people (Sharif, 1996, p. 5). Being involved in BSEC activities, Ukraine 
hoped to obtain the necessary experience in developing international economic 
projects. At the same time, Ukraine's participation in BSEC was seen to enhance the 
country's eligibility for eventual membership in the EU. The accumulation of 
experience in dealing with countries with stable market economies (and especially 
with the only EU member - Greece), would contribute to stabilizing Ukraine's 
economy and gradually fulfilling the requirements of an EU associate member 
(Sharif, 1996, p. 5). At the BSEC meeting in Yalta on 4-5 June 1998, its Minister of 
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Foreign Affairs, Boris Tarasyuk, characterized the formation of a Euro-Black Sea 
economic space as the BSEC's main task. 
Ukraine might well be one of the largest countries in Europe, with the potential 
to undertake a leading role in BSEC but it has been cautious in policy towards the 
subregion. First, the relationship with Russia remains a central element of Ukraine's 
role in the area.IS Tensions with Russia in both the security and economic spheres 
(the two countries found themselves on the verge of economic war in September -
October 1996) did not allow Ukraine to develop a BSEC strategy itself. Early in the 
1990s, Ukraine had to resolve a whole cluster of difficult problems in bilateral 
relations associated with the Crimean issue. The division of the Black Sea fleet and 
the status of its major base - Sevastopol - was another source. 
Beyond its relations with Russia, another factor which undermines Ukraine's 
role in BSEC has been its political choice to be regarded as a Central European rather 
than a Black Sea country. To strengthen this position, Ukraine has not regarded the 
Black Sea as isolated from neighbouring areas but as an integral part of Europe 
(Bukkvoll, 2001, p. 87). The latter was manifested by Ukraine's initiatives to organize 
joint ministerial meetings between BSEC and CEI specifically on transport and to 
promote the idea of a Baltic - Black Sea space. All major initiatives of Ukraine within 
BSEC related almost exclUSively to linking BSEC with other subregional fora even 
beyond Europe such as the Mercosur. 
Being aware of its restricted status in the Black Sea subsystem and the 
limitations of its foreign policy, Ukraine's main concern in its policy vis-a-vis BSEC 
has been to keep the organization away from the Russian influence, to stress its 
18 For the relations of Ukraine with Russia see Albright & Appatov, 1999. 
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European orientation and create a multi-polar system of international affairs in the 
subregion. 
3. Transformation of the security dilemma 
The fourth variable in the analytical framework suggests that security considerations 
determine the mode of cooperation that appears at the subregional level. If states no 
longer perceive each other's security means as a threat to their own security, then the 
dilemma becomes less intense and favourable conditions for institutionalized 
cooperation are established. Security dilemmas that states confront historically 
express two concerns. First, is the concern that "many of the means by which a state 
tries to increase its security decrease the security of the others" Gervis, 1978}. A 
second security dilemma facing decision makers is the division of national resources 
as between economic welfare and military security (Sperling & Kirchner, 1997, p. 6). 
The two security dilemmas have become less intense and have been 
transformed in post-Cold War Europe, but they are still dominant in several aspects 
around the Black Sea, constraining state choices and influencing subregional 
dynamics. Thus measures taken by the states of the subregion to enhance national 
security defined in its military or security dimension are not always viewed as a 
positive contribution to security but as a threat. 
On the other hand as table 5.2 indicates defence expenditure of BSEC member 
states remains relatively high in comparison to the NATO average with Greece and 
Turkey having the highest defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP among all 
their NATO allies. Despite economic hardships, countries such as Albania, Armenia 
and Bulgaria by 1999 have increased their defence budget. On the other hand, the 
243 
reduction in military expenses in several transition countries including Russia has to 
be attributed to budgetary problems rather than a reallocation to welfare expenses 
(Kuzio, 1998, pp. 134-136). 
Table 5.2 Defence expenditure and size of armed forces of the BSEe countries 
State . Number of Armed forces·(OOO) Defence expenditure as % of GDP 
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bulgaria 
1~4 1~9 1~4 1~9 
73.0 • 
32.7 
56.0 
101.9 
10.2 : _ 
159.3 ! 
54.0 
53.4 
69.9 
80.8 
26.3 
165.6 ; 
.•.. " 
10.7 • 
... 
207.0 
3.6 
8.6 
4.4 
3.3 
2.4 
5.0 
0.5 
1.8 
. Georgia 
Greece 
Moldova 
Romania 
Russia - -! "'--"-¥"- '--' 
2.9 
9.6 : 
3.2 
-. _ .. _---- ----
; Turkey 
Ukraine 
Source: NAT()/200~, p~34. 
, .. 
517.0 ! 
1004.1 
639.0 
311.4 • 2.1 
5.1 
5.5 
2.9 
We have to clarify two issues before we proceed with the examination of the 
security dilemma among BSEC members. First, there is no meaningful concept of a 
single BSEC-wide security complex (including all eleven member-states) whereby 
conflicts in one part of the subregion could generate tensions and spill over to other 
parts nor of a common security umbrella. In fact BSEC includes countries which 
belong to two main security subgroups: one delineated by the Balkan space and the 
one covering the former Soviet Union space (Caucasus and the WNIS). Security 
perceptions and priorities are thus significantly diversified among BSEC states. 
Second, in their majority, BSEC members are fragile states which have either gained 
their independence recently and/ or are undergoing a fundamental political-
economic transformation. This means that issues of state survival and sovereignty 
have been central on their political agenda. Internal reconstruction and regime 
stability has often become more important than foreign policy issues (Papayoanou, 
1997, pp. 220-221). State-building in the cases of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine and Russia was directly related to internal security concerns and national 
identity building. Georgia and less Moldova are outstanding examples of 'failing' 
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states whose survival has been a constant in their security perceptions as they do not 
fulfil at least one of the basic definitional elements of a state: control over their 
territory. 
3.1 From polarization to pluralism 
The Black Sea was for decades a political landscape representing the constellation 
brought about by the Cold War dynamics and the East - West confrontation. It was 
divided in an almost 'north - south' geographic axis, where the north was part of the 
Soviet bloc and the south belonged to the NATO allies. This created a space 
identified by clear cut hierarchies and statist or 'bloc' configurations. There was 
hardly any room for pluralistic thinking and cooperation. Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the geopolitics in the Black Sea has changed 'from hegemony to 
pluralism' (Sezer, 1997, pp. 1-29). However, the system of international relations in 
this area is still in the making. At the same time, a number of historical legacies re-
emerged, some driving Black Sea subregionalism, others restraining it. 
The Black Sea subregion is distinctly marked by an expanded number of 
international actors. From a geopolitical point of view, the number and variety of 
actors that emerged around the Black Sea has been unique compared to other areas 
in the world. Seven NIS (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine 
and Russia), along with an almost equal number of non-internationally recognized 
state entities have emerged in the 1990s making any meaningful sense of classic 
'inter-state' affairs blurred. The presence of more remote states (United States) and 
international organizations has been also strengthened, the latter either through their 
expansion to include Black Sea states (e.g. NATO, EU, Council of Europe, etc.) 
and/or through their mediation in conflict resolution (e.g. UN, oseE). The security 
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picture becomes more complicated with the formation of subregional arrangements 
with implicit or explicit security roles and aspirations (e.g. CIS, BSEC, GUUAM). 
Nevertheless, neither locally initiated cooperative structures, nor international 
organizations have had a decisive direct involvement in the security domain in the 
area. Non-state actors, on the other hand, have remained a distant voice in shaping 
subregional dynamics with the exception of secessionist movements, seceded 
authorities and organized crime. 
As we will see in the next section, a three polar constellation of power (Russia, 
Ukraine and Turkey) has been shaping security dynamics and dilemma around the 
Black Sea but this is not dominant throughout the whole BSEC subregion. The 
security complex of the western part of the Black Sea (which includes the Balkan 
states) is more clearly placed in the Euro-Atlantic security orbit. 
Beyond the actors, pluralism is also witnessed in the definition of security itself 
(Krahmann, 2001, p. 6). New transnational threats are added to traditional military 
ones altering or broadening the nature of security dilemma in the area. This is not to 
say that traditional security concerns regarding the preservation of state boundaries 
have lost any of their significance - on the contrary they have been strengthened - but 
a new dimension of the protection of societies and individuals within states has been 
added. With the extension of the concept of security to new levels of analysis, threats 
are also perceived in broader terms to include a multitude of dangers ranging from 
the inadequacy of political and social structures, to environmental degradation. 
3.2 The triangle of rivalry and cooperation 
One dimension of the security dilemma involves the foreign policy preferences of 
Russia, Turkey and Ukraine both independently and towards one another. On the 
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one hand, national interests and policies commensurate with the status of a 'great 
power' have become central themes in the Russian foreign policy (Adomeit, 1998, p. 
33). On the other hand, Turkey as a rising geopolitical power has been delineating its 
sphere of influence in the emerging constellation of power while Ukraine's main 
concern has been the consolidation of its sovereignty through a 'neutral' foreign 
policy. Each one constitutes a significant factor in the threat perceptions of the others 
and relations among those three states (in particular Russia and Turkey) have 
included strong elements of rivalry (e.g. in the past, territorial wars) as well as of 
common interests (regional stability). Despite their 'regional power' status, for all 
three states the security dilemma has also been directly related to state integrity and 
borders preservation. Shifts in the policies of and relations between them have a 
powerful impact on BSEC dynamics. 
As we saw earlier (chapter two) the rapprochement between Turkey and the 
former Soviet Union that was witnessed in the late 1980s, motivated mainly by new 
geoeconomic considerations and a change in elite policy, permitted BSEC to take 
root. However, relations among the three states (Russia, Ukraine and Turkey) in the 
post-Cold War era have been burdened by historical images in the collective national 
memories (Fuller E., 1996). Turkey has traditionally perceived Russia as an 
expansionist state. According to S. Elekdag, despite all controversial issues, "the two 
countries have a strong political will to expand their mutual area of interest, to 
minimize points of contention and to be careful and respectful to the sensitivities of 
each other. In the light of the above it would not be wrong to state that Russia does 
not constitute an urgent threat for Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey must include the 
Russian Federation in her threat assessment rating. The main reason for this 
protection is the possibility that due to social and political instabilities, the likes of 
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Jirinovski may come to power and pursue expansionist policies" (Elekdag, 1996, pp. 
53-54). Two sets of issues have strained bilateral relations. First, Turkey's desire to be 
an active player in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus and second, tensions 
resulting from secessionist movements in both countries, namely Kurdish separatism 
in Turkey and Chechen in Russia. Russian perception of Turkey as a threat to 
Russian interests in Central Asia, and more acutely in the southern Caucasus, 
generally falls into three categories: Turkey as a challenger in Russia's backyard; as a 
provocateur of Turkish/Islamic secessionism; and as a military threat in collusion 
with the West (Sezer, 1997, pp. 14-18). 
The Russian - Ukrainian relationship at the historical level is to a degree one of 
brotherhood more than enmity, with Kiev having been the first capital of the Rus in 
early medieval times. The political schism in both states is as much about identity as 
it is about economic system and political structures. In each of the two countries, the 
relationship with the other state is an integral part of the identity crisis. Whereas the 
loss of Ukraine contributed more, perhaps, than the loss of any other part of the 
Soviet Union or Russian empire to Russia's identity crisis, for Ukrainians the most 
urgent task in establishing an independent state was to define an identity which was 
separate from Russia. This makes both Russians and Ukrainians highly sensitive to 
the policies adopted by the other (Light et al., 2000, pp. 11-12). Two main issues 
influenced Ukrainian - Russian relations in the 1990s. One is Ukraine's position as a 
buffer state between west and east and the other is specific to Sebastopol, Crimea 
and the Black Sea fleet.19 For Ukraine recognition by Moscow of its independence 
19 In May 1997, long negotiations over the issue of the status of Sebastopol and the future of the Black 
Sea fleet were concluded with signature of a set of agreements. Russia acknowledges Ukrainian 
sovereignty over Crimea, Sebastopol and the naval port there. Russia retains about four-fifths of the 
Black Sea fleet buying part of the half earlier allocated to the Ukraine, and taking out a 20 year lease 
over the main bays and some hinterland. Ukraine will receive a rent for the port facilities used by 
Russia and retain one bay outside the main port for its own fleet. 
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within its current borders was its ultimate goal while its integration with the West 
has been a priority of its foreign policy. However, Ukraine's dependence on Russia 
for energy and the issue of the Black Sea fleet has left Kiev exposed to Russian 
pressures (Toritsyn & Miller, 2002). Economic tensions recur over gas supplies. In 
fact these have now eased, with the Black Sea Fleet settlement substantially financing 
debt service. However, pipeline politics can work both ways, Russia holding Ukraine 
under pressure for its vital energy needs, Ukraine having a hold on Russian export 
earnings with the gas pipeline to the west passing through its territory (Adams et aI., 
2002, p. 75). The bottom line in Russia's considerations is the fear that Ukraine might 
be headed for full-fledged incorporation into a Western bloc or into an alliance with 
other powers in the subregion (Turkey, Romania, Georgia) that might some day turn 
anti-Russian. Kiev in turn fears that Russia does not really accept Ukrainian 
sovereignty and independence within its present borders (Goncharenko, 1998, pp. 
121-128; Bukkvoll, 2001, p. 95). 
For Ukraine a central dilemma emerges. The strengthening of a strategic 
partnership with Russia and closer relations with NATO has been hard to combine. 
As in several occasions President Kuchma has noted there is one principally 
important axiom for Ukraine's international policy: its European future is indivisible 
from a strategic partnership with Russia. Ukraine and Russia are extremely sensitive 
to one another and particularly to the relationship of the other to Europe. Both are 
outsiders in relation to the EU but each would become even more isolated if Europe 
(either NATO or the EU) seemed to favour one at the perceived expense of the other 
(Light et al., 2000, p. 12). Ukraine has not formally sought NATO membership, but it 
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has pressed for a ' special partnership'2o and its conunitment to neutrality has come to 
be viewed in Russia with scepticism. Kiev entered the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC) in 1992 and has been an early participant in the PfP since 1994. 
Turkey and Ukraine have shared the same hope since 1991 that Russian 
hegemony will not return to the Black Sea (Sezer, 1997, p. 10). How Ukrainian-
Russian relations evolve is critical to the course of Ukrainian-Turkish relations. 
Ukrainian-Turkish relations flourished during the tenure of President Kravchuk, 
who in the early years of independence, was convinced that Turkey possessed the 
qualities necessary to play a positive leadership role in the region. He gave full 
support to the BSEC initiative (Sezer, 1997, p. 11) and numerous projects for 
economic, commercial and defence cooperation were also proposed in this period 
(1991-1994). The initial euphoria and momentum in Ukrainian-Turkish relations did 
not continue at the same degree after late 1994 for one basic reason: Ukraine has 
turned towards the West to serve its national interests. With new-found reassurance 
and prestige, Kiev no longer feels the need to seek regional patterns and allies for 
support against potential Russian dominance. 
Strained relations notwithstanding among the three dominant powers in Black 
Sea politics, none of them considers explicit alliances against the other (in particular 
against Russia) to be the best solution (Bukkvoll, 2001, p. 95). There has been 
however a consensus reached to use BSEC's confidence-building capacities, though 
at a different degree each, with Ukraine being the strongest advocate (numerous 
proposals in 1993-1994) and with Turkey being the least enthusiastic. 
3.3 Security policy diversification 
20 A Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine was signed at the 
Madrid NATO Summit in July 1997 which gives Ukraine the right to call for consultations 
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BSEC members represent the most heterogeneous group of states in post-Cold War 
Europe in terms of their security policy interests and requirements. Their security 
policies are shaped by national imperatives, regional dynamics and extra-regional 
influences. Policy-choices are still viewed by many states in the area in zero-sum 
terms. 
The subregion lacks multilateral security policy coordination. Greece and 
Turkey being both full-fledged NATO members did not share the security concerns 
of their neighbours regarding their security policy (re)orientation, but did share most 
of their neighbours' suspicion of any proposals for collective security schemes 
outside the Euro-Atlantic structures. It became clear soon that a common feature of 
security policy course was emerging among BSEC members. That has been the 
'westemism' or the reorientation of the countries' security preferences to powerful 
external actors being the United States, NATO and the EU. The majority of the NIS 
has followed a 'pragmatic westernism' foreign policy orientation (Kuzio, 2000, pp. 
81-114) to relax their main concern of how to avoid new dividing lines between 
'Europe' and 'the rest'. Expressing a view shared by all member states, the Ukrainian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Tarasiuk has argued, while referring to the role of 
GUUAM, that ensuring that no new dividing lines were created as NATO and the 
EU expanded eastwards would prevent its members being defined outside Europe 
and thereby within Russia's sphere of influence (Financial Times, 11 September 1999). 
Consequently, proposals to link security of the Black Sea states with the 
Western structures were aired in the early 1990s, particularly from Ukraine. In May 
1993 the idea of an east-central European collective security system which would 
exclude Russia was discussed by the Ukrainian and Polish presidents (Allison, 1998, 
with NATO if it feels threaten (www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm). 
251 
p. 24). However, the NATO orientation of Poland and of other Central and East 
European countries rendered this and similar proposals unrealistic. 
Most NIS remain suspiciou~ of collective security schemes that include Russia 
fearing its domination, particularly within the CIS. The Tashkent agreement on 
collective security of 15 May 1992 has remained thus on paper.21 Internal instability 
in Russia, the weakness of the CIS mechanisms, the opposition of several of the CIS 
countries, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia, inhibit Moscow from 
activating a CIS collective security authority. This has led to a proliferation of efforts 
to create smaller cooperation schemes which have however failed to materialize or 
produce any meaningful outcome. At the sub-state level, the plan for a 
Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus (KNK) expressing the interests of the non-
Russian peoples of the North Caucasus has not offered a prospect for regional 
cooperation and the transformation of KNK militias into joint regional military forces 
(excluding Russia) has remained unrealized. The proposal for a 'Common Caucasian 
home' which would include defence cooperation among the three Caucasian states 
also collapsed under the division formed by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Allison, 
1998, p. 23). 
Beyond intra-regional security dynamics, the uncertainty of the evolving Euro-
Atlantic security system through the dual enlargement of NATO and the EU has had 
a profound impact on Black Sea geopolitics and on the transformation of security 
dilemmas (Herd & Moustakis, 2000). The criteria for enlargement - the 
institutionalization of democratic ~alues, a free market enlargement, the resolution of 
disputes with neighbours, democratic civil-military relations and the ability to 
21 The Tashkent agreement includes nine states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan has described the CIS collective arrangements 
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contribute to NATO's military effectiveness - have underpinned the PfP programme 
bringing positive effects in dissolving security dilemmas by building networks of 
trust at the national and multinational level. The decision of the December 1999 EU 
Helsinki Summit, to make Turkey. a candidate for EU accession has fostered and 
consolidated the reconciliation between former adversaries such as Greece and 
Turkey as it has created (in the words of the Greek Minister of Defence) "new 
parameters and new conditions" for the Greek-Turkish relations (Tsohatzopoulos, 
2000). The inclusion in 1999 of Bulgaria and Romania in the next round of 
enlargement has created positive dynamics too while their accession preparations for 
NATO have been accompanied with closer cooperation between the two countries 
and Greece and Turkey. At the same time confidence-building measures at a 
subregional level proliferated. A Balkan rapid-reaction brigade created in 1999 
(operational in 2000) represents the first multinational arrangement in south-eastern 
Europe to be utilized by the NATO to increase security. 
However, the lack of an overall security umbrella around the Black Sea, keeps 
security dilemma high among BSEC members in particular as far as the foreign 
policy orientation of their neighbours is concerned. The feeling of a double exclusion 
for most of the BSEC members (both from the EU and NATO expansion) has 
important implications for the domestic and foreign policies that the governments of 
the 'outsiders' states adopt (Herd & Moustakis, 2000, p. 120). The enlargement of the 
NATO and the EU creates a new diving line around the Black Sea leaving the most 
fragile states (Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan) outside the evolving European 
structures and susceptible to Russian influence. Of the Black Sea states, Romania 
as 'purely declarative' and placed 'special hopes on NATO to help restore Azerbaijan's territorial 
integrity' see Monitor, 26 April 1996. 
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and Bulgaria are expected to join NATO by May 2004.22 Several of the BSEC states 
(Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) although they participate in NATO 
programs such as the PfP have no security guarantees. Georgia and Azerbaijan have 
both stated that they perceive the p.fP programme as a stepping stone to full NATO 
membership. The expansion of the EU and NATO influences the security perceptions 
of all BSEC members, the way they view their role in Europe and particularly their 
relations with subregional organizations. Perceptions of exclusion and potential 
isolation are strong in all states but they are produced by different fears. The 
prospect of NATO expansion aroused them in Russia whereas in Ukraine they were 
evoked by disappointment that EU membership proved so difficult to attain. In an 
effort to reduce security dilemma resulting from the feeling of exclusion, the Black 
Sea states have joined the Council of Europe and the OSCE not individually but as a 
group. Thus Armenia and Azerbaijan were both admitted to the Council of Europe 
on 25 January 2001. Their membership has enlarged their security policy horizons 
and contributed to familiarization with OSCE and western principles and practices. 
The Russian attempt to limit diversification in the security policies of the states 
in the 'near abroad' has been expressed in its reluctance to accept the legitimacy of 
even a limited UN or oseE presence in the area being suspicious about the 
intentions of these organizations, in which it participates (Allison, 1998, p. 26). OSCE 
missions have been in Georgia (South Ossetia) since December 1992. An OSCE 
peacekeeping force has been earmarked for Nagorno-Karabakh on the basis of an 
OSCE summit decision in December 1994. A small UN observer mission (UNOMIG) 
was established in Georgia in August 1993. 
22 On 26 March 2003. Bulgaria and Romania signed accession protocols. 
254 
Although none of the states in the area has regarded subregional security 
building measures or alliances as an alternative to NATO or EU security provisions, 
sub-groupings have emerged among the BSEC members increasing policy 
diversification. The GUUAM 23 and the Black Sea Naval Force establishments are the 
most interesting examples of such cooperation involving a group of like-minded 
states or dealing with specific problems related to the Black Sea itself. Although 
GUUAM's military and security dimension is downplayed, it has launched joint 
peacekeeping units to protect oil transportation routes (January 1999) that could also 
be the first step in the direction of internationalizing peacekeeping in Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. Ukrainian, Georgian and Azeri units held their first joint military 
exercise on 13-19 April 1999 in conjunction with the inauguration of the Baku-Supsa 
oil pipeline and Poti-Odessa railway ferry link. Defence ministers hold special 
meetings alongside the PfP exercises and the defence ministries of Azerbaijan and 
Georgia signed a memorandum on military cooperation (March 1999) proposing the 
establishment of a multinational GUUAM force within the PfP to protect the security 
of their energy sectors (Kuzio, 2000, p. 87). 
At a bilateral level, BSEC states have been steadily developing military links 
with extra-regional powers as well as with their neighbours. Ukraine has been in the 
forefront of this process, concluding a Memorandum of Cooperation in the field of 
defence with the United States in July 1993, followed by similar memoranda with 
Germany and the United Kingdom. 
The conclusion of bilateral agreements has often indicated an 'axis' approach. 
Azerbaijan and Georgia have initiated military cooperation with Turkey on training 
23 GUAM, expanded to GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova), was launched 
on 10 October 1997 with a joint presidential communique issued as part of the framework of the 
development of the TRACECA transportation corridor. 
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and military assistance while Ukrainian-Turkish military discussions offer Ukraine 
"a potential strategic axis to the south if tensions with Russia in the Black Sea were to 
increase" (Allison, 1998, p. 22). In contrast Armenia has concluded military 
cooperation agreements with Gree!=e and Bulgaria, states which "share Yerevan's 
distrust of Turkey, although it is unlikely to reduce Armenia's military dependence 
on Russia" (Allison, 1998, p. 22). In August 1997, a bilateral treaty of friendship, 
cooperation and mutual assistance was signed between Russia and Armenia. 
3.4 Traditional and new elements of security dilemma 
Still today the security map of the Black Sea consists of a puzzle of 'frozen' and 
'ongoing' conflicts involving ethnic animosities, border demarcation and 
secessionism (table 5.3) which raise security dilemmas. What is important to stress is 
that security concerns of the BSEC members come from within the subregion or in 
other words from their BSEC partners. It would be difficult to identify today a 
common external security threat. 
Ethnic animosities in the Black Sea subregion stem from an extraordinary 
ethnic diversity of an area populated by more than 20 different larger ethnic groups 
and nationalities. Besides, these nationalities are dispersed in the territories of several 
countries, where the national minority often plays a substantial role. For instance, 
ethnic Russians constitute 22 per cent of Ukraine's population, 13 per cent of that of 
Moldova and 8 per cent of the Georgian population. Many ethnic Ukrainians reside 
in territories adjacent to their coUntry. Thus 300,000 of them live in the adjacent 
Rostov region, and another 600,000 live in Moldova. The Crimea is known for its 
ethnic entanglements, as its population of 2.5 million is composed of 1.7 million 
ethnic Russians, 600,000 Ukrainians and 280,000 Tartars (The Moscow Times, 15 
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January 1994). What is important here is that the conscious playing-off of one ethnic 
group against the other has been often applied as a strategy of 'divide and rule' 
(Hunter, 1997, p. 5). The problem of refugees and forced migrants is clearly 
outstanding in this context. Droves of refugees amounting to 600,000 have fled the 
Northern Caucasus to settle in the Krasnodar and Stavropol territories. As many as 
250,000 to 300,000 refugees from Abkhazia have come to settle in Georgia. Crowds of 
refugees estimated at 900,000 (as of 1993) by the UN High Commissioner on 
Refugees fled Nagorno-Karabakh for Azerbaijan (Peace Courier, September 1994) 
while huge migration flows were also triggered by the war in Chechnya. 
Ethnic aggravation linked with issues of national identity and territorial claims 
has assumed an acute dimension in the subregion. This is further complicated by 
several NIS failing to demarcate their borders. In the Caucasus, administrative and 
national borders frequently lie in sharp contrast to the ideas of the local populace 
about the entitlement of certain ethnic groups to specific territories (Ingushetia -
North Ossetia). This situation is particularly fraught for Russia, as some segments of 
its southern borders have not been legally formalized. In Armenia, international 
demarcation treaties of the early 1920s were perceived as unfairly discriminating in 
the late 1980s. The striving of smaller ethnic communities for the attributes of a 
nation comes into conflict with the previously established, but now obsolete, borders 
(like in the case of Georgia). This obsolescence by and large occurred due to civil 
war, forced and spontaneous migrations and the incapability of the NIS to defend 
their external borders. Particularly the eastern part of the Black Sea subregion, as 
well as Moldova, is marked by a fierce bloody tussle over territories combined with 
struggle for independence (King, 2001). This has meant that security dilemmas have 
not been transformed but have been based on traditional military concerns. 
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Territorial integrity and sovereignty are still a prerequisite while some of the 
BSEC member states are still technically at war (i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan). As we said 
already the initiation of BSEC took place at a time when most of the participating 
states were either in conflict or in dispute with each other (Table 5.3). While 
negotiating the BSEC founding documents in 1991 and 1992, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Moldova and Russia (half of the BSEC members) were engaged in violent 
conflicts involving another BSEC state. Nagorno-Karabakh brought Armenia and 
Azerbaijan at war, the issue of Transdnistria brought Moldova in confrontation with 
Russia and Ukraine, while Georgia was thrown into a civil war and the country was 
in the midst of internal conflicts and unrest in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adjaria. 
Traditional rivalry between Russia and Turkey as well as long-standing disputes 
between Greece and Turkey cultivated a climate of mistrust and increased insecurity 
feelings. The two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, came close to war in 1996 over 
territorial disputes. 
Table 5.3 List of Major Conflicts around the Black Sea 
Violent Conflicts 
Case Initiation Resolution/Status International Mediation 
Azerbaijan/ Nagorno - 02/1988- Ceasefire Russia/OSCE 
Karabakh/ Armenia 
Russia/ Chechnya 12/1994 - Ceasefire and treaty OSCE/HCNM 
08/1996 
10/1999 - Conflict OSCE 
North 01/1991 Control Regime Russia 
Ossetiaj Ingushetia 
Moldova/Transdnistria 09/1991- Ceasefire Russia/Ukraine/OSCE/HCNM 
Georgia/ Abkhazia 04/1989 Ceasefire Russia/CIS/UN/OSCE/HCNM 
Georgia/South 01/1991 Settlement Russia/oseE 
Ossetia/ 
Non-t,iolent conflicts 
Ukraine/ Crimea 1990 Constitutional OSCE 
Autonomy 
Russia/Tatarstan 03/1990 Treaty Autonomy None 
Moldova/ Gagauzia 09/1991 Constitutional HCNM 
Autonomy 
Georgia/ Adjaria 01/1991 Constitutional None 
Autonomy 
Source: Hughes & Sasse, 2002. 
As we can see in table 5.3 which summarizes the major conflicts around the 
Black Sea, security dilemmas evolve at large around the Russian factor. First, Russia 
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has been involved in all conflicts and disputes and second, state and regime stability 
or even survival in the NIS has been depending on Russian support (militarily, 
politically or economically). Russia's role in the conflicts in the Caucasus has 
generated the reaction of Azerbaijan and Georgia which have strengthened 
cooperation with the US and Turkey to counterbalance the Russian factor. Azerbaijan 
has attacked the supply of Russian arms to Armenia and since 1999 it has implied 
that in retaliation it could offer basing rights to NATO or Turkey on its soil (Allison, 
2000, p. 161). Moscow has taken several concrete and positive steps since 1991, which 
has helped to make the security dilemma in the Black Sea region much less intense 
than before e.g. the initiation of the CIS collective security agreement and 
involvement in conflict resolution. However, the conditions for regional cooperation 
could have been better. Although there longer exists an immediate Russian threat, 
there is still much negative Russian behaviour that continues to cause uncertainty 
and insecurity for the other countries in the area. 
The destabilizing factors cited above are rarely manifested individually. More 
frequently, a confrontational incident evolving into a conflict will be brought about 
by a whole set of intertwined causes. This situation may be common for all major 
conflict entanglements in the BSEC subregion. The conflict in the Caucasus is 
probably the most intractable, as bloody clashes break out here and now in various 
parts of its territory. The situation in North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Abkhazia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh has not been settled so far, even though Russian peace-making 
and intermediary efforts undertaken jointly with the UN and oseE produced some 
results. The situation in Chechnya appears to be particularly dangerous as regards its 
potential consequences at this point in time. Moreover the issue of arms control 
(particularly proliferation of small arms) and criminality are key factors contributing 
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towards overflowing regional security agenda. The inevitable turmoil and disorder 
in a conflict become a fertile breeding ground for organized crime and drug-dealer 
rings. Taken in conjunction these factors induce the growth of organized crime, 
especially in the eastern part of the region but also in other parts e.g. Moldova, 
Albania. At the same time, the growth in the number of crimes, expansion of criminal 
activity and the increasing share of violent crimes are typical for most countries of 
the Black Sea region. 
The factors that complicate the situation in the Black Sea subregion and create 
tension both in terms of politics and economics include the shipment of the Caspian 
oil extracted from the shelf and land fields through this area. The choice of a route 
for the oil main pipeline affects the interests of all BSEC members, several other 
countries and major oil multinationals (Forsythe, 1996). The energy factor has 
weighed both negatively and positively in the security picture in the area. On the one 
hand, it has increased competition among the BSEC members over the pipelines 
while on the other hand, it has been a main factor for the rapprochement between 
Turkey and Russia following the agreement on the Blue Stream gas project (as we 
saw earlier in Chapter 2) and the determination of the states to secure a stable 
environment around the Black Sea. Cooperative initiatives have emerged regarding 
e.g. the security of pipelines as we saw in the case of GUUAM but all efforts have 
remained outside the BSEC framework. The organization has steadily and 
consciously kept oil and gas issues outside its agenda although it has established a 
WG on energy and it has dealt with other less contentious aspects of energy such as 
electricity. 24 
24 The only exception being the Recommendation 68/03 on 'Cooperation in the field of energy' 
forwarded to the BSEC Council by the PABSEC in October 2003. 
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Aggravating environmental problems (Aleksandrov, 1997; Mee, 2002) should 
also be added to the security dilemmas. The Black Sea with its coasts providing home 
for about 160 million people is becoming one of the most polluted in the world. 
Intensified oil shipments, construction of oil terminals and oil and fuel spills from 
vessels result in the greater contamination of water, an adverse impact on the fishing 
industry and tourism. The same fate befell the Azov Sea, which was turned into a 
dumping site for the industry of the neighbouring areas. Ho wever, the security 
sector where inter-state cooperation has been weakest within BSEC is the one sector 
that most unites states within the area and gives the subregion its definitional 
distinctiveness - environmental security in the Black Sea area. Environmental 
problems led to positive action but this was not undertaken by BSEC. 
4. BSEC under security dilemma 
As we indicated here security dilemma in the BSEC subregion far from being 
transformed in the 1990s has remained intensified while the definition of security 
itself has broadened. How has this influenced the evolution of the organization's 
strucutres and policies? 
Given the 'hard' security concerns in the early 1990s, BSEC's only survival 
policy was the I de-securitization' of its character by building cooperation around 
seemingly unrelated areas (transport, trade, agriculture, etc.) which would have the 
cumulative effect of helping its members stabilize the regional environment. This is 
reflected in its institutionalization, which envisaged working bodies dealing with 
functional issues and foresaw regular meetings of the heads of governments and 
meetings of the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs but not meetings of 
defence ministers or military staff. 
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Although BSEC was established with the aim lito ensure the Black Sea becomes 
a sea of peace, stabilihj [emphasis added] and prosperity, striving to promote friendly 
and good neighbouring relations" its 1992 founding Declaration did not include 
specific security measures as to how this main goal should be reached. Promotion of 
economic cooperation was attributed most attention as the vehicle of prosperity and 
long term stability. The Bosphorus Statement (25 June 1992) restated the commitment 
of the heads of state and government lito act in a spirit of friendship and good 
neighbourliness and enhance mutual respect and benefit, cooperation and dialogue 
in the relations between them". It dealt with the issue of dispute settlement 
emphasizing "the need for the peaceful settlement of all disputes by the means and 
in accordance with the principles set out in the CSCE documents". The signatories 
committed themselves to resist aggression, violence, terrorism and lawlessness in 
order to restore peace and justice while relying, as a basis of their common 
understanding, on the general principles of the UN Charter and the CSCE 
documents. 
The reference to the CSCE principles and the UN Charter should be placed in a 
historical context. In 1991 only Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania were 
participating in the CSCE (OSCE) and only two of them Greece and Turkey) were 
also members of the Council of Europe. Adherence to the CSCE principles was a 
priority in formulating the conceptual basis of the foreign policy of the new states 
around the Black Sea and in establishing a regime for interstate affairs in the 
subregion. Furthermore, explicit adherence to those principles was a precondition for 
the recognition of their statehood as it was outlined by the Bush Administration: 
respect for human rights and the democratic process, due regard for borders, and 
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adherence to the Helsinki Final Act and Charter of Paris of the CSCE. Similar 
guidelines were issued by the EC 
As it has been argued (Pavliuk, 1999, pp. 141-143; Valinakis, 1999, pp. 32-34) 
the diversity of BSEC members, and political tensions between them, mean that the 
organization is most unlikely to agree to a coordinated approach to peacekeeping or 
crisis management or to coordinate security policies towards its neighbours. The 
difficulties regarding BSEC's potential role in the peaceful settlement of disputes in 
the subregion are underscored by the European Commission's acknowledgement 
that the ability of BSEC to bring together representatives of all Black Sea states is 
itself a notable achievement (EC, 1997a, p. 4). In fact, neither the states of the region 
nor the international community have requested BSEC to undertake an active role in 
arms control issues or direct involvement in conflict management crises. It would be 
hard for such an heterogeneous group of neighbouring states which lacks formal 
competence for conflict management, shared military resources, and large economic 
sticks or carrots to undertake such a role (EC, 1997a, p. 4). 
The first specific reference to security concerns (though of a non-traditional 
nature) appeared in the Bucharest Summit Declaration (30 June 1995) stating that the 
members "will take coordinated actions by the conclusion of the bilateral 
agreements, aimed at the struggle with organized crime, drugs sales, illegal 
transportation of the weapon and radioactive materials, acts of terrorism and illegal 
crossing of borders".25 In subsequent declarations, BSEC members steadily expressed 
their political will to enlarge their partnership from being strictly economic to 
undertaking measures in the 'soft' security field and even more explicit security 
25 'Bucharest Statement' in BSEe PERMIS, 1995, p.17. 
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issues (e.g. terrorism).26 However, in line with the original perception of BSEC as an 
'economic organization' no reference was made to security issues in the Charter 
establishing the BSEC organization which was signed three years later. Only some 
general reference is made in the preamble which refers to /I the common vision of 
their regional cooperation ... based on ... prosperity through economic liberty, social 
justice, and equal security and stability ... /I (para 9). This reaffirmed the dominant 
perception among its members (in particularly Turkey and Greece) to maintain the 
economic character of BSEC and at least at a statutory level to avoid any security 
functions. Expectations for addressing 'hard' security issues were still directed to 
larger organizations such as the OSCE and particularly the NATO. Nevertheless, 
since BSEC's early stages of development the NIS (and Russia) have been more 
inclined to include confidence-building measures on the agenda.27 The fact that the 
first ever agreement concluded in BSEC has been on combating organized crime in 
(signed by all members) while the second agreement has been on cooperation in 
emergencies (not signed by Turkey) testifies to the above. 
Combating organized crime and terrorism has been the main concern of the last 
three meetings of BSEC interior ministers (Borisenko et al., 1998, pp. 139-142). The 
first meeting, held in Yerevan (October 1996) produced a joint statement that marked 
the launching of interaction between law-enforcement agencies in combating 
organized crime, terrorism, trafficking of drugs, illicit trade and illegal migration. At 
the second meeting held in Istanbul (October 1997) the ministers agreed to establish a 
joint front and common institutions of cooperation in the sphere of combating 
crime,28 followed by a subsequent agreement in October 1998.29 In the aftermath of 11 
26 'Moscow Declaration' in BSEC PERMIS, 1996, p. xii. 
27 Ideas presented here on BSEC's security dimension are also reflected in Manoli, 2002; 2003. 
28 'Joint Statement' adopted at the Meeting of the Ministers of Internal Affairs of the BSEC 
Participating States (Yerevan, 17 October 1996) and' Joint Declaration' adopted at the Second Meeting 
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September 2001, and in response to the urgent need for implementation of the BSEC 
I Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Crime in Particular in its Organized 
Forms' the organization concluded an Additional Protocol to this agreement 
envisaging the establishment of a Central Network of Liaison Officers on Combating 
Crime to provide for a speed regional response in urgent cases and to inform the 
members on the trends of transnational crime in the region. The agreement covers 
acts of terrorism, corruption, smuggling, trafficking in people and in weapons, 
economic crime, ecological crime, high-tech crime, trade in human organs and 
kidnapping, maritime crime and illegal trafficking in vehicles. The implementation of 
the agreement with the establishment of a Liaison Centre on Combating Crime met 
the reservations of several countries though. The strongest opposition was from 
Bulgaria which stated that "the Bulgarian side cannot afford to ignore the 
recommendations of the Justice and Home Affairs Directorate of the European 
Union, which strictly requires for such initiatives to be coordinated with EU member 
states". The Bulgarian opposition however reflected another problem associated to 
the duplication of efforts and its burden: "bearing in mind the experience we gained 
in the difficult process of setting up the SECI Centre on Trans-border Crime in 
Bucharest and our commitments regarding this Centre... the establishing of new 
centres and structures would be beyond the abilities of [the] country in terms of 
financial and human resources".30 
The readiness of the BSEC member states to undertake measures on 
confidence-building should not be considered within the framework of the 
of the Ministers ofinternal Affairs (Istanbul, 22 October 1997) in BSEC PERMIS, 1998a, pp. 139-142 
and 148-149. 
29 'Agreement Among the Governments of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Participating States 
on Cooperation in Combating Crime, in Particular in its Organized Fonus' (Corfu, 2 October 1998). 
30 Note of the Ministry of Forei~n Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria, No. 04-19-9 dated 7 May 200 1, 
Annex V to the 'Report of the 4 Meeting of the WG on Combating Organized Crime', Istanbul, 10-11 
December 2001, p. 2. 
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expectations addressed to BSEC by the international community and in particular the 
EU rather than merely the priorities of BSEC's member states. In 1996, the Assembly 
of the Western European Union (WEU) issued a call for security to be incorporated 
into the existing subregional cooperation structures, including BSEC. The proposal 
projected that in the long term, structures for political and security dialogue would 
need to be set up in order to ensure systematic headway in developing the stability 
essential for consolidating economic progress (Assembly of the WEU, 1996, p. 9). The 
EU also supported engagement in I soft' security issues. The European Commission, 
in its 1997 report to the Council, suggested that cooperative efforts could 
constructively focus on the promotion of political dialogue, the strengthening of 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, as well as on the reduction of drug 
trafficking, smuggling, and illegal immigration throughout the region (EC, 1997a, pp. 
8-9) . 
Any inclusion of hard security issues on the agenda has found strong resistance 
by both Greece and Turkey. This position was expressed by Greece which while 
holding the term Chairmanship of BSEC in 1999, refused to represent BSEC at a 
meeting of the Working Table on security issues of the Stability Pact on the grounds 
that: 
The BSEC participation in the said Working Table cannot find 
justification in the character of the organization which is primarily of an 
economic nature and therefore a BSEC participation cannot take place. The 
fact that issues of BSEC concern, like Justice and Horne Affairs are included 
in the Draft Agenda of the Meeting cannot counterbalance the inclusion of 
items dealing with issues completely out of BSEC's reach like Defence and 
Security.31 
31 Verbal Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, no. AS.445, 13 October 
1999. 
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Turkey has also held a strong position on the matter, its view departing from 
the CSCE (OSCE) process. It has reiterated the functional logic of security and 
stability via economic cooperation. In this respect it has expressed the conviction that 
the BSEC Economic Agenda already provides a sufficient framework for the 
contribution of BSEC to strengthening security. The Turkish position however 
contains some additional elements. It refers to the "importance of social and cultural 
dialogue which surely will contribute to building-confidence amongst the peoples of 
the BSEC member states". Consequently it underlines that the "comprehensive 
approach to security adopted by BSEC requires utilization of opportunities that will 
be presented for close cooperation in the fields of culture, science and sports" .32 Thus, 
for this reason the idea of a Black Sea naval task force which includes six of the BSEC 
members, has been promoted as a separate national initiative by Turkey (and it is not 
linked either to BSEC - not even to the PfP program). Outside the BSEC framework, 
the Agreement of Black Sea Naval Force signed on 2 April 2001, made an important 
step towards the institutionalization of naval cooperation among all littoral states on 
the Black Sea. It is intended to be an on-call force composed of naval units of the 
participating states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine).33 The 
purpose of BlackSeaFor is to foster cooperation in search and rescue operations, mine 
clearing operations, environmental cooperation and organizing goodwill visits 
among the Black Sea navies. 
Although 'hard' security concerns have not been relaxed and the security 
dilemma remains intense BSEC reiterated its willingness to move cautiously to new 
security aspects. Ten years since its inception and despite the reluctance of Greece 
32 Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, no. 2002/CEGY/397836, 17 
October 2002. 
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and Turkey, the Decennial BSEC Summit Declaration (Istanbul, 25 June 2002) 
requested that the organization considers" ... new means of cooperation within the 
mandate of the BSEC" (para. 9). Following the mandate of the Decennial Summit 
Declaration, the Council (Tirana, 25 October 2002) considered the issue of enhancing 
BSEC's contribution in strengthening security. As a compromise between those 
advocating expansion of BSEC to encompass security issues and those being more 
reserved at that stage it was finally agreed that the ICBSS, which is a Related Body to 
the organization, (but not the organization itself) would organize ad hoc meetings 
(Study Groups) with participants from the BSEC member states, but not official 
governmental representatives, to produce a working paper on the implementation of 
the mandate of the Decennial Declaration. 
5. Conclusion 
In this Chapter we tried to explore two issues: the dynamics of the security dilemma 
in the BSEC subregion and the presence of a benevolent leading country. Empirical 
evidence can assist us to understand the formation of BSEC and its mode of 
governance under the dynamics of the above-mentioned factors. As became evident 
in this section, the intensity of security dilemma among BSEC members, the sources 
of which have to be traced within the subregion rather than beyond it, undermined 
significantly the chances of the emergence of a benevolent leading member state. 
The insistence on a state-to-state bargaining and intergovernmentalism comes 
both as the outcome of the absence of leadership and as a choice of the member states 
whose perception of subregionalism is not that of a tool of intra-regional integration 
33 'Agreement on the Establishment of the BlackSea Naval Cooperation Task Group', 
(www.blackseafor.org). On the Black Sea Naval Cooperation see Allison, 2000, pp. 162-163; Maslov. 
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but of a means of loose policy coordination. As we indicated in this section the 
organization lacks a clear leadership. Despite the fact that Turkey seems to have 
displayed most interest in the BSEC process, its role falls behind that required for a 
benevolent regional leader. The possible leading states simply lack the resources to 
support an ambitious multilateral scheme in the subregion (e.g. Russia, Ukraine) or 
do not have the political will to undertake such a role (e.g. Greece). The fear of being 
dominated by larger neighbours, such as Russia or Turkey, has been a strong 
undermining factor which relates to the intensity of security dilemma. BSEC 
members have instead chosen to place their concerns within broader fora where the 
weight of larger states (particularly of Russia), can be balanced by the presence of 
other powers or within smaller groups in which larger neighbouring states do not 
participate. 
The findings with respect to security dilemma appear at large to be in 
accordance with the expectations of the analytical framework. Thus, one reason why 
BSEC cooperation continues to be of an intergovernmental nature is because the 
security dilemma has not yet been fully transformed in the Black Sea region. This 
supports the argument that the greater or more serious the regional security concerns 
are for a group of states, the more unlikely they are to engage in deep cooperation 
with each other (Allison, 2000, p. 172). The diversity of the countries involved does 
not qualify for a clear common strategic vision shared by all states as far as inter-
regional political, security issues are concerned. The salient feature since the early 
1990s has been that each of the states in the subregion is eager to be involved in the 
integration process taking place in the European continent. 
2002, pp. 53-55. 
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New threats called for new types of subregional structures around the Black 
Sea. The way that the Black Sea subregional ism developed has to be seen as a 
response to the new broadened concept of 'security governance' and the expansion 
of the concept of security into non-military issues. However, institutionalization of 
BSEC and its mode of governance do not actually reflect only the preferences of the 
member states as to how manage their intra-regional affairs better, but their concern 
on how to use BSEC as a functional tool vis-a-vis the expectations and priorities of 
the EU in the region. The latter is manifested in the engagement of the organization 
with confidence-building measures to meet respective expectations of the 
international community (e.g. of the EU, oseE, WEU). BSEC's role has been likewise 
undermined by the low degree of member-states' commitment to cooperation within 
the institution. Its weak political voice results from the fact that all of the member 
states prefer other foreign and security fora to BSEC for meeting their security 
objectives (Pantev, 2001, p. 120). A number of BSEC members therefore place greater 
priority on pursuing their foreign policy objectives in the region by other means (EC, 
1997a, p. 4). At least one of the major players, Russia, displays a lack of interest in 
using multilateral institutions in the area and has not revealed any enthusiasm for 
building a Black Sea community. However, states from the region have formed other 
smaller groups such as GUUAM - consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova - in an effort to counterbalance Russian influence and in 
response to their particular security concerns. 
Despite the intensity of th~ security dilemma among its members, BSEC's 
evolution has manifested a new stage of affairs in the area - from conflict to 
cooperation. The process of institutionalized cooperation has been slow given the 
security policy diversification, historical legacies, ongoing conflicts as well as the 
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diversity of the views of the BSEC members in defining 'security' as a field of 
competence of the organization. However, the broadening of the definition of the 
concept of security and the inclusion of economic considerations allowed for more 
cooperative attitudes to prevail when traditional military concerns were still strong. 
Nevertheless, the persistence of traditional security concerns and the absence of a 
leading country have maintained BSEC's strictly intergovernmental character and its 
role as a means of governance rather than an integration machinery. The acute 
security dilemma would allow nothing more than a superficial integration and a 
resistance to building supranational regimes in any of the fields of expected 
competence of BSEC (e.g. environment, trade). 
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CHAPTER 6. THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON BSEC: 
INTERRELATIONS WITH THE EXTERNAL ANCHOR 
1. Introduction 
While examining the intra-BSEC dynamics in earlier chapters, it becomes evident 
that one factor external to the subregion, the European Union, has been influencing 
both the preferences of the BSEC member states and the organization's evolution 
itself. This chapter examines the extent of the EU's influence on the formation of 
BSEC. 
Comparative studies on other subregional groups in the world have shown 
that there is asymmetrical influence between subregionalism and what is often called 
'hemispheric' regionalism, with the latter being the dominant process (Inotai, 1997; 
Phillips, 2002; Telo, 2001). In Europe, the EU constitutes the dominant force of 
hemispheric regionalism on the basis of its strategy of 'non-dividing' lines in the 
continent and its (external) integration effects on the overall political economy of 
Europe. 
In the search for the impact of the EU on the BSEC process it is important to 
acknowledge that firstly, direct interaction between the EU and the BSEC 
organization itself has been limited and secondly, the diversified bilateral links of 
BSEC member states with the EU and their perceptions of (sub)regional cooperation 
have determined the direction of EU - BSEC interaction. 
The subsequent sections consider first, the overall links of the EU and BSEC 
and second, the EU as a factor shaping the evolution of Black Sea subregionalism. 
The conclusions summarize how the EU has influenced the reconfiguration of BSEC. 
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2. BSEC: stepping stone or alternative to EU membership? 
BSEC has been variably described as an alternative to the ED, a preparatory ground 
for ED membership, or a limited subregional initiative open only to its members 
(Genckaya, 1993; Sen, n.d.; Ozer, 1997; Dragasakis, 1995). As a consequence, interest 
in BSEC has fluctuated depending on prevailing perceptions on European 
integration. At times, BSEC members have given considerable importance to BSEC, 
strengthening its institutional status along the lines of the EU model and allocating 
resources. However interest has at times waned and initiatives such as sector-
focused working groups have diminished in relevance. 
Contemporary regional cooperation and integration processes in Europe focus 
on a vision of 'enlargement' (EC, 1997b, para. 20). As part of a broader process of 
hemispheric integration the central project is to construct a Europe-wide space 
stretching from the Urals to the Atlantic. Subregional groups have thus been 
considered either as a 'training ground' for future membership in the EU or as 
'stepping stones' to inclusion into the European structures and norms. Like the ED 
enlargement, subregional groups envisage increased cooperation among countries of 
often disparate levels of development and their integration with the ED market. This 
process is premised on forces of market reform and democratization that have been 
sweeping Central and Eastern Europe in more than a decade. Nevertheless, 
subregional cooperation as a 'stepping stone' is not a new phenomenon in Europe 
given the previous examples of the Iberian or Benelux cooperation or more recent 
ones such as the Visegrad group. Experience however, has shown that the sequence 
runs not from subregional to regional (or global) cooperation, but in the opposite 
direction (Inotai, 1997) as subregional cooperation (particularly of less developed 
countries) cannot be a substitute for integration into a community of more developed 
273 
nations. Widespread international experience of successfully modernizing countries 
indicates that efficient policies have always proceeded from the global (and regional) 
to the subregional level. Subregional groups in Europe such as BSEC, the CEFT A and 
the CBSS have implemented more or less parallel processes, but with clear priority 
given to integration into the EU structures. 
Subregionalism as a stepping stone 
The idea of subregional cooperation as a stepping stone, or even a condition for 
integration into the EU was embraced by the BSEC members and arose out of a 
number of different arguments, concepts and misconceptions. These have already 
been presented in detail in chapter two and five. Epitomizing the main arguments of 
subregionalism as a stepping stone we can group them as follows. 
Subregional cooperation was expected to serve as a training ground or learning 
process for EU membership in various areas: economic development, institution-
building, political cooperation, development of mentality and behaviour patterns, 
the ability to build a consensus and collective approaches to solving common 
concerns. 
Geopolitical and security considerations were emphasized. Subregional 
cooperation was seen as a support for regional security after the collapse of the 
Soviet system. A subregional security anchor would shield the EU from 
unfavourable developments and political and social disorder. Furthermore, 
contentious issues such as ethnic and national minorities, border disputes, and 
historical antagonisms need to be resolved or regulated among neighbours before 
applications to the EU were to be considered. 
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The EU had an economic interest in intensified subregional cooperation, to 
provide easier market access for its goods, companies and capital during the 
transformation process. 
The building of a new BSEC subregion could be a testing ground for 
reintroducing the kind of elements of regional cooperation applied in Western 
Europe after World War II: a regional trade zone, common institutions, coordination 
of regional policy approaches, etc. 
Finally, some observers saw EU emphasis on subregionalism as an indication 
of lack of a clear, genuine strategy, with which to respond to the urgent needs of the 
Black Sea countries in the crucial years of transition, and therefore, as a conscious 
device for delaying Eastern enlargement. 
BSEC as a substitute to EU membership? 
The debate over the character of BSEC as a I stepping stone' or an alternative to ED 
membership was eminent during the formative years of the subregional initiative but 
has lost much of its significance today. However the discussion over the nature of 
BSEC and the fear of its member states that BSEC might be perceived or used as a 
substitute to ED gave grounds for a reluctant stand of the member states to create 
supranational structures that would be beyond a traditional intergovernmental mode 
of cooperation or simply delayed/ stopped joint projects that could be conceived as 
running parallel to similar EU projects (e.g. in the field of energy). The question of 
whether BSEC could be an alternative model to ED was linked primarily to the 
motivations of Turkey and the priorities of its leadership at that time (1990-1992). 
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That is why we make a detailed reference here to the real intentions of Turkey as 
regards the potential of BSEC to be an alternative model to the EU. 
Following the European Commission's opinion to the Council on 18 September 
1989, stating that it was unlikely to be able to discuss Turkish membership before 
1993, Turkey started exploring other areas of cooperation and alliance patterns. 
According to some experts Turkey's primary consideration in proposing the creation 
of the BSEC was to explore alternatives to an eventual exclusion from the European 
Union: lithe essence of the endeavours and cooperation agreements of Turkey is the 
fear of exclusion from the Western blocs and in particular the EU" (Ilkin, 1993, p. 69). 
It has been argued that full EU membership was not a final objective for Ozal 
leadership who viewed the EU as a means to improve Turkey's industrialization and 
economic development rather than a political objective (Ataman, 2002, p. 143). He 
acknowledged that if Turkey solves its domestic cleavages (such as political Islam 
and the Kurdish problem), EU membership is irrelevant, or not while he claimed that 
"still by keeping the priority of the European context, we have to attach great 
importance to the United States, Black Sea Economic Cooperation and East Asia" 
(Ozal, 1991, p. 35). 
However, most analysts view BSEC as a scheme that has been conceived and 
elaborated as an integral part of Europe's new architecture and that would make 
Turkey a more promising economic partner for Europe, regardless of EU status 
(Fuller, 1993, p. 104). Turkish officials have steadily stressed the ability of the project 
to improve Turkey's longer-term prospects for EU membership. According to 
President Suleyman Demirel regional efforts are not regarded as an alternative to 
Turkey's relations with the Euro-Atlantic alliances, instead, "they are considered 
complementary to and supportive of them" (Demirel, 1994, p. 45), while for the 
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Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly H. Cindoruk, "BSEC must 
definitely not be regarded as an alternative to the international organizations in 
which Turkey is a member or aspires to join. On the contrary, this process must be 
considered as a tool of economic integration to further strengthen Turkey'S economic 
and political status and to support, complement and accelerate its integration into the 
European Union" (Cindoruk, 1994). Even if it is not likely that Turkey will accede to 
the EU in the near future, schemes of regional cooperation offer Turkey the 
possibility of being an important regional actor. Ankara hoped that BSEC and what 
is seen as Turkey's role within it as primus inter pares would enhance Turkey's 
prospects for full admission to the EU. By focusing on its historical and cultural ties 
with other states and peoples in the area, Turkey aimed to tap the full potential for 
trade and other economic links with all countries in these regions. In the words of 
Turkey's Prime Minister, Tancu Ciller BSEC is a "complementary bid for peace and 
stability at this end of Europe. Its role and institutions have been consciously 
designed to link the member states to the wider European market" (Ciller, 1996, p. 6). 
The inclusion of Greece strengthened the argument that BSEC could not 
function as an alternative but as a complementary process to the EU. However, the 
EU's positive stand towards other subregional groups in Europe on the one hand, 
and its total absence from the BSEC organs on the other hand, sent mixed signals to 
the Black Sea states regarding the way that the EU assessed BSEC. The founding 
documents clarified that BSEC was part of the new European architecture, not 
contravening obligations with other organizations in particular the EU (BSEC, 1992, 
para.7). All Summit Declarations without exception stressed the European 
orientation of BSEC. Nevertheless, the fears of several member states that BSEC 
could be seen as a 'non European structure' or as a counter organization to the EU, 
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were not allayed. This concern has been clearly reflected in all official documents, 
decisions and agreements reached within BSEC which one way or the other 
repeatedly refer to the complementarities of the BSEC and European integration 
processes. 
3. Regional treatment versus differentiation 
Subregionalism and tire EU 
In broad terms the EU has supported subregionalism within its own borders and 
beyond them. EU involvement in subregional projects in Europe has been based on 
the assumption that regionalism is a potential mechanism to ensure stability along 
the borders of the EU as well as a means of assisting neighbouring states overcome 
historical and/or ongoing conflict (EC, 1997b). It is therefore, a member in the 
Barents Region Council and in the Baltic Sea Council and it has supported the 
Vise grad group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary). Regional 
cooperation in terms of 'good neighbourly relations' has become a precondition for 
aid from the EU. On the other hand, its participation in regional fora gives a chance 
for the EU to connect nearby areas with its internal activities without permitting full 
membership with all burdens for the Union (Lahteenmarki & Kakonen, 1999, p. 211). 
However, the EU has often been criticized for showing little interest in 
subregional or cross-regional forms of regionality (Berg & Meurs, 2002, pp. 68-69). 
Critics point, among others, to the formal division in several regional categories 
instilled itself in the institutions of the Union: the directorate-general for 
enlargement is not responsible for Southeastern Europe while its external relations 
counterpart has no mandate for the accession states. There is a mismatch between the 
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European Union's division of labour and cross-cutting regional organizations such as 
the CBSS or BSEC. In addition, the bilateral conditionality of EU perspectives and 
negotiations often put regional cooperation on hold. The ED's hesitant attitude 
towards practical engagement wi.th subregional groupings can be explained as 
follows (Herolf, 2000, pp. 87-90): 
First, the number of subregional initiatives that have developed in the course of 
the last decade has made the EU reluctant to become closely involved in each one. 
While the EU has declared its support for this development, there is considerable 
scepticism as to the sincerity and commitment of many subregional actors to engage 
in concrete cooperative projects. Demonstrated 'clear political will' on the part of 
participants to regional cooperation, notably through their 'active involvement' in 
projects, is in the view of the Commission, a prerequisite for any EU assistance (EC, 
1997a, para. 4). Furthermore, a 'progressivity' principle, i.e. financial assistance shall 
reward reform, was incorporated as a main element of the 'new neighbourhood' 
approach of the EU to its relations with its eastern and southern neighbours (EC, 
2003, p. 16). 
Second, the enlargement process has been another factor. Enlargement has 
overwhelmed the Union's external policy processes towards its immediate region. 
The way in which enlargement has been structured as a largely bilateral and highly 
statist endeavour, it has not been an incentive to deepening cross-border cooperation. 
The complex hierarchy of relations among applicant countries added to this. The 
difference statuses of EU relati~ns - accession, pre-accession, partnership and 
cooperation - are accompanied with distinct frameworks of assistance. This complex 
system tends to encourage interstate cooperation to be determined more by the EU 
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relationship status than by geographical proximity and contributed to competition 
between states. 
The third factor impeding interconnection between the EU and subregional 
groupings lies in the nature of the two processes. There is an inherent tension 
between the supranational European project and the loose, multilevel process of 
subregional cooperation. EU integration is a process of comprehensive, structural 
cooperation in which a significant degree of state sovereignty is voluntarily 
transferred to a supranational authority. Member states are limited in the range and 
nature of cooperative commitments that they can make with non-EU states in any 
field in which an acquis exists. The consequences of this for subregional cooperation 
among states with different EU relations are significant. 
In general, it has been argued (Inotai, 1997) that, on the one hand, subregional 
groups have minimal economic impact for the EU business while on the other had, 
they have little political relevance for the EU governments, given that they are 
perceived to be simply complementary processes and facilitators of the Europe-wide 
integration process. In addition, the political fragility and shallow integration seem 
to justify the pessimistic view that they are ill equipped to meet the political, 
economic and institutional challenges. The result is then a vision of the obsolescence 
of weak and fragment subregional groups such as BSEC (Aral, 2002). However, it is 
generally detrimental for a country to opt out of an established subregional 
cooperation group, whether on the grounds of real or alleged (fictitious) 
'ad vantages' . Opting out will not improve the position of a country to the extent that 
it increases regional instability, so delaying the membership of all countries involved 
in the sub-regional cooperation scheme. 
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3.1 Preference for bilateralism 
Once BSEC was defined as part of the European integration process, relations with 
the EU and other European organizations became a central issue on BSEC agenda. 
There has been no annual report of BSEC activities or program of BSEC 
Chairmanship-in-Office where interaction with the EU is not mentioned as a priority. 
For BSEC, establishing institutionalized relations with the EU has been as important 
a goal as deepening integration among its member states. Nevertheless, the EU's 
official position remains that cooperation with BSEC cannot develop in an 
institutionalized way but it should be on a 'case by case' basis or involve more 
systematic interaction (Lake, 2000; Koukiadis, 2003). 
Seen from a power disparity perspective, relations between the EU and BSEC 
c.an best be described as a case of 'regime maker and regime taker'.1 The outcome of 
negotiating issues either between the two institutions or between the EU and 
individual BSEC states (EU membership, the content of trade agreements, or the level 
of aid) reflects great power differentials. BSEC represents more than a small portion 
of the EU's total GDP while the economic relations of its members (in trade and FDI) 
are EU-dominated as indicated earlier in chapter four. Consequently, their strong 
dependence on the EU means they have to consider developments on an EU level 
when shaping their domestic and foreign policies. 
International organizations including the EU do not possess a distinctive 
approach or policy towards the Black Sea as a subregion and BSEC as an 
organization but their policies have developed at a bilateral level. As EU officials 
have repeatedly stressed II the primary basis of the EU relations with the Black Sea 
area is and will remain the bilateral agreements with the countries of the region" 
281 
(Jeffreson, 1999). This has not been the case with other (sub)regional groupings 
where EU has a uniform approach or a specific dimension. Examples vary from the 
two Iberian states - Spain and Portugal - which were treated as a group and were 
both offered EU membership in 19~5 to the Northern Dimension that was launched-
upon the initiative of Finland - in 1997 and the Stability Pact for South East Europe 
launched in 1999. 
Table 6. 1 Agreements between the EU and BSECcountries 
Europe Association Stabilization &: 
Membership Agreement Agreement Association 
(negotiating (non -negotiating Agreement 
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bulgaria 
Georgia 
Greece 1981" 
Moldova 
Romania 
Russia 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
candidate) . candidate) 
1993 
1993 
1963 
Note: dates of signature " accession 
Source: Based on information from www.europa.eu.int 
(negotiation) 
Partnership &: 
Cooperation 
Agreement· 
1996 
1996 
1996 
1994 
1994 
Existing bilateral links with countries in the subregion (table 6.1) represent a 
different status for each country and include them in different programs and policies 
while implying therefore a diversity of legal and financial instruments. 
Notwithstanding the above, what comes across as an undisputable is the 
intensification of interaction between the EU and the Black Sea countries throughout 
the 1990s. Thus with the establishment of BSEC in 1992, among the eleven founding 
members, Greece was an EU member and Turkey had submitted its application for 
membership but had no association agreement while the remaining states had no 
institutionalized relationship with the EU. Today relations have advanced but in a 
variety of ways as table 6.1 illustrates. 
Bulgaria and Romania are in the process of negotiating their accession to the 
EU with membership expected in 2007 or soon thereafter. They receive economic and 
I The tenn has been used in Keohane et aI., 1993, p. 191. 
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technical assistance from the EU through the PHARE, SAPARD (Special Accession 
Program for Agriculture Development) and ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies 
for Pre-Accession) programmes aimed at preparing them for EU membership. 
Turkey has a customs union and was recognised in 1999 as a candidate for EU 
accession, expecting to begin negotiations for EU accession by the end of 2004. The 
other BSEC members have signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the 
EU while Albania is negotiating a Stabilization and Association Agreement and is a 
beneficiary of the CARDS program of financial and technical assistance. The non-
Balkan states are also beneficiaries of EU financial assistance though at a lower level, 
through support programs such as the T ACIS.2 Given the geopolitical significance as 
well as the relative weight resulting from the size and the economic potential of 
Russia and Ukraine, the EU concluded separate Common Strategies for those 
countries in 1999 (European Council, 1999a; European Council, 1999b). Although 
regional cooperation in general has been encouraged by the EU, there has been no 
direct reference to BSEC in most of the agreements or other cooperation programs 
between the Black Sea states and the EU. The brief reference to BSEC in the EU 
Common Strategy on Russia3 is the exemption which confirms the reluctance of 
involving BSEC in the EU strategies towards the region. 
The amount allocated by the EU to the different categories of countries in its 
neighbourhood vary from 1200Euro/ capita for the enlargement countries, to 
200Euro/capita for the western Balkan countries (e.g. Albania) and 13Euro/capita 
for the former Soviet Union republics (Adams et al., 2002, pp. 19-20). This allocation 
2 The Republic of Moldova has been reluctantly accepted as a participating member in the Stability Pact 
for S outheastem Europe a s a beneficiary, 0 illy a fier pursuing participation tenaciously, but it is unique 
among participants in not being eligible to sign Stabilisation and Association Agreements, as are the other 
participants once they meet specific standards of democratization. 
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aims at reducing economic disparities between the EU and its new members as well 
as assisting the transition process but it does not address the gap among the 
candidate countries and the former Soviet Union republics. Nevertheless, the EU 
remains the main source of financial assistance to the BSEC states which reached 
2589 million ECU - excluding the assistance allocated to Greece - in the period 1991 -
1996 (Ee, 1997a, p. 9). Diversification on the types of assistance has meant that 
candidate countries benefit investment support while the former Soviet Republics 
receive mainly technical assistance. The EU accession countries also receive funding 
from the European Investment Bank which has so far been unable to operate in the 
NIS. Analytically table 6.2 shows the allocation of resources by the EU to the BSEC 
states. 
r·--··-··--· . 
: Table 6.2 EU Assistance to selected BSEC countries 
1 ...... __ ._ .. ·.····_ .. ··T __ .·_·__·_ .... _~~2~:~QQ.Q(~!!!i.~!:'~!?~~~r()L ..... .............._ .. L Count!I __ -0tal T e of Assistancec--____ . ___________ _ 
I Albania I 1037.7 Phare, CARDS, FEOGA (Agriculture), Humanitarian Aid, Food 
I i security, macro-financial assistance, democracy and human rights, : 
i 1 ElB loans i II·-Ar;~enia-·-·--r. ···----·286:i3· -Ta~is·Na-ti~naCAli~cations,N~cTear-Safety Tacis, E-rnO, food aid-, --1 
! Humanitarian assistance, financial assistance ; 
I·· .......... -..... -... -............ _ ......... j ... - •... - ....•.....•.... - .........••.. _ ...................... - ............... - ........................................... _ ........................................................................................... - ....... - ......... - ... - ......... -._-- ... - ..• --............... . Azerbaijan I 326.90 Tacis, Exceptional Assistance, ECHO, FEOGA, Food Security, : 
\....._ .... _____ .. _..j ....... _._._ .. _ ... __ ....... _ .... ~~~~~i!!~?<:>.!:''..~~~~p!i<:>.!:'~!.1.i~~~!'.i~.!~~~~j.~.. __ .... ___ .... __ . __ . __ j 
i Georgia I 295.13 Humanitarian Aid, ECHO, FEOGA, food security program, TACIS, ! 
~ M~idova---+'----262~94 ~:~:i~~~~~:~~~;!!~!l~i~n~: ~=~=~~ ~::~~~;'~::d ~ 
~··Ro~ania---····+·-·········-············ .. ····i450 ..... ~~~:i;rs;!:~~1~ri-············-······· .. ········· .. ···· ...... -....................................... ---... -.-... ··--····-··1 ~-··------·T---·-··-····· .. --···· --.---.-.-... -............... - .. -.. - .. -.-.... - .. ---.-.... --.----.... -.... --------, 
Russia . 2281 Tacis, Nuclear Safety, donor coordination, etc. i 
.. ~~~~ l~_ ... _1 ___ ... ____ ._~~_ .. :~;~~~~:.~~~;!:I~;~~~i~~~!~~;~;~!~:L;~~~~~::ru:~~.-J 
, Ukraine ! 1072 Tacis, humanitarian assistance, macro-financial assistance i t ..?<>.lJ.rCE!: .. ~~.e:Ll~~~.:~.':!.~!?P~:.E!~.~!~.t.l~~!?:'l.E!_~.t.E!~I.'.~~"'!~.I.~.?!?~~ .. ~~ .. J~~y .. ?.Qq.~.~ .... _ ... _ ..... _. __ ... _._ .... __ .~ 
The availability of EU financial resources has proved an important factor in 
subregional cooperation. Financial resources made available for subregional projects 
have a general, indirect positive .impact on the countries' economic cooperation 
potential, by contributing to growth, structural change, competitiveness and 
3 It refers to the intention of the European Union to cooperate with Russia in regional and cross border 
cooperation and infrastructure "by working more effectively with Russia in the various fonn of regional 
cooperation (CBSS, BSEC, Barents Euro-Arctic Council) ... ", part I, 4d. . 
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attractiveness to FDI. Perhaps more importantly in the longer term, financial 
transfers may stem the growing regional differentiation, and so consolidate the 
regional stability that is a major factor of successful subregional economic 
cooperation. BSEC has not however benefited from a financial strategy on behalf of 
the EU or any other organization. 
3.2 A Platform for Cooperation 
Although fostering relations with the EU is an often cited claim by BSEC 4 neither 
BSEC nor its Related Bodies have articulated a strategy to achieve that goal. The 
closest effort to such a strategy is the 'Platform for Cooperation between the BSEC 
and the EU' adopted by the BSEC MMFA in Tbilisi on 30 April 1999. 
In fact it was the European Commission that 1997 set out the conceptual basis 
and the framework of its interaction with BSEC and other subregional groups in 
Europe with its 1997 and 1996 Communications forwarded to the Council (EC, 1997a; 
1997b; 1996). In its Communication to the Council titled 'Regional Co-operation in 
the Black Sea area: state of play, perspectives for EU action encouraging its further 
development', the EC set out the priority objectives for cooperation around the Black 
Sea (EC, 1997a, pp. 8-9): 
- First, political stability and strengthening of human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law; 
- Second, development of the . , regIOn s transport, energy and 
telecommunications networks including connection with the European 
networks; 
- Third, creation of favourable conditions to attract EU and other foreign 
investment, including in the sector of SMEs; 
4 Among others see the 'Swnmit Declaration on ten years ofBSEC: Anniversary' (Istanbul, 25 June 2002). 
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- Fourth, sustainable development, environmental protection and nuclear 
safety; 
- Fifth, reduction of drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal immigration. 
Those objectives have been in line with the original priorities declared in the 
BSEC founding documents, although the emphasis differs. What is of interest 
however, is the total lack of any reference to trade policies and trade-related 
measures. BSEC is not seen as bearing great potential in undertaking trade-related 
initiatives. Placing political stability as the main objective of subregional cooperation, 
the EU recognized that BSEC could play more a political and security role rather than 
an economic one. The above-mentioned priorities would be supported 'exclusively' 
by the existing instruments of the EU towards the region (Phare, T ACIS, Interreg, 
etc.) excluding thus any additional or separate financing. The EU strategy towards 
BSEC was exhausted in the idea of developing 'Black Sea synergies' within the 
existing assistance programs meaning that the project proposals made by the Black 
Sea countries would be also evaluated in 'Black Sea' terms (EC, 1997a, p. 11). 
Although the EC recognized the need for' some form of relationship with BSEC', by 
requesting observer status in BSEC activities, it stressed that such a relationship 
would only be 'complementary to strengthening bilateral relations' with each of the 
BSEC member states (EC, 1997a, pp. 12-13). However, the Communication did 
propose that the Commission could become an observer in BSEC. 
Beyond the above-mentioned priorities, the EU did not formulate a distinct 
BSEC strategy. Rather, the EU has developed its own instruments, structures and 
programs in addressing the issues that it considers of primary importance in the 
subregion such as energy, environment and transport, bypassing BSEC even though 
"BSEC is seeking to do all the things that EU policy is typically looking for in 
regional cooperative structures in the area of its borderlands" (Adams et al., 2002, p. 
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2). Officials from the EU have mostly held ad hoc consultations with their BSEC 
colleagues and attend several meetings but with no direct involvement whatsoever 
in BSEC activities. In fact, BSEC has unilaterally granted the Commission and the 
European Parliament observer statu~. 
One factor contributing to the EU's position is that in EU circles, BSEC 
countries feature as more of a source of problems such as migration, crime and 
conflicts and much less as an area of new markets and other economic opportunities 
that would anyway be served through BSEC. Other factors relate to the complexity of 
the bilateral agreements that EU has concluded with each of the BSEC members and 
the great differentiation of BSEC membership that does not allow for a single 
approach towards the subregion. At the same, as the example of the 'Northern 
Dimension' shows (developed by the EU under the Finish Presidency) there has been 
no EU country to politically lobby for an EU Black Sea strategy. Neither Greece as a 
member state of both organizations nor any other EU states which are observers to 
BSEC - such as Germany, Italy and France - have prepared the political ground for a 
Black Sea strategy. In fact Greece, the most obvious advocate for such a strategy, has 
been trapped between its own policy of downgrading the 'political' character of 
BSEC on the one hand and the calls of all BSEC states for an enhanced political 
dialogue between the EU and BSEC, on the other hand. Furthermore, we should not 
underestimate the fact that BSEC's indigenous character - being conceived not in 
Brussels or by any EU member - has weighed negatively as Brussels was neither 
convinced of the goals of the organization nor of the political commitment of its 
members.s 
5 Estimations of the author based on discussions with EU officials during BSEC meetings. 
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The absence of a constructed proposal by BSEC itself regarding its relations 
with the EU has added to the scepticism and reluctance of the EU to engage 
systematically with the Black Sea subregion. Officials of the European Commission 
commenting on the 'Platform for. Cooperation between the BSEC and the EU' 
proposed by BSEC in 1999, have argued that it cannot be considered as an equivalent 
to the 'Northern Dimension' as it lacks a vision. The document itself is too brief and 
does not suggest ways of moving EU-BSEC relations forward. In 2002 it was 
therefore, explicitly requested by the European Parliament that BSEC formulates a 
set of proposals and concrete ideas on the modalities of EU-BSEC interaction 
(Koukiadis, 2003). 
The 'Platform for Cooperation between the EU and the BSEC' adopted by the 
BSEC MMFA on 30 April 1999 in Tbilisi aimed to open up a political dialogue with 
the EU. It was prepared along the lines of the 'Yalta Summit Declaration' (5 June 
1998) which emphasized the importance of the Conclusions of the EU Luxembourg 
Council of Ministers (December 1997) as a step forward in creating a 11 comprehensive 
strategy" of the EU towards BSEC embracing the fields of transport, energy, 
telecommunication, trade and environment (para. 8). It should be also considered as 
the response of BSEC to the Communication of the Commission (1997a) on the EU's 
perception of Black Sea cooperation. The Platform outlines the objectives of BSEC-EU 
cooperation in the most general way: i) integration into Europe, ii) shaping an EU-
BSEC economic area, and iii) development of infrastructure networks, cooperation in 
commerce, investments, sustainable development, nuclear safety and fight against 
organized crime. BSEC expected that detailed modalities for cooperation would 
develop through close negotiations with the EU. Therefore, its proposals on how to 
promote political dialogue with the EU were limited and tried to reflect the ideas 
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presented earlier by the EC itself in its 1997 Communication. The main proposals for 
the substance of the political dialogue of the EU-BSEC were (para. 11-18): 
i) requesting the European Commission to obtain observer status in BSEC; 
ii) annual joint' troika' meetings and direct contacts of the BSEC Chairman-in-
office and the EU Presidency; 
iii) direct contacts at the level of bureaucracy; 
iv) creation of a 'focal point' on BSEC activities in the European Commission; 
v) introducing 'Black Sea synergies' for the EU assistance instruments; 
vi) establishment of a BSEC Fund entrusted to the EBRD or the BSTDB; 
vii) provision of technical and logistical support to the BSTDB; 
viii) EU assistance for the accession of all BSEC states to the WTO. 
A response from the Commission on the document of the Platform was never 
forwarded to BSEC indicating the reluctance of the EU to open up a direct political 
dialogue with the organization. In September 1999, in his letter to the Greek Minister 
of Foreign Affairs - who was holding the term BSEC Chairmanship -, the President of 
the European Commission reaffirmed that the " ... Commission will continue its 
cooperation with BSEC through the exchange of information and possibly through 
projects of mutual interest. However, he expressed his reservation regarding the 
mode of a future relationship with BSEC, following consultations with the 
[European] Council". Indeed, at the BSEC Council of MFA held in Thessaloniki 
(Greece) on 27 October 1999 "the Finnish Presidency of the EU, having the promotion 
of the Northern Dimension as a priority, downgraded its presence (it was 
represented by the Minister of Justice and a Director from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Finland) while the European Commission participated not with observer 
status but as a special guest, being represented by a bureaucrat".6 
6 Infonnation Paper, ATI6409/\o726/Al:606, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, General 
Directorate for European Union Affairs, Athens, 16 July 2002. 
289 
4. A case of 'regime maker - regime taker' 
Irrespectively of the EU commitments towards the Black Sea states and the BSEC 
organization itself, the EU plays a prominent role in the economic and political scene 
of the subregion. This is primarily' due to the fact that the EU as the dominant 
regional actor sets the agenda for most of the issues in the area. The EU-BSEC 
interaction shows a heavy bias towards the EU which exerts practical influence on 
subregional cooperation in almost all meaningful areas. First, it exerts direct 
influence on the policy choices of the states of the subregion which are also the 
principal actors in Black Sea subregionalism and, second, it shapes the character and 
agenda of the organization itself. 
To distinguish the impact of the EU on subregionalism, in terms of whether it is 
positive or negative, would be a difficult endeavour as EU's impact can change in 
time while it may also vary according to what sectors are examined. The correlation 
between the process of the European Union integration and (sub)regionalism rather 
than being examined in a 'strengthening - weakening' approach (Inotai, 1997) is 
better understood through a multifaceted process " involving a substantial 
reconfiguration of the subregionalism due to the complex interaction of hemispheric 
processes and the internal dynamics of the subregional projects" (Phillips, 2002, p. 5). 
4.1 A 'soft' power 
Subregionalism is embedded in the process of economic liberalization and neoliberal 
restructuring as well as the new European security architecture that took part across 
Europe over the course of the 1990s. The establishment of BSEC was premised on the 
notion of 'open regionalism' and articulated as all its documents and activities. Apart 
290 
from facilitating trade liberalization, 'open regionalism' was expected to assist the 
member states in attracting foreign direct investment. Beyond this however, 
subregionalism in the Black Sea has little to do with domestic political economy 
concerns as it did not imply reloca~on of decision-making authority thus serving as a 
option to maintain national social/ economic arrangements and policies. 
The process of European integration spreading beyond the strictly speaking ED 
integration, as manifested by the formation of the so-called 'Common European 
Economic Space', should be understood as an attempt to further entrench the 
neoliberal rules reflecting "the triumph of economic liberalism, of faith in export-led 
growth and of belief in the centrality of the private sector to development processes" 
(Payne, 1996, p. 106). Therefore, hemispheric regionalism represents "a specific 
strategy on the part of its protagonists - governments or business interests - to lock 
in a political economy ideologically and strategically hospitable to the rules of the 
neoliberal game" (Phillips, 2002, p. 6). Of these protagonists at the European level the 
most important driving force is the EU, which systematically works for the 
dissemination of the values of neoliberalism and democracy. 
The EU is seen as the indisputable anchor for Europe's development and 
modernization (Inotai, 1997). This has two important impacts on subregionalism. 
First, the BSEC subregion which has a lower level of development considers the ED 
as the core for its members' as well as of its institutions' growth and development, 
the provider of longer-term stability and predictability in their catching-up process, 
the purveyor of free access to large markets, and the supplier of resource transfers to 
, 
finance modernization projects. Second, as a result of intensified globalization and 
regionalization, both the members and the near geographical neighbours of the ED 
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class it as the core of Europe's 'new regionalism', and the main economic actor in the 
international economy. 
The correlation between BSEC and the EU should not be encapsulated solely in 
a focus of the immediate interests ofthe EU in the economic sphere or on its ability to 
define the negotiating agenda. EU strategies cannot be simply understood in 
economic terms. What is striking in this case is the relative insignificance of the Black 
Sea region for key EU economic interests. The only exception to that would be the 
energy sector but even in this case the EU interests involve more the Caspian and 
Central Asian states (producers) rather than the Black Sea states (transport routes). 
On the other hand, energy politics have been consciously left outside the subregional 
agenda. Both the Ee Communication (1997a) and the TAD Report (2001) on the 
territorial impact on the EU of the developments around the Black Sea point to 
political issues (involving stability and immigration) and not to economic interests. 
The benefits of encouraging subregionalism seem to be less economic. It is the 
structural and ideological foundations of EU hegemony that are diffused and 
reinforced through the subregional project. Beyond the expansion of neoliberal 
discipline, the EU interests in the region are defined far more robustly by the security 
agenda and concerns about democracy and stability. The key issues in the security 
agenda - illegal trafficking in people and drugs, environment, terrorism, energy, etc.-
are thus seen to call for an approach which increases the leverage of the EU in the 
region and the vehicle through which this objective is pursued is through a Europe 
wide integration process. 
Given the diversified membership of BSEC, particularly in terms of its 
members' contractual links with the EU and all other international organizations, it is 
misleading to talk about tlte impact of the EU on the BSEC subregion. Nevertheless, 
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despite its asymmetric presence in the subregion (strong in the western part, distant 
in the eastern part), particularly in domains of critical importance (e.g. conflict 
resolution) for a number of 'failing' states, the EU has been perceived as the 
'modernizing anchor' by all states in.the subregion. 
The pro - EU dril'e and its impact 
The pro-EU drive has first influenced the conceptualization of BSEC itself as a 
'European' structure and a 'stepping stone' or 'training ground' for integration in 
European political economy as it is reflected in the statutory documents of the 
organization. Second, the pro-EU drive has affected the level of political cooperation 
that each state seeks within subregionalism, as relocation of decision-making 
authority is directed directly to the EU rather than the subregional level. 
From a political point of view however, the starting point must be the 
prevailing reality that not all of BSEC members will join the EU no matter their 
intention of becoming an integral part of the European political economy. They are 
therefore, affected differently by the EU processes and by such major EU issues such 
as the future of sovereignty, the EMU, restructuring structural funds, enlargement, 
the evolving balance of power and so on. Thus, this should be expected to influence 
governance and the level of commitments at the subregional level. On the other 
hand, differentiation regarding their contractual relationships with the EU has 
undermined their ability to use subregionalism as the basis for bloc bargaining and 
also as an arena for undertaking the necessary adjustment processes. In neither of 
these two areas can it be claimed with much conviction that subregionalism is 
effectively or concretely being' strengthened' in the Black Sea. 
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More subregional cooperation becomes a prevailing feature in all parts of 
Europe as border conflicts and ethnic minority issues have to be settled in order for 
countries to be admitted in the EU or develop advanced political and economic 
partnerships with it. This has become a powerful argument for more subregional 
cooperation on the political level in recent years especially in the case of Black Sea 
and Southeast European countries. The EU's positive role is sometimes expressed not 
as one of moderating conflicts, but of preventing countries or parts of countries from 
initiating them. Furthermore, the EU sometimes creates a better balance of power, 
particularly between neighbouring countries with different potentials (e.g. Moldova, 
Russia). The EU orientation has fostered and consolidated reconciliation between 
former adversaries such as Greece and Turkey or has motivated Black Sea states to 
successfully address internal issues of democratization and minority policies like in 
the exemplary case of Romania which solved peacefully its minority and 
neighbourhood issues. The example in this respect is the one of Greece, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Turkey which have intensified cooperation in the prospect of EU 
accession for the latter three. Their cooperation has been translated into regular 
meetings, the provision of technical assistance as well as political support on behalf 
of Greece as an EU member state. 
The EU supports a learning process of cooperation on a subregional level. 
Countries aspiring to EU membership have to show a sufficient degree of political 
cooperation as a test of maturity. Talks with Brussels in which various countries in 
the same subregion participate allow the parties to get to know each other better, rid 
themselves of prejudice and uncertainties about their neighbours, and find new areas 
of cooperation. The idea of taking up a joint position towards Brussels has been 
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strengthened by the meetings among the BSEC leaders? Thus BSEC countries have 
cooperated to attract the interest of the ED institutions while pressing for 'Black Sea' 
synergies in the EU's policies. Joint delegations from Romania, Greece and Georgia 
or from Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and Ukraine have met with EU officials to lobby for the 
elaboration of an EU Black Sea strategy.8 
In any case, contractual bilateral links between each BSEC state and the EU 
contain a number of common elements in the spheres of legislation, economy, 
political system and institution building that have to be considered for each of the 
countries. Thus, the EU indirectly fosters subregional cooperation, even though each 
country prepares alone. 
Furthermore, the prospect of ED membership has encouraged the removal of 
barriers that hinder subregional cooperation. The creation of free trade agreements 
with the ED is expected to enhance the chances of smaller countries to gain 
economies of scale in production, due to the larger market, and some of this output 
could be marketed in the subregion. Contractual relations in general and the 
Association Agreements in particular, have a salutary impact on the creation of an 
adequate framework for subregional trade relations. As a result of ED obligations, 
several BSEC economies managed to bring forward a free-trade agreement. 
Therefore, Albania signed an FT A agreement with Romania in February 2003 while it 
is currently preparing an FT A with Turkey as a result of negotiating a Stabilization 
and Association Agreement with the EU. Economic ties between Bulgaria and 
Romania on the one hand, and Gre~ce on the other, have accelerated as a result of the 
accession process of the first two into EU. Trade and investment links have 
7 Several bilateral and trilateral meetings have been held to this end, e.g. 'President Sezer renews his 
support to Ukraine's Euroatlantic integration', Turkish Daily News, 20 June 2003. 
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flourished among the three countries, legal frameworks and physical infrastructure 
are becoming more compatible and harmonized and restrictions regarding the 
movement of goods and people are diminishing in anticipation of the entry of 
Bulgaria and Romania into the single market of the EU. 
From an economic point of view, however, paradoxically, while the rapid 
expansion of trade with the EU may ensure survival and even development for 
several economic activities in the BSEC countries, the EU's rapidly growing market 
share may contribute to a decline in subregional trade for several reasons: i) more 
powerful, better financed EU exporters could crowd out traditional suppliers from 
the subregion, ii) the entrance of western firms in important sectors of the national 
production and consumption markets could destroy much of the domestic 
production and export capacities tailored to the subregional market, iii) new trade 
links with the EU, favoured by the Association Agreements may divert some 
potential subregional trade, while eliminating structural linkages, and iv) most 
financially weak enterprises in the countries in transition are unable to compete with 
western firms, and lose market share at home and in the subregional markets. 
The ambiguous impact of the EU on subregional cooperation may become 
pronounced in the coming years in the general economic-policy adjustment of the 
BSEC countries. Hasty adjustment to EU rules (acquis communautaire) and unhealthy 
competition among countries in the same subregion to fulfil the adjustment criteria, 
without taking account of the economic realities in individual countries, may give 
8 Such meetings were held between delegations of the P ABSEC with the. leadership of the European 
Parliament in March 2002 and May 2003. 
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way to short-sighted national efforts, with a detrimental impact on subregional 
coopera tion. 9 
4.2 Setting the policy agenda 
The formation of subregional ism as has been evolving within the last decade should 
not be seen merely through the lenses of the choices of subregional actors (in BSEC 
case, those actors have been primarily the governments) but through the influence of 
the I soft' hegemonic power driving a hemispheric integration process; namely the 
EU. First, transnational actors (as private economic interests) that could have set their 
own agenda in BSEC have been absent. Second, none of the leading states was 
willing or powerful enough to drive the BSEC process beyond the EU imperatives. In 
the midst of weak integrative subregional forces, the external anchor became a 
decisive formative force. We indicated in earlier chapters how EU obligations or EU 
related considerations of the BSEC member states have underlay their position in 
subregional bargaining. The BSEC group has hence been clearly divided between 
two subgroups: the 'close' to the EU states (Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Albania) and the rest. 
Although BSEC started with a clear economic orientation (see founding 
declarations and type of meetings in chapter three) being pushed by the need to 
address the extreme economic problems that the majority of its members were 
facing, it slowly changed its scope of activities. This is better reflected if one 
compares the founding Declarations of BSEC in 1992 and the priority fields of action 
identified in the BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future of 2001 (table 3.2), the 
9 Obviously, the EU's impact on the domestic economy and society of BSEC states also needs to be 
assessed, but it remains beyond the scope of this research. 
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document that sets the future orientation of the organization. The latter reflects to a 
great degree the major issues in the EU enlargement process as illustrated in the 
agreements between the EU and BSEC states (Le. Association, Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements). At the same time, both the contents of the BSEC Economic 
Agenda and the type of activities that the organization developed particularly since 
1997 manifest a process to stress the element of 'security' in the concept of 
'comprehensive security-building'. Since the Commission's approach to BSEC (EC, 
1997a) was not an economic one but it stressed the 'security-building' value of 
subregionalism, BSEC not accidentally, started developing a 'soft' security oriented 
agenda. 
The BSEC Economic Agenda introduced for the first time social, cultural, 
security and political issues which were not initially BSEC priority fields. On the 
contrary, at its early stages, the organization had focused exclusively on entrenching 
regionally agreed rules and orientation on economic, functional issues such as 
environment, infrastructure, trade and investments. Security issues gained 
significance in BSEC following the explicit interest of the EU first expressed in the EC 
Communication (1997a) although not all BSEC countries shared the same interest to 
advance cooperation in the political sphere. 
The impact of the EU on delineating BSEC's competence on issues of economic 
cooperation and particularly on trade has been important. Chapter four reflects on 
the relevance of the EU for subregional trade flows. The BSEC subregion is highly 
dependent on the EU market for, imports and for the - limited - exports of its 
members but particularly as a source of foreign direct investment. Subregional trade 
has not benefited from the opportunities created by a larger market in BSEC and it 
has been diverted from the subregion towards mainly the European markets. This 
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has generated limited demands towards BSEC for a change in the trade regime of the 
subregion. On the contrary, subregional trade regime is being shaped by the 
adjustment to the acquis C011l11lunautaire and the conclusion of free trade agreements 
between individual states and the EU. 
Plans for the creation of a zone of free trade, which had spurred the conception 
of BSEC back in 1990, became redundant as they lacked any support from the EU. 
This is despite the fact that during the preparatory discussions on a BSEC FTA it 
became clear that its structure would be harmonized closely with the WTO 
requirements. The main aim was to create identical trading environments for the EU 
and the subregion and the expansion of the WTO principles rather than simply 
expand trade within the subregion or create a trade bloc (see chapter four). The EU's 
position on the creation of a FT A was clearly negative: "BSEC member states have 
expressed an interest in establishing a Black Sea Free Trade Area and are 
investigating the possibility. However, this does not appear to be a realistic objective, 
taking into account that Greece is a member of the EU, Turkey is engaged in a 
customs union with the EC, Bulgaria and Romania have association agreements with 
an eventual orientation towards accession to the EU, and a number of other BSEC 
states have yet to complete the WTO accession process" (EC, 1997a, pp. 3-4). 
To sum up, BSEC has shown a defensive, follower-type pattern of trade and 
trade-related issues. Until now, trade liberalization was adjusted to the liberalization 
of trade implemented earlier with the EU, or taken as a sign of 'good behaviour' or 
'EU maturity' in the associated countries. Subregional trade liberalization hence, 
proceeds alongside trade liberalization with the EU. 
EconOmic-policy coordination is weak among the BSEC states, for a number of 
reasons: i) as less developed countries, they necessarily look upon the EU as their 
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modernization anchor, and concentrate their policy harmonization on requirements 
formulated in Brussels, ii) their main economic partners (in trade and capital 
investment) are inside the EU, iii) adjustment to the acquis communautaire pre-empts 
the limited resources in these regions, and iv) the majority of the countries in the 
group are still engaged on key problems of transition, and have reached different 
stages of development. 
Being in fact left without a clear economic goal, BSEC turned to new areas of 
cooperation (see points II, III on the BSEC Economic Agenda, table 3.2) such as 
institutional renewal and governance, combating organized crime, emergency 
situations and security. 
4.3 Setting the institutional framework 
The direct influence of the EU to BSEC is also manifested in the institutionalization of 
the organization itself and its mode of governance. As we illustrated in chapter three 
which dealt with the institutional design of BSEC, its structures reflect a certain 
transfer of the EU model. 
Since its inception, BSEC has tried to transplant to the subregion a type of 
multilevel governance, imposed however 'from above', which included a Business 
Council to represent the interests of the private sector, a Parliamentary Assembly and 
a Development Bank to function as the financing mechanism of subregional projects. 
The institutional design besides the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the 
Summit Meetings includes a type of 'COREPER' with permanent representatives of 
the member states to the organization, namely the Permanent Representatives, and a 
'troika' system. Those structures not envisaged before 1998 and the signature of the 
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Charter, were developed as a sign of the institutional maturity of the initiative. It 
would be however incorrect to argue that they indicated a shift in the preferences of 
the member states to engage more within BSEC and to deepen cooperation or change 
the organization's mode of governance. Therefore, and despite some discussions on 
the role of the Permanent Secretariat no consensus was reached on the enhancement 
of its role from a strictly administrative to a more political and policy generating one. 
Although it is recognized that lithe role of BSEC PERMIS needs to be redefined, in 
order to be in line with the new phase of BSEC development" its role is still projected 
as "a center for communication, exchange of information and coordination of joint 
activities in all spheres of multilateral cooperation" (BSEC, 2001, p. 26). There has 
been no intention of the member states to allow for the development of anything 
other than a strictly intergovernmental mode of governance and decision-making. 
This is advocated both by the states more institutionally advanced with the EU 
which do not wish to jeopardize their EU future where they have redirected their 
expectations and the NIS which are against setting any supranational mode of 
governance that would involve Russia. We can therefore say that one factor that 
explains the advanced institutionalization of BSEC, which was strengthened despite 
the limited success of the organization itself, has been the influence of the EU as a 
paradigm of organization and regional governance. 
The debate over the enlargement of BSEC is also indicative of the influence 
that the EU has on the character of BSEC. In the decision to accept two more 
Balkan states, namely the FYRO¥ and Serbia-Montenegro, rather than expand 
in Central Asia, their 'European' identity weighted heavily. By accepting them 
as full members, BSEC did not expect any economic benefits. Rather its main 
intention has been to increase its political importance for the EU. 
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4.4 Ambivalent influences 
Some authors argue that subregional cooperation involving transition economies, is 
not only impeded by the heterogeneity of the national transition processes but also 
by the bilateral relations with the EU as "conditionality creates asymmetries and 
tensions for which regionality cannot compensate" (Berg & Meurs, 2002, p. 68). 
Subregional cooperation is furthermore hindered by the somewhat ambiguous 
attitude that the EU itself takes to it. On the one hand, the EU stresses its importance 
in all cases (EC, 1997b) while on the other hand, if unwillingly, it keeps creating 
divisions among countries in the same region. The Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements as well as the individual Strategies to Russia and Ukraine have a special 
reference to regional and cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries 
particularly within the Tacis, Inogate and Traceca programs. However, the EU has 
been developing its strategy to the Black Sea subregion beyond the existing and -
indigenous - subregional initiatives drawing new dividing lines and creating new 
concepts such as the Western Newly Independent States (Belarus, Ukraine and 
Moldova) which appears in the 'Wider Europe' Communication to the Council of the 
EU, contributing thus more to the disintegration of the concept of a Black Sea 
community or entity (EC, 2003). 
The EU's hesitant behaviour reflects the absence of a clear strategy for the 
countries beyond the current round of enlargement. It impacts on subregional 
cooperation because the EU is the modernization anchor for the BSEC states. This 
problem is particularly evident in. connection with the strategy or strategies for 
enlargement, or the lack of them.1o Uncertainty about the timing and scope of 
10 Another sign of the Commission's changing position can be found in 'Agenda 2000'. This 
document, while setting a comprehensive framework for Eastern enlargement, encourages negotiations 
with selected associated countries only. 
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enlargement has been a major barrier to subregional cooperation and in no way a 
benign pressure to intensify it. The possibility that some countries in a subregional 
group may become members of the EU earlier than others downgrades the group's 
relevance and immediacy. The same effect is produced by special national opting out 
from aspects of the subregional frameworks. 
The cases of the environment, energy and transport are indicative of the 
ambivalent influence of the EU on segmenting subregional governance. The above-
mentioned three sectors are priority fields of cooperation in BSEC. However, the 
evolving regime in all sectors remains outside BSEC as primarily the EU - and 
following it other international organizations active in the area - have not considered 
the BSEC framework as an appropriate one either for the negotiation of agreements 
or for their implementation and management. The division of labour in those sectors 
ignores BSEC as a subregional actor. 
The development of the physical infrastructure is a basic component of 
subregional cooperation as indicated earlier (the BSEC WG on transport is the most 
frequently convent). The EU has had a substantial impact here through its support 
for infrastructure projects such as the TRACECA program, launched in 1993 by the 
five Central Asian and there South Caucasus countries together with the EU. This 
consists of EU funded technical assistance and catalytic investment support (so far 
approximately 100 million Euros) to develop a transport corridor on an east-west 
axis from Europe, across the Black Sea, through the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to 
Central Asia. The program has also, attracted international funding. For example, the 
EBRD has committed approximately 300 million Euros. Within the framework of 
TRACECA 12 countries (including all BSEC states but Albania, Greece and Russia) 
the 'Basic Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for the Development of 
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TRACECA' was signed in 1998. At the Third European Conference of Ministers of 
Transport in 1997 dedicated to pan-European transport infrastructure, the Black Sea 
was designated as one of four Pan-European Transport Areas (PETrA), the maritime 
complement to the Pan-European· Transport Corridors. A Steering Group was 
composed of representatives of the eight participating countries (the six Black Sea 
littoral countries, Greece and Moldova) and the EU Commission was established in 
1999. Four sector working groups and an annually revised Action Program have 
been developed. A technical secretariat of the Black Sea PETrA is in Odessa despite 
the fact that the BSEC offered to host it in its Secretariat. 
As suggested earlier in chapter five, environmental cooperation within BSEC is 
an interesting case. In spite of being considered as one of the highest priorities (along 
with trade) on the BSEC agenda, it has lost its relevance. Although it was the area 
expected to produce most of cooperative attitudes (since Black Sea pollution is 
among the most urgent subregional problems) the Black Sea environmental regime 
remains totally outside the BSEC organs. First, the diversity of the BSEC membership 
(five members are not Black Sea coastal states) made consensus difficult despite the 
identification of the Black Sea as the 'core' of BSEC's geographic reference and its 
identity basis. As a result, BSEC although was given the opportunity to handle issues 
of environmental management (such as preparing a fisheries agreement), it failed to 
reach an agreement as it was seen that such an agreement could not fulfil the BSEC 
principle, i.e. involve all eleven BSEC states. Second, the EU developed its own 
environmental policy towards ~e Black Sea, bypassing BSEC. Environmental 
legislation for three out of six coastal states (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) is 
revised in line with the EU requirements. On the other hand EU funding partly goes 
through the UN supported Black Sea Environmental Program and for the 
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implementation of the Bucharest Convention. No BSEC environmental activity has 
been financed by the EU. The outcome in the field of environment was the same with 
the one on trade cooperation; the WG on environmental protection remained without 
an agenda. 
In chapter three we indicated how another priority area of BSEC, that of 
energy, lost its relevance too when even in the case of a less legally binding 
'Memorandum on Cooperation in the Field of Electric Power Industry', the three pre-
EU accession countries - Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey - were reluctant to commit 
themselves to cooperative projects that could be perceived as contradicting their EU 
related aspirations)1 The establishment of a Black Sea Energy Center in Sofia in 1995 
at the initiative of the European Commission under its SYNERGY programme 
indicated once more that BSEC was not perceived as a partner for addressing issues 
of regional concern. 
Therefore, the EU accession process has at times impacted negatively on the 
deepening of BSEC cooperation mainly due to the diverse contractual links between 
the EU and the subregion's states and the preference for bilateralism.12 Since the 
requirements to draw closer to the EU involve candidate countries, changing 
standards and rules concerning the flow of goods, people and the provision of 
services, there are cases within BSEC in which candidates have erected barriers with 
non-potential EU candidates (for example, in the areas of visa regime and trade). 
Already the differentiated process of the EU integration has impacted upon the 
stability in neighbouring countries .. In Moldova, for example, citizens are now 
required to purchase visas for entering Bulgaria and Romania. These visas 
restrictions have contributed to a dramatic increase in the number of Moldovans 
II See the Bulgarian reservation in Chapter 3, page 142. 
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acquiring dual citizenship with Romania (approximately 400,000 or ten per cent of 
the total population). This implies costs for the excluded as they risk losing 
important links with neighbours. At the multilateral level, the introduction of 
previously non-existent restrictions, at the very least impedes and at worst 
undermines the efforts of an organization such as BSEC to promote subregional 
cooperation and economic integration. 
5. Conclusion 
There are several aspects in which the EU exerts power beyond its borders; as a 
collective identity, a structural process, a new border and a political and economic 
actor. Here, we focused on how BSEC's mode of governance and character has been 
influenced by the EU process. 
BSEC subregionalism is not an autonomous structure. Rather, it is embedded in 
a hemispheric integration process. The second process, the core of which is the EU, 
exerts an asymmetric structural and ideological power to subregion building. This is 
because of the EU's policy-making status, its long-standing advantage in socio-
economic development, and the problems of less developed countries, both in their 
internal transformation and their external relations. 
We indicated here that the impact of the EU on BSEC can best be placed not in 
terms of a merely strengthening - weakening dichotomy, but rather as involving a 
substantial reconfiguration of subregionalism due to the interaction of the wider 
European process and the internal dynamics of BSEC subregion. If we dispense with 
the strengthening/weakening dichotomy, we can see that the impact of hemispheric 
regionalism is felt principally in the reconfiguration of the nature and purpose of 
12 This applies not only to the EU but to the pre-accession BSEC states as well. 
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subregionalism that is currently in evidence across subregional blocs including in 
BSEC.13 
Improving ties with the ED. has been the primary means of the countries to 
attain their overall national objectives, including raising living standards, and 
alleviating poverty while in some aspects it has become an end in itself. To sum up, 
the EU dictates the positions of the Black Sea countries in the negotiating process of 
BSEC subregionalism while it constitutes a crucial dimension of the ways in which 
subregional strategies and structures have been articulated and pursued. This EU 
focus, has tended to push other initiatives of a subregional or trans-national character 
such as BSEC into the background or has underwritten both their character and 
potential. 
What are the aspects in which BSEC's formation has been influenced by the 
EU's imperatives? In this case study we can identify: 
First, that BSEC's economic character and rhetoric notwithstanding, 
progressively greater emphasis has been placed on the pursuit of political and 
strategic objectives in line with the ED's perceptions of where the instrumental 
character of subregionalism lies. The Black Sea countries therefore, moved away 
from setting up a free trade zone and have indicated their intentions to develop joint 
strategies for addressing a range of security problems (particularly, organized crime 
and corruption). Of course some of these strategies remain rhetorical and there is 
concern about the capacity of BSEC for dealing with such issues. 
Second, there is preference for 'multi-thematic' subregionalism which 
encompasses the elaboration of subregional strategies in areas relating to 
infrastructure, the environment, combating crime, good governance and so on. This 
13 The same has been argued for regionalism in the Americas (Phillips, 2002, p. 18). 
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tendency reflected in the original stages of BSEC was strengthened when the 
domains of cooperation expanded, since subregionalism became increasingly 
understood not as a merely economic integration process but as encompassing a 
multifaceted policy coordination. 
Third, the economic agenda features a movement away from a focus on 
creating a free trade area and undertaking tariff liberalization towards an emphasis 
on the subregional level as an area for the adjustment necessitated by a wider 
regionalist project. The economic basis for more intensive subregional cooperation 
has been, or is expected to be created by global openness and a larger economic 
organization - the EU. In the BSEC case, the 'normal', defensive (passive) stance of 
adaptation has prevailed. As a consequence, European integration becomes the 
means of upgrading the subregional cooperation. Most of the welfare-creating and 
dynamiC effects described by integration theories are expected to come from outside 
BSEC or the Black Sea states.14 
The fourth dimension is that institutionalization comes as a result of political 
considerations vis-a.-vis the effects of the European integration process rather than as 
the outcome of the commitment of the member states to deepen cooperation. 
Institutionalization does not represent power transfer. 
Finally, state-to-state bargaining has remained at the core of subregionalism 
keeping the decision-making process and power within the governmental elites. 
Intergovernmentalism has been the only mode to develop as states from within the 
subregion redirect - if they do -' their loyalty or authoritative decision-making 
towards the EU and not subregional structures. There is a strong reluctance to create 
regimes which could run parallel to or contradict EU ones. On the other hand, the 
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issue of lack of knowledge for EU policies and the possibilities to combine EU 
orientation with formulation of subregional regimes has often led to unjustified, 
extreme positions. Pre-accession EU states such as Bulgaria refrain from signing, for 
example, a BSEC MoU (e.g. cooperation in the field of electricity) on the grounds that 
it impedes on their EU commitments while EU members such as Greece do sign. It 
becomes therefore an open question as to whether 'EU commitments' have also been 
used by states within BSEC as an excuse to hinder deepening of subregional 
cooperation. 
14 The case of the Spanish and Portuguese accession to the EU shows that the EU impact on 
subregional cooperation came after integration, not before, and certainly not as a substitute to it. 
309 
CONCLUSIONS 
The issue with which the counh·ies involved in Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
have been concerned throughout ~he 1990s until today has not been whether or not 
to cooperate but how and to what degree. Hence one of the most interesting aspects 
of subregionalism refers to the mode of cooperation that it implies. In this case study, 
disclosing the mode of BSEC cooperation and its formation reveals the real intentions 
of the member states as well as the actual substance and purpose of subregionalism. 
What type of cooperation does BSEC subregionalism represent and what are the 
factors behind its formation? This is the basic question around which this 
dissertation has evolved. 
Within this context, the dissertation has sought to achieve three principle goals. 
First, it has traced the development of BSEC as an initiative since 1990. Second, it has 
offered an analysis of the factors that have influenced its configuration. Third, it has 
sought to identify the substance of subregionalism around the Black Sea subregion. 
This research was based on the hypothesis that BSEC's formation has to be 
explained on the basis of the following variables coming from the subregiona1level: 
i) transnational demands, ii) economic difficulties, iii) a leading country, and iv) the 
security dilemma. A fifth external variable is also incorporated, namely the European 
Union. 
Empirical findings 
There are two issues of importance in the evolution of BSEC. First, despite its 
complex organizational structure, policy making has remained an exclusively 
intergovernmental process. Second, BSEC has changed from being an 'integration' 
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tool - if it ever was one - to a governance structure. Consequently it has moved away 
from its original priority goals such as the creation of a free trade area to a broader, 
more inclusive agenda which touches upon issues of cultural, social and security 
policy coordination. 
We saw in this case study that subregionalism as expressed in BSEC remains a 
strictly intergovernmental mode of cooperation. Although the member states have 
established the necessary institutional frameworks and mechanisms for coordination, 
none of the central bodies established has been empowered with any real authority. 
Intergovernmental bargaining and intraregional interactions have been 
institutionalized at all levels, but the organization has not gone far in forming 
supranational institutions. Despite its advanced legal capacity (being an organization 
rather than a forum or initiative), expanded agenda, multidimensional character and 
the involvement of other than only state-actors in the process, BSEC's capacity to act 
as a supranational actor has been undermined. A type of paradox has therefore 
emerged. Institutions at all levels (business, financial, civil society) have been 
established along with a permanent secretariat indicating an attempt to include into 
the process non-state actors and make decision making a more pluralistic process. To 
this end, observer status is been offered not only to states and intergovernmental 
organizations but to non-governmental organizations as well. With the 
transformation of BSEC into an international organization, it was expected that 
BSEC's authority would be enhanced, the power of the secretariat would increase 
and institutions would acquire a new dynamic accompanied with the conclusion of 
, 
binding agreements. There is no evidence that this has occurred. State-to-state 
bargaining and consensus is the central piece of decision-making in BSEC for 
practically all issues. Beyond that, member states have refrained from building 
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supranational regimes in any field of the organization's competence. In the ten years 
of its existence, only two binding agreements and two Memoranda of Understanding 
have been concluded. Policy coordination takes place mainly through long-
negotiated and legally non-binding Action Plans. 
Like many other subregional groups in post-Cold War Europe, BSEC was 
formed in the early 1990s as a state-sponsored mechanism to establish a conducive 
subregional regime for economic cooperation and integration. To this end, it focused 
on functional fields of cooperation and developed a set of subregional organs to 
negotiate and produce common policies in almost all possible areas that could 
improve economic conditions: trade, investments, SMEs, environment, agriculture, 
transport, communications, technology and tourism. Issues of cultural, political and 
security cooperation were at that stage intentionally excluded. Driven by 
neofunctional logic, the expectations were that 'spill-over' would occur between 
economic and political issues. Cooperation in economic, technical issues or 'low' 
politics however did not take off. Since the Istanbul Summit Declaration in 1992, 
advances in the BSEC process have been largely sparse in terms of consolidating the 
rules of an enlarged market and the creation of a FT A has collapsed. The 
organization has instead acquired a more political role. Although the concept of the 
inseparability of security and economic development was advocated by the founding 
states of BSEC, the latter functioned on the basis of an artificially sharp division (in 
terms of its activities) between economic cooperation and security. This division 
however began to erode. After almost five years of existence, BSEC in 1997 moved 
towards issues such as combating organized crime and in 2003 it developed a 
'second track' security dimension by establishing an ad-hoc group of experts on 
security. 
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Beyond - limited - cooperation on 'confidence-building' measures such as 
emergency situations, a BSEC-wide subregional cooperation has not taken root. 
Furthermore, in areas such as the environment, naval cooperation and transport 
where some success has been regis~ered, the member states again responded with 
reliance on intergovernmental' subsystems' which were distinct from the framework 
of BSEC. The result of this process was further incremental cooperation without a 
direct BSEC competence in either economic cooperation or security. 
Nevertheless, institution building has advanced, the subregional agenda has 
widened and membership is enlarging with two newcomers: the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro. 
Having presented the development of BSEC since 1991 the issue of what 
explains its formation arises. 
A national preference asymmetry 
As illustrated in chapter two, the diversity of BSEC's membership led to different 
agendas and blurred any meaning of what the 'core' of BSEC business was about. 
Each member state viewed participation in BSEC through the prism of often 
diverging aspirations, but not contradictory ones. Although economic issues were 
placed on the centre of the BSEC agenda, it was geopolitical and security 
considerations that significantly shaped the features of the cooperation process. 
Thus, BSEC as a regional body was the result of geo-strategic considerations to which 
an economic dimension was added. 
The convergence of the ideology between the Turkish and Russian leadership 
in 1991 set the grounds for the emergence of BSEC as an initiative. The creation of a 
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tool to facilitate economic interaction around the Black Sea along the lines of 
economic and political liberalism was advocated by both sides. Bilateral relations 
between the two historic rivals had been strengthened and the stable north-south 
axis seemed to be able to move forw~rd the first cooperation of this kind around the 
Black Sea. However, the course of history and the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
changed the nature and scope of Black Sea subregionalism altogether. Diverse 
security considerations prevailed. The newcomers in the Black Sea international 
system, most of them fledging democracies, were too weak and disoriented, after 
years of authoritarian rule, to demand economic integration. Their main concern has 
been to overcome the difficulties resulting from the Soviet past of structural 
interdependence. Hence concepts of regionalism or integration were perceived in an 
instrumental way partly as tools to solve the structural problems that emerged in this 
area from a cumulative point of view, but mainly as a means to ensure the 
independence of their countries vis-a-vis their Russian partner by obtaining 
recognition at the international level. Considerations of internal stability which were 
under threat and increasingly weak in the process of transition were also strong 
(Buyukakinci, 1998, p. 6). Those concerns were mainly reflected in the case of the 
newly independent states as well as in the other three Balkan states of Albania, 
Bulgaria and Romania. Such concerns were however not shared by Russia whose 
main interest was to preserve its presence in the area and undermine the deepening 
of cooperative efforts that could limit its leverage. To make the picture of national 
priorities more complicated, the inclusion of non-Black Sea states in the process such 
as Greece and Albania deepened the existing diversity. Neither of these two states 
seemed to have had a clear agenda for BSEC beyond bilateral considerations. As we 
saw in chapter two, it was bilateral relations under a security prism that significantly 
conditioned the attitude of all member states vis-a-vis BSEC. 
314 
The salient feature that bound eleven states with such a diverse or no agenda 
for BSEC became their strategic priority to be involved in the integration process of 
the EU model. Almost all BSEC countries had to undergo certain stages of adaptation 
aimed at demonstrating their capab~ity to function as viable economic and political 
bodies. However, it soon became evident that even the goal of integrating within the 
European structures would not be best served through BSEC. 
Nevertheless, the political imperative of integrating within the world and 
primarily the immediate European structures influenced the development of the 
BSEC in an unmistakable way. To this end, what seemed to be required was 
horizontal rather than vertical integration: the adoption of measures such as 
unambiguous respect for the independence and territorial integrity of the newly 
independent states; encouragement of market-oriented reforms; and involvement of 
the private sector, governments and international organizations in the policy 
coordination process. 
Economic difficulties, weak transnational exchange and demands 
Despite the diverse national dispositions on the basis of security considerations, the 
urgency of the economic problems throughout the Black Sea area shaped a consensus 
on the necessity of regional cooperation. As we saw in chapter four, the poor 
economic performance of BSEC states in the early 1990s did spur cooperation and a 
call for coordination of economic and trade policies. This call however resulted not 
from transnational actors but from the governmental elites. More importantly, 
economic difficulties made states prefer the EU track instead of deepening BSEC 
cooperation. 
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Economic difficulties played a dual role. On the one hand, they have 
underwritten demands for more economic cooperation. On the other hand, they have 
been a main obstacle hindering any meaningful economic integration. Without actual 
economic integration taking root ~ the area, and weak transnational flows and 
demands, the form of subregionalism that emerged developed along the lines of 
state-to-state bargaining, being conceptualized primarily as a foreign policy. Hence, 
in the absence of clear demand for a distinct subregional trade regime that would 
require binding agreements and supranational institutions to implement them, both 
the decision-making procedures and the structures of the organization remained 
strictly intergovernmental. 
Therefore, the empirical findings seem largely to support the hypothesis that 
the existence of economic difficulties as well as the increase of transnational 
exchanges and demands, influence the mode of governance that develops at the 
subregional level here. Transnational exchanges have been expanding and demands 
for change are voiced. Organized interests from the business community are 
increasingly involved in the subregional bargaining process, but their demands are 
connected to the trade regimes of the WTO and the EU and the transfer of their 
economic regimes and principles to the subregion as well as the facilitation of 
economic activities. There is no demand for deeper subregional integration but for 
loose cooperation, hence not for supranational organs in the Black Sea subregion. 
Thus, one reason why BSEC has moved to an intergovernmental mode of integration 
rather than to a supranational one is because the business community has not 
presented a clear demand for such a change. 
Cooperation without leadership and under security dilemmas 
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Not only are national dispositions diverse but also the interest of the larger states in 
BSEC have fluctuated over time indicating that no country has actually had a clear 
agenda for BSEC or vested interests in it. The only exception would be Turkey 
however which back in 1992 under Ozal's leadership conceived the creation of a 
Black Sea Economic Zone of 'free movement of goods, people and capital'. 
The lack of a clear interest in the process has undermined the potential leading 
role of any member state. As we saw in chapter five, beyond the lack of actual 
capacities, none of the countries seemed to wish to assume the role of a benevolent 
leading country, with the exception of Turkey. States either simply lack the resources 
to support an ambitious multilateral scheme in the subregion (e.g. Turkey, Ukraine) 
or/and do not have the political will to undertake such a role (e.g. Greece, Russia). 
The fear of being dominated by larger neighbours, such as Russia or Turkey, has 
been a strong undermining factor which relates to the intensity of the security 
dilemma. BSEC members have instead chosen to place their concerns within broader 
fora where the weight of larger states (particularly of Russia) can be balanced by the 
presence of other powers or within smaller groups in which larger neighbouring 
states do not participate. Particularly in the case of Turkey, which has had the 
political will to undertake a leading role in BSEC, two factors restrained its 
ambitions. First, a series of economic crises drained the country of the required 
resources. Second, there was a limitation of its role in the subregion as the Black Sea 
states turned towards other poles of modernization and mainly to the EU. For 
Turkey itself, what became the highest priority was the reorganization of its relations 
with the EU particularly after its nomination as an EU candidate country. 
Furthermore, the external constellation did not provide much room for the potential 
leading states to undertake the leading role as most of the functions of BSEC in those 
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spheres were to be absorbed by other organizations and institutions such as the EU, 
UN, World Bank, etc. 
The findings with respect to the security dilemma appear at large to be in 
accordance with the expectations .of the analytical framework. The BSEC case 
discloses the limitations that security dilemmas impose on any common action and 
commitment to supranational structures. The greater or more intense the regional 
security concerns are among a group of states, the less likely they are to engage in 
deep cooperation with each other. The diversity of the countries involved does not 
qualify for a clear common strategic vision shared by all states as far as inter-regional 
political and security issues are concerned. Also, what is of importance in the BSEC 
case is also the type of security dilemma. Since it has been linked with transition 
issues, identity building and state-building, subregionalism could do little to its 
transformation, as the problem has not been simply building trust but resolving 
ongoing or frozen conflicts. There is only one salient political feature since the early 
1990s, that each of the states in the subregion is eager to be involved in the 
integration process taking place on the European continent. 
Should one expect that once the security dilemma is transformed, then more 
demands for deeper subregional cooperation would emerge? On the one hand, as 
sovereignty issues become less contested and the economic problems remain, states 
may become more willing to embrace supranational institutions at a subregional 
level for economic benefit. On the other hand, an increased ability to trade with other 
regions of the world, coupled with security provisions provided by larger 
organizations such as NATO or external powers like the US (which are not involved 
in BSEC) may make subregional cooperation less desirable or necessary. 
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BSEC's ellgagemellt in the European integration process 
Two dimensions are important in comprehending BSEC's evolution. First, it is a case 
which illustrates that countries in the same geographical area are not (necessarily) 
the ones with the political and economic power in the subregion. In this case the 
modernizing anchor is the EU. Second, beyond being a 'subregion in itself', the Black 
Sea is a 'subregion in Europe'. It is thus embedded in a hemispheric regional 
integration process by which it is asymmetrically affected. 
Contrary to what has happened with other subregional formations in Northern 
Europe (e.g. CBSS) and Southeast Europe (e.g. Stability Pact), in our case study the 
'soft' power in the continent (i.e. the EU) has refrained from being institutionally 
present in the organization's structures. The correlation between BSEC 
subregionalism and the European Union described in chapter six has disclosed that 
despite the EU's rhetoric in supporting regional cooperation, BSEC is a case where 
the EU has clearly distanced itself. The EU's ambivalent attitude has made Black Sea 
countries reluctant to commit themselves to the process. Thus as the Black Sea is 
slowly turning from being a geographical area to a structure symbolizing special 
political or economic relations, each time that the geographical denomination is 
taken to imply not only more, 'natural' regional cooperation but a differentiation 
from the EU (i.e. their modernization anchor), strong protests and open opposition 
follow. Having said that, the intergovernmental mode of BSEC and the low level of 
agreements reached at the subregional level, are underwritten by the lack of 
demands or incentives by the EU for supranational governance (e.g. subregional 
agreements and strong institutions) to emerge at the subregional level as well as due 
to the priorities of the states themselves when conceiving BSEC vis-a-vis the EU 
process. 
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There are several aspects in which the European Union exerts power beyond 
its borders - as a collective identity, a structural process, a new border and a political 
and economic actor. The impact of the EU on BSEC involves a substantial 
reconfiguration of subregionalism due to the interaction of the wider European 
process and the internal dynamics of the BSEC subregion. In chapter six we 
identified the following main aspects of this influence varying from the 
institutionalization of the organization itself to its identity and the core of its 
activities. First, there is the progressively greater emphasis to move away from trade 
related issues towards the pursuit of political and strategic objectives along with the 
expectations of the EU as to what European subregional structures constitute: 
comprehensive security building mechanisms. Second, there is a clear trend towards 
'multi-thematic regionalism', which encompasses the elaboration of subregional 
strategies in areas relating to security, drugs, the environment, democracy, and social 
policy. Economic issues however, are subsumed into either the EU and/or other 
more powerful organizations (as we saw in chapter four) or trade issues were dealt 
with bilaterally. Alt hough originally envisaged as the centre piece of BSEC, the 
management of key trade and economic policy issues was made redundant, 
therefore the scope of subregionalism was changed for other political and security 
issues. The economic agenda features a movement away from a focus on free trade 
and tariff liberalization towards an emphasis on turning BSEC into a tool for the 
adjustment of the member states to the imperatives of a wider regionalism project. 
Theoretical implications 
Having placed the evolution of BSEC in the core of the dissertation there is one 
question that arises: what explains the formation of subregionalism around the Black 
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Sea? In a broader sense what conclusions can we draw on the correlation between 
the formation of subregionalism and the five variables identified in our analytical 
framework? 
As we said at the beginning of the dissertation, we do not aim at generating a 
new theoretical proposal for regional cooperation. The aim though is to reflect on a 
set of causal variables driven from a 'two-level' analysis (internal and external) and a 
dependent variable, the mode of subregionalism. 
Returning to the aforementioned question, we shall start by clarifying two 
basic conceptual elements of subregionalism. First, it is a process embedded one way 
or another in a larger regionalist project. Its generic complementary nature implies 
that theorizing over subregionalism should not be restricted to a 'one-level' 
approach. This being said we move to the second element. Subregionalism is an 
indigenous, top-down process initiated by local governmental elites and it is not 
imposed by external powers,1 This makes governmental elites the dominant agents 
in the process. 
The current configuration of Black Sea subregionalism should be understood 
not so much as the concentration of trade and investment activities around 
circumscribed integrated areas but rather as a policy option pursued as a response by 
governmental elites to address the need for the provision of public goods. 
Furthermore, despite the rich rhetoric about the role of subregionalism as a step 
towards further integration into global structures and as a tool of economic 
integration, it actually refers to. governance and foreign policy rather than 
integration. Therefore, there is a need to readjust the theoretical approaches to 
subregionalism from 'integration' theories to 'foreign policy' and governance. 
I This is not the case with cooperative structures such as the Royaumont Process, launched by the EU 
in December 1995, or the SECI launched by US in December 1996, which fall into another category. 
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Empirical research in this dissertation tried to disclose the dynamics of the 
formation of BSEC as a structure. On the basis of the findings of this case study we 
can draw four proposals with theoretical implications on the formation of 
subregional governance as the outcome of the relationship between a set of demand 
and supply conditions. 
Demand conditions point to transnational exchange. This case study shows 
that an increase in transnational exchange and the existence of demands for change, 
do not necessarily lead to more supranational institutions. Furthermore, as we have 
shown here, countries belonging to one geographical region are not necessarily the 
main or natural economic partners for each other. What is important here is the issue 
of expectations and the direction of demands. Demands for change might be directed 
not to the subregional level but to external centres of authority which possess more 
structural power. Therefore, transnational forces did trigger cooperation but 
expectations were directed to the EU track. 
The same conclusion is drawn for the impact of economic difficulties on BSEC's 
evolution. Economic difficulties do partly explain why BSEC was established at first 
place. However, while at the first place they constituted the mobilizing force for 
change and support of subregional integration they later on inhibited the deepening 
of BSEC. 
Two other supply conditions are important here. First, BSEC shows how the 
absence of a benevolent leading country impedes the formulation of supranational 
institutions. The significance of a ,leadership with a preference for supranational 
institutions becomes crucial, the more diverse the national preferences and the larger 
the number of countries involved in a cooperation process. Second, subregionalism 
under intense security dilemmas among its member states cannot move beyond 
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intergovernmentalism. Subregionalism however, if empowered with confidence-
building functions, assists in the transformation of security dilemmas. 
Given the weakness of subregional integrative forces, the role of external 
factors in the reconfiguration of subr~gionalism is substantial. An external structural 
or ideological power may become the decisive engine of subregional cooperation. 
Under those conditions subregionalism develops along the lines of loose policy 
coordination resulting from negotiations among governmental elites, unequipped to 
exercise any real authoritative power and form effective supranational institutions. 
However, subregional groups require some sort of supranational institutions, to 
avoid being captured by special interests action. 
Today's literature is preoccupied with the general question of what drives 
subregionalism. Is it ideas embodied in institutions and transported to policy 
formation? Or do socio-economic interest groups construct ideas and ideologies for 
the purpose of legitimizing claims to power. Whatever the answer to the question in 
general, the argument made here is that an interest-based approach cannot explain 
all aspects of the evolution of BSEC. Rather than socio-economic interests, it is ideas 
that have shaped the process. The following considerations support the argument. 
First, new elites in positions of influence in the early 1990s were becoming familiar 
with and wanted to transplant neoliberaI ideas. Second, there is the influence of the 
dominant (neoliberal) ideology embedded in the hemispheric regionalist project 
driven by the EU on the mode of subregionalism. The EU's influence on 
subregionalism goes beyond identify~g political and economic interests of the EU in 
the subregion. It is the EU as a 'soft' structural and ideological power and as the core 
of the European identity that shapes the conceptualization of subregionalism. 
323 
Realist explanations of state behaviour have been shown to have considerable 
salience in understanding subregionalism. Member states have proved to be very 
reluctant to accept supranational governance in any field given the persistence of 
security dilemmas and the conflicting perceptions of how their interests are best 
served. At the same time, the politics of both 'high' and 'low' security remain 
intertwined with conceptions of sovereignty and national identity, even if the 
distinction between the two is academically and practically unsatisfying. 
(Neo)realism however ignores the importance of inertia and the extent to 
which institutional cooperation leaves a legacy of cooperation. This is the most 
important aspect of subregionalism. The process of cooperation, even via the less 
binding nature of intergovernmental subregional mechanisms, does make a 
difference in states' abilities to calculate the costs and benefits of unilateral action. 
The neorealists' contempt for integration as largely irrelevant ignores the durability 
of institutions. The habits and structures of cooperation developed in subregional 
formations will leave a legacy of cooperation. These groupings and the commitment 
to consult and coordinate within them, do influence state behaviour and the 
assessment of national interest (Wyatt - Walter, 1997, p. 254) and cast 'a shadow over 
the future'. The frequency of meetings in subregional fora such as BSEC provides 
continuous and multiple channels through which states can communicate their 
policy positions. Although intergovernmentalism means that common approaches 
are not always agreed, the process of information and feedback alters the context in 
which national policies are formulated. 
Yet, despite the importance of institutions, we have found that the areas of 
cooperation remain largely untouched by processes of 'spill-over' . The 
neofunctionalist belief that accelerated integration in economic affairs would create 
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pressures for political and then security integration may still be true over the long 
term but this study shows that states consciously resist such pressures for 
supranational integration by employing intergovernmental mechanisms. The 
experience of BSEC has shown that the member states have chosen other subsystems 
or broader frameworks. 
Finally the research demonstrates the need for theoretical eclecticism. Both the 
realist and institutionalist approaches have their uses in understanding 
subregionalism formation but neither is fully satisfying. 
Future research directions 
Subregionalism around the Black Sea is not just about interests. Rather it is about the 
diffusion of neoliberal ideas and the cultivation of the habit of cooperation. Interest-
based approaches, despite their explanatory power in disclosing either national or 
private preferences, cannot capture the whole picture of the evolution and formation 
of BSEC. The four variables chosen for our analytical framework which mainly point 
to the interests and the preferences of the agents in the subregion assist us greatly in 
understanding the - intergovernmental - mode of governance that BSEC represents. 
However, it is constructivist elements that need to be taken into consideration in 
explaining the persistence of BSEC and its reconfiguration. 
Ultimately, the question that arises when one researches a phenomenon is 
utilitarian. What is significant about BSEC? The significance of BSEC is on building 
institutions to defuse cooperative 'attitudes and assist in modernization and the 
implant of the neoliberal rules of the European and global 'game'. This utility 
argument should not be dismissed easily given the endemic deficiencies of the Black 
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Sea system. Subregionalism aims at strengthening the agents of change which are in 
the making in the Black Sea system: states, private actors, institutions and ideas. 
There is however one element which became clear in this case study and significantly 
restricts the power of BSEC: the lack of commitment either by the local elites or/and 
particularly by the dominant power - the EU - to endow BSEC with authoritative 
power. 
How can we proceed in the future in researching subregionalism? What we 
postulate here is that given the complexity of the regional phenomenon and its 
constant evolution, further research needs to be conducted on the ground, to test an 
already rich theoretical literature. Given the specific economic, political, social, 
cultural, historical conditions in each region, we cannot talk about a single regional 
phenomenon. In researching BSEC's formation, three dimensions that need further 
research come up. 
First, subregional cooperation as a means to assist in successful transition 
needs to be empirically assessed. Beyond its historic significance, such research could 
reveal the actual impact of subregionalism and its character in the troublesome 
decade of the 1990s. The empirical findings could produce policy recommendations 
to be taken into account when the international community drafts 'subregional' 
structures such as the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, as a means to assist the 
completion or consolidation of the transition process in Europe. Transition bears 
with it endemic elements such as feeble state structures or 'failing' states (like 
Georgia and Moldova in our case study), weak transnational actors and the absence 
of effective institutions. In other words, all possible agents (viable states, 
transnational actors and institutions) identified by integration theory are not present 
to drive subregionalism. 
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Second, the relationship between the EU and BSEC has to accorrunodate as its 
unit of analysis both the subregional organization as such and the states which 
comprise it. Here, we placed emphasis on the first type of correlation. Given the size 
of BSEC's membership and the complexity of its members' contractual links with the 
EU an in-depth analysis of the second dimension would require extensive research 
which would alter the scope of this dissertation. BSEC consists of eleven members, 
each with a unique relationship with the EU which affects differently all the domains 
of their interaction. Further research therefore could be taken to examine further this 
dimension. The case of countries such as Romania and Bulgaria in this respect would 
present useful insights on i) how prospective EU members readjust their positions in 
view of regional (as in the EU) and subregional (as in BSEC and other fora) options 
and ii) the actual and not normative impact of the hemispheric pan-European 
integration process driven by the EU. Most research to date, places subregional 
groups within larger regional processes describing them either as 'stepping stones' 
or 'stumbling blocs' to further integration or as 'training grounds' and 'club' 
formations. A redirection of the research is needed. Why should the impact of 
subregionalism on the regional or international system be examined when there is a 
clear asymmetry on the impact that the external dominant actor (e.g. the EU) exerts 
on subregionalism? What is the actual impact of the EU itself, primarily in economic 
but also in political terms, in subregion building examined mainly through the 
commitments of the states that participate in both processes? How does EU 
orientation affect the sectors of the economy and the chances for market-led 
subregional integration? Such an investigation could disclose what happens beyond 
rhetoric. What type of subregionalism, if any, does the EU actually reinforce beyond 
its borders and in the continent? 
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Finally, there is one aspect that could contribute significant to the study of 
subregionalism and particularly to the study of the BSEC process. It is the case that 
often loose intergovernmental structures - such as subregional groups - have no 
capacity to change the foundations of power (production, security, economy and 
knowledge) but they might be symptoms and manifestations not only of a policy 
change (as we indicate here) but also of an identity building. In these terms 
subregionalism has not only an instrumental value but also a cognitive one. This is 
an aspect that would require further research. 
By disclosing the main dynamics of the formation of BSEC we indicated here 
that an eclectic analytical framework, in terms of the agents and levels of analysis 
incorporated in it, is more adequate to provide an understanding of the 
contemporary phenomenon of subregionalism. Further research, as proposed earlier, 
would place subregional groups in a wider perspective and would indicate what is 
permanent about them and what is not. 
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